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UNIVCRSITY      OF       ILLINOIS       BULLETIN 

Vol.  XI  October  13,  1913  No.  7 

laas    matter    December    11,    1912,   at   the    post   office   at   Urbana, 
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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 

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VOL..    II.      NOS.      2    AND    3 


OCTOBER.    IBIS 


The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  the 
American  Revolution 


BY 


PAUL  CHRISLER  PHILLIPS,  Ph.D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  in  the  University  of  Montana 


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Paine,  A.  E.     The  Granger  movement  in  Illinois.    Vol  i,  No.  8.  1904. 
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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 

SOCIAL  SCIENCES 

VOL.    11.      NOS.      2   AND    3  OCTOBER,    IBIS 


The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  the 
American  Revolution 


BY 


PAUL  CHRISLER  PHILLIPS,  Ph.D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  in  the  University  of  Montana 


PRICE     $1.26 


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PREFACE 

In  this  essay  I  have  tried  to  show  to  what  extent  and  in 
what  respects  the  Mississippi  Valley  was  a  subject  of  diplo- 
matic negotiations  in  the  American  Revolution.  Altho 
many  different  views  have  been  advanced  on  this  question, 
I  do  not  believe  that  any  American  scholar  has,  as  yet,  made 
any  considerable  use  of  the  material  available  in  this  coun- 
try and  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  getting  at  the  exact 
truth.  Doniol  did  not  appreciate  the  importance  of  the 
West  in  the  diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution,  and, 
altho  he  quotes  many  important  documents  bearing  on  the 
subject,  he  omits  many  of  the  most  valuable,  and  in  no 
sense  does  he  attempt  to  explain  the  whole  question. 

This  study  is  written  almost  entirely  from  the  sources 
and  some  of  its  conclusions  differ  from  those  commonly 
accepted,  while  in  other  cases,  I  believe  additional  light  has 
been  thrown  upon  facts  already  established.  Altho  Spain's 
ambition  to  get  control  of  the  lands  bordering  on  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  and  the  Mississippi  is  well  known,  I  do  not  think 
that  the  definite  purpose  back  of  her  tortuous  and  appar- 
ently vacillating  policy  has  ever  been  properly  explained. 
Vergennes's  professions  of  friendship  for  the  United  States 
and  his  opposition  to  their  claims  to  the  West  have  been 
regarded  too  long  as  proof  of  his  duplicity.  Vergennes  him- 
self did  not  regard  his  policy  towards  the  West  as  un- 
friendly to  his  ally,  or  as  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  of  alliance,  and,  at  no  time,  did  he  attempt 
to  conceal  his  views.  The  evidence  shows  beyond  doubt 
that  he  was  conceding  to  the  United  States  all  he  thought 
they  had  a  right  to  claim.  The  main  outlines  of  British 
policy  are  already  well  understood,  but  the  efforts  of  Shel- 
burne  to  detach  the  Americans  from  the  French  alliance 
have  not  received  the  attention  they  deserve.  The  greatness 
of  Franklin  as  a  diplomat  appears  in  a  new  light  when  it 

3 


4  PREFACE  [114 

is  understood  that,  but  for  the  obstinacy  of  Jay  and  Adams, 
he  would  have  obtained  for  his  country  the  richest  parts  of 
Canada. 

To  establish  the  facts  herein  set  forth,  the  archives 
of  Washington,  London,  and  Paris  have  been  searched  in 
addition  to  a  careful  reading  of  all  available  printed  ma- 
terial. I  regret  that  I  could  not  go  through  the  archives  of 
Spain;  but  I  found,  in  the  French  foreign  office,  copies  of 
many  Spanish  documents  obtained  by  the  French  ambas- 
sadors and  agents  during  the  years  from  1774  to  1783. 

For  assistance  in  preparing  this  study  I  am  indebted 
to  Professors  Evarts  B.  Greene,  Guy  Stanton  Ford,  and 
Laurence  M.  Larson  of  the  University  of  Illinois.  I  desire 
also  to  express  my  thanks  to  Mr.  Waldo  G.  Leland  of  Wash- 
ington, D.  C.,  for  much  valuable  help  and  advice  while  I 
was  working  in  the  archives  of  Washington  and  Paris. 

To  Professor  Clarence  W.  Alvord  of  the  University 
of  Illinois  I  must  acknowledge  my  greatest  obligations. 
While  I  was  working  on  this  investigation  he  carefully  and 
painstakingly  wrent  over  all  the  material  with  me,  and  gave 
me  his  time  to  discuss  and  analyze  every  point ;  and  during 
my  study  with  him  he  offered  many  valuable  suggestions 
and  helpful  criticisms  which  have  added  much  to  the 
thoroughness  of  my  work. 

Notwithstanding  my  efforts  and  the  assistance  of  my 
friends,  I  realize  that  there  are  many  weak  spots  in  the 
study  as  here  presented.  On  some  points  the  material 
is  not  absolutely  conclusive,  and  there  are  doubtless  many 
valuable  documents  which  I  have  not  unearthed.  I  hope, 
however,  that  in  spite  of  many  defects,  this  essay  has  added 
something  worth  while  to  our  knowledge  of  the  West  in 
the  diplomatic  negotiations  of  the  American  Revolution. 

P.  C.  P. 


Missoula,  Mont,  May,  1913. 


CONTENTS 

Abbreviations    6 

Chapter         I — The  Origins  7 —  26 

Chapter       II — Vergennes  and  Spanish  Diplomacy 27 —  57 

Chapter      III— The  Question  of  the  West 58—  68 

Chapter      IV — The  French  Alliance 69 —  90 

Chapter        V — Florida  Blanca  and  the  Convention  with  France 91 — 107 

Chapter      VI — Development    of   a    Congressional    Policy   toward 

the  West  108—130 

Chapter    VII — Vergennes  and  the  Allies  of  France 131 — 149 

Chapter  VIII — Luzerne  and  the  Pretensions  of  Spain 150 — 172 

Chapter      IX — Triumph  of  the  Anti-Gallican  Party 173 — 188 

Chapter       X— The  close  of  the  War 189—202 

Chapter      XI — Vergennes  and  the  Negotiations  for  Peace 203 — 215 

Chapter    XII — Peace  216 — 227 

Bibliography    228 — 238 

Index 239 — 247 


LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS 

Arc.  Aff.  Etr. — Archives  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Am.  Hist.  Rev. — American  Historical  Review. 

Angre. — Angleterre. 

Arc.  Col. — Archives  des  Colonies. 

Bt.  Trs. — British  Transcripts. 

C.  O—  Colonial  Office. 

Dip.  Cor. — Diplomatic  Correspondence. 

Esp. — Espagne. 

E.  U— Etats  Unis. 

F.  O.— Foreign  Office. 

L.  C. — Library  of  Congress. 

Nou.  Acq.  franc. — Nouvelles  Acquisitions  franchises. 

P.  R.  O.— Public  Record  Office. 

S.  M.  C.  or  Sa.  Maj.  Chr—  Sa  Majeste  Chretienne. 

S.  M.  Cath — Sa  Majeste  Catholique. 

U.  of  W. — University  of  Wisconsin. 

(  ) — manuscript  illegible. 

[  ] — word  supplied. 


CHAPTER    I 


THE  ORIGINS 

For  more  than  a  century  before  the  American  Revolu- 
tion the  Mississippi  Valley  was  an  object  of  interest  to  the 
colonizing  nations  of  western  Europe,  and  to  their  subjects 
who  were  scattered  along  the  shores  of  North  America. 
Spanish  adventurers  had  wandered  northward  from  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico ;  and,  from  the  region  of  the  Great  Lakes, 
French  missionaries  and  traders  penetrated  to  the  heart  of 
the  continent;  while,  from  the  headwaters  of  the  James 
and  Potomac  rivers,  enterprizing  Virginians  descended  the 
western  slopes  of  the  Alleghanies  to  claim  a  share  of  this 
rich  country.1  The  colonizing  efforts  of  the  French  and 
English,  and  their  bitter  rivalry  during  the  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  foreshadowed  the  struggle  for  the 
Mississippi ;  but  the  ownership  of  the  country  between  that 
river  and  the  Alleghanies  was  ^not  decided  until  the 
last  French  and  Indian  war  witnessed  the  triumph  of  the 
English. 

With  the  Treaty  of  1763  eighteenth  century  diplomacy 
begins  a  new  development.  In  Europe  and  America  alike, 
the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  marked  "the  end  of  an 
era,  the  beginning  of  an  era."  France  and  Spain  were  both 
reduced  to  the  rank  of  second  rate  powers,2  while  Great 
Britain,  with  undisputed  supremacy  on  the  ocean,  stood 
forth  the  arbiter  of  European  politics.  In  Prussia,  Freder- 
ick the  Great  smarted  under  the  sense  that  he  had  been 

1Alvord  and  Bidgood,  The  First  Explorations  of  the  Trans-Alleghany 
Region  by  the  Virginians,  1650-1674,  is  a  convenient  and  valuable  account 
of  the  beginnings  of  English  colonization  in  the  Mississippi  Valley. 

2Vergennes  recognized  this  as  a  fact.  "The  deplorable  peace  of  1763," 
he  informed  Louis  XVI.,  "the  partition  of  Poland,  and  in  fact  other 
causes  equally  disastrous,  have  struck  the  greatest  blows  to  the  respect  for 
your  crown".  Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  13. 

7 


8  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [118 

sacrificed  to  Hanoverian  intrigue,  and  looked  with  pleasure 
on  any  danger  which  threatened  his  former  ally.3  Of  the 
Bourbon  powers,  Spain  was  willing  to  accept  her  fate  if 
she  were  given  peace  and  an  opportunity  to  recuperate  her 
wasted  fortunes,4  but  the  tarnished  glory  of  French  arms 
called  loudly  for  vengeance.  "The  humiliation  of  Britain ! 
The  prestige  of  France  !"5  These  were  the  phrases  most 
often  on  the  lips  of  French  statesmen  in  the  decade  fol- 
lowing the  Peace  of  Paris.  To  their  minds  the  first  was 
the  means  to  the  second.  To  realize  their  ambition,  the 
wisest  of  them  knew  that,  in  addition  to  the  old  coalition 
of  the  Pacte  de  Famille,  they  must  raise  up  a  new  foe  to 
Great  Britain.  The  shrewd  and  crafty  Choiseul  saw,  in  the 
liberty  loving  English  colonies  in  America,  the  latent  power 
needed  for  this  purpose.  Ever  alert  for  advantages  abroad, 
he  carefully  nourished  national  resources  at  home8  until 
France  should  be  ready  to  strike.  To  the  capable  and  ener- 
getic Vergennes  was  left  the  task  of  building  up  the  new 
coalition,  of  guiding  its  forces  against  the  common  enemy, 
and  finally  of  apportioning  the  spoils  between  his  greedy 

8"Ici  1'administration  envisage  comme  tres  probable  une  guerre  de  la 
France  et  de  1'Espagne  avec  1'Angleterre.  Je  crains  qu'ils  ne  considerent 
1'independence  des  colonies  comme  devant  etre  une  consequence  de  cette 
guerre,  et  ils  se  flattant  d'avoir  a  y  gagner  beaucoup."  Elliott,  British  min- 
ister to  Berlin,  to  Lord  Suffolk  (without  date).  Translation  in  Circourt, 

HI,  293- 

4"L'ambition  n'animait  pas  Charles  III.,  il  amait  la  paix."  (Doniol, 
Histoire,  I,  293.)  Ossun,  the  French  minister  to  Spain,  wrote  to  Vergennes, 
December  n,  17/5,  that  Charles  declared  he  had  no  desire  to  acquire  new 
territory.  Esp.  578,  no.  70.  Later  (December  28)  Charles  urged  that  Spain 
had  much  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain  by  war.  (Ibid.,  no.  74.) 

BBefore  the  conclusion  of  peace  in  1763  France  was  planning  for  a 
new  war  with  England.  She  wished  to  repair  her  losses,  and  be  ready 
to  strike  at  the  first  opportunity.  Memorial  of  the  Due  de  Broglie,  1762. 
(Archives  de  la  Marine,  84,  135,  fol.  4-6.)  Choiseul  had  the  same  ideas  in 
mind.  See  account  of  his  schemes  in  Perkins,  France  in  the  American 
Revolution,  22-32.  "Rappelez-vous  Monsieur,  que  j'ai  toujours  etabli  en 
principe  qu'en  nous  occupant  a  humilier  1'Angleterre.  .  .  .  elle  est 
necessaire  dans  la  balance  de  1'Europe."  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Sep- 
tember 21,  1779.  (Circourt,  111,317.) 

•Perkins,  France  in  the  American  Revolution,  24. 


119]  THE  ORIGINS  9 

allies.  The  British  conquests  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
became  once  more  a  bone  of  contention,  this  time  between 
the  jarring  nations  in  alliance  with  France,  and  around 
them  twined  the  intricate  negotiations  of  the  American 
Revolution.  The  Floridas,  Canada,  and  the  strip  of  land 
lying  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi  called 
by  the  French  "Eastern  Louisiana,"  lacked  the  population 
to  give  them- a  title  role  in  the  drama  of  a  world  struggle, 
but  their  position  made  them  of  vital  importance  in  the 
settlement  of  peace.  The  United  States  desired  them  as  a 
guarantee  against  powerful  neighbors,  while  Spain  feared 
the  danger  to  her  colonial  possesions  of  a  strong,  inde- 
pendent nation  in  the  New  World.7  Upon  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  these  divergent  interests  depended  the  success  of 
the  new  French  diplomacy,  and  upon  this  problem  Ver- 
gennes  was  to  spend  many  thoughtful  years,  only  to  find 
its  solution  wrought  out  by  other  men,  working  on  prin- 
ciples strange  to  his  ideas,  and  with  forces  unknown  to  his 
reasoning. 

With  the  expulsion  of  France  from  the  New  World  all 
fears  of  the  enemy  which,  for  so  many  generations,  had 
harassed  the  English  colonies,  passed  away.  The  treaty  of 
1763  portended  the  establishment  of  the  United  States,  for 
it  left  the  English  colonies  free  to  set  their  autonomous 
views  against  the  British  imperial  policy.  Altho  the  Eng- 
lish and  American  viewpoints  were  essentially  different 
there  were  but  few  to  see  the  necessity  of  reconciling  their 
antagonistic  principles. 


7See  plan  of  treaty  drawn  up  by  Congress  in  September,  1776.  Journals 
of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  V,  770.  In  the  early  discussions  of 
peace  the  chief  American  argument  for  extended  boundaries  was  the 
necessity  of  keeping  foreign  powers  at  a  distance.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes, 
June  8,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVII.,  no.  145,  new  17.)  So  fearful  was  Spain  of 
American  power  that  she  insisted  that  Great  Britain  be  guaranteed  pos- 
session of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  and  suggested  that  she  be  allowed  to 
keep  certain  places  in  the  states,  as  New  York  or  Boston.  Montmorin, 
French  minister  to  Madrid,  to  Vergennes,  October  i,  1778  (Esp.,  591,  no. 
61)  and  again  on  October  15  (ibid.,  no.  33,  new  61). 


10  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [120 

In  regard  to  the  unoccupied  lands  of  the  West  the 
British  ministry  had  two  policies  before  it.  One  was  to 
throw  them  open  to  settlement  and  allow  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to  establish  homes  there;  the 
•other  was  to  keep  them  in  wilderness,  inhabited  only  by 
Indians  and  traders.  The  first  of  these  plans  naturally 
received  the  support  of  the  Americans,  and  their  chief 
advocate  was  Franklin.8  The  ministry  was  undecided  what 
course  to  take  but  at  first,  under  the  lead  of  Lord  Shel- 
burne,9  appeared  willing  to  favor  the  American  desires. 
For  several  years  there  was  much  discussion  of  the  matter, 
but  no  definite  policy  was  adopted.10 

The  tendencies  of  British  politics,  however,  were  be- 
coming more  and  more  imperialistic,  and  in  the  develop- 
ment of  this  new  imperialism,  three  acts  of  vital  import- 
ance for  the  West  were  promulgated.  These  were  the 


8  As  early  as  1754  Franklin  suggested  a  "plan  for  settling  the  western 
colonies  in  North  America  with  reasons  for  the  plan".  (Works  (Smyth 
ed.),  HI,  358.)  At  an  early  date  he  also  urged  the  advantages  of  a  settle- 
ment in  the  Illinois  country.  (Ibid.,  IV,  462;  V,  46.)  January  3,  1760.  he 
•wrote,  "I  am  therefore  by  no  means  for  restoring  Canada.  If  we  keep 
it  all  the  country  from  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  Mississippi  will,  in  another 
century  be  filled  with  British  people."  (Ibid.^V,  4.) 

'Shelburne  became  president  of  the  board  of  trade  in  1763.  Altho 
•deficient  in  education  and  superficial  in  thought,  his  brilliant  imagination 
conceived  a  grand  imperial  policy  for  America.  At  the  same  time  his 
friendship  for  the  Americans  led  him  to  favor  colonial  development.  Fitz- 
maurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  gives  a  good  account  of  his  work.  The  be- 
ginning of  British  activity  in  the  West  dates  back  to  1748  with  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Ohio  Company.  See  Alden,  New  Governments  West  of  the 
Alleghanies  before  1780.  November  n,  1761,  the  Board  of  Trade  estab- 
lished the  principle  of  buying  lands  of  the  Indians  before  settling  them,  but 
did  not  annul  any  former  grant.  Charles  Townshend  had  been  president 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  possibly  was  the  author  of  the  first  attempt 
to  form  a  western  policy.  He  early  favored  a  limitation  of  colonial  rights. 
Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  says  that  he  wished  to  leave  fifteen  regi- 
ments in  America. 

10Alvord,  Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763.  (Mich.  Hist.  Col., 
XXXVI,  23. "> 


121]  THE  ORIGINS  11 

Royal  Proclamation  of  1763,  the  Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix 
in  1768,  and  the  Quebec  Act  of  1774. n  The  first  of  these 
was  but  a  temporary  arrangement  until  a  consistent  west- 
ern policy  could  be  worked  out.  It  established  an  arbitrary 
government  for  the  Floridas  and  Quebec,  but  promised 
popular  representation  as  soon  as  their  "state  and  cir- 
cumstances" would  permit.  The  southern  boundary  of 
Quebec  was  drawn  from  the  south  end  of  Lake  Mpissing 
to  the  intersection  of  the  forty-fifth  parallel  with  the  St. 
Lawrence  Eiver,  and  the  northern  boundary  of  West 
Florida  was  placed  on  the  thirty-first  degree  of  north  lati- 
tude. The  intervening  territory,  bounded  on  the  east  by 
the  Alleghanies,  and  on  the  west  by  the  Mississippi,  was 
reserved  "for  the  present"  in  possession  of  the  Indians. 
The  proclamation  forbade  any  governor  or  commander-in- 
chief  "to  grant  Warrants  of  Survey,  or  pass  Patents  for 
any  Lands  beyond  the  Heads  or  Sources  of  any  of  the 
Rivers  which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean  from  the  West 
or  North  West,"  altho  provision  was  made  for  the  pur- 
chase by  the  government,  of  the  lands  which  it  had  closed 
to  its  subjects. 

In  spite  of  the  restrictions  of  the  king's  proclamation 
the  Americans  at  once  began  to  push  their  settlements 
westward.12  It  was  not  long,  however,  before  trouble  arose 
between  the  Indians  and  the  frontiersmen  and  soon  became 
so  serious  that  the  British  ministry  was  again  obliged  to 
interfere.  The  Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix,  opened  to  settle- 
ment the  upper  valleys  of  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee  Rivers 
and  into  these  regions  frontiersmen  quickly  pushed  their 
way.  So  rapid  was  their  immigration  that  by  the  outbreak 


"For  the  first  of  these  see  Canadian  Archives  Report,  1906,  p.  119; 
for  the  second,  Alvord,  The  British  Ministry  and  the  Treaty  of  Fort, 
.Stanwix  (Proceedings  of  State  Hist.  Soc.  of  Wisconsin  for  1908,  pp.  165- 
183)  ;  for  the  third,  Coffin,  The  Province  of  Quebec  and  the  Early  Amer- 
ican Revolution  (U.  of  W.  Bulletin,  I,  no.  3,  1896). 

12For  discussion  of  American  attempts  to  establish  themselves  west  of 
the  Alleghanies  see  Alden,  New  Governments  West  of  the  Alleghanies 
.before  1780. 


12  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [122 

of  the  Revolution  the  forests  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee 
contained  a  population  large  enough  to  dispute  British 
claims  to  ownership. 

In  regard  to  the  lands  north  of  the  Ohio  a  different 
(rule  was  followed.  Settlements  were  persistently  dis- 
couraged, and  throughout  its  whole  extent,  this  region  was 
peopled  only  by  Indians  and  a  few  hundred  French  "hab- 
itants" gathered  together  in  drowsy,  ancient  villages.13 
Across  its  prairies  roamed  fur  traders  of  English,  French, 
and  Spanish  nationality,  knowing  no  law  but  their  own 
wills.  Altho  this  country  was  not  open  to  settlement,  it 
was  still  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  thirteen  colonies 
until,  in  1774,  their  titles  were  swept  away.  The  Quebec  Act 
of  that  year  incorporated  the  country  north  of  the  Ohio 
and  west  of  the  Alleghanies  with  the  province  of  Quebec, 
and  to  the  English  colonists  it  appeared  that  they  were 
to  be  forever  barred  from  the  vast  regions  behind  them. 
By  this  act  half  of  the  back  countries  was  definitely  separ- 
ated from  the  influence  of  Anglo-Saxon  institutions  and 
intrusted  to  the  arbitrary  rule  of  a  military  governor  under 
French  law.  Protests  were  unavailing,  but  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  act,  together  with  other  unpopular  measures  of 
the  royal  government,  was  fast  driving  the  colonies  to 
rebellion.14 

These  acts  of  the  British  ministry  divided  the  con- 
quests of  the  Seven  Years'  War  into  four  districts,  each  of 
which  was  to  be  a  distinct  issue  in  the  diplomacy  of  the 
Revolution.  Canada,  with  its  distinctive  population  and 
institutions,  was  not  in  sympathy  with  the  ideals  of  the 
English  colonies;  but  the  ultimate  possession  of  it  was,  to 
the  end  of  the  struggle,  a  matter  of  doubt.  The  old  North- 
west, as  yet  unpeopled,  was  still  claimed,  under  their 
charters,  by  the  seaboard  colonies.  Eastern  Louisiana  was 

13The  chief  centers  of  French  settlement  were  Vincennes  on  the 
Wabash,  and  Cahokia  and  Kaskaskia  on  the  Mississippi.  The  Cahokia 
Records  and  the  Kaskaskia  Records  of  the  era  of  the  Revolution  have 
been  edited  by  C.  W.  Alvord,  but  the  material  relating  to  Vincennes  has 
never  been  satisfactorily  arranged. 

14 Van  Tyne.  American  Revolution,  23. 


123]  THE  ORIGINS  13 

held  under  the  same  title,  and  with  less  contradiction,  by 
Virginia,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia.  The  Floridas  on  the 
south,  like  Canada  on  the  north,  formed  a  colony,  distinct 
in  character  and  government.15 

Beyond  the  Mississippi  stretched  the  unexplored 
domains  of  Spanish  Louisiana.  Only  a  few  years  before,  it 
had  been  the  pride  of  the  French  colonial  empire,  but  had 
since  been  ceded  to  Spain  as  compensation  for  her  losses 
in  the  Seven  Years'  war.  New  Orleans  was  its  most  im- 
portant post,  and  controlled  the  commerce  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. Other  Spanish  villages  were  scattered  up  the  river 
as  far  as  St.  Louis,  which  had  become  a  refuge  for  the 
French  who  desired  to  escape  the  rule  of  the  British  across 
the  river.  It  was  the  natural  outlet  for  the  trade  of  the 
Illinois  country  and  had  become  a  serious  menace  to  British 
influence  in  that  region.  So  strong  were  the  French  in 
this  region,  that,  in  1769,  the  commander  of  Fort  de 
Chartres  complained  that,  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of 
British  traders,  backed  by  their  country's  soldiers,  they 
carried  off  all  the  trade,  and  influenced  the  Indians  against 
the  English  to  such  an  extent  as  to  threaten  another  Indian 
war.16 


15The  population  of  West  Florida  was  largely  French  and  Spanish, 
and  was  held  in  subjection  by  powerful  garrisons  of  English  troops.  In 
addition  there  was  a  considerable  number  of  English  traders  along  the 
Mississippi.  The  chief  centers  of  British  influence  were  Pensacola,  Mobile, 
and  Natchez.  Hamilton,  Colonial  Mobile. 

^"Notwithstanding  the  immense  sums  spent  on  taking  post  at  Ft. 
<ie  Chartes,  and  the  length  of  time  we  are  said  to  be  in  possession  of  the 

Illinois,  the  French  still  carry  away  all  the  trade They  go  up  our 

rivers,  introduce  French  manufactures  in  the  Country,  and  influence 

the  Savages  against  us by  which  means,  unless  these  parts  are 

established  as  represented,  we  shall  soon  be  embroiled  in  another  general 
Indian  War."  Lt.  Col.  Wilkins,  commander  at  Fort  de  Chartres,  to  the 
secretary  of  war.  December  5,  1769.  (Colonial  Office  5,  88,  p  175.)  The 
Proclamation  of  1763  was  not  able  to  stop  the  Pontiac  War,  and  the 
Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix  in  1768  did  not  allay  all  discontent  among  the 
Indians.  It  was  only  when  the  Revolution  broke  out  that  the  Indians  took 
the  side  of  the  English  as  less  dangerous  to  their  interests  than  the 
Americans. 


14  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [124 

Altbo  the  French  people  still  possessed  an  active 
interest  in  their  ancient  empire,  their  rulers  had  given  up 
all  thought  of  regaining  it.  Louis  XV  regarded  New 
France  and  Louisiana  as  irretrievably  lost,  and  wished  to 
oppose  Great  Britain  with  the  old  system  of  continental 
alliances,  and  there  were  many  to  support  this  view. 17  Al- 
tho  there  is  no  evidence  that  Choiseul  aimed  at  the 
restoration  of  the  French  empire  in  the  New  World,  it  is 
apparent  that  he  did  regard  America  as  the  most  easy  and 
most  natural  ground  on  which  to  work  out  the  humiliation 
of  the  ancient  rival  of  the  House  of  Bourbon.  With  the- 
British  in  command  of  the  seas  he  looked  to  America  a* 
tb'e  battle  ground  on  which  to  dispute  this  supremacy. 
He  was  not  alone  in  realizing  the  dangers  of  dissension 
within  the  British  Empire,18  but  the  blindness  of  Geor^i? 
III  in  provoking  war  aroused  in  his  mind  the  greatest 
astonishment.19 

Choiseul  was  convinced  also  that  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  meant  revolution  in  America,  and  he  re- 
solved to  keep  himself  informed  regarding  conditions  there. 
Secret  agents  were  sent  into  the  English  colonies  with 


17Perkins,  France  in  the  American  Revolution,  20.  I  have  looked 
through  the  documents  in  the  French  archives  but  I  find  no  mention  by 
a  responsible  member  of  the  government  of  any  wish  to  regain  the  old 
dominions  of  France,  altho  there  are  several  memorials  presented  to  the 
ministry  at  various  times  which  urged  the  retrocession  of  Louisiana  or  at 
least  a  French  protectorate  over  it.  (See  p.  17,  note  26.)  It  is  probable 
that  public  opinion  would  have  favored  this  action.  The  Memoir e  sur  la 
Louisiane  par  Vergennes  which  advocated  the  retrocession  of  both  Louis- 
iana and  Canada  is  undoubtedly  a  forgery.  See  p.  30,  note  n. 

"Vergennes  told  Stormount,  the  British  ambassador  to  Paris :  "I  was 
at  Constantinople  when  the  last  peace  was  made.  When  I  heard  the  con- 
ditions I  told  several  of  my  friends  there,  that  I  was  persuaded  it  would 
not  be  long  before  England  would  have  reason  to  repent  of  having  re- 
moved the  only  check  that  could  keep  the  Colonies  in  awe."  Stormount  to 
Rochford,  October  31,  1775.  (F.  O.,  France,  542,  no.  19,  Stevens,  Facsimiles, 
XIII,  306;  Circourt,  III,  i.) 

"Wharton,  Dip  Cor.,  I,  371,  note. 


125]  THE  ORIGINS  15 

instructions  to  report  every  indication  of  discontent,20  and 
even  French  naval  officers  in  American  waters  described 
conditions  for  the  eager  ears  of  the  French  minister.21  The 
writings  of  prominent  Americans  and  even  the  sermons 
of  New  England  ministers  were  carefully  searched  for 
evidences  of  disaffection,  and  American  merchants  in 
French  ports  were  interviewed  in  regard  to  the  attitude  of 
the  colonists.22  London,  too,  furnished  the  latest  intelli- 
gence. In  the  French  archives  are  bundles  of  reports  con- 
cerning America,  gathered  from  every  source. 

Choiseul  did  not  limit  his  interest  to  the  English 
colonies,  but  gave  attention  as  well  to  the  old  French 
provinces  of  Canada  and  Louisiana.  The  French  Canadians, 
however,  were  well  satisfied  with  British  rule  and  not  at  all 
disposed  to  rebellion.23  Louisiana,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  a  hotbed  of  discontent  and  disaffection;  this  was  sys- 
tematically reported  to  Paris,  and  the  discontented  element 
probably  received  encouragement  from  Choiseul's  agents. 
The  knowledge  of  the  cruelty  and  tyranny  of  Spain  was 
public  property  in  France,  and  led  to  a  strong  demand  for 
the  retrocession  of  this  province24  to  its  former  mistress 


20Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  43.  Choiseul  sent  over  Pontleroy  in  1764  on  a 
tour  of  observation  and  he  returned  in  1766.  In  1767  Kalb  was  sent  to 
America  to  learn  the  intentions  of  the  people  and  their  needs  in  case  of 
war.  He  was  instructed  to  learn  the  strength  of  their  fortified  places, 
their  facility  in  securing  supplies,  their  plans,  the  character  of  their  lead- 
ers, and  any  other  information  likely  to  prove  useful.  Kalb  made  several 
reports,  the  first  in  January,  1768.  (Kapp,  46-55.) 

21See  memorial  entitled  "D'Estaing  propose  la  liberte  de  la  Louisiane 
sous  le  protectorat  de  la  France,"  March  10,  1769.  (Margry  Collections, 
Nou.  Acq.  Frangaises,  9309,  fol.  8.) 

22Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  45. 

28Kalb's  report  of  January  20,  1768,  Kalb  reported  that  the  French 
Canadians  were  no  longer  in  sympathy  with  the  mother  country.  They 
were  becoming  prosperous  under  British  rule  and  were  intermarrying 
with  the  English  population.  Kapp,  Kalb,  67. 

24The  cruelties  of  the  Spanish  governor,  O'Reilly,  who  became  gov- 
ernor of  New  Orleans  in  1769,  aroused  great  indignation  in  France  and 
there  were  urgent  demands  that  France  interfere.  Gayarre,  Louisiana. 


16  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [126 

or  at  least  that  it  be  declared  under  the  protection  of  the 
government  at  Versailles.  The  French  archives  during 
this  period  contain  many  documents  on  the  subject,  of 
which  the  most  important  one  is  generally  attributed  to 
Admiral  D'Estaing.23  The  author  describes  in  glowing 
terms  the  climate  and  resources  of  Louisiana  which,  he 
declares,  extends  as  far  as  "the  Ilinois,  and  is  capable  of 
supporting  an  immense  population."  The  Mississippi  Val- 
ley, argues  the  author,  is  of  vital  importance  to  Spain  for 
the  protection  of  Mexico.  How  could  this  barrier  be  made 
more  effective?  Not  by  reducing  it  to  the  full  control  of 
Spain,  under  whose  government  the  population  would  re- 
main scattered  and  restless,  and  ready  to  submit  to  the 
more  liberal  rule  of  Great  Britain.  A  better  way,  insists 
the  writer,  is  to  allow  the  people  of  Louisiana  to  govern 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  France  and  Spain.  The 
reason  for  this  revolutionary  proposal  is  explained  in  the 
memorial.  The  example  of  a  free  republic  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley,  it  was  argued,  would  encourage  the  English  col- 
onists to  revolt,  and  France  could  then  enjoy  the  commerce 
of  all  America  without  the  expense  of  maintaining  colonies. 
Furthermore,  while  Louisiana  was  dissatisfied  she  would 
offer  no  opposition  to  British  aggression,  but  if  granted  her 


w'D'Estaing  propose  la  liberte  de  la  Louisiane  sous  le  protectorat  de 
la  France"  (Margry  Collections,  Nou.  Acq.  Francoises,  9309,  8)  Other 
documents  on  this  subject  are  the  "Memoir  de  Poterat  tendant  a  mettre 
la  Louisiane  sous  le  protectorat  franfais."  ..(Memoires  et  Documents,  Aff. 
Etr.  Fond  Divers,  Amerique,  II.)  There  is  also  a  letter  from  a  M. 
Francis,  dated  October  21,  1763,  describing  Lord  Egremont's  plans  regard- 
ing "Accadia,  Canada,  and  the  Floridas."  (Arc.  Aff.  Etr.  Angleterre,  481, 
fol.  103.)  This  name  suggests  the  J.  B.  Lazarus  Francis,  the  agent  of 
Beaumarchais  in  America.  There  is  also  a  letter  from  a  M.  de  Neyon,  a 
French  officer  at  Fort  de  Chartres,  to  Loftus,  conceding  to  the  English 
permanent  possession  of  the  Illinois.  (Arc.  Col.  Louisiane,  44,  div.  2 
i8b.)  There  was  also  mention  of  a  M.  Larnier  who  was  in  the  Illinois 
in  the  early  seventies.  (Arc.  Aff.  Etr.  Angleterre,  501,  fol.  320.)  Another 
important  document  is  a  "Memoir  que  regarde  la  Louisiane,"  dated  1763. 
(Arc.  Col.  Louisiane,  vol.  43.) 


127]  THE  ORIGINS  17 

independence  she  would  make  every  effort  to  preserve  it.26 
The  many  suggestions  regarding  Louisiana  probably 
received  consideration  from  Choiseul,  altho  it  is  un- 
likely that  they  were  officially  discussed  in  the  cabinet.27 
The  mercurial  mind  of  the  French  minister  had  already 

26L'Evenement  singulier;  ....  arrive  a  la  Nouvelle  Orleans 
<leviendra  s'il  est  saise  legerme  heureux  de  (  )  administration  de  1'Empire 
Britannique  aider  1'Amerique  Sepentrionale  a  s'en  separer  accroitre  le 
desire  qu'  elle  parait  en  avoir,  montrer  a  ses  colons  qui  veulent  etre  libres 
•qu'euse ;  leur  faire  voir  sous  leurs  yeux  le  spectacle  interressant  de  deux 
Potentates  qui  pardonnent,  qui  protegent,  et  qui  daignent  de  concert  pro- 
ferer  le  mot  de  paussant  de  liberte.  ce  serait  faire  plus  que  econguerir  une 
<les  provinces  anglaises  de  1'Amerique.  Le  choc  de  la  guerre  ne  servirait 
«qu  a  rafermer  les  liens  qui  attachent  encore  ces  countrees  a  la  metropole, 
c'est  a  I'example  (  )  bonheur  a  les  entrainer  vers  le  but  ou  elles  tenent 
-deja.  c'est  par  la  confiance  qu'elles  oseront  plus  et  plus  tot :  mais  cette  con- 
fiance  en  des  Monarques  que  des  prejuges  populaires  leurs  ont  fait  regarder 
comme  des  despottes,  ne  peut  s'acquirer  que  par  une  preuve  incontestable, 
il  n'en  peut  exister  une  plus  persuasions  que  la  liberte  de  la  Louisiane  .... 
...  les  citoyens  de  la  Louisiane  gouvernir  par  eux  memes  mais  avec  le(s) 
lois  donnees  par  la  parmission  de  1'Espagne  et  sous  la  guarentee  de  la 
France,  ne  dependraient  que  de  leur  intelligences  pour  tout  ce  que 
regardirait  les  details  de  la  justice  de  1'administration,  et  de  I'accroissement 
•qui  devrait  etre  le  point  de  vue  unique  de  leur  regime,  mais  des  com- 
missaires  soutenus,  et  authorises  par  les  deux  puissances  veuleraient  a  ce 
<que  1'ambition  des  particulaires  ne  causera  point  de  secousses  dans  les 
fibres  naissants  de  cette  petite  republique  ....  Les  colons  naturalises 
Espagnoles  par  la  cession,  et  frangais  par  leur  origin,  conserve  les  droits 
•de  commerce  .  .  .  .  un  territoire  salubre  dont  la  population  est 
presque  aussi  prompte  que  cette  du  Canada,  fertile  dans  tous  les  genus 
commestibles,  qui  s'etend  jusqu'aux  Illinois  ....  C'est  je  repete, 
armer  leur  Amerique  centre  eux  memes."  D'Estaing  propose  la  liberte  de 
la  Louisiane  sous  le  protectorat  de  la  France,  Versailles  March  10,  1769. 
(Margry  Collections,  Nou.  Acq.  Franqaises,  9309,  8.)  Bancroft  gives 
extracts  from  this  document  but  attributes  it  to  Choiseul.  United  States, 
V,  339- 

27I  can  find  no  traces  in  the  French  archives  of  a  cabinet  minute 
relating  to  the  West  during  this  period.  Bancroft  says  that  Choiseul  sent 
the  memorial  described  above  (note  26)  to  Du  Chatelet.  the  French  minis- 
ter to  London.  (United  States,  V.  339.)  He  is  probably  right,  altho 
Choiseul  may  not  have  intended  the  memorial  to  express  his  own  opinions. 
Bancroft  also  quotes  Chatelet  as  approving  the  ideas  of  the  memorial. 
(Ibid.,  340.)  It  is  probable  that  the  whole  question  excited  lively  interest 
at  the  French  court  altho  no  official  action  was  taken. 


18  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [128 

turned  to  other  schemes  for  the  humiliation  of  England, 
and  the  old  king  Louis  XV.  was  sunk  too  deep  in  debauch- 
ery and  disease  to  care.28  Choiseul's  investigations  had 
piled  up  a  mass  of  documents,  but  they  did  not  result  in  a 
definite  policy  either  to  promote  insurrection  in  America, 
or  to  leave  the  colonies  alone.20  The  vacillating  minister 
dropped  his  schemes  before  they  could  bear  fruit,  and  ere 
a  successor  could  develop  anew  the  policies  of  interven- 
tion, the  War  of  Independence  was  well  under  way;  and 
the  course  of  events  had  carried  it  beyond  the  control  of 
French  diplomacy. 

With  the  abandonment  of  French  activities  in  the 
Mississippi  Valley,  the  whole  territory  was  left  to  the 
English  and  Spanish.  Spain  held  the  west  bank  of  the 
river  and  within  her  domains  were  the  important  posts  of 
St.  Louis  and  New  Orleans,  the  latter  of  which  gave  her 
control  of  the  river's  mouth.  On  the  lower  Mississippi  the 
British  balanced  the  strategic  positions  of  Mobile  and 
Natchez  against  New  Orleans,  but  in  all  the  wilderness 
north  as  far  as  the  Illinois  posts  of  Kaskaskia  and  Cahokia 
there  was  not  a  single  British  stronghold.  In  the  year* 
between  1763  and  1774  the  population  of  Spanish  Louisiana 
increased  at  the  expense  of  the  Illinois  country.30  British 

28Perkins,  France  in  the  American  Revolution,  32.. 

29In  his  efforts  to  conquer  Corsica,  Choiseul  lost  sight  of  America. 
When  Kalb  returned  from  his  mission  to  America,  Choiseul  refused  to  see 
him  and  declared  that  he  wanted  to  hear  nothing  more  of  America.  Soon 
after  this,  however,  he  announced  that  in  retaliation  for  English  aid  to  the 
Corsicans,  he  would  assist  the  Americans.  (Kapp,  Kalb,  72.)  He  was  soon 
threatening  to  involve  France  in  war  with  Great  Britain  over  the  Spanish 
claim  to  the  Falkland  Islands,  when  he  was  dismissed.  Perkins,  France  in 
the  American  Revolution,  31. 

30Immediately  after  the  treaty  of  1763  many  of  the  French  living  ins 
the  Illinois  country  crossed  to  the  western  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  Pro- 
fessor Alvord  believes  that  as  soon  as  the  British  actually  occupied  the 
country  this  migration  stopped.  Cahokia  Records,  Introduction.  (Illinois 
Historical  Collections,  II.)  In  1787  an  investigation  by  Congress  showed 
fewer  than  600  inhabitants  in  the  Illinois,  of  whom  50  were  Americans, 
about  250  slaves,  and  the  remainder  French  and  English.  Journals  of  the 
Continental  Congress  (MSS.),  XLVIII,  fols.  48-52,  165.  Bancroft  gives 
the  population  of  the  Illinois  in  1768  as  1358.  United  States,  III,  319. 


129]  THE  ORIGINS  1^ 

traders,  however,  came  with  British  soldiers  to  the  old 
Northwest  and  entered  into  competition  with  the  French 
and  Spanish  across  the  river.  At  first  the  newcomers  were 
helpless  against  the  skill  and  influence  of  their  rivals,31 
but  within  a  few  years  they  controlled  the  trade  of  the 
Illinois.32 

During  the  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  American 
Revolution  the  British  and  Spanish  along  the  Mississippi 
were  mutually  distrustful.  There  were  many  points  of 
dispute  between  the  two  nations,  and  it  seemed  that  at  any 
time  there  might  be  an  outbreak  of  war.  33  Both  sides  saw 
the  importance  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  and  both  made 
preparations  to  preserve  and,  if  possible,  to  extend  their 
influence  there.  The  Spaniards  strengthened  their  defenses 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  and  the  British,  ever  alert, 
prepared  to  checkmate  them.34  Orders  were  given  that, 
in  the  event  of  war,  British  troops  should  at  once  seize  New 


31Col.  Wilkins  to  secretary  of  war,  December  5,  1769.  See  above,, 
p.  13,  note  16. 

32Gayarre,  History  of  Louisiana,  III,  106.  In  1783  the  Canadian 
merchants  protested  vigorously  against  the  surrender  of  the  Northwest 
Territory  because  "it  cuts  off  all  the  trading  Posts,  and  almost  all  the 
Indian  Nations,  the  trade  with  whom  was  the  grand  object  of  the  Com- 
mercial Intercourse  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Province  of  Quebec." 
Representation  of  Canada  Merchants  to  Lord  Shelburne,  January  31, 
1783.  (Shelburne  MSS.  in  Lansdowne  House ;  E.  L.  S.,  72,  fol.  459.  Copy" 
in  Peace  Trs.,  Lib  of  Congress,  XIII.)  The  extent  of  British  trade  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  in  one  month  in  17/6  the  governor  of  Louisiana  cap- 
tured fifteen  British  trading  vessels.  See  p.  65.  The  French  archives 
also  contain  frequent  references  to  merchants  ruined  by  British  competition. 

33In  1770  there  was  a  dispute  between  the  two  countries  over  the 
Falkland  Islands  which  threatened  war.  Perkins,  France  in  the  American 
Revolution,  31.  In  1774  there  was  a  dispute  between  Spain  and  Portugal 
"de  leurs  limites  sur  le  Rio  St.  Pedro  et  vers  1'Uruguay."  Doniol 
Transcripts  Nou.  Acqs.  Franc.  6482,  36.  France  supported  Spain,  Great 
Britain  Portugal.  Ibid.,  31,  39. 

34"The  proceedings  of  the  Spaniards  in  the  different  Posts  they  are 
forming  on  the  Western  side  of  the  Mississippi  cannot  be  too  narrowly 
watched."  Hillsborough  to  Gen.  Gage,  September  28,  1770.  (C.  O.  5,  88,. 
no.  35,  fol.  277.) 


20  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [130 

Orleans  and  get  possession  of  Louisiana.35  For  several 
years  the  two  nations  preserved  an  armed  peace  along  the 
Mississippi.  New  questions  of  dispute  arose,86  and  at 
the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  war  was  still 
threatening.  The  court  of  Madrid,  however,  was  anxious 
for  peace,37  and,  with  the  beginning  of  insurrection  in  the 
colonies,  the  British  commander  felt  it  safe  to  withdraw 
the  troops  in  the  Northwest  for  service  in  the  East.88  Spain, 
however,  was  not  satisfied  and  the  disputes  between  the 
two  countries  were  allowed  to  drag  on  until  they  led  to  war. 
Events  in  the  East  soon  directed  all  eyes  toward  Bos- 
ton, but  at  the  same  time  the  importance  of  the  outlying 
districts  increased.  The  control  of  the  Floridas,  of  Can- 
ada, and  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  became  at  once  a  matter 
of  vital  interest,  for  if  they  could  be  brought  into  rebellion 
British  power  in  America  would  receive  a  staggering  blow. 
In  none  of  these  provinces  was  the  population  large  enough 
and  sufficiently  homogeneous  to  organize  an  independent 
revolt,  but  the  American  insurgents  were  anxious  to  get 
their  assistance.  There  were  many  reasons,  however,  to 
prevent  both  the  Floridas  and  Canada  from  following  the 
lead  of  the  English  colonies.  In  the  southern  province 

35Hillsborough  to  Gage,  January  2,  1771.    (C.  O.,  5,  88,  no.  89,  fol.  I.) 

S6The  question  of  the  boundary  between  the  possessions  of  Spain 
and  Portugal  in  South  America.  See  note  34. 

37"S.  M.  Cath  ne  m'a  pas  dit  qu'elle  desirait  une  mediation  mais  vrai- 
semblablement,  que  si  la  France  d'accord  avec  1'Angleterre  1'offrant  a  ce 
Monarque  il  1'accepterait,  car  il  est  certain  qu'il  desire  sincerement  le 
maintien  de  la  paix." — Ossun,  French  ambassador  to  Madrid,  to  Vergennes, 
December  5,  1774.  (Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Franc.,  6482,  49.) 
See  also  p.  8,  note  4. 

»8"Lord  Dunmore  has  sent  me  a  provincial  major  by  the  name  of 
Conoly,  in  whom  his  Lordship  puts  great  Confidence  to  Impart  a  Project 
of  raising  the  People  of  Detroit  and  other  Settlers  in  the  interior  Coun- 
try, who  with  the  Indians  and  the  two  Companys  of  the  i8th  Regiment 
at  the  Ilinois  might  make  a  diversion  on  the  Frontiers  of  Pensylvania 

and  Virginia I  will  do  all  I  can  to  promote  its  success 

I  have  sent  ....  Lord  Dunmore  Letters  ....  for  Capt.  Lord  of 
the  18  th  Regiment,  ordering  him  to  move  the  Companys  of  said  Regiment 
from  the  Ilinois  to  Detroit  .  .  .  ."  Gage  to  Dartmouth,  September 
20,  175.  (C.  O.  5,  92,  no.  37,  fol.  568-569.) 


131]  THE  ORIGINS  21 

the  restless  spirits  who  favored  revolt  were  overawed  by 
the  strong  garrisons  which  the  British  maintained  to  pro- 
tect the  country  from  the  Indians  and  Spaniards,  while 
the  great  mass  of  the  population  sympathized  with  Great 
Britain.  Concerted  action  with  the  insurgents  was  fur- 
thermore made  impossible  by  the  unexplored  wilderness 
to  the  north.  Under  such  conditions,  the  conquest  of  the 
Floridas  by  the  Americans  was  possible  only  with  foreign 
assistance.  Spain,  however,  had  not  forgotten  her  ancient 
possession  of  them,  and  regarded  them  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance in  maintaining  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.39 
Due  to  these  circumstances  American  projects  against  the 
Floridas  were  destined  to  prove  abortive,  and  in  spite  of 
every  effort,  these  provinces  were  to  serve  only  as  a  pawn  to 
tempt  the  greed  of  Spain. 

In  the  minds  of  many  Americans,  Canada  held  a  place 
of  greater  importance  than  the  Floridas,  altho  there 
were  equally  serious  difficulties  in  the  way  of  union.  The 
natives  were  of  alien  race,  and  twelve  years  before  had 
fought  desperately  against  the  men  who  would  now  call 
them  brothers.  Their  difference  in  religion  had  only  recent- 
ly been  emphasized  in  the  bitter  dispute  over  the  Quebec 
Act,  and  the  French  Canadians,  long  accustomed  to 
paternal  government,  looked  with  indifference  on  the  New 
England  ideas  of  liberty.  They  were  well  satisfied  with  the 
improvements  which  the  English  had  made  in  their  con- 
dition,40 and  the  pleas  of  insurgent  agitators  found  no  re- 
sponse in  their  minds.  French  civil  law  was  still  main- 
tained, and  the  Koman  Catholic  religion  virtually  estab- 
lished,41 while  the  annexation  of  the  territory  north  of  the 


39See  p.  80,  note  37. 

40Kalb's  report  to  Choiseul,  1768.  Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  65-70. 

41For  description  of  the  organization  of  the  province  of  Quebec  see 
Coffin,  "The  Province  of  Quebec  and  the  Early  American  Revolution. 
Kalb  wrote  in  1768  that  the  Canadians  would  not  unite  with  the  other 
colonies  in  revolt.  Kapp,  "Life  of  Kalb,  68. 


22  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [132 

Ohio  flattered  the  pride  of  the  Canadians42  and  gave  them 
a  practical  monopoly  of  the  fur  trade.43 

The  measures  favoring  the  French  in  Canada  aroused, 
among  the  English  of  that  province,  a  spirit  of  disaffection, 
which  held  out  to  the  revolting  colonies  a  promise  of  union. 
The  governor-general  was  alarmed  at  the  threatening  atti- 
tude of  the  English  Canadians  and  took  measures  to  repress 
insurrection.44  The  Continental  Congress,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  anxious  to  bring  all  British  America  under  its 
sway,  and  in  October,  1774,  adopted  resolutions  urging  the 
Canadians  to  unite  with  them  in  opposition  to  the  measures 
of  the  British  government.45  In  the  February  following 
agents  of  Congress  arrived  in  Montreal,  where  they  held  a 
"meeting  of  Merchants  and  most  of  the  English,  Scotch, 
and  Irish  of  Montreal  at  the  Coffee  House  ....  and 
[these]  were  urged  by  the  New  Englanders  to  send  2  del- 
egates to  Congress  at  Philadelphia."46  These  agents  re- 
ported that  Canada  was  not  in  condition  to  resist  attack, 
that  the  English  population  was  ready  to  revolt,  and  that 
the  French  would  remain  inactive.47 

Congress,  thereupon,  determined  to  send  a  military 
expedition  against  Canada,  in  the  hope  of  inducing  it  to 


42Kingsford,  History  of  Canada,  V,  251. 

43  ....  "it  [the  treaty  of  1783]  cuts  off  all  the  trading  Posts  and  al- 
most all  the  Indian  Nations,  the  trade  with  whom  was  the  grand  Object  of 
the  Commercial  Intercourse  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Province  of 

Quebec Consequently  the  whole  trade  with  the  Indians  must  be 

entirely  cut  off  from  the  Province  of  Quebec."  Representation  of  the 
Canada  Merchants  to  Shelburne,  January  31,  1783.  (Shelburne  MSS.,  E.  L. 
S.,  72,  fol.  459;  copy  in  Peace  Transcripts,  XIII.) 

44Carleton,  the  governor-general  of  Canada,  wrote  Dartmouth,  Jan- 
uary 12,  1775,  of  "endeavours  being  made  by  certain  of  his  Majesty's  British 
subjects  to  kindle  in  the  Canadians  the  spirit  that  reigns  in  Massachu- 
setts, and  seems  to  run  through  most  of  the  other  colonies."  P.  R.  O.,  Col. 
Cor.,  Quebec,  n,  24.  Quoted  in  Stephens,  Chronological  Index. 

^Journal  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  I,  62. 

"Extract  of  letter  from  Montreal,  April  6,  1775.  (P.  R.  O.,  Col.  Cor 
Quebec,  n,  48;  quoted  in  Stephens,  Chronological  Index:) 

47Kingsford,  Canada,  V,  251. 


133]  THE  ORIGINS  23 

join  the  rebellion.  Washington  agreed  to  this,  and  believed 
also  that  the  movement  would  be  of  strategic  value.48  To 
this  expedition  he  gave  much  time  and  thought,  for  he  felt 
that  it  would  have  a  "decisive  effect  on  the  public  interests." 
If  the  Continentals  should  conquer  Canada,  he  was  certain 
that  the  plans  of  the  British  ministry  would  fail.49 

Governor  Carleton  was  greatly  alarmed  at  these  ef- 
forts of  Congress  to  win  over  the  Canadians.  He  admitted 
that  the  Americans  were  "only  too  successful"  in  their 
efforts  "to  debauch  the  minds  of  the  Canadians  and  In- 
dians." He  complained  that  the  people  in  general  seemed 
"to  think  it  their  interest  that  these  Wretches  should  be- 
come Masters  of  the  Country,  though  the  Gentlemen, 
Clergy  and  most  of  the  Bourgeois,  have  manifested  great 
Zeal  and  Fidelity  for  the  King's  service."  Carleton  was  in 
despair.  He  declared  that  the  whole  country  was  "on  the 
eve  of  being  overrun  and  subdued."50  Gage  was  more  opti- 
mistic, however,  and  felt  that,  unless  the  whole  body  of  the 


^Washington,  Works  (Ford  ed.),  Ill,  238. 

*9Ibid.,  Ill,  120.  The  colonial  assemblies  had  early  sent  detached 
expeditions  towards  Canada,  and  Washington  resolved  to  bring  these 
together  in  a  systematic  invasion.  On  August  20,  1775,  he  wrote  to 
General  Schuyler  communicating  a  plan  of  attack  by  way  of  the  Kennebec 
River  to  Quebec.  He  hoped  this  would  make  a  diversion  and  prevent 
General  Carleton  from  defending  both  Montreal  and  Quebec.  (Ibid.,  124.) 
He  instructed  Arnold  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  win  the  good  will  of  the 
Canadians  "by  just  and  honorable  conduct,"  and  to  treat  them  and  the 
Indians  as  friends  and  brothers.  He,  himself,  issued  a  proclamation 
urging  the  Canadians  to  join  in  the  revolt.  (Ibid.,  126.)  He  also  suggested 
to  Congress  that  the  Canadians  be  invited  to  send  delegates  to  that  body. 
(Ibid.,  238.)  In  accord  with  Washington's  ideas  Montgomery  urged  the 
Canadians  to  form  "a  provincial  convention  to  maintain  the  civil  and 
religious  rights  of  the  colonies."  (Ibid.,  239.) 

5*Carleton  to  Gage,  Montreal,  September  16,  17/5.  Carleton  went  on 
to  state :"....  I  had  great  hopes  of  holding  out  for  the  Year, 
tho'  I  seemed  abandoned  by  all  the  Earth,  had  the  Savages  remained  firm ; 
I  can  not  blame  these  poor  People  for  securing  themselves,  as  they  see 

Multitudes  of  the  Enemy  at  Hand  [and]  no  succor  from  any  Part " 

C.  O.  5,  92,  fol.  673;  copy  in  Bt.  Trs.,  123,  fol.  405,  L.  C. 


24  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [134 

Canadians  went  over  to  the  provincials,  the  American 
expedition  must  fail.51 

News  of  the  fall  of  Montreal  further  alarmed  the 
British  commanders  and  aroused  a  corresponding  elation 
among  the  Americans.  Many  of  the  Canadians  went  over 
to  the  side  of  the  insurgents,  and  for  a  time  it  seemed  that 
the  whole  province  would  take  the  side  of  Congress.  In 
the  revolting  colonies  great  importance  was  attached  to  the 
expedition  against  Quebec,  and  Washington  wrote  that, 
upon  its  outcome,  would  probably  depend  the  issue  of  the 
whole  war.52  The  failure  of  Montgomery  and  Arnold  was 
a  bitter  disappointment  to  him,  and  he  felt  that  the  colonies 
had  lost  a  great  chance  for  a  speedy  and  decisive  victory, 
and  that  now  the  struggle  must  be  long  and  bloody.53  For 
a  time,  however,  he  did  not  give  up  hope  of  affecting  the 
conquest  of  Canada,54  but  military  events  in  other  colonies 
became  more  serious,  the  American  forces  were  withdrawn, 
and  the  province  of  Quebec  was  lost  to  the  Revolution. 

Only  the  West,  then,  offered  opportunities  for  expan- 
sion. In  this  direction  population  naturally  flowed,  and, 
altho  without  legal  sanction,  frontiersmen  had  already 
spread  over  the  region  south  of  the  Ohio,  and  established 
settlements  in  its  rich  valleys.  To  these  settlements,  as 
well  as  to  the  territory  north  of  the  river,  the  colonists  laid 
claim  by  right  of  their  charters.  55  Against  these  charters 
was  the  legal  force  of  various  Indian  treaties  and  the 
Quebec  Act.  Furthermore,  in  the  Northwest  the  British 
held  a  quasi-military  authority  which  the  colonists  were 
in  no  position  to  dispute.  The  country  south  of  the  Ohio, 
however,  did  not  offer  so  difficult  a  problem.  The  British 
had  no  military  control  within  its  limits,  and  there  was  no 
one  to  dispute  the  claims  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina. 

"Gage  to  Dartmouth,  September  20,  1775.     (C.  O.  5,  92,  no.  38,  fol. 

571.) 

"Washington,   Works  (Ford  ed.),  Ill,  381. 

"Ibid.,  IV,  47,  103,  108,  174, 

"Ibid.,  IV,  195,  218. 

55 Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVIII,  939. 


135]  THE  ORIGINS  25 

Altho  settlers  were  pouring  in,  the  outbreak  of  war  had, 
as  yet,  prevented  the  organization  of  a -government.56  It 
was  not  long,  however,  until  the  inhabitants  of  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky  demanded  some  organization,  and  estab- 
lished the  Watauga  Association  and  the  County  of  Ken- 
tucky. 

During  the  early  days  of  the  Revolution,  the  West  re- 
'Ceived  scant  consideration  from  the  leaders  of  the  rebel- 
lion. Congress  concentrated  its  armies  in  the  East  and 
the  West  was  left  to  shift  for  itself.  In  no  sense,  however, 
did  the  colonies  abandon  their  claims  to  the  valley  of  the 
Mississippi.  Washington,  Franklin,  and  Jay  all  main- 
tained the  right  of  the  Americans  to  the  West,57  and  there 
probably  could  be  found  no  one  among  the  patriots  who 
-did  not  regard  the  back  countries  as  a  part  of  the  colonial 
dominions,  and  this  very  unanimity  doubtless  forestalled 
discussion. 

The  British,  however,  were  the  first  to  see  the  import- 
ance of  the  West  in  the  war  and  were  quick  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  it.  General  Gage  planned  to  raise  the  set- 
tlers of  the  Northwest  to  assist  the  Indians  and  some  reg- 
ular troops  from  the  Illinois  in  an  attack  on  the  frontiers 
of  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia.58  Supplies  were  to  come 
from  Pensacola  up  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio,  and  with  the 
cooperation  of  Lord  Dunmore  in  Virginia,  Gage  planned  to 
-cut  the  colonies  in  two  and  restrict  the  area  of  rebellion  to 
New  England.  This  plan  was  never  carried  out,  but  the 

66See  Alden,  New  Governments  West  of  the  Alleghanies  before  1780; 
Turner,  Western  State  Making  during  the  Revolution,  in  American  His- 
torical Review,  I,  20,  70. 

67In  July,  1775,  Franklin  drew  up  a  plan  of  confederation  to  include, 
not  only  the  thirteen  colonies  and  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  the  Floridas, 
but  the  West  Indies  and  Ireland  as  well.  (Works  (Smyth  ed.),  VI,  425.) 
This  plan  was  presented  to  Congress  but  never  acted  upon.  Altho  no 
specific  mention  was  made  of  the  West  it  is  evident  that  Franklin  thought 
it  unnecessary  to  discuss  it.  Jay  declared  that  he  had  long  believed  that 
Congress  should  grant  Spain  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  below  "our 
•territories."  History  of  the  Spanish  Mission;  Jay,  Life  of  Jay,  I,  100. 

58Gage  to  Dartmouth.     See  p.  20,  note  38. 


26  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [136 

British  were  successful  in  keeping  Detroit  and  the  posts 
along  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Mississippi,  which,  with  the 
control  of  the  Floridas,  enabled  them  to  threaten  contin- 
ually the  vast  regions  between. 

Thus  conditions  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  limited 
the  area  of  rebellion  and  threw  the  conquests  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War  once  more  into  the  jackpot  of  world  diplomacy. 
These  conquests  were  now  divided  into  four  zones,  each  of 
which  presented  a  distinct  problem.  The  Floridas  were 
definitely  included  within  the  scope  of  Spanish  diplomacy, 
while  the  claims  of  Spain  and  the  United  States  to  the 
territory  south  of  the  Ohio  made  impossible  an  alliance 
between  these  two  powers.  The  old  Northwest  was  of  vital 
interest  to  the  new  republic,  while  Canada,  as  the  last 
stronghold  of  British  power  in  America  was  sure  to  receive 
great  attention.  Each,  then,  was  a  distinct  issue  in  the 
diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution,  and  the  outcome 
was  made  still  more  uncertain  by  the  policy  of  Vergennes, 
who,  through  the  humiliation  of  Britain,  was  seeking  to 
brighten  the  prestige  of  his  beloved  France. 


CHAPTER    II 

VERGENNES  AND   SPANISH  DIPLOMACY 

The  accession  of  Louis  XVI  to  the  throne  of  France 
gave  renewed  life  to  the  worn  out  diplomacy  of  Versailles. 
The  nominal  head  of  the  new  ministry  was  the  aged  and 
dissolute  Maurepas,  but  the  real  leadership  fell  to  the 
astute  and  energetic  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Charles 
Gravier,  comte  de  Vergennes.1  Vergennes  had  spent  his 
active  life  in  diplomacy  and  was  called  to  the  foreign  office 
from  an  embassy  to  the  court  of  Sweden.  He  had  none  of 
the  characteristics  of  the  supple  Choiseul,  but  was  a  man 
of  resolute  purpose,  blunt  and  direct  in  speech,  and  cold 
and  haughty  in  manner.  His  temper,  when  once  aroused, 
was  violent;  but  his  anger  was  soon  appeased;  and  he  was, 
in  general,  patient  and  courteous.  Particularly  noticeable 
was  his  lack  of  that  vivacity  and  optimism  so  general 
among  Frenchmen;  and  his  appearance  gave  the  impres- 
sion of  one  laboring  under  a  load  of  responsibility  and 
anxiety.  He  was,  however,  a  man  of  clear  understanding 
and  definite  aims,  and  one  who  would  pursue  unhesitatingly 
to  the  end  a  policy  upon  which  he  had  once  decided.2 
Altho  not  a  great  man,  he  had  an  infinite  capacity  for 
taking  pains,  and  would  often  labor  at  his  desk  from  early 
in  the  morning  till  late  at  night.  He  has  been  described, 
and  perhaps  justly,  as  having  for  his  trump  cards  "subtlety, 

1Turgot  was  the  only  serious  rival  of  Vergennes  and  the  latter  always 
carried  his  point  over  the  advice  of  the  minister  of  finance.  Doniol  has 
the  same  view  of  the  position  of  Vergennes.  Histoire,  I,  249. 

2"Whether  the  policy  which  he  [Vergennes]  pursued  was  the  boldest 
which  he  could  have  adopted  no  man  now  possesses  the  means  of  judging. 
....  But  having  adopted  it,  it  is  but  justice  to  this  minister  to  admit  that 
he  pursued  it  with  singular  equanimity,  firmness,  and  temper."  North 
American  Review,  XXXIII,  471.  Wharton  attributes  this  article  to 
Edward  Everett.  Dip.  Cor.,  I,  243  et  seq. 

27 


28  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [138 

wiliness,  cleverness,  and  sagacity,"3  but,  at  the  same  time 
bis  honesty  and  loyalty  were  beyond  suspicion.  Narrow 
in  outlook,  his  one  passion  was  patriotism,  and  he  gave  to 
France  a  life  of  single-hearted  devotion.  His  was  not  a 
lovable  character,  but  his  uprightness  and  ability  gained 
for  him  the  respect  and  friendship  of  such  opposite  char- 
acters as  the  frivolous  Marie  Antoinette,  the  dull  Louis 
XVI,  and  the  shrewd  and  philosophic  Franklin.4 

When  Vergennes  took  up  the  slackened  reins  of  power, 
France  was  reduced  to  irnpotency  in  the  councils  of  Europe. 
The  new  minister  saw  clearly  the  depths  to  which  his  coun- 
try had  fallen  and  felt  keenly  her  degradation.  "The  de- 
plorable peace  of  1763,"  he  informed  his  king,  "the  parti- 
tion of  Poland,  and  in  fact,  other  causes  equally  disastrous, 
have  struck  the  greatest  blows  to  the  respect  for  your 
crown."5  Great  Britain,  he  complained,  had  gained  most 
from  the  misfortunes  of  France,  for  she  had  conquered 
Canada,  Louisiana,  and  other  important  possessions  of  the 
Bourbons.  To  retrieve  the  fallen  glory  of  his  country  he 
would  strike  at  the  British  Empire.  To  restore  French 
prestige  through  the  humiliation  of  England  was  the  key- 
stone of  his  policy,  and  it  was  this  which  led  him  to  suggest 
that  encouragement  and  aid  be  given  the  British  colonies 
in  their  opposition  to  the  mother  country.6  It  was  this 
idea,  also,  which  led  him  in  1778  to  recognize  the  inde- 

3Hale,  Franklin  in  France,  II,  80. 

4This  characterization  of  Vergennes  is  drawn  from  his  letters  and 
•despatches.  Franklin  had  a  high  appreciation  of  his  character.  In  1781 
he  wrote  of  "the  sincerity  of  this  upright  minister,  who  never  promised 
to  me  any  thing  which  he  did  not  punctually  perform".  (Works  (Smith 
€d.),.yill,  302.)  At  the  news  of  Vergennes's  death  Franklin  again 
wrote :  "So  wise  and  good  a  man,  taken  away  from  the  station  he  filled 
is  a  great  loss,  not  only  to  France  but  to  Europe  in  general,  to  America 
and  to  mankind."  (Ibid.,  IX,  575.)  For  a  common  idea  of  Vergennes 
see  Jay's  characterization  in  Magazine  of  American  History,  XIII,  31. 

translation.     Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  13. 

•Hale  declared  that  Vergennes's  object  was  to  weaken  Great  Britain, 
"to  make  good,  in  a  measure,  the  territorial  losses  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  that  is  Canada  .  .  .  ."  Franklin  in  France,  II,  44. 


139]  VERGENNES   AND   SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  29 

pendence  of  the  United  States,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
make  every  effort  to  keep  the  alliance  and  friendship  of 
Spain.7 

From  accounts  of  conditions  in  America,  Vergennes 
was  sure  that  a  rupture  was  at  hand.  He  was  not  satisfied 
with  De  Kalb's  report ;  and,  to  make  his  information  more 
exact,  he  determined  to  send  over  an  agent  of  his  own.8 
His  choice  fell  upon  a  gentleman  named  Bonvouloir  who 
was  sent  secretly  and  with  no  credentials.  Vergennes  rec- 
ognized the  jealousy  felt  by  the  colonists  of  French  influ- 
ence and  their  fear  of  aggression,  and  he  instructed  his 
agent  to  inform  them  that  France  had  no  designs  on  Can- 
ada.9 This  promise  Vergennes  doubtless  made  in  good 
faith,  for  he  cared  nothing  for  wide  colonial  dominions 
which  would  bring  only  trouble  and  expense.10  His  chief 
interest  was  in  small  and  productive  colonies  and  in  ad- 
vantageously situated  commercial  ports. 

The  revolt  of  the  American  colonies  gave  to  the  New 
World  an  international  importance  such  as  it  had  never  be- 
fore possessed.  Always  before,  it  had  been  a  minor  factor  in 
great  European  struggles,  but  now  it  became  the  center  of 
a  new  conflict,  fought  out  on  different  lines.  In  previous 

7Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  13. 

8"Quoiqu'on  ait  voulu  faire  honneur  a  M.  le  due  de  Choiseul  d'avoir 
prepare  cette  revolution  je  dois  dire  avec  verite  sans  pretendre  enlever 
rien  a  sa  gloire  qu'il  n'y  a  en  aucune  part.  .  .  .  Bn  de  Kalb  qui  apres  la 
paix  avait  voiage  de  son  ordre  dans  les  Colonies  angloises  n'avoit  d'autre 
commission  qui  de  reconnoitre  les  dispositions  de  ces  peuples.  La  cor- 
respondance  qui  j'ai  Sous  ma  main  n'announce  pas  meme  des  decouvertes 
fort  importantes."  Vergennes  (in  his  hand)  to  the  king,  1776.  Vergennes 
went  on  to  explain  that  new  conditions  had  arisen  and  it  was  necessary 
to  have  some  one  on  the  ground  to  report  new  developments.  Aff.  Etr. 
France,  446,  no.  33,  Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Francs.,  6494,  55. 

9Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  I,  333. 

10"La  France  a  des  colonies  dans  la  proportion  qui  convient  a  sa  popu- 
lation et  son  Industrie.  Plus  seroit  une  charge  plus  tost  q  un  benefice. 
Si  la  perte  du  Canada  lui  a  etc  sensible  elle  doit  la  moins  regretter  depuis 
que  labandon  quelle  a  etc  obligee  d  en  faire  est  devenu  le  signal  de 
revolte  des  provinces  angloises  sur  le  continent."  Vergennes  to  Aranda, 
April  26,  1777.  (Esp.,  584,  no.  40.) 


30  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [140 

wars  it  was  merely  a  question  of  whether  Great  Britain  or 
the  Bourbons  should  extend  a  colonial  empire,  but  now  the 
matter  in  hand  was  the  birth  of  a  new  nation.  Defeated  in 
the  past  in  every  struggle  with  a  united  Britain,  France 
now  saw  in  a  divided  empire  her  opportunity  for  vengeance. 
It  was  no  longer  a  contest  over  Canada  and  Louisiana ;  the 
reconquest  of  these  did  not  enter  the  dreams  of  Vergennes; 
he  looked  for  triumph  over  Great  Britain  in  the  destruction 
of  her  commerce,  in  the  dismemberment  of  her  empire,  and 
above  all,  in  forming  her  richest  provinces  into  a  new  na- 
tion that  would  be  forever  a  check  on  British  aggression. 

The  outbreak  of  open  war  in  America  formed  a  crisis 
in  the  diplomacy  of  France.  The  moment  had  come  for 
which  Choiseul  had  waited  in  vain  and  towards  which 
Vergennes  had  pointed  his  policy.  The  report  of  battle  on 
the  commons  of  Lexington  warned  him  that  the  time  for 
action  was  at  hand.  While  it  was  clear  that  France  had 
a  great  interest  in  the  revolt,  there  still  arose  in  the  mind 
of  Vergennes  many  questions.  Would  the  colonies  declare 
their  independence?  If  they  did,  would  they  fight  with 
determination  to  maintain  their  declaration?  Should 
France  offer  them  aid ;  and,  if  so,  what  should  be  its  char- 
acter? Would  Spain  join  in  a  war  to  free  rebellious 
colonies?  What  recompense  should  the  two  crowns  expect 
for  their  assistance?  With  these  questions  in  mind  Ver- 
gennes began  to  formulate  a  definite  policy. 

In  two  memorials  written  at  this  time  may  be  read 
the  fundamentals  of  his  decision  to  which  he  clung  through- 
out the  succeeding  years.11  The  first  is  headed  "Reflexions 


"There  is  a  third  memorial  entitled  "Menwire  Historique  et  Politique 
sur  la  Louisiane"  par  M.  de  Vergennes,  ministre  de  Louis  XVI,  and  pub- 
lished in  Paris  in  1802.  This  memorial  declared  that  the  war  then  going 
on  in  America  was  of  vital  interest  to  France  and  Spain,  and  that  the  two 
countries  ought  to  unite  on  a  policy  regarding  the  struggle.  The  Ameri- 
cans, if  successful,  were  likely  to  seize  the  American  possessions  of  Spain 
and  become  the  dominant  power  on  the  continent.  The  only  means  of 
preventing  this,  continued  the  memoir,  was  to  restore  Canada,  Louisiana, 
and  Eastern  Louisiana  to  France.  The  Indians  and  Canadians  wouM 


141]  VEEGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  31 

Sur  la  Conduite  qu'il  convient  a  la  france  de  tenir  a  1'egard 
des  Colonies  Angloisses,  par  M.  Gerard  de  Kayneval,"  and 
was  prepared  in  the  latter  part  of  1775  for  the  use  of 
Vergennes.12  The  second  bears  the  title  "Considerations 
sur  1'affaire  des  Colonies  anglois  de  PAmerique,"  and  was 
drawn  up  by  Vergennes  himself.13  The  first  of  these  de- 
scribes in  general  terms  conditions  in  America,  and  the 
interest  of  France  in  the  struggle;  the  second  sets  forth, 

then  be  able  to  balance  the  ambition  of  the  Americans.  Louisiana  was 
useless  to  Spain,  it  argued,  and  that  power  ought  to  be  glad  to  surrender 
it  to  France  in  return  for  a  guarantee  of  her  other  possessions.  It  was 
also  necessary  for  the  protection  of  French  commerce.  Whatever  the  out- 
come of  the  war  between  England  and  her  colonies,  reasoned  the  memorial, 
Europe  must  intervene.  In  that  case  France  would  be  in  position  to  re- 
claim her  ancient  possessions  in  Canada. 

This  memorial  has  received  importance  from  the  use  Professor  Turner 
makes  of  it  in  his  "Policy  of  France  toward  the  Mississippi  Valley  in  the 
Period  of  Washington  and  Adams."  (Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  X,  249.)  There  is 
good  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  the  whole  memoir  is  a  forgery.  Tur- 
ner admits  that  there  was  some  suspicion  of  it,  but  attempts  to  establish  its 
authenticity  by  the  assertion  that  "the  subsequent  actions  of  Vergennes  are 
entirely  consistent  with  the  view  that  he  was  the  author."  He  attempts 
to  prove  this  assertion  by  reference  to  Oswald's  letter  to  Shelburne  of 
September  17,  1782,  regarding  Rayneval's  mission  to  London,  and  by 
Godoy's  declaration  in  his  memoirs  that  Vergennes  tried  "to  induce 
Spain  ....  to  give  to  France  her  ancient  colony."  The  publication  of  Ray- 
tieval's  report  to  Vergennes  (Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  135)  shows  that  his 
mission  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  western  territories.  Godoy's  account 
can  not  be  accepted  as  decisive.  During  the  Revolution  he  was  but  a 
child  and  he  was  hardly  more  than  a  youth  when  he  assumed  office  in 
1792.  He  could  have  had  no  first  hand  information  of  any  such  attempt 
as  he  describes.  He  did  not  publish  his  memoirs  until  many  years  later 
(1832)  when  his  memory  could  not  have  been  accurate  and  he  probably 
confused  some  French  efforts  after  the  Revolution  to  obtain  Louisiana 
with  the  name  of  Vergennes.  As  will  be  shown  in  the  course  of  this 
study,  the  policy  laid  down  in  this  memoir  was  not  in  accord  with  the 
policy  of  Vergennes  as  stated  in  his  authentic  papers.  He  made  no  attempt 


12In  hand  of  Rayneval.  (Etats-Unis,  Mentoires  et  Documents,  I,  no. 
4,  fol.  59;  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XIII,  1310;  Doniol,  Histoire,  i,  243  et  seq.) 

"Dated  March  12,  1776.  (Etats-Unis,  Memoires  et  Documents,  I,  no. 
9;  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XIII,  1316;  Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  278  et  seq.) 


32  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [142 

in  detail,  the  confused  state  of  English  politics,  and  argues 
for  a  policy  unfriendly  to  Great  Britain. 

Vergennes  and  his  chief  assistant  were  alike  convinced 
that  the  rebellious  colonies  would  declare  their  indepen- 
dence; but  the  position  France  should  take  offered  many 
problems,  for  a  move  in  any  direction  was  threatened  with 
danger.  They  were  willing  to  allow  both  combatants  to- 
exhaust  themselves  without  offering  any  interference,  but 
they  foresaw  great  hazards  from  a  consistent  policy  of 
non-intervention.  Both  declared  that,  whatever  the  out- 
come of  the  war  in  America,  it  would  surely  lead  to  an- 
other struggle  between  the  Bourbon  powers  and  Great 
Britain.  If  the  latter  power  should  conquer  the  insurgents, 
they  argued,  she  would  seek  indemnity  for  her  expenses  in 
an  attack  on  the  colonies  of  France  and  Spain ;  if  defeated, 
she  would  but  have  an  additional  motive  to  cover  the 
humiliation  by  a  blow  at  her  ancient  rivals.  The  Bourbon 
powers  could  not  hope  to  save  themselves  by  maintaining- 
their  neutrality,  for  no  matter  how  carefully  they  ab- 
stained from  interference  in  the  war,  the  British  would 
still  accuse  them  of  aiding  the  rebels,  and  use  this  as  a  pre- 


to  obtain  territory  in  America  and  often  disclaimed  even  to  Louis  XVI 
any  desires  in  that  direction. 

There  is  other  evidence  of  forgery.  The  style  is  not  that  of  Vergen- 
nes. Page  after  page  is  taken  up  with  historical  and  geographical  details 
of  which  we  find  little  in  the  authentic  papers  of  Vergennes,  and  there 
is  no  part  that  bears  the  ear  marks  of  a  state  paper.  The  paper  also 
shows  an  ignorance  of  political  and  geographical  conditions  during  the 
Revolution  which  can  not  be  attributed  to  Vergennes.  The  plainest 
example  is  found  on  page  26  of  the  memoir.  It  states  that  the  English 
will  soon  get  possession  of  Louisiana  and  that  then  "Florida  will  fall  of 
itself."  Vergennes  frequently  discussed  the  question  of  Florida  but  he 
never  committed  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  it  belonged  to  Spain  during 
the  period  of  the  Revolution. 

The  circumstances  of  the  publication  of  the  memoir  are  suspicious. 
In  the  years  from  1800  to  1803  Napoleon  was  concerned  with  Louisiana. 
and  the  publication  of  this  supposed  work  of  Vergennes  would  help  to 
justify  his  conduct  in  the  eyes  of  the  world.  On  no  ground  can  the 
authenticity  of  this  memoir  be  accepted. 


143]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  35 

text  for  attack.  No  faith  could  be  placed  in  the  guarantees 
of  Great  Britain,  for,  declared  Vergennes:  "L'experience 
n'a  que  trop  prouv6  quils  croient  juste  et  honorable  tout 
quils  regardent  comme  advantageux  a  leur  nation  et 
destructif  pour  ses  rivaux."  Vergennes  went  on  to  state 
that  there  was  already  talk  in  England  of  a  popular  war 
against  France  to  allay  domestic  disputes  and  extinguish 
the  national  debt.  France,  he  declared,  had  little  to  fear 
from  an  independent  republic  in  the  New  World,  for  it 
would  be  too  exhausted  to  attempt  any  aggression  for  years,, 
and  its  very  organization  as  a  republic  would  discourage 
the  spirit  of  conquest,  while  its  people,  devoted  to  industry 
and  commerce,  would  see  the  need  of  peace. 

Eayneval  urged,  moreover,  that  his  country  had  much 
to  gain  from  an  independent  America,  for  not  only  would 
it  weaken  Great  Britain  but  also  increase  proportionately 
the  power  of  France.  England's  commerce  would  suffer 
an  irreparable  blow,  and  that  of  France  would  increase  in 
importance.  Kayneval  thought  the  opportunity  favorable 
also  for  France  to  recover  some  of  her  lost  American  pos- 
sessions, particularly  the  fisheries  of  Newfoundland  and 
the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.14  In  regard  to  the  restoration 
of  the  ancient  French  empire,  he  merely  remarked:  "On 
ne  parle  pas  du  Canada." 

No  plan  that  Rayneval  may  have  had  for  the 
recovery  of  New  France  received  any  encouragement 
from  Vergennes,  altho  such  a  scheme  was  not  con- 
trary to  the  Bourbon  traditions.  He  did  not  be- 
lieve that  a  French  empire  in  America  was  again 
possible;  and,  if  it  wrere  possible,  he  argued,  France 
had  already  enough  colonies  for  her  resources  and  should 


14In  discussing  the  advantages  to  France  of  aiding  the  Americans 
Rayneval  states : — "elle  nous  presente  comme  tres  probable  le  recouvere- 
ment  d'une  partie  des  possessions  que  les  anglois  nous  ont  enleves  en 
Amerique  comme  la  peche  de  terre-neuve,  et  du  golfe  de  St  Laurent, 
1'Isle  Royale  &."  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XIII,  1310.  Doniol  writes  instead 
of  "Peche  de  terre-neuve,"  "peche  de  terre."  Histoire,  I,  244. 


34  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [144 

not  seek  more.15  A  course  of  aggrandizement  in  America 
would  arouse  the  fears  of  the  colonists  and  they  might 
return  gladly  to  their  former  allegiance.  The  suggestion 
of  commercial  advantages  he  passed  over  likewise  without 
consideration  and  gave  his  whole  attention  to  the  lowering 
of  English  prestige.  He  would  prepare  for  war  and  at  the 
right  moment  strike  a  decisive  blow  strong  enough  to  re- 
duce England  to  the  rank  of  a  second  class  power,  and 
destroy  the  empire  which  she  had  built  up  with  so  much 
"arrogance  and  injustice." 

Vergennes  did  not  think  the  time  was  yet  ripe  for 
intervention.  The  warring  powers  should  first  be  allowed 
to  exhaust  themselves  and  not  until  the  colonies  declared 
their  independence  should  France  intervene,  for  it  was  not 
in  accord  with  the  king's  dignity  to  ally  himself  with  in- 
surgents. On  the  other  hand  France  could  not  delay  too 
long,  for  there  was  always  the  possibility  of  a  reconciliation 
or  sudden  collapse  of  the  revolt.  Vergennes  felt  it  would 
be  well  to  encourage  the  insurgents  "par  quelques  faveurs 


15"Au  pis  aller  la  crainte  d  une  guerre  malheureuse  qui  finiroit  par 
remettre  la  France  en  possession  du  Canada  seroit  le  pouventail  le  plus 
certain  pour  1'Amerique  ou  le  voisinage  de  notre  religion  et  notre  gouvern- 
ment  est  extremement  aprehende."  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  August  7,  1775 
(Esp.,  575,  no.  15.)  See  also  Vergennes  to  Guines  of  same  date.  (Doniol, 
Histoire,  I,  155.)  Vergennes  wrote  to  Aranda,  March  n,  1777,  that  since 
the  two  crowns  were  content  with  their  possessions  and  not  ambitious  for 
new  conquests,  "reste  done  celui  de  cooperer  a  la  foiblessement  de  la 
puissance  dont  elles  pourvient  redouter  la  (c)  croissement  et  (  )  quelle 
seroit  tentee  d'un  faire."  (Esp.,  583,  no.  155.)  A  month  later  he  expressed 
the  same  idea.  (Ibid.,  584,  no.  21.)  Again  he  wrote:  "Sa  Mte  n  hesite 
pas  a  declarer  quelle  ne  connoit  en  Amerique  coe  en  Europe  aucun  objects 
asses  seduisant  d'acquisition  pour  compensir  a  ses  yeux  les  hazards,  les 
calamities  et  1'epuisement  resultans  dune  guerre.  La  France  a  des  colonies 
dans  la  proportion  qui  convient  a  sa  population  et  son  industrie.  Plus 
seroit  une  charge  plus  [tost]  q'un  benefice."  Vergennes  to  Aranda,  April 
26.  1777.  (Esp.,  584,  no.  40.)  In  none  of  his  despatches  does  Vergennes 
admit  any  intention  to  obtain  territorial  gains  in  the  New  World;  but  he 
frequently  disclaims  any  such  object.  The  decadence  of  Spain  and  the 
dangers  of  Great  Britain  were,  in  his  day,  striking  proof  of  the  folly 
of  colonies. 


145]  VERGENNES   AND   SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  35 

secretes  et  par  des  esperances  vagues"  until  they  should 
•declare  their  independence  and  the  moment  had  come  for 
intervention.  He  would  also  conciliate  the  British  and  lull 
their  suspicions  so  they  would  not  fear  to  embark  on  an 
expensive  campaign;  but  France  must  not  be  too  humble 
for  the  "Anglais  ne  respect  que  ceux  qui  peuvent  se  faire 
craindre." 

This  was  the  program  of  Vergennes  which  he  consist- 
ently maintained  in  the  face  of  all  obstacles.  He  was  not 
animated  by  any  feelings  of  sympathy  for  the  "patriot 
cause,"  altho  his  hatred  of  England  doubtless  inspired 
a  kindlier  feeling  for  the  Americans  than  he  would  have 
•entertained  otherwise.  Of  far  greater  propelling  power 
was  his  desire  to  humiliate  the  old  enemy  of  France.  He 
would  not  seek  a  pretext  for  war.  It  was  enough  that 
Great  Britain  was  dangerous,  the  natural  enemy  of  France, 
•"avide,  injuste,  et  de  mauvaise  foi,"  and  that  she  had  always 
sought  every  means  to  injure  the  House  of  Bourbon. 
Should  not  France  then  seize  this  opportunity  to  enfeeble 
her  rival?  The  humiliation  of  England;  the  prestige  of 
France;  such  was  the  policy  of  Vergennes.16  He  did  not 

16This  memoir  of  Vergennes  is  especially  important  as  forming  the 
"basis  of  his  whole  policy  regarding  the  interests  of  France.  Doniol  says 

of  the  "Reflexions" :  "Cette  piece  etait  a  vrai  dire  un  programme 

Le  ministre  etait  desormais  fixe  a  ce  programme,  et  il  devait  letre  avec  le 
conseiller  veritable  du  roi  le  chef  du  cabinet.  Le  cours  des  choses  on  le 
•verra  n'y  changer  a  presque  rien."  Histoire,  I,  249. 

Vergennes  submitted  his  memoir  to  Maurepas,  Turgot,  and  St.  Ger- 
main, all  members  of  the  king's  cabinet,  and  asked  for  their  opinion. 
(Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  279.)  St.  Germain  replied  three  days  later  and 
advised  getting  ready  for  war.  Turgot's  answer  was  not  ready  for  nearly 
a  month.  His  paper  of  April  6  was  a  careful  statement  of  the  finances 
•of  France.  He  pointed  out  the  immense  public  debt  of  the  monarchy,  and 
the  miserable  state  of  her  exchequer,  and  argued  that  a  war  would  make 
impossible  for  a  long  time  to  come  certain  very  necessary  reforms.  The 
reply  of  Maurepas  is  not  certainly  known,  but  Doniol  attributes  to  him  a 
short  and  concise  memoir,  a  copy  of  which  is  found  in  the  foreign  office. 
(Histoire,  I,  286.) 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Vergennes  allowed  the  opinions  of  his  col- 
leagues to  affect  his  policy.  The  later  discussions  on  the  subject  do  not 


36  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION 

seek  to  build  up  the  old  France,  overloaded  with  colonies 
to  drain  the  life  blood  of  the  nation;  that  could  be  left  to 
the  worn  out  empire  of  Spain  and  to  the  shattered  might  of 
Britain.  He  would  call  into  being  a  new  nation,  which 
would  be  a  friend  and  ally  of  the  Bourbon  throne,  and  a 
constant  menace  to  the  maritime  power  of  the  British 
Empire. 

In  his  plans  for  wrecking  England's  power,  Vergennes 
counted  on  the  help  of  Spain.  The  two  powers  had  long 
been  in  alliance  and  the  Spanish  court  had  not  been  behind 
that  of  Versailles  in  its  hatred  of  the  common  enemy.  At 
the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  the  dispute  between  Spain 
and  Portugal  over  the  boundaries  separating  Brazil  and 
Uruguay  was  unsettled  and  the  governments  of  Versailles- 
and  Saint  James  were  involved.  The  latter  was  actively 
supporting  Portugal,  while  the  former,  in  accord  with  the 
terms  of  the  Pacte  de  Famille,  was  giving  encouragement  to 
Spain.17  Vergennes  protested  his  desire  to  make  even 
stronger  the  union  of  the  two  crowns,18  and  the  Spanish 
minister,  Grimaldi,  declared  in  warm  terms  his  gratitude- 


appear  in  the  records  of  the  foreign  office.  Vergennes  had,  by  this  time, 
become  master  of  the  ministry.  Turgot  did  not  long  hold  the  favor  of  the 
king,  and  with  his  retirement  Vergennes  was  the  only  man  of  first  rate- 
ability  in  the  cabinet.  And  Vergennes,  when  he  had  once  determined  on 
a  policy,  was  of  a  character  to  pursue  it  to  the  end. 

"See  page  19,  note  33.  Spain  counted  on  French  assistance  in  case 
of  war,  and  the  British  sent  a  fleet  to  Buenos  Ayres  on  behalf  of  PortugaL 
Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Francs,  6482,  39,  41.  England  offered  to 
mediate  but  Spain  refused  unless  France  should  also  be  a  mediator. 
Ossun  to  Vergennes,  December  5,  1774.  (Ibid.,  49.) 

18  ".  .  .  .  je  vous  prie  de  ma  cooperation  et  de  mon  empressement  pour 
le  maintien  de  1'union  si  desirable  entre  les  deux  monarques.  Si  M.  le  Mis 
de  Grimaldi  se  rapelle  1'epoque  a  laquelle  nous  residions  ensemble  aupres 
du  feu  roy  d'Angleterre  peutetre  se  souviendra  t'il  que  mon  attachement 
a  1'union  ne  date  pas  du  Pacte  de  Famille  qui  nous  en  fait  desormais  une- 
obligation."  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  July  22,  1774.  (Doniol,  Transcripts, 
Acq.  Francs.,  6482,  6,  19.) 


147]  VERGENNES   AND   SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  37 

and  affection  for  France.19  In  the  communications  be- 
tween the  two  countries  before  the  middle  of  1775,  there 
was  much  discussion  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  but  there 
was  no  suggestion  of  using  the  rebellious  colonies  against 
the  mother  country.  Vergennes  had  not  fully  decided  on 
a  course  of  action  regarding  America,  and  the  Spanish 
ministers  had  no  sympathy  with  rebels.  Each  nation  ex- 
pressed the  greatest  sympathy  for  the  other;  but  the  ends 
that  each  had  in  view  were  entirely  different.  Vergennes 
was  getting  ready  to  strike  hard  at  Great  Britain,  while 
€harles  III  was  seeking  anxiously  for  peace.20  Kemem- 
brance  of  the  humiliating  treaty  of  1763  stirred  the  French 
minister  to  thoughts  of  vengeance;  it  merely  frightened 
the  old  king  at  Madrid. 

Events  in  America  soon  forced  the  hand  of  Vergennes. 
The  spread  of  the  revolt  made  necessary  the  transport  of 
powerful  fleets  and  large  bodies  of  troops  across  the  Atlan- 
tic, and  Spanish  fears  of  British  aggression  changed  to 
certainty.21  Grimaldi  hastened  to  assure  the  British  min- 
istry of  the  peaceful  intentions  of  his  court,  and  demanded 
guarantees  that  the  troops  then  in  America  should  not  be 


19"I1  [Grimaldi]  ....  m'a  charge  de  nous  assures  de  sa  gratitude  et 
<le  la  Constance  des  sentiments  de  consideration  et  d'amitie  .  .  .  ."  Ossun  to 
Vergennes,  December  n,  1774.  (Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Francs., 
6482,  6,  8.) 

20Ossun,  the  French  minister  to  Madrid,  frequently  enlarged  on  the 
anxiety  of  Charles  for  peace.  See  his  letter  to  Vergennes,  December  u, 
1775.  (Esj>.,  578.  no.  70.)  Doniol  explains  the  case  exactly:  Histoire,  I, 
293.  See  p.  8,  note  4. 

21"Le  voisinage  quil  y  a  entre  les  Colonies  Angloises  de  1'Amerique  et  les 
possessions  1'Espagnoles  dans  cette  parte  du  Monde  ne  permit  pas  de 
voir  sans  inquitude  tant  de  forces  de  Mer  et  de  Terre  qui  s'y  rassemblent, 
....  malgre  cela  il  est  notoire  que  1'Espagne  n'a  pas  fait  passer  dans 
cette  partie  le  plus  petit  transport  de  Troupes  et  des  Vaisseux  .  .  .  ."  Spain 
further  demanded  assurances  that  "les  dits  armamens  de  1'Angleterre  ne 
subsisteront  en  Amerique  qu'aussi  longtemps  que  1'esprit  de  revoke  des 
Colonies  .  .  .  .  et  retourneront  en  droiture  en  Espagne  aussitot  que  cet 
motif  aura  cesse."  Copy  in  Esp.,  575,  no.  231.  (Aranjuez,  April  25,  1775.) 


38  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [148" 

used  against  the  possessions  of  Spain.22  The  answer  to 
this  demand  was  not  satisfactory.  Great  Britain  gave  as- 
surances that  her  intentions  were  peaceful,  but  at  the  same 
time  larger  armaments  were  sent  to  America,  the  defences 
of  Gibraltar  were  increased,  and  a  British  fleet  was  sent 
to  watch  the  navy  of  Spain.23  To  add  to  the  terror  of  the 
Spanish  court,  credit  was  given  to  the  rumor  that  twenty 
thousand  Russian  troops  and  a  large  German  army  were 
on  their  way  to  America.24 

Fear  drove  Grimaldi  to  seek  counsel  once  more  from 
Vergennes.  The  latter  had  shown  his  disapproval  of  de- 
manding guarantees  from  Great  Britain  and  he  maintained 
that  if  France  and  Spain  accepted  her  assurances  they 
would  be  bound  to  remain  defenceless,  trusting  only  to 
the  good  faith  of  a  treacherous  enemy.25  He  denounced  the 
ambitions  of  the  British  ministry,  which,  he  declared,  had 
in  view  a  project  to  end  the  rebellion  by  uniting  all  parties 
in  an  attack  on  the  American  possessions  of  the  Bourbons. 
26To  Charles  III  he  directed  a  letter  particularly  designed 
to  arouse  Spanish  fears.  He  pointed  out  British  interests 

22"Vous  vous  rapelleres  aussi  les  assurances  reiteres  que  je  vous 
ai  donnees  de  1'idee  avantageuse  et  de  la  parfait  confiance  que  le  Roi 
a  dune  les  vues  pacifiques  du  Gouvernment  Anglois.  Jajouterais  que  Sa 
Mte  est  toujours  dans  la  meme  persuasion."  Esp.,  575,  no.  231. 

23"M.  d'Aranda  est  allarme  des  forces  de  terre  qui  les  Anglois  y  font 
passer."  Ossun  to  Vergennes.  (Esp.,  576,  no.  155;  see  also  DonioU 
Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Francs.,  6482,  83.) 

24Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq.  Francs,  6482,  130,  136,  163. 

25" si  nous acceptons  une  declaration  rassurante  de  1'Ange 

nous  nous  engageons  en  quelque  maniere  a  rester  tranquilles  sur  la  foi  de 
ses  assurances,  et  il  faudra  ou  renouncer  aux  precautions  qui  la  prudence 
conseille  pour  pourvoir  nos  possessions  d'outre  mer  de  tout  ce  qui  peut 
necessaire  a  leur  conservation  ou  s'exposer  a  des  reclamations  sans  fin 
toutes  les  fois  que  nous  ferons  la  moindre  disposition  pour  leur  procurer 
une  surete  moins  precaire  que  celle  qui  peut  dependre  de  la  bonne  foi  des 
Anglois."  Vergennes  to  Aranda,  May  9,  1775.  (Esp.,  576,  no.  20.) 

26  ".  .  .  .  nous  etions  informes  dupuis  asses  longtems  M.  qui  cetoit  une 
opinion  asses  accredited  dans  1'opposition  et  que  cherchoit  a  rendre 
populaire  que  le  moyen  de  faire  cesser  la  guerre  de  1'Amerique  seroit 
de  la  declarer  aux  deux  courrones."  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  August  7, 
1775-  (Esp.,  575,  no.  15.) 


149]  VEBGENNES   AND   SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  39 

in  Porto  Kico,  San  Domingo,  and  in  the  control  of  the  Isles 
of  the  Winds  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  argued  the  cer- 
tainty of  an  attack  upon  some  of  them  by  the  immense 
British  forces  then  in  America.27 

The  arguments  of  Vergennes  were  not  without  availr 
altho  the  Spanish  king  was  still  anxious  for  peace. 
Grimaldi  was  at  last  convinced  that  Great  Britain  would 
use  her  immense  forces  in  America  in  an  attack  upon  the 
Spanish  possessions.28  Preparations  were  made  to 
strengthen  the  chief  ports  on  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  armaments  of  Spain  were  greatly 
increased.29 

While  preparing  for  hostilities  Grimaldi  and  his 
master  still  hoped  for  peace.30  They  knew  that  Spain 
was  not  ready  for  war,  and  had:  no  intention  of  doing 
more  than  provide  for  the  defense  of  her  possessions. 
It  was  recognized  at  both  the  Bourbon  courts  that  Spain 
had  more  to  lose  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain  than  had 
France.31  Spanish  colonies  were  widely  scattered  and 

27 Vergennes  to  Charles  III,  August  7,  1/75.  (Esp.,  577,  no.  15.  Doniol, 
Histoire,  I,  125.) 

28Ossun  informed  Vergennes  that  the  Spanish  feared  English  aggres- 
sion, whether  the  English  conquered  the  Americans  or  failed.  In  the 
first  case,  they  could  readily  use  their  large  army  against  the  possessions 
of  the  two  crowns ;  in  the  second,  they  would  doubtless  use  it  to  make 
up  for  their  losses  by  conquering  new  colonies.  October  30,  1775.  (Esp.r 
578,  no.  59.)  Also  November  13,  1775.  (Ibid.,  no.  62.) 

29The  king  of  Spain  informed  Ossun  that  he  would  send  two  batal- 
lions  to  Havana  and  two  to  Porto  Rico  to  reinforce  the  garrisons  there. 
Ossun  to  Vergennes,  November  13,  1775.  (Esp.,  578,  no.  62,  p.  179.) 
Grimaldi  wrote  to  Aranda  that  Spain  would  continue  her  preparations 
with  much  "chaleur."  February  26,  1775.  (Ibid.,  no.  73.)  See  also 
Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  161. 

30Charles  said  he  would  maintain  peace  even  at  the  expense  of  some 
sacrifice.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  December  u,  1775.  (Esp.,  578,  no.  70,  fol. 
395-) 

31  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  December  28,  1775.  He  gives  an  account  of 
an  interview  with  the  Spanish  court  in  which  it  was  clearly  brought  out 
that  while  France  had  only  a  few  colonies  Spain  had  a  rich  empire  which 
was  almost  defenseless.  (Ibid.,  578,  no.  74,  fol.  461.)  Grimaldi  to  Ver- 
gennes, November  5,  1775.  (Ibid.,  582,  no.  69,  fol.  161.) 


40  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [150 

defenseless,  while  the  few  still  left  to  France  were  strongly 
fortified.  In  the  schemes  of  Vergennes,  espcially  in  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  state  in  America,  the 
court  of  Charles  III  could  have  no  interest.  While  the 
.Spanish  government  recognized  that  an  independent 
nation  in  the  New  World  would  be  a  menace  to  the  British 
possessions,  it  did  not  overlook  the  danger  to  its  own  col- 
onies. It  was  clear  that  the  power  that  would  be  able  to 
check  the  British  in  Canada  would  be  formidable  to  the 
Spaniards  in  Louisiana.  The  interests  of  Spain  could  not 
be  realized  merely  by  humiliating  Great  Britain.  She  was 
anxious  to  recover  her  ancient  possessions,  particularly 
Gibraltar,  Minorca,  and  Jamaica,32  but  could  see  only  dan- 
ger from  an  independent  nation  in  the  New  World. 

It  became  then  the  task  of  Vergennes  to  win  the  Span- 
ish ministers  to  his  policy.  Grimaldi  did  not  have  the 
quality  of  mind  to  follow  an  independent  course,  and  the 
opposition  of  the  French  party  at  the  Spanish  court  led 
him  to  doubt  the  wisdom  of  his  own  reasoning.  As  a  result 
his  actions  were  timid  and  vacillating,  and  the  opposition 
was  encouraged  to  continue  its  endeavors  to  bring  about 
war  with  the  British  Empire.  Again  and  again  Ossun 
pointed  to  the  vast  armaments  which  Great  Britain  was 
sending  to  America,  and  as  often  declared  that  they  would 
ultimately  be  turned  against  the  colonies  of  Spain.  He 
urged  that  the  time  had  come  to  weaken  England  and  de- 
prive her  of  a  part  of  the  vast  empire  through  which  she 
was  seeking  to  control  the  world.  The  opportunity  was 
at  hand,  he  urged,  to  ruin  her  commerce  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, the  Levant,  and  in  Africa,  and  to  build  up  the  trade 
of  France  and  Spain  on  its  ruins.33  Vergennes  found  an 
enthusiastic  advocate  in  Aranda,  the  Spanish  minister  to 
Versailles,  who,  to  his  own  court,  pictured  the  English  as 
the  perpetual  enemies  of  Spain,  hostile  because  of  rivalry 

82Grimaldi  to  Ossun,  October  8,   1776.     (Esp.,  582,  no.  21.) 
"Memorial  handed  by  Ossun  to  Grimaldi,  July  8,  1776.    (Ibid.,  581,  no. 
15,  fol.  42.) 


151]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  41 

in  interests,  and  the  difference  in  the  character  of  their 
population.34  In  the  past,  he  urged,  England  had  over- 
come her  enemies  by  a  sudden  and  unexpected  attack,  and 
there  was  good  reason  to  think  that  she  was  preparing  to 
do  the  same  again.  He  was  sure  that  the  close  of  the  Amer- 
ican war  meant  an  attempt  to  secure  for  Great  Britain 
some  compensation  for  her  losses  by  an  attack  on  the  pos- 
sessions of  France  and  Spain.  Aranda  showed  himself  par- 
ticularly anxious  for  the  provinces  of  San  Domingo  and 
Louisiana,  which,  he  asserted,  were  entirely  unprotected.35 
The  arguments  of  Vergennes  and  the  pleadings  of 
Aranda  were  not  without  effect  on  the  wavering  mind  of 
Grimaldi,  and  he  began  to  carry  on  more  vigorously  the 
work  of  arming  his  country.36  Plans  were  formed  once 
more  for  an  attack  on  Gibraltar,  Jamaica,  and  other  col- 
onies of  the  British  Empire.37  Grimaldi,  however,  did  not 
neglect  preparations  for  defending  the  Spanish  dominions. 
He  was  particularly  worried  about  San  Domingo,  which, 
altho  poorly  fortified,  would  be  of  immense  advantage 
to  England,  and  he  urgently  besought  Vergennes  to  send 
troops  for  its  protection.38 

34Translation  in  Esp.,  579,  no.  81. 

85"M.  d'Aranda  est  allarme  des  forces  immenses  de  terre  que  les 
Anglois  y  font  passer :  considere  qu'il  est  a  craindre  quelque  soit  1'evene- 
ment  de  la  guerre  des  colonies,  que  les  Anglois  ne  s'emparent  de  quelques 

possessions  considerables,  espagnoles  ou  francoises M.  d'Aranda 

examine  ensuite  quelle  seroit  la  conquete  la  plus  aisee  et  la  plus  facile 
que  les  Anglois  pourroient  entreprendre  il  se  fixe  a  la  Louisiane  et  a 
1'isle  St.  Domingue,  la  premiere  comme  les  mettant  a  portee  de 
s'emparer  dans  la  suite  du  Mexique ;  la  seconde  pouvant  leur  procurer  de 
grande  richesses  et  augmenter  considerablement  1'entendue  de  leur  com- 
merce. Get  ambassadeur  regarde  cette  conquete  comme  infallible  si  les 
Anglois  1'entreprennent,  il  suppose  que  1'Espagne  a  suffisamment  pourvu 
a  la  conservation  de  la  Havane  de  Porto  Rico,  et  des  autres  Colonies  de 
consequence  et  il  conseille  tres  fort  de  pourvoir  sans  delai,  a  la  defense 
de  la  Louisiane  et  de  St.  Dominque."  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  April  25, 
1776.  (Ibid.,  580,  no.  57,  new  31.) 

"Grimaldi  to  Aranda,  February  26,  1776.  (Ibid.,  579,  no.  73.)  Ossun 
to  Vergennes,  August  19,  1776.  (Ibid.) 

"Archives  de  la  Marine,  64,  30-41. 

38Ossun  to  Vergennes,  July  I,  1776.    (Esp.,  581,  no.  57.) 


42  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [152 

The  belief  that  the  close  of  hostilities  between  England 
and  her  colonies  meant  an  attack  on  the  American  posses- 
sions of  Spain  gave  the  United  States  a  new  importance 
in  the  eyes  of  that  power.  Her  ministry  saw  a  crisis  ap- 
proaching which,  if  properly  utilized,  might  mean  a  vast 
increase  in  the  Spanish  empire.  It  recommended  measures 
for  a  vigorous  campaign  formidable  enough  to  overwhelm 
the  enfeebled  state  of  Britain.39  It  promised  a  close  alli- 
ance with  France  but,  at  the  same  time,  solicitiously  re- 
called that  Spain  must  suffer  the  heavier  losses  in  case 
their  plans  should  miscarry.40  Grimaldi  was  convinced 
that  the  war  in  America  would  soon  end  and  then  would 
come  the  long  dreaded  attack.  To  withstand  this  onslaught 
the  Bourbon  powers  must  be  ready  to  strike  at  the  critical 
moment 

The  activities  of  Spain  aroused  British  suspicions  and 
Lord  Grantham,  the  British  minister  at  Madrid,  demanded 
•explanations.  He  assured  Grimaldi  of  the  peaceful  inten- 
tions of  his  court,  and  declared  that  the  British  armaments 
were  intended  only  to  suppress  the  revolt  in  America.  He 
•complained  that  the  preparations  of  Spain  and  France 
could  be  directed  only  against  Great  Britain.41 

Grimaldi  was  not  fully  satisfied  with  Grantham's  as- 
surances of  good  will.  He  replied  that  the  preparations  of 
the  Bourbon  powers  were  made  only  in  self  defense  and 
that  they  desired  peace  above  all  things,  but  he  also  de- 
clared that  the  armaments  of  Great  Britain  were  too 
dangerous  to  pass  by  unnoticed.42  Spain  therefore  did  not 


**"Que  si  1'Angelterre  est  maintenant  foible,  elle  le  sera  d'avantage 
dans  deux  ou  trois  mois  par  les  pertes,  qui  lui  aura  cause  la  guerre 
civile".  Grimaldi  to  Ossun,  October  8,  1/76.  (Esp.,  582,  no.  21.) 

40"Enfin  que  dans  cette  guerre  1'Espagne  risque  mtiniment  plus  que 
la  France  en  egard  a  ses  vastes  et  riches  possessions."  Grimaldi  to  Os- 
sun, October  8,  1776.  (Ibid.) 

41Ossun  to  Vergennes,  November  21,  1776.  (Ibid.,  582,  no.  132,  new 
106.) 

42Grimaldi  to  Aranda,  November  29,  1776.  (Translation.  Ibid., 
582,  no.  137.) 


153]  VEEGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  43 

cease  her  efforts  to  strengthen  her  military  position,  and  it 
looked  as  if  the  Bourbon  powers  were  rapidly  drifting  into 
war.43 

The  vacillating  Grimaldi  was  not  yet  ready  to  proceed 
to  extremities,  but  wished  to  postpone  war  as  long  as  pos- 
sible.44 An  attack  by  the  Bourbon  powers  upon  Great 
Britain,  he  urged,  would  produce  a  reconciliation  between 
the  combatants  in  America,  and  a  combined  attack  upon 
the  Spanish  colonies.45  On  the  other  hand,  he  argued,  a 
recognition  of  the  United  States  would  imperil  Spanish 
interests  by  encouraging  revolt  among  her  American  pos- 
sessions. He  further  suggested  that  the  two  powers  should 
plan  to  begin  war  early  in  1778,  but  that,  in  the  meanwhile, 
they  should  try  to  reconcile  England  and  her  colonies.46 

The  objects  of  French  and  Spanish  diplomacy  were 
fundamentally  different.  Vergennes  wished  to  enfeeble 
-Great  Britain  in  order  to  readjust  the  balance  of  power 
in  favor  of  France.  Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  accepted 
with  resignation  her  loss  of  influence  in  Europe,  and  her 
statesmen  were  looking  only  to  an  extension  of  colonial 
power.  Grimaldi  declared  that  if  his  country  should  enter 
into  war  with  Great  Britain,  her  plans  would  in  no  wise 
concern  themselves  with  the  American  conflict.  The  ob- 
jects of  Spanish  policy  would  be,  first  of  all,  to  conquer 
Portugal,  or  at  least  a  part  of  her  dependencies,  to  destroy 
British  commerce  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  to  reconquer 
Gibraltar  and  some  of  the  other  lost  colonies  of  the  ancient 
Spanish  empire.47  While  Vergennes  wished  to  act  in  con- 
junction with  the  Americans,  Grimaldi  insisted  upon  an 
independent  course  of  conquest.  Vergennes  wished  to  raise 


43Grimaldi  urged  France  to  get  ready  for  war.    Ossun  to  Vergennes, 

November  26,   1776.     (Esp.,  582,  no.   193,  new   117.) 

44Grimaldi   suggested   that  if   France   would   disarm   England   would 

doubtless  do  likewise.    Ossun  to  Vergennes,  November  26,  1776.     (Ibid.) 
45Grimaldi  to  Aranda,  February  4,  1777.     (Ibid.,  583,  no.  70.) 
^Memoir  of  the  Court  of  Spain,  July,  1776.    (Ibid.,  585,  no.  100.) 
47Memoir  of  Court  of  Spain  sent  July  26,  1776.     (Ibid.,  585,  no.  100, 

fol.  185.)     Grimaldi  to  Ossun,  October  8,  1776.     (Ibid.,  582,  no.  21.) 


44  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [154 

up  a  nation  in  the  New  World  as  a  friend  to  France  and  a 
barrier  to  British  aggression ;  Grimaldi  feared  an  independ- 
ent state  as  a  constant  menace  to  the  possessions  of  Spain. 
With  these  conflicting  aims  there  could  be  no  sympathy  of 
action  between  the  two  crowns. 

The  conflicting  ideas  of  France  and  Spain  became  first 
apparent  on  the  question  of  giving  aid  to  the  revolting 
colonies.  Both  had  furnished  money  and  supplies  for  pro- 
longing the  war;  but  while  the  aid  of  France  had  been, 
under  the  direction  of  Beaumarchais,  steady  and  zealous, 
the  grants  of  Spain  had  been  given  grudgingly  and  only 
at  the  urgent  solicitations  of  her  ally.  Early  in  1776  the 
British  navy  succeeded  in  blockading  many  American  ports 
and  Vergennes  decided  to  seek  new  means  of  aiding  the 
colonies.  He  proposed  that  Louisiana  should  be  used  as  a 
base  from  which  supplies  could  be  furnished  to  the  insur- 
gents. Spain  had  good  reason,  he  urged,  to  fortify  and 
provision  this  province,  and,  while  doing  this,  it  would  be 
easy  to  send  provisions  into  the  English  provinces.48  Grim- 
aldi declined  to  fortify  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  but 
courteously  offered  Vergennes  the  privilege  of  using  New 

48"Les  avenues  [to  America]  sont  bien  gardees  quil  sera  desormais 
tres  difficile  de  percer  par  mer  dans  ce  continent  la  route  de  la  Louisiane 
est  presque  la  seule  quoique  bien  plus  longue,  mais  nous  n'en  avons  plus 
la  possession  et  vous  connoisses  la  repugnance  des  Espagnoles  pour  don- 

ner  acces  aux  Etrangers Les  Anglois  disent  a  la  force  de  1'Europe 

quils  manquent  de  vetements,  d'armes  et  des  munitions  de  guerre;  c'est 
indiquer  ce  quil  seroit  expedient  de  leurs  fournir  et  ou  pourroit  ou  mieux 
leurs  faire  trouver  leurs  besoins  qu'a  Louisiane.  L'Espagne  a  des  grands 
motifs  pour  fortifier  et  pour  aprovisionner  cette  colonie :  c'est  lavant 
[MS.  illegible]  du  nouveau  Mexique:  que  des  choses  sous  ce  pretexte  ne 
pourrait  on  pas  y  porter,  dont  a  titre  de  commerce  les  insurgens  pour- 
roient  traiter.  A  seroit  leur  affaire  ensuite  de  les  faire  arriver  au  lieu 
de  la  consummation.  Les  derrieres  sont  libre.  ...  les  insurgens  etant 
sans  numeraire  et  leur  denrees  netant  pas  propus  a  ce  commerce  il  fau- 
droit  leur  livrer  a  credit  les  efforts  quon  leur  fourniroit  sauf  a  les  payer 
ensuite  par  envoy  de  leur  denrees  dans  les  ports  d'Espagne ;  d'ailleurs 
quelques  millieurs  de  barrils  de  poudre  ne  sont  pas  un  objet  [MS  illegible] 
pour  une  aussi  grande  puissance  que  1'Esp."  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  March 
IS,  1776.  (Esp.,  579,  no.  116,  new  no.  n.) 


155]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  45 

Orleans  as  a  depot  from  which  the  French  could  aid  the 
colonists.  New  Orleans  was  of  no  use,  he  urged,  for  the 
defence  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  no  plausible  pretext 
couid  be  offered  for  fortifying  it.  No  arms  could  be  fur- 
nished, he  continued,  for  all  those  made  in  Spain  bore  the 
royal  insignia ;  but,  if  France  cared  to  despatch  an  expedi- 
tion, Spain  would  pay  a  part  of  its  expenses.49 

Vergennes  declined  the  use  of  New  Orleans  on  the  con- 
ditions offered  by  Grimaldi.  He  argued  that  while  Spain 
couid  increase  her  forces  there  on  account  of  the  proximity 
of  the  revolt,50  French  troops  in  the  Mississippi  Valley 


49"Ce  ministre  [Grimaldi]  est  convenu  quil  seroit  desormais  tres  dif- 
ficile de  percer  par  mer  dans  le  continent  anglois  de  1'Amerique  septen- 
trionale  et  que  la  route  de  la  Louisiane,  quoique  bien  plus  longue,  etoit 
presque  la  seule  par  laquelle  on  put  etre  informe  de  ce  qui  se  passeroit 
dans  le  continent  anglois;  il  a  ajoute  la  permission  de  se  rendre  a  la 
Louisiane  aux  sujets  que  la  France  jugeroit  a  propos  d'y  envoyer  pour 
remplir  d'objet  desire.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  March  28,  1776.  (Esp.,  579, 

no.  145,  fol.  24.)    "M Grimaldi  m'a  dit  que  le  Roi  son  Maitre  n'y 

trouvoit,  d'autre  difficulte  que  dansles  moyens  de  1'executer  de  maniere 
a  pouvoir  le  desavouer  et  avec  le  plus  grand  secret  possible,  que  1'Espagne 
n'etoit  pas  dans  1'usuage  d'envoyer  souvent  des  batiments  a  la  Louisiane: 
que  cette  Colonie  n'etant  pas  susceptible  d'etre  fortifee  ni  d'etre  regardee 
comme  un  poste  interessant  la  conservation  du  Mexique  ne  seroit  pas  un 
pretexte  plausible;  que  toutes  les  armes  que  se  font  en  Espagne  protent 
la  marque  des  f abriques  Royales :  quil  f audroit  done  que  les  effets  dont  il 
s'agit  pussent  partir  de  France,  destinees  en  apparance  pour  un  de  nos 
Colonies  mais  reellement  pour  la  Louisiane.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  April 
I,  1776.  (Ibid.,  580,  no.  2,  new  25.) 

50Vergennes  to  Ossun,  April  22,  1776.  (Ibid.,  580,  no.  46,  new  7.) 
Nous  ne  pensons  pas  differement  de  M.  Grimaldi  sur  la  commodite  dont 
peutetre  la  Louisiane  pour  y  etablir  un  entrepost  ou  les  insurgens  trou- 
verouent  a  s'aprovisionner  des  gendres  qui  peuvent  leur  manquer:  mais 
sil  Espagne  qui  possede  ce  pays  manque  de  motifs  pour  y  envoyer 
1'aliment  de  ce  commerce,  quil  pretexte  pourrions  nous  employes  pour 
couvrir  1'envoy  que  nous  pourrions  y  faire  de  nos  batimens,  prevenir  quils 
ne  fussent  suspectes  visites,  et  arrites?"  Ibid. 


46  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [156 

would  at  once  arouse  English  suspicion.51  Grimaldi,  how- 
ever, refused  to  change  his  attitude  and  the  matter  was  al- 
lowed1 to  drop.52 

At  the  close  of  1776  new  conditions  arose  to  pull  the 
policies  of  the  Bourbon  powers  still  further  apart.  In 
December,  Benjamin  Franklin  arrived  in  Paris  as  the  envoy 
of  Congress,  and  soon  after  the  incompetent  and  vacillating 
Grimaldi  was  succeeded  by  the  able  and  aggressive  Count 
de  Florida  Blanca.  Franklin  at  once  made  a  most  favor- 
able impression  on  Paris  and  the  French  court.  The  mod- 
eration of  the  American  demands  delighted  Vergennes  and 
he  was  convinced  that  the  time  had  come  for  France  to- 
recognize  the  new  republic  and  take  steps  for  the  humilia- 
tion of  Great  Britain.  He  assumed  that  Spain  would  still 
act  in  harmony  with  his  court,  and  arranged  for  a  meeting 
between  Franklin  and  Aranda. 

Aranda  had  already  given  himself  to  the  cause  of  war. 
He  was  the  leader  of  the  French  party  at  the  Spanish  court 
and  devoted  to  the  Family  Compact.  He  had  been  a  soldier 
of  Frederick  the  Great,  an  enemy  of  the  clerical  party,  and 
was  a  student  and  admirer  of  eighteenth  centurv  French 


51"  . . .  J'attendrai  M.  la  conversation  que  M.  le  M.  de  Grimaldi  vous 
avoit  promise  sur  1'usuage  quom  poruoit  faire  de  la  Louisiane  pour  y 
faire  trouver  aux  Americans  les  munitions  dont  ils  manquent.  Nous 
ne  pouvons  pas  nous  servir  de  cette  voye ;  des  permissions  particulieres 
accordees  a  quelques  de  nos  armateurs  decleroient  le  but  de  ces  envoys 
et  soumet  troient  nos  batimens  a  etre  detournes  de  leur  route  par  les 
Anglois.  Les  Espagnols  ont  au  contraire  un  motif  aparent  pour  couvrir 
les  envoys  qui  peuvent  se  faire  dans  cette  partie.  Le  feu  de  la  revoke  qui 
saproche  de  cette  frontiere  est  une  raison  legitime  pour  y  porter  avec 
abondance  tous  les  moyens  qui  peuvent  la  faire  respecter."  Vergennes 
to  Ossun,  April  12,  1776.  (Esp.,  580,  no.  29,  new  16.) 

B2M.  Grimaldi  ....  a  trouve  forte  justes  les  considerations  qui  etn- 
pechent  la  France  d'envoyer  a  la  Louisiane  des  emissaires  pour  eclairer 
ce  qui  se  passe  dans  les  Colonies  Britainniques  et  d'engager  des  nego- 
cians  et  des  navigateurs  francais  a  fournir  aux  besoins  des  Provinces 
Angloises  revoltes.  Ce  Ministre  a  senti  que  les  memes  motifs  qui  sus- 
pendoient  la  prevoyance  du  Gouvernment  Espagnol  devoient  1'interdire 
au  Ministere  Francois;  aussi  c'est  une  idee  dont  il  ne  sera  plus  ques- 
tion." Ossun  to  Vergennes,  May  6,  1776.  (Ibid.,  580,  no.  76,  new  35.) 


157]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  47 

philosophy.  He  had  driven  the  Jesuits  from  Spain  but  had 
been  unable  to  maintain  his  position  at  the  court  and  had 
retired  as  ambassador  to  Versailles.53  Here  he  bent  his 
efforts  to  bringing  about  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  He  pic- 
tured to  his  court  the  loss  of  Louisiana  and  the  West  Indies 
unless  a  strong  effort  were  made  to  save  them,54  and  had 
already  convinced  Grimaldi  that  another  general  war  was 
inevitable.55 

The  hopes  of  Franklin  to  bring  France  and  Spain  into 
alliance  with  the  United  States  seemed  near  realization,68 
when  all  his  plans  were  broken  up  by  the  overthrow  of 
Grimaldi  and  his  party  at  the  court  of  Charles  III.  Grim- 
aldi was  sent  to  Italy,  and,  altho  Aranda  was  allowed  to 
retain  his  post,  he  lost  all  influence  and  was  no  longer  en- 
trusted with  important  negotiations  between  the  two  courts. 
The  tone  of  Spanish  diplomacy  changed  in  a  night  and 
Vergennes  found  that  the  faith  of  kingdoms  was  no  more 
to  be  relied  upon  than  the  promises  of  republics. 

"Bancroft,   United  States,  V,  128. 

"See  p.  41,  note  35. 

"Grimaldi  informed  Aranda  that  he  believed  there  were  many  ad- 
vantages in  beginning  the  war  with  Great  Britain  at  once.  He  declared 
his  belief  that  this  power  would  begin  war  without  notice  and  use  her 
forces  in  America  in  an  attack  on  some  of  the  Spanish  colonies.  October 
8,  1776.  (Esp.,  582,  no.  21.)  Spain  sent  a  fleet  to  cruise  in  the  waters  of 
the  southern  West  Indies  while  the  French  maintained  vessels  off  the 
southern  coast  of  North  America  to  watch  the  British  ships  which  might 
attempt  to  enter  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Archives  de  la  Marine,  &jt  128, 

p.  194- 

56Grimaldi  wrote  to  Aranda,  February  4,  1777,  regarding  an  alliance 
with  the  Americans  which  he  regarded  as  probable  altho  he  felt  no 
enthusiasm  for  it  and  was  fearful  of  treachery.  (Esp.,  583,  no.  70. 
See  also  Memoir  of  Spain,  January  3,  1777.)  In  this  Grimaldi  set  forth 
the  danger  of  an  attack  from  England  and  suggested  that  Spain  should 
imitate  the  "celerite  des  Anglois''.  As  the  war  was  "indispensable"" 
Spain  would  not  be  the  aggressor.  (Ibid.,  583,  no.  42.)  On  January  27, 
Ossun  wrote  Vergennes  as  if  an  alliance  with  the  Americans  were  con- 
cluded. (Ibid.,  no.  n,  fol.  8.)  During  the  next  month  Grimaldi  was 
busied  with  projects  of  war  and  schemes  for  aiding  the  colonies.  Grim- 
aldi to  Aranda,  February  4,  1777.  (Ibid.,  583,  no.  70.)  Ossun  to  Ver- 
gennes, February  29,  1777.  (Ibid.,  579.,  no.  77.) 


48  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [158 

The  successor  of  Grimaldi,  Don  Jose  Monino,  Count 
de  Florida  Blanca,  was  an  able  and  ambitious  man  and  sub- 
servient to  the  wishes  of  the  king  and  to  the  interests  of 
Spain.  Grimaldi  had  negotiated  the  Family  Compact  of 
1761  and  was  willing  to  stand  by  it,  but  Florida  Blanca 
cared  nothing  for  the  alliance.  The  rule  of  the  foreigner 
in  Spain  was  at  an  end,  and  a  Spanish  ministry  began  the 
formation  of  a  Spanish  policy.57  The  new  minister  was 
intensely  jealous  of  French  influence,  and  proceeded  to  lay 
out  a  policy  calculated  to  make  Spain  independent  and 
France  a  suppliant.  No  longer  did  the  Spanish  ministry 
look  to  Vergennes  for  guidance,  but  her  aid  was  henceforth 
to  command  its  price  and  a  price  increasingly  exorbitant. 
An  intense  royalist,  Florida  Blanca  hated  the  new  republic 
across  the  Atlantic,58  and  refused  to  accept  Vergennes's 
plan  for  a  triple  alliance.  A  strong  imperialist,  he  hoped 
to  recover  the  ancient  dominions  of  his  king.  His  imperial- 
ist and  royalist  principles  combined  made  him  oppose  the 
recognition  of  the  United  States,  and  led  him  to  seek  in 
every  way  to  restrict  the  boundaries  of  the  new  republic. 
Such  was  his  dislike  of  the  United  States  that  he  refused 
to  receive  its  representatives  as  long  as  possible ;  and,  when 
he  did  receive  them,  it  was  with  coldness  and  reserve.  Flor- 
ida Blanca  was  a  most  skilful  diplomat.  In  every  point 
he  succeeded  in  overreaching  Vergennes,  and  throughout 
the  war  and  during  the  negotiations  for  peace  he  was  the 
most  resourceful  and  determined  enemy  of  the  American 
cause.  No  longer  was  Vergennes  able  to  discuss  freely  and 
with  assurance  the  future  of  the  new  republic;  he  must 
consider  always  the  opposition  of  Florida  Blanca. 

With  Florida  Blanca  was  associated  Galvez,  minister 
for  the  Indies,  who  included  among  his  duties  the  manage- 
ment of  colonial  affairs.  Like  his  chief  he  was  sincere  and 
single-minded  in  his  patriotism;  but  he  did  not  show  the 


"Bancroft's   excellent   characterization   of   Florida    Blanca   is   borne 
out  by  the  documents.     United  States,  V,  137  et  seq. 

58Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  December  23,  1777.    (Esp.,  587,  no.  125.) 


159]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  49 

same  subserviency  to  the  wishes  of  Charles  III.  He  often 
opposed  the  measures  of  the  prime  minister  regarding  the 
policy  of  Spain,  and  showed  an  active  sympathy  for  the 
American  insurgents.  In  his  hatred  for  the  enemies  of  his 
country  he  sometimes  showed  himself  as  radical  as 
Aranda.59  Such  aid  as  the  Americans  received  from  Spain 
was  largely  due  to  his  favor. 

The  ideas  of  Florida  Blanca  differed  from  those  of 
Tergennes  in  every  important  detail.  The  Spanish  minister 
liad  determined  upon  a  policy  of  peace,  and  as  the  price  of 
peace  he  expected  to  gain  large  accessions  of  territory  in 
the  New  World.  Furthermore,  he  showed  no  inclination 
to  give  recognition  to  the  United  States  in  their  struggle  for 
freedom.  He  felt  no  love  for  the  British  Empire,  but  he 
•dreaded  more  the  growing  power  of  the  young  nation  in 
America.  He  regarded  it  as  already  a  rival  to  Spain  for 
the  possession  of  the  Floridas,  and  a  dangerous  contender 
for  the  vast  territories  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 

Florida  Blanca  had  a  definite  policy  in  view;  he 
planned  to  hold  the  balance  of  power  between  Great  Britain 
and  her  enemies,  and  to  take  whatever  position  would  offer 
the  best  opportunity  for  an  increase  of  Spanish  influence. 
He  believed  he  could  attain  his  ends  without  involving 
Spain  in  wrar;  but  he  realized  that,  if  his  country  should 
have  any  weight  in  the  final  settlement,  it  must  be  prepared 
for  any  emergency.  He  did  not  know,  too,  at  what  moment 
his  schemes  might  fail,  and  a  British  fleet  fall  upon  the  ex- 
posed colonies  of  the  empire  and  reduce  them  to  subjection. 
From  the  nature  of  his  policy,  the  course  of  Florida  Blanca 
•could  not  fail  to  impress  outsiders  as  timid  and  vacillating, 
"but  the  inconsistencies  of  his  actions  gave  his  policy  its  only 
chance  of  success. 

"We  do  not  need  to  undertake  war  in  order  to  augment 
our  power,  for  whatever  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  be- 
tween England  and  her  colonies,  our  power  will  be  in- 

89Ossun  to  Vergennes,  December  9,   1776.     (Esp.,  582,  no.   163,  new 
112;  Bancroft,  United  States,  V,  136.) 


50  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [160 

creased,"60  wrote  Florida  Blanca  soon  after  assuming  di- 
rection of  affairs.  To  Vergennes  he  explained  himself  less- 
clearly.  "The  two  inonarchs,"  he  urged,  "will  not  swerve 
from  their  principle  of  moderation,  if  they  wish  to  profit, 
by  some  happy  opportunity  to  recover,  by  way  of  negotia- 
tion, some  of  the  territories  which  legitimately  belong  to- 
them,  or  which  have  been  usurped  from  them  by  violence."61 

Against  these  ideas  Vergennes  protested  vigorously. 
There  were  no  territories  either  in  Europe  or  America,  he 
declared,  tempting  enough  to  compensate  for  the  hazards, 
"les  calamites,  et  1'epuisement  resultans  dune  guerre." 
France  had  all  the  colonies  she  needed,  for  the  interest  of 
her  industry,  he  urged,  and  more  extensive  possessions 
would  be  but  a  burden.  Even  the  loss  of  Canada  ought  to 
be  regretted  less,  he  declared,  since  its  abandonment  has- 
been  the  signal  for  the  revolt  of  the  English  provinces.  He 
admitted  the  interest  of  France  in  the  Newfoundland  fish- 
eries, but  he  wrote  of  the  matter  with  no  enthusiasm.62 

These  radically  different  views  of  the  two  ministers 
could  admit  of  no  compromise.  Florida  Blanca  cared 
nothing  for  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  or  for  the  commerce 
of  the  United  States.  His  policy  was  one  of  territorial 
aggression,  while  Vergennes  opposed  all  conquests.  Against 
the  French  minister's  idea  of  war  to  enfeeble  the  British 
Empire,  Florida  Blanca  set  up  the  plan  of  Spanish  aggran- 
dizement by  peaceful  negotiations. 

In  spite  of  his  pacific  intentions,  however,  Florida 
Blanca  continued  his  preparations  for  war.  He  knew  that 
the  game  of  diplomacy  could  be  successful  only  when  sup- 
ported by  arms;  and  he  saw  a  real  danger  to  the  Spanish 

«°Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  April  7,  1777.  (Translation  in  Esp.,  584,. 
no.  14,  new  31.) 

6lQuoted  by  Vergennes  in  note  to  Aranda,  April  26,  1777.  (Ibid.,  584, 
no.  40.) 

•2See  Vergennes  to  Aranda,  April  26,  1777.  "Si  la  perte  du  Canada", 
he  continued,  "lui  a  etc  sensible,  elle  doit  la  moins  regretter  depuis  que- 
1'abandon  qu  elle  a  etc  obligee  d'en  faire  est  devenu  le  signal  de  revoke 
des  provinces  angloises."  (Esp.,  584,  no.  40.  See  p.  34,  note  15.) 


161]  VERGBNNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  51 

empire  in  the  cupidity  of  Great  Britain.  He  felt  that  Spain 
should  prepare  to  defend  herself  and  particularly  her 
American  colonies.  For  this  purpose  he  was  glad  to  con- 
tinue to  act  in  cooperation  with  France.  The  naval  head» 
of  the  two  nations  had  already  formed  plans  for  patroling 
the  west  Atlantic,  and  commanders  of  ships  were  ordered 
to  watch  carefully  the  movements  of  English  vessels,  espec- 
ially those  trying  to  enter  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  or  the  waters 
of  the  West  Indies.  The  instructions  further  ordered  that 
the  commanders  of  both  nations  were  to  aid  each  other,  and 
to  guard  equally  the  interests  of  the  two  crowns.63  Besides 
these  arrangements  Florida  Blanca  provided  for  the  mili- 
tary defense  of  the  Spanish  colonies.  An  army  corps  was 
sent  to  San  Domingo,  and  additional  troops  were  des- 
patched to  Havana,  Vera  Cruz,  and  Porto  Rico.64  Special 
attention  was  given  to  Louisiana  on  account  of  its  proxim- 
ity to  the  British  possessions.  Spanish  fears  were  increased 
by  the  great  number  of  English  Loyalists  who  were  fleeing 
from  the  Atlantic  provinces  and  settling  along  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi.  The  Spanish  officials  at  New 
Orleans  had  already  I'ecornmended  that  vthe  colony  be 
placed  in  a  state  of  defense  against  the  English,  who  coul'dj 
easily  come  from  Pensacola  or  Mobile,  or  even  from  Can- 
ada, by  way  of  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio.63 

While  preparing  to  defend  Spanish  colonists  against 
Great  Britain,  Florida  Blanca  could  not  ignore  the  new 
nation  across  the  ocean.  Its  representatives  were  already 
in  Paris  and  one  of  them  was  seeking  admission  to  the- 
Spanish  court.66  Frenchmen  were  enthusiastic  for  the 

6SThe  Spanish  were  to  guard  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  approaches 
to  New  Orleans,  while  the  French  were  to  watch  the  West  Indies. 
Project  d' Instructions  correspondantes  a  cette  de  la  cour  d'Espagne  .... 
(Archives  de  la  Marine,  64,  128,  p.  194.)  Florida  Blanca  frequently  urged 
the  necessity  of  getting  ready  for  any  emergency.  Ossun  to  Vergennes, 
February,  1777.  (Esp.,  583,  no.  118,  new  21;  ibid.,  no  127,  new  24.) 

84Ossun  to  Vergennes,  February  27,  1777.    (Ibid.,  583,  no.  127,  new  24.) 

65Fortier,  Louisiana,  II,  25-33. 

66Franklin  and  Deane  were  in  Paris,  and  Arthur  Lee  started  in  the 
spring  of  1777  for  Madrid. 


52  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [162 

independence  of  the  new  republic.  Aranda  at  Paris  and 
the  friends  of  France  in  Spain  kept  urging  Florida  Blanca 
to  join  with  the  court  of  Versailles  for  another  struggle 
against  the  common  enemy.67 

Altho  Florida  Blanca  had  no  intention  of  recognizing 
the  independence  of  the  United  States,  he  believed  it  for 
the  best  interests  of  Spain  that  the  war  should  continue. 
Great  Britain  already  suspected  the  Spaniards  of  aiding 
the  insurgents  and  a  sudden  collapse  of  the  revolt  would 
mean  the  end  of  Florida  Blanca's  hopes  to  regain  some  of 
the*former  possessions  of  Spain,  and  might  mean  the  loss 
of  others.  To  prevent  such  a  danger  he  kept  up  the  nego- 
tiations with  Vergennes  and  furnished  aid  for  the  Ameri- 
cans.68 

Early  in  1777,  Arthur  Lee  had  set  out  from  Paris  to 
'Madrid  to  secure  Spanish  assistance  for  the  American 
«ause.  He  was  allowed  to  proceed  no  further  than  Burgos, 
where  Grimaldi  met  him.  We  know  little  of  the  interview. 
Orimaldi  apparently  did  not  treat  the  mission  seriously 
and  Lee's  accounts  are  colored  by  his  sense  of  personal 
importance.69  It  is  clear,  however,  that  Lee  was  willing 


87Ossun  repeatedly  wrote  of  the  earnest  insinuations  of  Aranda  to 
treat  with  America  and  go  to  war  with  Portugal  and  Great  Britain. 
Ossun  to  Vergennes,  January  23,  1777.  (Esp.,  583,  no.  39,  new  7.) 

68Ossun  informed  Vergennes  that  Florida  Blanca  was  in  accord 
with  France  in  regard  to  the  war  in  America,  that  both  powers  desired 
its  continuance.  March  3,  1777.  (Esf>.,  583,  no.  136,  new  28.)  Florida 
Blanca  wrote  the  same  to  Aranda,  and  declared  that  it  was  important  to 
sustain  the  American  colonies,  for  as  long  as  the  war  continued  both 
sides  would  be  weakened.  March  5,  1777.  (Ibid.,  140,  new  i.)  "M.  de 
floride  blanca  m'a  assure  Monsieur,  qu'on  avoit  deja  fait  des  remis 
•d'argent  a  M.  Lee,  et  qu'il  retournoit  en  France  satisfait  des  secours 
pecuniares  qui  luy  avoient  ete  promis."  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  March 
24,  1777.  (Ibid.,  583,  lib.  184,  new  39.) 

"On  March  3,  Ossun  wrote  that  Grimaldi  had  neglected  for  a  long 
time  to  give  the  Spanish  court  an  account  of  his  interview  with  Lee. 
(Ibid.,  583,  no.  136,  new  28;  Bancroft,  United  States,  V,  137.)  Lee  asserted 
that  he  received  encouragement  from  Spain  and  a  promise  that  war 
should  be  begun  within  a  year.  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  282.)  There  is  no 
evidence  to  support  Lee's  assertions. 


163]  VERGENNES   AND   SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  53 

to  offer,  in  return  for  an  alliance,  the  assistance  of  the 
United  States  in  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas.70  While 
Spain  was  anxious  for  those  provinces  she  would  not  enter 
into  negotiations  with  the  United  States  until  they  had 
given  stronger  evidence  that  they  were  able  to  maintain 
their  independence.  Charles  III  declared  that  the  offers 
of  Lee  were  premature.71  Spain  was  willing  to  aid  the 
Americans  secretly  but  would  enter  into  no  negotiations 
with  them  which  might  mean  a  recognition  of  independ- 
ence. 

In  spite  of  Florida  Blanca's  resolutions  for  peace, 
preparations  for  war  were  rapidly  increased.72  Louisiana 
would  doubtless  be  the  first  object  of  attack  in  case  of  war, 
and  would  afford  an  excellent  depot  of  supply  for  the 
insurgents  as  long  as  Spain  cared  to  aid  them.  Galvez, 
the  president  of  the  Council  of  the  Indies,  sent  over  as 
governor  of  Louisiana,  his  nephew,  Bernardo  de  Galvez, 
an  energetic  and  ambitious  man,  full  of  sympathy  for 
American  independence.  The  younger  Galvez  entered  with 
vigor  on  his  administration  and  prepared  to  begin  the 
struggle  along  the  Mississippi.  For  several  years  the 
British  had,  controlled  the  trade  of  the  river,  but  their 
monopoly  was  now  at  an  end.  The  Spanish  governor  at 

70Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  290.  "J'ai  1'honneur  de  vous  informer 
qu'une  des  propositions  que  le  M.  Lee  a  faites  a  1'Espagne  pour  1'exciter 
a  venir  au  secours  de  Colonies  Angloises,  a  etc  qu'elles  s'engageroient  a 
prendre  Pensacola  conquete  facile  selon  M.  Lee  et  a  remettre  immedi- 
atement  cette  place  au  pouvoir  de  Sa  Majeste  Catholique.  Je  sais  que 
cette  Monarque  a  repondu  qu'il.  verroit  avec  beaucoup  de  plaisir  les 
Insurgens  faire  cette  acquisition  mais  qu'il  n'en  accepteroit  la  cession  que 
lorsque  leur  independence  seroit  assuree.  C'est  en  traivaillant  avec  M.  de 
Calves  que  le  Roy  Catholique  a  dicte  cette  reponse,  mais  j'ai  lieu  a 
croire  que  1'avis  de  M.  le  Comte  de  floride  blanca  seroit  que  1'Espagne 
acceptat  1'offre  des  Colonies  a  titre  de  depot  en  attendant  la  decesion  de 
la  guerre  qu'elles  soutiement.  Je  doute  que  son  sentiment  soit  adopte." 
Ossun  to  Vergennes,  March  24,  1777.  (Esp.,  583,  no.  184,  new  39.) 

71"Le  Roi  d'Espagne  a  seulement  daigne  me  dire  ....  qu'il  avoit  fait 
connoitre  a  ce  Depute  [Lee]  qu'il  les  [propositions]  regarderoit  comme 
prematures."  Ossun  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.) 

72Vergennes  to  Ossun,  May  2,  1777.     (Ibid.,  584,  no.  48,  new  30.) 


54  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [164 

once  seized  all  the  British  vessels  within  reach  and  ordered 
the  confiscation  of  all  that  should  enter  the  port.  In  one 
day,  soon  after  his  arrival,  eleven  English  vessels,  laden 
with  rich  cargoes,  were  captured  and  condemned  by  his 
orders.73 

The  belligerent  attitude  of  the  Bourbon  powers 
alarmed  the  British  court.  The  British  ambassadors, 
Stormount  at  Paris  and  Grantham  at  Madrid,  were  in- 
structed to  demand  explanations  regarding  the  immense 
military  and  naval  demonstrations  in  America.  Both  de- 
clared that  the  intentions  of  the  British  court  were  peace- 
ful, and!  they  offered  a  British  guarantee  of  the  Spanish 
possessions  in  America.74 

To  the  British  representations,  both  Vergennes  and 
Florida  Blanca  gave  the  same  answer.  They  declared  that 
it  was  necessary  to  guard  Spanish  interests  in  America, 
and  Florida  Blanca  added,  by  way  of  explanation,  that  a 
strong  force  was  needed  to  hold  in  subjection  the  Spanish 
colonies  which  were  being  seduced  by  the  example  of  the 
British  provinces. 

The  protests  of  Great  Britain  was  a  step  towards  the 
success  of  Florida  Blanca's  policy.  Her  alarm  convinced 
him  that  she  was  ready  to  concede  much  for  the  sake  of 
peace.  France  was  seeking  Spain's  alliance  and  the  Amer- 
icans were  bidding  high  for  her  assistance.  With  French, 
Britons,  and  Americans  seeking  favors  from  Spain,  Flor- 
ida Blanca  felt  strong  enough  to  assume  an  independent 
attitude.  He  informed)  Ossun  that  Spain  had  much  to 
lose  and  nothing  to  gain  from  war  with  Great  Britain,75 
but  that  the  two  crowns  could  settle  the  troubles  in  Amer- 
ica and  receive  valuable  concessions  as  the  price  of  neu- 
trality.70 Charles  III  again  and  again  declared  his  wish 

"Fortier,   Louisiana,  II,  56-57. 

74Vergennes  to  Ossun,  May  2,  1777.  (Esp.,  584,  no.  48,  new  30.) 
Ossun  to  Vergennes,  May  19,  1777.  (Ibid.,  no.  80,  new  60.) 

75Ossun  to  Vergennes,  May  15,  1777.  (Ibid.,  584,  no.  75,  new  58.  See 
also  p.  39,  note  31.) 

76Vergennes  to  Ossun,  June  21,  1777.     (Esp.,  584,  no.  140,  new  38.) 


165]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  55 

to  end  his  days  in  peace,  and  Spain  was  committed  to  a 
policy  of  masterly  inactivity.  Florida  Blanca  had  lost 
much  of  his  fear  of  British  aggression,  but  he  greatly 
distrusted  France.  He  wished  to  recover  the  old  empire 
and  influence  of  Spain,  but  he  did  not  believe  that  Ver- 
gennes  would  aid  him  in  his  efforts.  Spanish  diplomacy 
was  still  in  the  shoals;  but  its  pilot  felt  that  if  he  would 
bide  his  time,  the  warring  nations  must  allow  his  country 
to  regain  some  part  of  the  vast  influence  she  had  wielded 
under  Charles  I. 

The  defection  of  Spain  did  not  cause  Vergennes  to 
despair.  He  still  favored  sustaining  the  Americans  and 
still  counted  on  the  assistance  of  Florida  Blanca.  He 
made  no  protest  against  the  action  of  the  Spanish  court, 
but  declared  that  its  measures  were  in  full  accord  with 
his  own  policy.77  He  agreed  that  the  continuance  of  the 
war  was  beneficial  to  the  Bourbon  powers,  and  was  glad 
to  get  Spanish  aid  for  the  Americans.  He  was  anxious, 
however,  about  the  future  policy  of  Florida  Blanca,78  but 
hoped  to  persuade  him  to  unite  with  France  in  recognition 
of  the  United  States.  To  this  end  and  doubtless  at  his 
instance,  Franklin  wrote  directly  to  the  Spanish  ambas- 
sador, asking  for  an  alliance,  and  offering  to  assist  Spain 
in  the  conquest  of  Pensacola,  if  only  the  use  of  its  port, 
together  with  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  should 
be  granted  to  the  Americans.79 


"Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  March  5,  1777.  (Translation  in  Esp., 
583,  no.  140,  fol.  i.)  Ossun  asserted  the  same  thing  to  Vergennes. 
March  3,  1777.  (Ibid.,  no.  136,  fol.  28.)  "Les  principes  d'apres  lesquels 
la  Cour  de  Madrid  a  dirige  ses  responses  au  M.  Lee  sont  entierement 
conformes  a  ceux  que  nous  avons  adopte  a  1'egard  des  insurgens  et  que 
nous  continuerons  de  suivre  jusqu'a  ce  que  les  circonstances  nous  par- 
oisent  en  exiger  d'autres.''  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  March  25,  1777.  (Ibid., 
no.  1 86,  new  23.) 

78"Je  vous  prie  M surtout  de  nous  mander  quelle  somme  d'argent 

ce  Pee  s'est  determine  de  luy  Congress  accorder Je  vous  prie  M. 

de  nous  informer  exactement  que  le  Roi  Cque  fera  parvenir  .  .  .  ."  (Ibid.) 

79Franklin  to  Aranda,  April  7,  1777.    (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  304.) 


56  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [166 

Vergennes  made  quick  use  of  Franklin's  offer  to 
Spain.  He  had  previously  asserted  that  neither  country 
had  use  for  conquests;  but  now  he  began  to  dangle  before 
the  hungry  eyes  of  the  Spaniards  rich  conquests  as  the 
reward  for  their  services.  He  spoke,  not  only  of  the  Flor- 
•idas,  but  even  suggested  the  conquest  of  the  rich  sugar 
islands.80  He  pointed  out  again  the  danger  which  Spain 
must  encounter  if  she  allowed  a  settlement  of  the  struggle 
in  which  she  had  no  part.  Such  an  outcome,  he  declared, 
would  endanger  the  whole  colonial  empire  of  the  two 
crowns.81 

Altho  Vergennes  was  willing  to  concede  much  to 
the  ambition  of  Spain,  he  still  asked  nothing  for  France. 
To  Louis  XVI  he  argued  that  the  only  interest  of  the  mon- 
archy was  the  enfeeblement  of  Great  Britain.  This  could 
best  be  accomplished  by  breaking  up  the  British  empire 
in  America.  With  Canada  in  the  hands  of  the  English, 
he  argued  that  the  United  States  must  necessarily  hold 
close  to  France  for  their  own  safety,  and  thus  French 
prestige  would  be  increased.82 

That  part  of  British  America  not  in  revolt,  he  would 
leave  in  possession  of  its  rightful  sovereign.  He  hoped  in 
this  way  to  ensure  a  constant  rivalry  between  the  two 
Anglo-Saxon  powers  which  would  hold  the  United  States 
in  dependence  on  France.  Vergennes  would  make  the 
United  States  an  independent  nation  as  a  barrier  to  Brit- 
ish aggression.  It  was  of  no  interest  to  France  to  create 
a  great  and  extensive  republic,  whose  boundaries  could  be 
extended  only  by  the  cost  of  much  blood,  and  money.  He 
would  ensure  the  limits  of  the  United  States  as  he  con- 
ceived them  to  be;  but  to  his  mind,  Canada  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi Valley,  the  ancient  possessions  of  France,  had 
never  been  a  part  of  the  English  colonies,  and  he  would  not 


80Vergennes  to  Aranda,  April  10,  1777.     (Esp.,  584,  no.  21.) 
81Vergennes  to  Ossun,  April  12,  1777.     (Ibid.,  no.  22,  new  26.) 
*2Memoire  au  Roi,  July  23,    1777;   marked  "approve".     (Esp.,  585, 
no.  56.) 


167]  VERGENNES  AND  SPANISH   DIPLOMACY  57 

make  an  effort  to  obtain  them  for  the  new  republic.  Here 
was  the  bone  of  contention.  Spain  wished  the  east  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  to  insure  her  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico ; 
the  United  States  claimed  it  by  right  of  their  ancient  char- 
ters; while  Vergennes,  anxious  to  maintain  the  balance  of 
power  in  America,  preferred  that  Great  Britain  should 
keep  it.  He  wished  to  establish  the  United  States  as  a 
menace  to  British  power;  Florida  Blanca  feared  the  new 
nation  as  a  danger  to  Spanish  power.  To  bring  Spain  and 
the  United  States  to  the  point  of  view  of  Vergennes  was 
the  problem  of  French  diplomacy  and)  its  solution  was  to- 
give  the  French  minister  many  thoughtful  hours. 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST. 

In  the  policy  of  Vergennes  America  was  but  a  club 
for  the  humiliation  of  Great  Britain.  It  was  his  plan  to 
build  up  a  nation  in  America  with  sufficient  strength  to 
check  British  aggression,  but  not  powerful  enough  to  be 
independent  of  French  influence  or  to  threaten  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  New  World.1  The  disintegration  of  the 
British  Empire  in  America  was  rapidly  going  on,  and 
Vergennes  felt  that,  with  Spanish  aid,  he  could  control 
the  result.  The  forces  of  colonial  hatred  were  at  his  ser- 
vice; could  he  also  command  the  strength  of  Spain's  jeal- 
ousy and  ambition? 

The  ambitions,  the  hopes,  and  the  plans  of  the  Ameri- 
cans beyond  their  mere  desire  for  independence  were  un- 
known to  Vergennes,  or  at  best  he  discerned  them  but 
vaguely.  In  the  development  of  his  policy  the  French  min- 
ister showed  little  interest  and  less  knowledge  of  the  con- 
ditions and  purposes  of  the  revolting  provinces.  From  the 
time  of  Bonvouloir's  mission  until  the  surrender  of  Bur- 
goyne,  neither  France  nor  Spain  had  any  representatives 
in  America.  Both  countries  had!  felt  the  need  of  more 
information;  but  neither  had  regarded  the  matter  as  im- 
portant enough  to  command  immediate  action.2 


lMemoire  au  Roi  (Esp.,  585,  no.  56.)  "Si  elle  [independence]  s'acheve 
par  notre  moyen,  elle  doit  en  abaissant  L'Angleterre  relever  d'autant  la 
france,  et  la  remettre  a  son  rang."  Reflexions  [unsigned],  January  7,  1777. 
(E.  U.,  II,  no.  16,  new  28;  Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  118.) 

2In  July,  1777,  Vergennes  suggested  to  Spain  that  each  country  should 
have  some  one  in  America  "wise,  sensible,  and  discreet,  who,  without 
character,  or  ostensible  mission"  should  investigate  conditions  there. 
(Esp.,  585,  no.  45,  new  53.)  For  the  duties  of  this  position  he  thought  a 
merchant  best  fitted.  To  Ossun,  August  25,  1777.  (Ibid.,  no.  51,  new 

58 


169]  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST  59 

During  the  years  from  1770  to  1777  France  paid 
little  attention  to  the  Mississippi  Valley.  The  only  inter- 
est she  showed  in  this  territory  was  purely  commercial. 
In  the  foreign  office  there  are  some  memorials  on  the  to- 
bacco of  Louisiana,  and  Ossun  recommended  that  it  take 
the  place  of  the  Virginia  tobacco,  which  could  hardly  be 
obtained'.3  There  was  no  suggestion,  however,  that  France 
should  attempt  to  recover  her  political  power  in  Louisiana. 

To  the  mind  of  Vergennes  it  is  probable  that  the 
question  of  who  should  control  the  West  never  occurred 
until  it  was  forced  upon  him  by  the  issues  of  the  war.4  In 

137.)  In  November,  Florida  Blanca  informed  Ossun  that  he  already  had 
an  agent  in  America,  a  man  named  "Edouard"  who  had  been  in  the  col- 
onies before  on  matters  of  business  and  was  regarded  as  possessing  the 
prudence  and  skill  necessary  for  a  difficult  mission.  Ossun  to  Vergennes, 
November  8,  1777.  (Ibid.,  586,  no.  139;  Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  578.)  What 
became  of  Edouard  we  do  not  know.  There  is  no  further  mention  of  him 
in  the  documents  in  the  foreign  office  in  Paris,  and  when  Gerard,  the 
French  minister,  landed  in  America  in  1778,  Spain  was  represented  by 
Miralles.  (E.  U.,  IV,  no.  23,  new  97.)  Vergennes  still  delayed.  He  gave 
as  his  reason  the  difficulty  of  finding  a  suitable  agent.  In  November  he 
declared  that  he  had  in  mind  one  who,  he  thought,  would  be  admirable, 
and  who  should  go  at  once  by  way  of  San  Domingo.  (Esp.,  587,  no.  17; 
Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  580.)  At  the  same  time  he  asked  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment to  transmit  to  him  any  information  which  it  might  receive. 
Vergennes  finally  sent  a  man  named  Holker,  though  it  is  probable  that  his 
original  choice  was  B'eaumarchais.  (Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  615.)  Holker's 
instructions  were  given  verbally,  but  there  is  a  minute  of  them  in  the 
French  foreign  office.  November  25,  1777.  (E.  U.,  II,  no.  144,  new  266.) 
In  this  document  there  is  every  evidence  that  Vergennes  knew  nothing 
of  the  desires  of  the  Americans.  Holker  was  to  learn  of  the  situation  of 
affairs  in  America  and  report  them  at  once.  He  was  to  represent  to  the 
Americans  their  need  for  some  power  to  protect  them  from  Great  Britain 
and  to  suggest  that  France  might  aid  them. 

*Es(>.,  583,  no.  70.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  January  27,  1777.  (Ibid., 
no.  52.) 

4When  the  question  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  was  brought  to  his  at- 
tention in  1778,  and  he  was  informed  of  the  American  demands  regarding 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  Vergennes  wrote,  "  .  .  .  .  je  vous  assure 
qu'il  me  paroitroit  etonnant  qu'on  refusat  a  cette  demande.  Cependant 
il  peut  y  avoir  pour  la  negative  des  considerations  locales  que  J'ignore, 
et  qui  peuvent  meriter  quelque  attention."  Vergennes  to  Gerard,  October 
28,  1778.  (E.  U.,  V,  no.  43,  new  105.) 


60  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [170 

his  geography,  however,  the  West  was  not  a  part  of  the 
American  colonies.  It  was  the  ancient  Canada  and  East- 
ern Louisiana  over  which  the  French  and  Indian  Wars 
had  been  fought;  and  altho  the  Frenchman  had  lost  all 
in  the  struggle,  he  could  not  be  compelled  to  rewrite  his 
geography.  The  English  also,  in  the  "Quebec  Act,"  had 
followed  more  closely  French  ideas  of  geography  than 
those  of  their  colonies.  Thus  it  was  that  in  1778  a  French 
officer  describes  the  United  States  as  bounded  on  the  north 
by  Canada,  and  on  the  west  "still  by  Canada  and  the 
Indian  tribes  as  far  as  the  Mississippi."5 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Vergennes  had  ever  con- 
sidered the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
until  called  upon  to  defend  the  seizure  of  English  vessels 
in  4he  Mississippi  by  Galvez  in  February,  1777.  Vergennes 
learned  of  this  action  of  the  Spanish  governor  through  the 
newspapers  about  the  first  of  October.  At  that  time  he  did 
not  know  that  the  English  would  complain,  but  he  declared 
that  any  protest  could  not  be  founded  on  the  common 
law  of  America,  where  each  nation  reserved  to  itself  its 
exclusive  navigation  and  its  own  commerce.  He  held  that 
the  English  had  no  more  right  to  carry  on  commerce  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Mississippi  than  the  French  had  to  trade 
along  the  coasts  of  North  America,  where  all  French  ships 
were  arrested  and  seized.6  It  is  clear  from  this  that  Ver- 
gennes had  not  come  to  the  Spanish  view  of  the  exclusive 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  for  he  described!  the  Spanish 
rights  to  the  right  bank  by  an  argument  which  would  give 
the  English  control  of  the  left  bank.  Later  when  the 
Spanish  ministry  sought  to  deprive  the  Americans  of  the 
right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  Vergennes  expressed  his 
surprise.7 

Spain  did  not  in  any  way  commit  herself  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  until,  as  pre- 
viously noticed,  the  governor  of  Louisiana  seized  the  Eng- 

8 Archives  de  la  Marine,  64,  144,  23. 

•Vergennes  to  Ossun,  October  3,  1777.     (Esp.,  586,  no.  105,  new  63.) 

TVergennes  to  Gerard,  October  28,  1778.     (E.  U.,  V.  no.  43,  fol.  105.) 


171]  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST  61 

lish  ships  in  the  river.  Just  what  instructions  the  min- 
istry had  given  the  governor  is  not  certain,  but  it  has  al- 
ready been  shown  that  his  act  was  in  accord  with  the  pol- 
icy of  Galvez,  the  president  of  the  council  for  the  Indies. 
In  October,  1777,  Ossun  wrote  to  Vergennes  that  Spain 
held  to  the  opinion  that  England  did  not  have  the  right 
to  navigate  the  Mississippi  or  to  deposit  merchandise  at 
its  mouth.8  Spain  further  maintained  that  the  silence 
with  which  the  English  received  the  news  of  the  seizure 
of  their  ships  gave  grounds  to  believe  that  they  acquiesced 
in  her  position. 

Canada  and!  the  Floridas  offered  problems  distinct 
from  that  of  the  West  proper.  American  efforts  to  annex 
the  former  have  already  been  described,  and  they  did  not 
cease  until  the  close  of  the  Revolution.  Great  Britain  had 
no  intention  of  surrendering  this  province,  and  France 
had  no  interest  in  helping  the  United  States  to  take  it. 
The  Floridas  offered  still  less  difficulty.  It  was  recognized 
by  all  that  Spain  was  anxious  to  recover  them,  and  the 
Americans  were  willing  to  aid  this  project  in  return  for 
recognition  and  assistance. 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  brought  the  ques- 
tion of  %  the  extent  of  the  new  republic  at  once  to  the  front, 
and  with  the  problem  of  boundaries  is  connected  every 
diplomatic  negotiation  of  the  American  Revolution.  On 
September  17,  1776,  Congress  resolved  on  a  plan  of  treaty 
to  be  proposed  to  the  king  of  France,  Article  IX  of  which 
provided?  that  "the  most  Christian  King"  shall  never  in- 
vade nor  under  any  pretense  attempt  to  possess  himself 
of  Labrador,  New  Britain,  Nova  Scotia,  Acadia,  Canada, 
Florida,  or  any  other  part  of  North  America.  It  further 
declared  its  intention  to  annex  these  territories  to  the 
United  States,9  but  assured  Spain  that  it  had  no  designs 
on  her  possessions,  and  would  in  no  case  molest  them.10 


8Ossun  to  Vergennes.     (Esp.,  586,  no.  138,  new  118.) 
8 Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.)f  V.  770. 
"Instructions  to  agent  at  court  of  France.    (Ibid.,  816.) 


62  THE  WEST  IN  THE   REVOLUTION  [172 

At  the  same  time  Congress  elected  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin, Silas  Deane,  and  Arthur  Lee  as  American  commission- 
ers to  France,  and  appointed  a  committee  to  draft  instruc- 
tions for  them.  This  committee  reported  that  if  France 
would  aid  the  United  States  in  reducing  Nova  Scotia, 
Newfoundland,  and  Cape  Breton,  the  French  people 
should  be  allowed  equal  rights  of  fishing  there  with  the 
Americans  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  The  commis- 
sioners were  also  to  offer  France  half  of  Newfoundland 
provided  the  remainder  of  the  Island,  with  Nova  Scotia 
and  Cape  Breton,  were  annexed  to  the  United  States.  If 
necessary  to  get  French  aid  the  commissioners  were  to 
assure  "his  most  Christian  majesty  that  such  of  the  British 
West  India  Islands  as,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  shall  be  re- 
duced by  the  united  forces  of  France  and  the  United  States 
shall  be  yielded  in  absolute  property  to  his  most  Christian 
majesty."  The  committee  also  suggested  the  advisability 
of  getting  Spain  into  the  alliance,  and  that,  in  return  for 
her  aid  the  United  States  would  assist  her  in  the  reduction 
of  Pensacola,  if  to  them  should  be  left  "the  free  and  unin- 
terrupted navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  use  of  the 
harbour  of  Pensacola."11  Nothing  was  said  of  the  West, 
but  it  was  not  long  before  a  claim  to  it  was  set  forth.  The 
West  was  not  considered  a  subject  for  negotiation,  for  it 
was  held  to  be  already  a  part  of  the  union  of  states.  These 
instructions  were  the  first  declaration  by  Congress  of  its 
attitude  regarding  that  part  of  British  America  not  in 
rebellion. 

Of  the  commissioners  chosen  by  Congress  only  Frank- 
lin was  of  first  rate  ability.  He  was  undoubtedly  the  great 
statesman  of  the  Revolution.  He  had  done  much  for  his 
country  before  becoming  commissioner  to  France,  but  it 
was  in  Paris  that  he  was  to  accomplish  the  great  work  of 
his  life.  A  man  of  broad  experience  and  wide  attainments, 
he  soon  made  himself  master  of  the  situation.  His  ver- 
satility and  genial  sympathy  made  him  fit  easily  into  the 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress,  VI,  1057. 


173]  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST  6# 

distinctive  characteristics  of  French  life.  The  best;  known 
of  all  Americans,  not  only  in  politics  but  in  philosophy 
and  science  as  well,  from  the  moment  of  his  arrival  he  svas 
a  person  to  venerate  and  respect. 

Franklin  had  long  thought  of  the  problems  relating: 
to  the  territories  beyond  the  limits  of  the  thirteen  states,, 
and  the  experience  of  years  reinforced  his  ideas.  \s  early 
as  1754,  shortly  after  the  Albany  Convention,  he  Imd 
drawn  up  a  plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  western  colonies 
and  had  presented  a  strong  argument  why  this  plan  should 
be  carried  out.12  Again  in  1760,  during  the  struggles  of 
the  last  French  war,  he  had  urged!  the  importance  of  this 
section.  "I  have  long  been  of  the  opinion,"  he  wrote,  "that 
the  foundations  of  the  future  grandeur  and  stability  of  the 
British  empire  lie  in  America;  and  altho,  like  other 
foundations,  they  are  low  and  are  little  seen,  they  are,  nev- 
ertheless, broad  and  strong  enough  to  support  the  greatest 
political  structure  human  wisdom  ever  has  created.  I  am 
therefore  by  no  means  in  favor  of  restoring  Canada.  If 
we  keep  it,  all  the  country  from  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the 
Mississippi  will,  in  another  century,  be  filled  with  British 
people."13  Thus,  as  early  as  1760,  Franklin  had  a  juster 
view  of  the  West  then  did  the  leaders  of  the  nation  thirty 
years  later.  With  a  breadth  of  vision,  greater  than  that 
of  any  other  man  of  his  day,  Franklin  saw  the  grandeur 
of  the  West.  In  a  paper  on  the  "Interest  of  Great  Britain" 
he  asserted  that  "while  our  strength  at  sea  continues,  the 
banks  of  the  Ohio,  in  point  of  ease  and  expeditious  convey- 
ance of  troops,  are  nearer  to  London  than  the  more  remote 
parts  of  France  and  Spain  to  their  respective  capitals ;  and 
much  nearer  than  Connaught  and  Ulster  were  in  the  days 
of  Queen  Elizabeth."14  To  Franklin's  appreciation  of  the 
West  and  its  resources,  and  to  his  foresight  and  watchful- 
ness dluring  the  years  of  his  residence  in  France,  is  due, 


12Franklin,  Works  (Smyth  ed.),  Ill,  358. 
islbid.,  IV,  4. 
14Ibid.,  IV,  72. 


64  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [174 

more  than  to  any  other  cause,  the  preservation  of  Ameri- 
can domination  in  the  Mississippi  Valley. 

Franklin  arrived  at  Paris  in  the  middle  of  December, 
1776,  and  on  the  twenty-third  he,  with  Deane  and  Arthur 
Lee,  addressed  a  note  to  Vergennes,  informing  him  of  their 
mission  and  requesting  an  audience.  The  request  was 
granted,  the  commissioners  were  courteously  received,  and! 
they  submitted  to  the  French  minister  a  sketch  of  the 
treaty  suggested  by  Congress.  The  commissioners  also 
urged  upon  Vergennes  that  France  and  Spain  unite  with 
the  United  States  to  deprive  Great  Britain  of  her  West 
India  possessions.  They  also  offered  to  guarantee  the  pos- 
sessions of  France  in  the  West  Indies  and  such  other  con- 
quests as  she  might  make  there.  France  was  also  to  have 
a  favorable  commercial  Treaty,  by  which  her  ports  were 
to  receive  the  trade  which  formerly  flowed  into  British 
markets.  In  return,  the  Americans  asked'  only  that  France 
should  renounce  all  claims  to  the  mainland  of  North  Amer- 
ica. They  also  urged  a  treaty  of  recognition  and  com- 
merce.15 

Altho  Vergennes  returned  no  answer  to  the  American 
overtures,  he  was  surprised  and  pleased  at  their  modera- 
tion. He  felt  no  objection  to  giving  the  United  States  a 
free  hand  in  North  America,  and  he  was  gratified  at  the 
offer  to  guarantee  French  possessions  in  the  West  Indies, 
altho  he  declared  the  faith  of  a  republic  was  little  to  be 
relied  upon.  He  believed,  moreover,  that  a  favorable  com- 
mercial treaty  would  give  France  all  the  advantages  of  col- 
onies without  the  trouble  and  expense  of  governing  them.16 

During  the  next  few  months  the  Americans  presented 
in  greater  detail  the  desires  of  Congress.  Deane  submitted 
a  memorial  to  Vergennes  urging  a  treaty  with  France  for 
the  "common  security"  of  the  two  countries.  He  urged 
that  the  whole  British  Empire  in  America  be  conquered, 


15Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  239-246. 

16Vergennes  to  Ossun,  January  4,  1777.    (Esp.,  583,  no.  6,  new  2.    Same 
to  same,  January  12.     (Ibid.,  no.  20,  new  53.) 


175]  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST  65 

France  to  get  the  West  Indies  and  a  share  of  the  New- 
foundland fisheries,  while  all  the  remainder  was  to  go  to 
the  United  States.17 

It  is  probable  that  this  proposal  of  Deane  did  not  re- 
ceive any  serious  consideration  from  Vergennes,  for  he 
soon  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  necessary  to  keep 
Canada  in  the  hands  of  the  British  in  order  to  maintain 
the  balance  of  power  in  America,  and  to  make  the  United 
States  dependent  upon  France.18  It  is  not  unlikely,  how- 
ever, that  Vergennes  was  willing  to  allow  the  United  States 
to  make  such  conquests  as  they  could  in  the  West,  the 
Floridas,  and  even  a  part  of  Canada,  but  he  would  never 
consent  to  use  French  blood  in  extending  the  boundaries 
of  the  republic.  Since  France,  herself,  had  no  intention 
of  adding  to  her  dominions,  it  was  a  matter  of  little  mo- 
ment to  her  what  became  of  the  British  Empire  when  it 
fell.19 

The  Americans  were  willing  to  surrender  their  claims 
to  the  Floridas  in  return  for  Spanish  assistance.20  Frank- 
lin early  discerned,  however,  the  wide  stretch  of  Spanish 
-ambition;  and1,  before  it  could  declare  itself,  he  demanded 
from  Florida  Blanca  an  express  acknowledgment  of  the 

17Deane  to  Vergennes,  March  18,  1777.  (E.  U.,  II,  no.  72,  fol.  131.) 
Deane  had  written  to  Jay,  December  3,  1776,  that  articles  such  as  he  here 
.proposed  had  been  shown  to  him  (Sparks,  Dip.  Cor.,  I,  70),  but  it  is 
probable  that  he  meant  he  had  suggested  them  himself,  which  is  the  truth. 
Deane  was  fertile  with  suggestions  regarding  the  West.  In  December, 
1776,  he  suggested  to  Congress  the  formation  of  a  state  north  of  the  Ohio 
(Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  203),  and  in  March,  1777,  he  proposed  to  desig- 
nate, as  security  for  a  loan,  three  thousand  square  miles  (he  writes  three 
thousand  miles  square)  of  the  most  fertile  land  on  the  rivers  Ohio  and 
Mississippi,  one  acre  of  land  to  be  given  as  security  for  each  livre  sub- 
scribed. (E.  U.,  II,  no.  75,  fol.  135.) 

18Memoire  au  Roi,  July  4,  1777.  See  p.  58,  note  I.  It  is  possible  that 
Vergennes  informed  the  king  that  Canada  should  remain  British  in  order  to 
allay  the  fear  which  that  monarch  had  of  republics,  for  later  he  showed 
himself  willing  to  aid  the  Americans  against  Canada. 

19Vergennes  to  Aranda,  March  n,  1777  (Esp.,  583,  no.  155)  ;  April 
ao  (ibid.,  584,  new  21). 

20Lee  made  this  offer  on  his  mission  to  Spain.    See  p.  53,  note  70. 


66  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [176 

right  of  the  Americans  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi River.21  Thus  was  the  issue  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States  raised.  The  demand  for  the  right  to 
navigate  the  Mississippi  could  mean  only  that  the  United 
States  had  in  mind  to  claim  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  and 
thus  come  in  contact  with  the  Spanish  colony  of  Louis- 
iana. All  the  fears  which  the  Spanish  ministers  had  en- 
tertained had  now  become  threatening.  The  new  republic 
would  be  a  constant  menace  to  Louisiana,  and  would  likely 
either  seduce  it  into  rebellion  or  conquer  it.  With  such  a 
belief  the  Spanish  ministry  felt  it  necessary  to  do  every- 
thing possible  to  limit  the  boundaries  of  the  new  republic; 
and  this  led  to  an  effort  to  hold  as  much  of  the  east  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  as  it  could  lay  claim  to.  Here  lay  the 
root  of  a  vital  antagonism  between  the  two  countries,  and 
a  rivalry  which  did  not  cease  until  Spain  was  driven  off 
the  American  continent. 

Spain  had  a  strong  commercial  interest  in  maintain- 
ing control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  English  had  used 
their  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  and!  their  control 
of  Mobile  and  Pensacola  to  carry  off  much  of  the  trade 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley.  Spain  now  saw  that  if  she  were 
to  remain  the  dominant  power  in  the  lower  Mississippi 
she  must  cut  off  every  source  of  competition.  This  meant 
that  the  Floridas  and  the  control  of  the  river  must  be  the 
objects  of  Spanish  diplomacy  in  America,  and  with  these 
in  the  possession  of  Spain,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  would  be- 
come a  Spanish  lake.22 

While  the  West  was  becoming  the  subject  of  European 
diplomacy,  its  possession  by  the  United  States  was  held  by 
Congress  to  be  beyond!  question.  Other  questions  of  terri- 
torial right,  however,  were  constantly  engaging  the  atten- 
tion of  this  body.  The  project  for  annexing  Canada  was; 


"Franklin,   Writings   (Smyth  ed.),  VII,  40. 

22This  phase  of  the  subject  did  not  come  up  till  later,  but  Florida 
Blanca  doubtless  long  held  it  in  mind.    See  p.  80. 


177]  THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  WEST  67 

always  before  it.23  Plans  of  attack  were  prepared  and 
many  schemes  for  obtaining  assistance  were  urged. 

The  Floridas  claimed  equal  attention,  but  they  were 
thought  of  as  only  an  inducement  to  get  the  help  of  Spain. 
The  original  intention  of  Congress  to  annex  them  to  the 
United  States  was  soon  lost  sight  of  in  the  need  for  for- 
eign assistance,  and  at  the  close  of  1776  the  American  com- 
missioners were  authorized  to  pledge  the  help  of  the  na- 
tion in  conquering  them  for  Spain.24  To  this  promise,, 
however,  was  attached  the  proviso  that  the  free  navigation, 
of  the  Mississippi  and1  the  use  of  the  harbor  of  Pensacola 
should  be  accorded  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  possible  that  some  concessions  on  the  part  of 
Congress  were  induced  partly  by  the  efforts  of  the  Spanish 
agent,  Don  Juan  de  Miralles,  who  came  from  Havana  to 
the  United  States  some  time  in  1777  as  a  secret  and  un- 
accredited agent  of  Spain.  He  spent  some  time  at  Charles- 
ton, where  he  was  active  among  the  revolutionists.  Later 
he  went  to  Philadelphia,  where  he  became  acquainted  with 
several  members  of  Congress  and  apparently  secured  their 
confidence.  He  tried  to  get  the  support  of  Congress  for 
a  combined  expedition  of  Americans  and  Spaniards  which 
he  and  Governor  Henry  planned  to  send  to  conquer  the 
West,25 

The  great  aim  of  Miralles,  however,  was  to  secure  the 
claims  of  Spain  to  the  Floridas  and  to  the  exclusive  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  River.  Beyond  that  he  wished 
to  extend)  Spanish  authority  as  far  as  possible.26  Spain 
had  carefully  prepared  the  way  for  her  agent  by  showing 
new  favors  to  the  Americans  and  by  furnishing  them  wth 
supplies.  Galvez,  who  became  governor  in  January,  1777, 
promised  that  he  "would  go  every  length  possible  for  the 


^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  Dec.  30,  1776;  ibid.r 
VI,  1056  (Dec.  2,  1777)  ;  ibid.,  IX,  985. 
2*Ibid.,  VI,  1057. 
"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  25,  1778.    (E.  U.,  IV,  no.  41,  fols.  142-147.) 


€8  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [178 

interest  of  Congress."27  Under  his  administration,  New 
Orleans  became  a  depot  for  supplies  for  the  American 
troops.  Oliver  Pollock,  the  agent  of  Congress,  was  allowed 
to  carry  on  operations  unchecked,  and  Spain  and  the 
United  States  seemed  already  in  alliance.28 

The  question  of  the  West,  however,  was  still  unsettled. 
Spain's  designs  were,  as  yet,  not  fully  known ;  but  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi  had  already  become  an  issue.  The 
great  Southwest  was  soon  to  become  the  subject  of  dispute, 
and  the  Northwest  was  as  yet  unwon.  Great  Britain  still 
held  Detroit  and  other  important  posts,  and  these  must  be 
captured  before  the  States  could  make  good  their  claims. 
Congress  had  practically  abandoned  all  claims  to  the  Flor- 
idas,  and  Canada  was  still  untaken.  The  outcome  was 
uncertain,  and  experience  was  to  show  that  it  depended 
upon  two  things — hard  fighting  and  shrewd  diplomacy. 


"Oliver  Pollock  to  Congress,  September  18,  1782.  (Papers  of  the  Con- 
tinental Congress,  no.  50,  no.  I,  fol.  I.)  In  August,  1776,  Gov,  Unzuga 
granted  a  "Batteaux  load  of  the  King's  Powder."  Ibid. 

2BIbid.;  E.  U.,  IV,  no.  41,  fol.  142.  The  aid  given  by  Galvez  to  the 
Americans  was  not  unknown  to  the  British.  In  the  Public  Record  Office 
are  numerous  accounts  of  this.  According  to  one  the  Americans  were 
given  a  public  guardhouse  in  New  Orleans,  and  were  permitted  to  sell 
openly  plunder  taken  from  the  British.  They  were  also  allowed  to  fit  out 
armaments  and  Spanish  ships  were  furnished  to  take  supplies  up  the 
river.  Memorials  of  Alexander  Graydon,  Robert  Ross,  John  Campbell. 
(C.  O.,  5,  117.) 


CHAPTER    IV 

THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE. 

The  year  1777  was  full  of  unrest  in  the  politics  of 
Europe.  It  was  characterized  by  the  tortuous  policy  of 
Florida  Blanca,  the  double  dealing  of  Vergennes,  and  the 
suspicion  and  distrust  felt  by  British  statesmen  for  their 
neighbors.  Vergennes  was  constantly  trying  to  bring  Flor- 
ida Blanca  into  a  war  which  he  had  resolved  to  avoid,  and 
the  Spanish  minister  was  seeking  to  force  concessions  by 
a  system  of  ever-changing  threats  and  promises.  Great 
Britain  was  swayed  between  her  need  for  peace  and  her 
indignation  at  the  Unfriendly  attitude  of  the  Bourbon  pow- 
ers. 

Vergennes  was  still  unacquainted  with  the  vastness 
of  Spain's  ambition,  but  he  realized  that  he  had  a  gigantic 
task  in  bringing  her  into  the  struggle  against  Great  Brit- 
ain. Florida  Blanca  frequently  declared  his  anxiety  to 
maintain  the  alliance  with  France,  and  often  expressed 
his  willingness  to  go  to  war,  but  in  every  crisis  he  found 
some  pretext  which  enabled  him  to  avoid  fulfilling  his 
promises. 

The  Bourbon  powers,  however,  were  constantly  in- 
creasing their  preparations.  Vergennes  was  in  deadly  ear- 
nest, and  Florida  Blanca  knew  that  if  he  were  to  win  any 
concessions  a  show  of  force  at  least  was  necessary.1  Under 
these  circumstances  there  were  advanced  many  projects  of 
war.  Altho  the  two  countries  had  stationed  fleets  in 
the  West  Indies,  they  still  thought  it  necessary  to  make 


1Florida  Blanca  wrote  to  Aranda,  March  3,  1777,  that  while  Spain 
desired  peace,  it  was  necessary  to  get  ready  to  carry  on  a  vigorous  war. 
(Esp.,  583,  no.  140,  new  I.)  He  also  informed  Ossun  of  his  intention  to 
strengthen  Spanish  defenses.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  March  3  (ibid.,  no. 
136)  ;  February  27  (ibid.,  no.  127,  new  24). 

69 


70  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [180 

other  plans  to  protect  their  interests.2  The  extreme  weak- 
ness of  the  naval  equipment  of  the  two  countries  in  the 
West  Indies  was  regarded  as  dangerous  to  the  safety  of 
Bourbon  possessions  there,  for  it  was  believed  that  the  end 
of  the  American  war  meant  an  attack  upon  them.  The 
plans  of  the  naval  heads  of  the  two  countries  were  to  carry 
on  a  defensive  naval  war,  until,  if  their  undertakings  should 
prosper,  they  would  be  in  position  to  attack  some  important 
places,  such  as  Jamaica,  Gibraltar,  and  Grenada,  and  pos- 
sibly make  a  descent  upon  England  or  Ireland.3 

Both  Vergennes  and  Florida  Blanca  declared  that 
their  policies  were  in  complete  accord.4  But  in  spite  of 
their  assertions  this  agreement  was  only  on  expedients  and 
was  not  on  anything  fundamental.  They  saw  that  the 
continuance  of  the  war  in  America  was  beneficial  to  their 
interests,  and  so  they  were  willing  to  support  the  insur- 
gents. Here  their  agreement  ended. 

On  the  fundamental  question  of  the  policy  to  be  pur- 
sued there  was  a  wide  difference.  The  belief  of  the  Spanish 
minister  that  he  could  attain  all  the  ends  of  his  country 
while  keeping  the  peace  has  already  been  explained.  Ver- 
gennes was  very  skeptical  of  the  success  of  such  a  policy,5 
and  insisted  strongly  on  the  necessity  of  war  as  the  only 
outcome. 


^Archives  de  la  Marine,  84,  128-131. 

•Ibid.,  135. 

4"Les  principes  d'apres  lesquels  la  Cour  de  Madrid  a  dirige  ses 
reponses  au  M.  Lee  sont  entierement  conformes  a  ceux  que  nous  avons 
adopte  a  1'egard  des  insurgens  .  .  .  ."  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  March  25, 
1777.  (Esp.,  583,  no.  186,  new  23.)  Florida  Blanca  said  that  the  two 
crowns  were  in  accord  on  the  "fondamental  principes."  To  Aranda, 
March  5,  1777.  (Ibid.,  no.  140.) 

BVergennes  to  Ossun,  June  21,  1777.  (Esp.,  584,  no.  140,  new  38.) 
Vergennes  urged  Ossun  to  press  Florida  Blanca  for  his  memoir  advo- 
cating the  belief  that  it  is  possible  for  the  two  crowns  to  intervene  in 
America  without  taking  part  in  the  war.  "If  he  has  in  his  familiar  con- 
versation any  opinions  on  this  subject,  please  inform  me;  altho  I  do  not 
hold  it  impossible  that  the  minister  should  have  an  outlook  more  extended 
than  my  own." 


181]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  71 

The  political  situation  was  further  complicated  by 
the  suspicious  attitude  of  Great  Britain.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  American  insurrection  the  good  will  of  France  was 
taken  by  British  statesmen  as  practically  assured.6  Before 
the  close  of  1775,  however,  the  court  of  London  was  becom- 
ing suspicious.  Accusations  were  made  freely  that  French 
aid  was  given  the  rebels.  "Your  Lordship  will  not  think 
that  I  am  of  such  easy  credulity  as  to  believe  that  they 
do  not  connive  at  Succours  being  sent  from  this  country  to 
America,"  wrote  Stormount  from  Paris.  ".  .  .  .  This, 
however,  My  Lord,  I  never  pretend  to  see,  but  always  seem 
to  be  entirely  satisfied  with  the  assurances  they  give  me."7 

Throughout  the  years  1776  and  1777,  Stormount  was 
busy  protesting  against  French  violations  of  neutrality. 
He  suspected  that  Vergennes  had  gone  so  far  as  to  sign  a 
convention  with  the  Americans,  and  often  threatened  war.8 
Spain  also  was  credited  with  hostility  to  Great  Britain, 
and  at  the  close  of  1777  Stormount  summed  up  his  conclu- 
sions as  follows :  "I  have  not  a  shadow  of  doubt  that  this 
court  and  that  of  Madrid  are  combined  against  us  and  have 
long  been  preparing  and  still  continue  to  prepare  for  the 
execution  of  some  insidious  design."9 

With  Great  Britain  suspicious  and  Spain  defiant,  the 
problem  of  Vergennes  was  a  delicate  one.  Grimaldi  had 

6St.  Paul,  charge  d'affaires  at  Paris,  to  Earl  of  Rochford,  Secretary 
of  State  for  the  South,  September  30,  1775.  (F.  O.  France,  541 ;  Stevens, 
Facsimiles,  XIII,  1303.)  Stormount,  British  ambassador  to  France,  to 
Rochford,  October  31.  (Circourt.  III.  I.) 

7Stormount  to  Weymouth,  December  6,  1775.  (F.  O.  France,  542; 
Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XIII,  1307.)  Stormount  goes  on  to  say,  "There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  if  Choiseul  came  into  power  he  would  instantly 
take  a  decided  step  against  us  ...  ." 

Correspondence  of  Stormount  with  British  foreign  office.  (F.  O. 
France,  545;  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XIV.)  Stormount  wrote,  March  26, 
1777:  "I  have  tried  to  get  direct  proofs  of  this  duplicity  and  have  used 
every  endeavor  to  discern  if  there  exists  any  treaty  or  written  agreement 
between  this  court  and  the  rebels.  I  can  find  no  traces  of  any  such  con- 
vention ....  I  am  assured  that  the  ministers  here  wish  nothing  in 
writing."  (F.  O.  France,  547;  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XV,  1497.) 

9F.  O.  France,  551. 


72  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [182 

long  since  declared  his  willingness  for  war,  and  just  before 
his  retirement  from  office  had  asked  only  that  it  be  post- 
poned until  the  Spanish  treasure  ships  should  come  in. 
The  fleet  had  long  since  arrived  with  all  its  stores  of  wealth, 
but  still  Spain  hesitated.  To  the  urgings  of  the  French  the 
Spanish  ministers  replied  that  they  were  not  yet  ready. 

The  year  1777  was  allowed  to  wear  itself  out  with 
fruitless  bickerings  between  the  two  powers.  Vergennes 
continued  his  policy  of  urging  Spain  to  war,  sometimes 
with  bright  prospects  of  success,  more  often  with  com- 
plete defeat.  At  times  Florida  Blanca  would  talk  in  tones 
of  undoubted  belligerency;  but  when  he  had  almost  com- 
mitted himself  he  would  find  some  pretext  on  which  to 
draw  back.10 

Meanwhile  Vergennes  was  getting  into  more  serious 
difficulties  with  Great  Britain.  He  had  gone  too  far  to 
retrace  his  steps>  and  war  for  France  had  become  an  abso- 
lute necessity.  French  aid  had  been  given  almost  openly 
to  the  insurgents,11  and  a  powerful  fleet  sent  to  America.12 


10Florida  Blanca  suggested  in  August,  1777,  a  plan  to  combine  against 
England  as  soon  as  the  treasure  fleet  should  arrive,  and  the  fishermen 
should  return  from  Newfoundland.  Ossun  to  Vergennes,  August  21.  (Esp., 

585,  no.   131,  new  93.)     He  declared  that  the  treasure  ships  could  not 
return  before  the  next  May.     (Ibid.,  no.  106.)    Vergennes  agreed  to  wait 
and  be  very  careful,  for  he  declared  that  England  would  seize  the  ships 
which  carried  fifty  million  piastres  on  the  slightest  pretext.     Vergennes 
to  Ossun,  August  22.     (Ibid.,  no.  137,  new  51.)    In  September  Florida 
Blanca  arranged  with  France  to  send  troops  to  America.    (September  i, 
ibid.,  586,  no.  3.)     He  declared  his  approval  of  French  measures  and  de- 
clared he  would  begin  war  if  France  were  attacked.    Ossun  to  Vergennes, 
September  8.    (Ibid.,  no.  33,  new  103.)    The  next  day  he  declared  in  favor 
of  the  continuation  of  the  American  war,  but  urged  a  pacific  policy  for 
the  Bourbon  crowns.     Paper  handed  to  Ossun,  October  17,  1777.     (Ibid., 

586,  fol.  226.)     From  this  time  on  Florida  Blanca  would  say  nothing  in 
favor  of  war. 

"Stormount  to  Weymouth,  January  u,  14,  19,  21,  22.  (F.  O.  France, 
552.)  Wentworth  to  Eden,  December  28,  January  i,  6.  (Stevens, 
Facsimiles,  III,  322,  327.) 

"Vergennes  to  Ossun,  September  19,  1777.  (Esp.,  586,  no.  58,  new 
147 ;  September  26,  ibid.,  no.  59,  new  147.) 


183]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  73 

British  and  French  recognized  alike  that  peace  could  not 
long  be  preserved.13  Vergennes  himself  declared  that  the 
position  of  France  every  day  became  more  critical  and  the 
duration  of  peace  more  uncertain.14 

The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  meant  to  Vergennes  that 
the  crisis  had  come.  He  knew  that  the  time  was  at  hand 
for  France  to  strike;  to  humiliate  her  ancient  enemy  and 
to  regain  her  former  position  in  the  family  of  nations.  He 
declared  that  France  could  now  extend  her  commerce  and 
fisheries  without  interference,  and  could  assure  the  peace- 
ful possession  of  her  islands  without  the  danger  of  British 
aggression.15  "We  must  now  either  support  the  colonies  or 
abandon  them,"  he  argued.  "We  must  form  the  alliance 
before  England  offers  independence,  or  we  will  lose  the 
benefit  to  be  derived  from  Amrica,  and  England  will  still 
control  their  commerce."16  Independence  was  felt  to  be  so 
important  that  France  must  recognize  it  even  without  the 
support  of  Spain. 

Before  Vergennes  began  war,  however,  he  wished  to 
secure  the  active  cooperation  of  Spain.  News  of  the  sur- 

13Stormount  wrote  October  I,  1777,  that  France  would  interfere 
within  three  or  four  months.  (F.  O.  France,  550;  Stevens,  Facsimiles, 
XIX,  i/io.)  De  Noailles,  French  ambassador  to  London,  wrote,  January 
31,  that  he  saw  hostile  intentions  in  London.  (Ibid.,  XIV,  1421.)  Stor- 
mount's  protest  were  couched  in  threatening  tone.  See  note  n. 

14 Vergennes  to  Noailles,  August  30,  1777.  (Stevens,  Facsimiles, 
XVIII,  1666.) 

15"Les  avantages  qui  resulteroit  de  la  [intervention]  Sont 
innombrables  nous  humilierons  notre  enemi  naturel,  un  ennemi  perfide 
qui  ne  sont  jamais  respecter  ni  les  Traites  ni  les  droits  des  nations  nous 
de  tournerons  a  notre  profit  une  des  principales  sources  de  son  opulence 
nous  ebranleons  Sa  puissance,  et  la  reduirons  a  sa  juste  valeur  nous 
etendions  notre  commerce,  notre  navigation,  notre  peche,  nous  assurerons 
la  possession  de  nos  Isles,  Enfin  nous  retablerons  notre  consideration  et 
nous  reprendrons  parmi  les  Puissances  de  1'Europe  la  place  qui  nous 
apartient."  "Consideration  upon  the  necessity  of  France  declaring  at  once 
for  the  American  colonies."  (Angleterre,  528,  fol.  88;  Stevens,  Facsimiles, 
XXI,  1835.)  Unsigned ;  but  the  style  is  that  of  Vergennes  and  the  opin- 
ions set  forth  are  in  strict  accord  with  his  policy. 

i«Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  January  23,  1778.  (Esp.,  588,  no.  17,  new 
m.) 


74  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [184 

render  of  Burgoyne  reached  Paris  on  the  night  of  December 
7,  1777. 17  Four  days  later  Vergennes  sent  a  despatch  to 
Montmorin,  the  new  minister  to  Spain,  asking  for  a  Span- 
ish alliance.  He  declared  he  would  ask  nothing  hard  of 
the  Americans,  only  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  the  guar- 
antee of  French  possesions  in  America;  and  he  expected 
that  Spain  would  ask  nothing  more.18  Evidently  he  feared 
this  would  not  be  satisfactory  to  Spain,  for  on  the  thir- 
teenth he  wrote  again :  "Perhaps  Spain  still  regrets  the  loss 
of  Florida  which  gives  to  the  English  an  easy  access  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico."  He  doubtless  knew  that  Arthur  Lee 
had  offered  Florida  to  the  Spaniards,  but  he  cautiously 
continued:  "I  do  not  know  what  the  Americans  think  in 
regard  to  this  ....  but  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  they 
would  not  hold  very  strongly  to  a  thing  they  do  not  pos- 
sess, and  which,  it  seems  to  me,  is  not  of  much  importance 
to  them."19  Vergennes  had  not  yet  seen  the  importance 
•of  the  territorial  question  in  the  war.  He  was  bidding  for 
the  help  of  Spain,  but  it  did  not  occur  to  him  to  offer  more 
of  North  America  than  the  Floridas. 

Montmorin  sought  out  Florida  Blanca,  and  asked  for 
an  alliance  with  the  Americans.  He  presented  the  dangers 
of  reconciliation  and  an  attack  by  Americans  and  English 
•combined  upon  Spanish  America.  He  offered  the  Floridas, 
but  the  Spanish  minister  was  unaffected.  He  declared  that 
the  Spanish  fleet  was  poorly  prepared  for  battle  and  would1 
fall  an  easy  prey  to  the  English.  To  excuse  his  attitude 
he  blamed  the  French  for  not  going  to  war  when  he  was 
ready.  He  further  maintained  that  there  was  no  danger 
of  reconciliation;  and,  under  no  circumstances,  would  the 
king  treat  with  rebels.20 

In  spite  of  the  refusal  of  Florida  Blanca,  Montmorin 


"Esp.,  587,  no.  92. 

"December  u.   Ibid.,  587,  no.  99. 

19Ibid.,  587,  no.  103. 

20Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  December  23.    (Ibid.,  587,  no.  125.) 


185]  THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  75 

believed  that  if  France  should  enter  the  war  Spain  would 
be  bound  to  follow.21  His  efforts,  however,  led  to  further 
rebuffs.  At  an  interview  on  January  4,  Florida  Blanca 
declared  angrily  that  there  was  neither  object  in  be- 
ginning war  nor  plan  in  conducting  it.22  The  aims  of 
the  Spanish  minister,  however,  soon  became  apparent. 
To  Aranda  he  wrote  that  France  had  much  to  gain 
from  war,  while  for  Spain  there  was  nothing  to  gain 
#nd  much  to  lose.  France  was  looking  to  the  conquest 
of  the  rich  sugar  isles,  he  continued,  and  possibly  the 
fisheries  of  Newfoundland;  but  these  could  have  no  in- 
terest for  Spain.  The  Spanish  monarchy  could  have  no 
other  object,  he  insinuated,  than  the  recovery  of  some 
of  the  "shameful  usurpations"  of  Great  Britain,  "Gib- 
raltar, Minorca,  and  to  drive  the  English  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  and  the  coast  of 
Campeche."23  Here  was  the  program  of  Spain.  It  meant 
that  she  aimed  not  only  at  the  Floridas  in  North  America, 
but  at  the  control  of  the  Mississippi  River,  with  both  its 
"banks  as  well.  To  this  policy  Florida  Blanca  adhered, 
and  he  did  not  enter  the  war  until  he  had  some  assurance 
that  it  would  be  successful. 

The  British  also  were  becoming  aroused  over  the  ques- 
tion of  the  territories.  The  debates  in  Parliament  were 
long  and  bitter.  Shelburne  contended  that  if  the  rebel- 
lious colonies  were  to  secure  their  independence  they  would 
not  stop  at  that.  He  expressed  his  high  opinion  of  the 
moderation  of  the  American  people,  but  dieclared  that 
Congress  looked  further  and  was  likely  to  inspire  them 
with  hopes  of  conquest  and  extent  of  dominion.  "Should 
this  be  the  case,"  he  exclaimed,  "the  remainder  of  America 
must  fall."  He  declared  that  the  demands  of  the  Ameri- 

21Esf>.,  587,  no.  125. 

22"Dans  la  chaleur  d'une  de  nos  conversations  il  m'a  dit  votre  Cour 
^eut  trailer  avec  les  Americains  la  guerre  resulterset  elle  n'a  ni  objet  en 
la  commencement  ni  plan  pour  le  faire."  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Jan- 
uary 5,  1778.  (Ibid.,  588,  no.  i,  new  7.) 

"Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  January  13,  1778.    (Ibid.,  588,  no.  21.) 


76  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [186 

cans  would  ultimately  lead  to  the  loss  of  the  West  Indies 
and  even  of  Ireland.24 

Altho  the  British  were  determined  to  continue  the 
war,  if  necessary,  for  the  sake  of  peace,  they  were  willing 
to  offer  any  concession  short  of  independence.  To  this  end 
Hutton,  chief  of  the  Moravian  Brethren  in  England  and 
America,  and  a  friend  of  both  George  III  and  Franklin, 
was  sent  to  Paris.  Franklin  would1  consider  no  terms  un- 
less independence  were  granted;  and  he  appealed  to  the 
magnaminity  and  good  will  of  the  British  nation  for  a  just 
settlement.  "You  should  not  only  grant  such  as  the  neces- 
sity of  your  affairs  may  evidently  oblige  you  to  grant,"  he 
urged,  "but  such  additional  ones  as  may  show  your  gen- 
erosity and  may  thereby  demonstrate  your  good!  will.  For 
instance,  perhaps  you  might,  by  your  Treaty,  retain  all 
Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  the  Floridas.  But  if  you  would 
have  a  real  friendly,  perhaps  able  ally  in  America,  and 
avoid  all  occasions  of  future  discord,  which  will  otherwise 
be  continually  arising  on  your  American  frontiers,  you 
should  throw  in  those  Countries.  And  you  may  call  it  if 
you  please,  an  Indemnification  for  the  needless  and  cruel 
burning  of  their  Towns,  which  Indemnification  will  other- 
wise be  sometime  demanded."25 

In  spite  of  the  hesitancy  of  Spain,  Vergennes  pushed 
his  plans  for  war.  It  was  clear  that  peace  could  no  longer 
continue,  and  English  and  French  were  expecting  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  at  any  moment.26  Vergennes  was 
afraid  that  if  France  did  not  take  part  in  the  war  in  Amer- 


24Parliamentary  Register,  X,  380.  B'enj.  Vaughn  to  Franklin,  April 
28,  1778.  (Franklin,  Works  (Smyth  ed.),  VII,  151.) 

"Franklin,  Works  (Smyth  ed.),  VII,  100.  The  visit  of  Hutton  cre- 
ated quite  a  stir  in  Paris  and  there  was  fear  that  he  would  succeed  in 
affecting  a  reconciliation. 

28Garnier,  the  French  ambassador  at  London,  wrote  that  England 
regarded  herself  as  already  at  war;  and  on  February  2,  Sartine,  the  min- 
ister of  marine,  asked  for  an  embargo  on  English  ships  in  French  harbors. 
Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  747.  English  statesmen  knew  of  the  proposed  treaty 
on  January  i.  Wentworth  to  Eden,  January  I.  (Stevens,  Facsimiles, 
HI,  327.) 


187]  THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  77 

ica  England  would  succeed'  in  bringing  about  a  reconcilia- 
tion with  her  colonies  and  would  then  attack  France.27  On 
January  7  at  a  meeting  of  the  cabinet,  the  whole  situation 
was  gone  over.  Vergennes  presented  a  long  memorial  to 
the  king  in  which  he  urged  immediate  war.  "England," 
he  declared,  "must  soon  seek  peace.  She  must  grant  inde- 
pendence, and  will  then  seek  compensation  in  a  coalition 
with  the  United  States  for  an  attack  on  the  two  crowns." 
He  declared  that  England  would  keep  New  York,  and  with 
that  base  could  easily  conquer  the  possessions  of  France 
and  Spain,  while  the  insurgent  privateers  would  harry 
their  commerce.  The  Americans,  he  urged,  "will  easily  be 
led  to  go  further  by  the  bait  of  the  riches  of  New  Spain, 
sufficient  to  relieve  both  states  of  the  burden  of  their  debts. 
The  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  which  will 
make  the  possesion  of  Mexico  precarious  will,  in  itself,  be 
a  powerful  inducement  for  the  Colonies,  and  they  will 
willingly  undertake  anything,  because  they  will  have  noth- 
ing to  fear  on  their  continent  from  the  vengeance  of  the 
two  Crowns."  Such  an  issue,  he  declared,  would  be  real- 
ized at  once  if  England  would  recognize  the  independence 
of  America,  and  he  urged  war  before  it  should  be  too  late.28 
The  will  of  Vergennes  prevailed  and  war  was  decided 
upon.  Gerard  de  Rayneval  Vergennes's  secretary,  was 
commissioned  to  treat  with  the  Americans.  Rayneval, 
like  his  master,  strongly  suspected  the  Americans  of  a  wil- 
lingness to  be  reconciled  with  the  mother  country,  and  his 
suspicions  were  heightened  at  his  first  interview  with  their 
representatives.  Accordingly  he  lost  no  time  in  assuring 
them  that  the  king  would  recognize  their  independence  at 
once  and  make  a  treaty  with  them.  He  declared  that  France 
had  in  view  no  aggression,  and  wished  only  to  enfeeble  her 
enemy.  He  then  urged  the  Americans  not  to  be  seduced! 
by  promises  from  England.  To  Franklin's  query  Rayneval 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  January  16,  1778.     (Esp.,  588,  no.  23.) 
28Vergennes :     Paper    submitted   to   the   king   and   marked    by    him 
"approve,"  January  7,  1778.     (Ibid.,  588,  no.  10,  new  13.) 


78  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [188 

replied  that  France  would  not  begin  war  until  every  other 
means  of  securing  independence  were  exhausted.  Franklin 
then  stated  that  an  immediate  treaty  alone  would  bar  the 
Americans  from  negotiations  with  the  British.  This 
alarmed  the  French  agent,  and  he  assured  Franklin  that 
France  would  begin  the  negotiations  at  any  time.20 

The  treaty  of  alliance  between  France  and  the  United 
States  was  drawn  on  the  lines  agreed  to  by  Rayneval  and 
Franklin.  It  provided  for  mutual  aid  in  the  war,  and  de- 
clared that  all  conquests  made  on  the  continent  of  North 
America  should  belong  to  the  United  States,  and  France 
formally  renounced  all  claims  to  any  part  of  the  former 
New  France  or  Eastern  Louisiana.  In  return  for  this  re- 
nunciation she  was  to  have  all  conquests  made  among  the 
islands  of  the  West  Indies.30 

The  provisions  regarding  the  territories  were  in  ac- 
cord with  the  instructions  of  the  American  Congress  and 
did  not,  at  any  point,  antagonize  the  policy  of  Vergennes. 
He  still  insisted  that  all  France  desired  was  the  independ- 
ence of  the  United!  States  and  the  consequent  enfeeblement 
of  Great  Britain.31  The  American  commissioners  were  like- 
wise satisfied,  and  wrote  to  Congress  that  the  terms  were 
such  as  they  might  readily  have  agreed  to,  if  the  United 
States  were  in  a  condition  of  full  prosperity  and  estab- 
lished power.32 

This  treaty  of  alliance  meant  war.  On  March  10, 
Vergennes  wrote  to  the  French  embassy  at  London  enclos- 
ing a  copy  of  the  articles.  The  messenger  arrived  at  his 


29Rayneval  said  of  the  king  "qu'elle  etoient  exempte  de  toute  vue 
d'ambition  et  d'aggrandissement  qu'elle  ne  vouloit  qu'oper  irrevocablement 
et  completement  1'independance  des  Etats  Unis  qu'elle  y  trouveouir 
1'interest  essential  d'affoibler  son  enemi  natural  .  .  .  ."  Narrative 
of  Conference  with  American  Commissioners,  January  9,  1/78.  (E.  U., 
Memoirs  et  Documents,  I,  no.  17;  Stevens,  Facsimiles,  XXI,  1831.) 

*°Treaties  and  Conventions,  242. 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  17,  1778.    (Esp.,  588,  150,  fol.  25.) 

"Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  490. 


189]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  79 

destination  on  the  13th  and  on  the  17th  Great  Britain  de- 
clared war.33 

When  Vergennes  signed  the  treaty  of  alliance  with 
the  United  States  he  had  good  reason  to  think  that  Spain 
would  soon  accede  to  it.  The  historic  kinship  and  union 
of  the  two  crowns,  their  longstanding  hatred  of  Great 
Britain,  and  their  common  interest  in  humiliating  her,  all 
induced  Vergennes  to  expect  a  united  front  against  the 
common  foe.  Furthermore,  Spain  had  promised)  to  aid 
France  if  Great  Britain  attacked  her,  and  had  often  ex- 
pressed her  willingness  for  war.  Altho  during  the  few 
months  preceding  the  treaty  between  France  and  the 
United  States  Spain  had  looked  coldly  upon  the  very  sug- 
gestion of  war,  still,  French  statesmen  thought  she  would 
join  in  the  struggle  as  soon  as  it  began.34  Spain  is  anxious 
to  recover  some  of  her  former  possessions,  they  argued; 
and,  if  she  will  join  with  France,  she  will  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  make  many  rich  and  valuable  conquests. 

In  spite  of  the  urgings  of  the  French,  Florida  Blanca 
still  hesitated.  France  expected  to  gain  much,  he  argued, 
in  commercial  advantages  and  prestige  from  a  war  with 
the  British  Empire,  while  Spain  had  only  to  calculate  the 
probability  of  loss.  She  could  expect  nothing  from  the 
trade  with  the  United  States,  and  could  gain  no  influence 
in  European  diplomacy  if  she  allowed  France  to  map  out 
her  policy.  France  could  look  to  the  conquest  of  English 
islands  and  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  he  argued,  and 
could  hold  them  by  her  naval  power;  Spanish  possessions 
were  in  great  danger  from  the  English  navy,  and  it  would 
be  difficult  to  attain  the  objects  of  Spanish  ambition :  the 
recovery  of  Gibraltar  and  Minorca,  and  the  expulsion  of 
the  British  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.35 

83Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  822. 

84Montmorin  wrote  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1778,  that  he  did  not 
doubt  that,  if  France  had  any  success,  Spain  would  have  her  cupidity 
aroused  and  make  an  attempt  to  recover  Florida  and  above  all  Gibraltar. 
(Esp.,  588,  no.  175,  new  21.) 

**Ibid.  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1778.  (Ibid.,  no.  175, 
new  21.) 


80  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [190 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  enmity  of  Spain  for 
Great  Britain  was  genuine  and  deep.  The  whole  Spanish 
policy  had  been  hostile  to  the  British  court.  Spain  had 
protested  vigorously  against  the  great  armaments  which 
England  was  sending  to  America  and  was  correspondingly 
increasing  her  own ;  but  in  spite  of  this  the  Spanish  mon- 
archy was  bent  on  peace.  There  were  several  reasons  for 
this.  Spain  was  mortally  afraid  of  losing  her  colonies 
before  the  overwhelming  power  of  the  British  navy.  She 
realized  that  her  finances  were  not  in  condition  for  war, 
and  that  they  would'  be  further  crippled  by  cutting  off  the 
supply  of  precious  metals  from  her  American  possessions. 
And  then,  as  Florida  Blanca  declared,  "between  England 
and  America  there  is  a  sort  of  equality  of  enmity  that 
makes  it  difficult  to  desire  that  either  side  win."36  He  did 
make  it  clear,  however,  that  the  proper  concessions 
might  make  Spain  enter  the  war.  The  sine  qua  non  of  any 
arrangement,  however,  must  include  the  Floridas.  The 
Spanish  were  particularly  dtesirous  of  this  territory,  be- 
cause it  controlled  the  entrance  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
which  they  wished  to  make  a  Spanish  lake.  It  was  a  source 
of  great  annoyance  to  them  that  their  ships  could  not  get 
from  New  Orleans  to  the  ocean  without  almost  touching 
the  coasts  of  an  English  province.37  The  Spanish  desire 
to  control  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  made  inevitable  an  attempt 
to  get  possession  of  the  Mississippi  Valley. 

News  of  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  alliance  between 
the  United  States  and  France  aroused  in  the  mind  of  Flor- 
ida Blanca  the  greatest  apprehension.  Spain  had  long 


saMontmorin  to  Vergennes,  February  2,  1778.  (Esp.,  no.  80,  new  n.) 
S7"M.  le  Cte  de  Floride  Blanche  me  disoit  dernierement  qu'il  aimeroit 
mieux  qu'on  cut  cede  la  moitie  de  1'Amerique  que  la  Floride  en  effet  il 
ne  peut  rien  sortir  du  golfe  du  Mexique,  sans  presque  raser  les  cotes  de 
cette  province  Quant  a  un  etablissement  a  Terre  Neuve,  je  crois  qu'il 
souffririot  bien  des  difficultes:  vous  pouvez  etre  sur,  M  que  ces  deux 
points  formeront  la  baze  des  demandes  de  1'Espagne,  si  elle  entre  en 
negociation  avec  les  Americains."  Montmorin  to  Rayneval,  February 
2,  1778.  (Ibid.,  588,  no.  11.) 


191]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  81 

faeen  the  friend1  of  France  and  he  realized  that  it  would  be 
exceedingly  difficult  to  maintain  neutrality.  "You  believe 
that  the  actual  circumstances  are  most  happy  for  the  two 
•crowns,"  he  cried  to  Montmorin;  "I  regard  them  as  most 
fatal  for  Spain."  Charles  III  listened  patiently  and  cour- 
teously to  Montmorin's  explanations;  but  he  declared  that 
the  situation  was  most  critical  and  demanded  the  greatest 
caution.38  Charles  and  his  minister  both  believed,  how- 
ever, that  Great  Britain  would1  soon  attack  the  possessions 
of  Spain  and  thus  make  war  inevitable. 

Vergennes  maintained  throughout  a  moderate  attitude 
in  his  expectations  for  both  France  and  Spain.  He  repeat- 
edly declared  that  the  sole  desire  of  his  country  was  to 
humiliate  Great  Britain  and  to  raise  her  own  prestige.  He 
«ared  to  add  nothing  to  the  colonial  dominions  of  his  coun- 
try, but  he  was  willing  to  bid*  high  for  the  support  of  Spain. 
He  had  already  suggested  Florida  as  a  suitable  compensa- 
tion for  Spanish  assistance,  but  he  was  soon  convinced  that 
he  must  offer  more,  and  expressed  his  willingness  to  in- 
clude Jamaica.39  This  was  the  beginning  of  a  long  series 


38"Le  lendemain  .  .  .  .  j'ai  etc  au  Pardo  communiquer  a  M.  le 
•comte  de  F.  Blanche.  Quoique  j'eusse  amene  par  differents  preliminaires 
<lont  j'eusse  a  lui  faire  de  la  chose  principale,  je  vous  rendrait  difficilement 
les  different  impressions  que  lui  fit  la  lecture  de  votre  depeche.  Tous 
les  sentiments  dont  il  etait  affecte  se  peignaient  sur  son  visage  et  dans 
ses  gestes.  Je  le  voyais  qui  faisait  inutilement  des  efforts  sur  lui  meme 
pour  se  contraindre,  tremblait  de  tout  son  corps,  et  il  avoit  toutes  les 
peines  du  monde  a  s'exprimer  ....  vous  croyez  que  les  circom- 
stances  actuelles  sont  le  plus  heureuse  pour  les  deux  couronnes,  et  moi, 
je  les  regarde  comme  les  plus  fatales  pour  1'Espagne,  ce  join  me 
paroitroit  le  plus  beau  de  ma  vie  si  Sa  Majeste  Catholique  me  permettoit 
<le  me  retirer  et  d'aller  finir  mes  jours  tranquilement."  Florida  Blanca 
went  on  to  blame  Aranda  for  his  part  in  the  trouble  but  declared  that 
the  king  would  never  consent  to  go  to  war.  The  king  was  much  affected 
and  declared  "croyez-moi  ....  les  circomstances  sont  bien  critiques, 
et  il  faut  bien  de  la  prudence.  II  n'en  est  pas  de  1'Espagne  comme 
de  la  France."  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  January  28,  1778.  (Ibid.,  588, 
•no.  58,  new  9.) 

39 Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  27,  1778.  (Esp.,  588,  no.  173, 
new  26.) 


82  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [192 

of  ever-increasing  bids  on  the  part  of  France  to  be  answered 
only  by  the  ever-increasing  demands  from  Spain. 

In  addition  to  making  promises,  Vergennes  sought  to 
show  to  the  Spanish  ministry  the  advantages  of  war.  He 
urged  that  neutrality  was  dangerous,  for  England  already 
had  designs  on  Spanish  America.  With  Great  Britain 
mistress  of  all  North  America,  she  would  always  prove 
a  dangerous  neighbor,  while  there  was  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  United  States,  which  would  "remain  quiet  with 
the  inertia  that  is  characteristic  of  all  constitutional 
democracies."40  All  these  arguments,  however,  were  un- 
availing. Spain  maintained  her  policy  of  peace,  and  Ver- 
gennes turned  his  attention  more  towards  the  support  of 
his  new  allies;  but  he  did  not  give  up  hope  of  ultimately" 
securing  the  cooperation  of  Spain.  The  instructions  which 
he  gave  to  Gerard,  the  first  French  minister  to  the  United 
States,  looked  to  the  interests  and  ambitions  of  the  Span- 
ish court.  Altho  Gerard  was  not  to  speak  for  Florida 
Blanca,  he  was  to  use  his  influence  with  the  Americans  to- 
get  them  to  concede  the  Floridas,  or  at  least  Pen- 
sacola  and  those  parts  of  the  coast  which  would  be  of  most 
"convenance"  to  Spain.41 

The  instructions  which  Vergennes  issued  to  Gerardr 
were  not  designed  merely  to  serve  Spanish  ambition,  but 
were  in  accord  with  the  fundamentals  of  French  policy. 
In  recognizing  the  United  States  of  America,  Vergennes- 
believed  that  he  was  erecting  a  powerful  barrier  against 
the  dominance  of  the  British  Empire,  while  weakening  it 
by  lopping  off  an  important  member.  He  early  recognized 
the  impossibility  of  obtaining  territories  in  America  on 
account  of  the  jealousy  of  the  new  republic,  and  he  felt 
that  France  had  no  use  for  colonies  which  would  drain 
the  mother  country  of  her  population  and  wealth.  Altho 
he  did  not  seek  any  conquests  in  America,  at  the  same 
time  he  did  not  wish  to  turn  over  all  the  British  possessions 


40Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  3,  1778.    (Esp.,  589,  no.  4,  new  27.) 
"March  29,  1778.     (£.  U..  Ill,  no.  77,  fol.  159.) 


193]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  83 

there  to  the  United  States.  He  had  recognized  the  new  re- 
public as  a  step  in  the  downfall  of  Great  Britain;  and,  in 
order  to  insure  the  permanency  of  his  work,  he  felt  that 
his  ally  must  be  kept  in  a  state  of  permanent  dependence.42 

In  the  light  of  this  belief  Vergennes  issued  his  instruc- 
tions to  Gerard.  In  regard  to  the  propositions  of  the 
American  commissioners  that  France  should  aid  in  the 
conquest  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and'  the  Floridas,  he  de- 
clared that  the  king  considered  "the  possession  of  these 
three  countries,  or  at  least  of  Canada,  by  England  would 
be  a  useful  cause  of  disquietude  and  vigilance  to  the  Ameri- 
cans, which  will  make  them  see  all  the  more  the  need 
which  they  have  of  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  the  king, 
and  which  it  is  not  to  his  interest  to  destroy."  He  was 
not,  however,  wedded  to  the  idea  of  limiting  the  boundaries 
of  the  United  States.  Gerard  was  left  much  discretion  in 
this  matter,  and  he  was  instructed  that  by  all  means  he 
was  to  keep  the  good  will  of  Congress.  If  that  body  pro- 
posed any  conquests,  he  was  to  assure  it  of  the  friendship 
of  the  king,  but  was  not  to  enter  into  any  formal  engage- 
ment to  effect  its  desires.  If  the  republic  became  too  press- 
ing, Gerard  was  not  to  refuse  to  cooperate,  but  he  was  to- 
make  it  understood  that  the  retention  of  such  conquest 
need  not  be  a  condition  of  the  next  peace.  In  no  case,  how- 
ever, was  he  bound  by  hard  and  fast  rules,  but  was  to  use 
his  discretion.  That  he  did  so  is  amply  proven  by  the 
history  of  his  career  in  America. 

When  Gerard  arrived'  in  Philadelphia,  he  found  that 
the  Spanish  agent,  Don  Juan  de  Miralles,  had  preceded 
him.  The  two  soon  became  confidential  friends.  Altho 
Miralles  did  not  show  his  instructions  to  the  French  repre- 
sentative, he  soon  made  evident  the  expectations  of  his 
court  in  regard  to  the  West.  He  exerted  himself  to  show 
the  advantages  which  France  might  reap  from  the  con- 
quest of  Canada,  and  declared  the  right  of  Spain  to  all  the 
other  territory  which  the  English  had  acquired  by  the 

42See  p.  99,  note  34, 


84  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [194 

treaty  of  1763,  and  also  to  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  River.43  The  suggestion  that  France  should 
conquer  Canada  made  no  impression  on  Gerard;  but  he 
attempted  to  combat  the  ambitions  of  Miralles  regarding 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  He  argued  that  the 
Americans  already  had  claims  to  the  back  countries,  and 
that  in  offering  Pensacola  to  Spain  they  were  intending 
to  make  good)  their  claims  to  the  West.  He  urged  that 
Spain  should  not  advance  her  demands  at  this  time  for  by 
so  doing  she  would  merely  bring  on  a  dispute  that  might 
cause  much  trouble.44  Miralles  consented  to  postpone  the 
issue  and  the  matter  of  the  territories  was  allowed  to  rest. 
To  Congress  the  treaty  of  alliance  and  the  promise  of 
French  aid  brought  renewed  hopes  of  the  conquest  of  Can- 
ada. Washington  had  always  been  eager  to  get  the  British 
possessions  along  the  St.  Lawrence ;  and  the  failure  of  the 
early  expeditions  had  not  discouraged  him.  Gerard  had 
promised  the  Americans  both  military  and  naval  aid,  and 
this  was  counted  on  to  help  in  the  expedition.  Ad'miral 
D'Estaing  arrived  in  America  with  a  powerful  fleet  in 
July,  1778,  and  at  once  communicated  with  Gerard.  He 
was  planning  to  get  St.  John's  or  preferably  Newfoundland 


43"I1  [Miralles]  a  parle  tres  affirmativement  de  la  bonne  volonte  de 
1'Espagne  et  du  secours  immediat  de  la  france  II  s'est  efforce  d'etablir 
•qu'il  falloit  que  la  france  conquit  le  Canada  et  1'Espagne  tout  ce  que  les 
Anglois  ont  acquis  par  le  traite  de  1763  en  floride  et  sur  le  Mississippi. 
.  .  .  .  il  se  livroit  a  toutes  les  speculations  que  la  possession  des  florides 
et  la  navigation  exclusive  du  Mississippi  peuvent  suggerer.  J'ai  etc  fache 
•de  le  voir  meler  dans  ses  raisonnements  la  persuasion  que  les  americains 

seroient   bientot   les   ennemis   de    1'Espagne J'ai   combattu   cette 

persuasion  par  des  motifs,  Monseigneur  que  vous  avez  plusieurs  fois 
discutes  et  j'ai  observe  qu'il  paroitroit  sage  d'eviter  au  moins  de  les 
necessiter  a  le  devenir  immediatement.  Je  1'ai  persuade  de  representer 
a  sa  cour  que  jamais  le  congres  ne  consenteroit  de  plein  gre  a  renouncer 
a  la  navigation  du  mississipi  necessaire  pour  servir  de  debouche  aux 
etablissements  immenses  que  les  americains  se  proposent  de  faire  sur 
1'Ohio  et  autres  rivieres  affluentes."  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  25,  1778. 
<£.  U.,  IV,  no.  41,  p.  142.) 

HIWK, 


195]  THE  FRENCH  ALLIANCE  85 

on  account  of  its  fisheries.  He  declared,  however,  that  he 
saw  no  chance  of  satisfying  Spain,  which  was  "possessed 
of  a  territorial  mania  and  always  felt  herself  ill  used  unless 
the  compass  of  her  territory  was  as  large  as  the  map."  He 
suggested  that  the  easiest  solution  would*  be  to  turn  over 
St.  John's  and  Newfoundland  to  the  Americans  and  seek 
compensation  for  Spain  and  France  elsewhere.45  Gerard 
thought  the  proposition  was  worth  serious  consideration, 
and  submitted  it  to  Vergennes.46 

Long  before  the  project  of  invading  Canada  was  for- 
mally considered  Gerard*  was  aware  that  it  was  likely  to 
come  up.  On  July  16  he  wrote  Vergennes  of  the  whole 
affair,  and  described  American  apprehension  of  the  dan- 
gers to  the  United  States,  if  Great  Britain  were  allowed  to 
keep  both  Canada  and  the  Floridas.  He  did  not  believe, 
however,  that  the  Americans  would  d'emand  the  assistance 
of  French  troops  in  any  conquest  that  they  might  afr 
tempt.47 

In  the  fall  of  1778  Washington  began  to  prepare  for 
his  long  cherished  conquest  of  Canada.  He  expected  to 
begin  the  invasion  as  soon  as  the  British  could  be  driven 
from  their  posts  in  the  north.  He  considered  the  expedi- 
tion of  prime  importance,  but  he  was  not  very  sanguine  of 
success.48  Lafayette  also  conceived  a  plan  of  his  own  for 
the  invasion  of  Canada.  He  hoped  to  get  enough  assist- 
ance from  France  to  make  possible  an  attack  by  way  of 
Detroit,  another  by  Niagara,  and  still  another  up  the  Con- 
necticut River,  while  the  French  fleet  should  sail  up  the 
St.  Lawrence.49  To  his  friend1  D'Estaing  he  wrote,  "I  can 
think  of  nothing  but  the  happiness  of  being  with  you,  of 
Halifax  surrendering,  of  St.  Augustine  taken,  of  the  Brit- 
ish Islands  on  fire,  and  all  confessing  that  nothing  can 


«Ct.  d'Estaing  to  Gerard.     (E.  U.,  IV,  no.  22,  fol.  95.) 

"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  15.     (Ibid.,  no.  20,  fol.  90.) 

47Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  16,  1778.     (Ibid.,  no.  23,  fol.  97.) 

"Washington,   Writings  (Ford  ed.),  VII,  192-198. 

40Memoires,  Correspondence  et  Manuscrits  des Lafayette.  I,  208. 


86  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [196 

withstand  the  French."50  This  was  but  an  outburst  of 
patriotic  enthusiasm  and  was  entirely  opposed  to  the  plans 
of  Vergennes;  but  it  was  successful  in  arousing  the  inter- 
est of  D'Estaing.  Congress,  too,  was  so  carried  away  by 
the  young  Frenchman's  enthusiasm  that  it  gave  favorable 
•consideration  to  his  plan,  and  ordered  it  transmitted  to 
Franklin  for  submission  to  the  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs.51 The  Americans  regarded  the  conquest  of  Halifax 
and  Quebec  as  objects  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  in 
order  to  get  the  aid  of  France  in  this  undertaking,  they 
were  willing  to  concede  her  a  share  in  the  fisheries  and  fur 
trade  of  that  country.  They  reasoned  that  such  an  ar- 
rangement would  give  their  frontiers  greater  safety  and 
add  two  new  states  to  the  union.52  To  American  inquiries, 
Gerard  replied  vaguely  that  the  king  had  the  greatest  good 
will  for  the  success  of  the  Americans,  but  did  not  pledge 
the  cooperation  of  his  country.  To  Vergennes  he  expressed 
the  belief  that  the  expedition  would  not  be  undertaken,  for 
he  knew  that  Washington  could  not  spare  the  troops. 

The  attack  on  Canada  was  soon  abandoned,  tho  for 
other  reasons  than  those  given  by  Gerard.  Admiral 
D'Estaing  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Canadians  urging 
them  to  rise  against  the  common  enemy  and  to  unite  with 
their  neighbors  to  the  south.53  The  proclamation  suc- 

s°Towers,  Lafayette,  II,  14. 

61 Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XII,  1042. 

62G.  Morris  carried  on  the  negotiations  with  Gerard.  He  offered  to 
•give  the  French  Newfoundland,  if  they  would  aid  in  the  conquest  of 
Halifax  and  Quebec.  He  pointed  out  that  without  the  possession  of 
Newfoundland  France  could  never  hope  to  get  possession  of  the  fisheries ; 
and  he  promised  that,  if  France  would  aid  them,  the  Americans  would 
attack  at  the  same  time  all  the  points  from  the  river  of  the  Illinois  to 
'Quebec.  Gerard  hesitated  from  his  knowledge  that  Washington  must 
depend  for  his  troops  on  the  British  evacuation  of  New  York.  Morris 
was  distrustful  of  Spanish  influence  and  observed  that  as  long  as  Great 
Britain  kept  Canada  she  must  be  friends  to  the  United  States.  In  this 
he  opposed  the  French  argument  that  the  British  occupation  of  Canada 
~was  necessary  to  insure  the  friendship  of  the  United  States  for  France. 
•Gerard  to  Vergennes,  October  20,  1778.  (E.  U.,  V,  no.  33,  fol.  68.) 

^Archives  de  la  Marine,  64. 


197]  THE  FRENCH   ALLIANCE  87 

ceeded  in  creating  a  feeling  of  uneasiness  among  the  Cana- 
dians, but  it  gave  a  bad  impression  of  French  motives  to 
Washington  and  Congress.54  Washington  at  once  wrote 
to  Congress  disapproving  the  whole  scheme,  as  the  army 
was  not  in  condition  to  undertake  it.55  There  were,  how- 
ever, other  than  military  reasons  why  he  wished  to  aban- 
don this  plan.  In  a  personal  letter  to  Laurens  he  gave  as 
an  insurmountable  objection  the  "introduction  of  a  large 
body  of  French  troops  into  Canada,  and  putting  them  into 
possession  of  the  capital  of  that  province,  attached  to 
them  by  all  the  ties  of  blood,  habits,  manners,  religion,  and 
former  connection  of  government.  I  fear  this  would  be  too 
great  a  temptation,"  he  wrote,  "to  be  resisted  by  any  power 
actuated  by  the  common  maxims  of  national  policy."  He 
feared  that  France  in  possession  of  Canada  would  become 
the  most  powerful  maritime  state  of  Europe,  and  joined 
by  Spain  in  possession  of  New  Orleans  would  make  her- 
self dictator  of  all  America.  If  France  should  get  pos- 
session of  Canada  no  pledges  could  induce  her  to  leave 
it;  and  she  would  drive  the  English  from  the  seas  and 
make  the  English  speaking  world  her  subjects.56 

The  opposition  of  Washington  gave  the  death  blow  to 
the  project  of  conquering  Canada.  Congress  at  once 
voted  the  expedition  impractical  and  informed  Lafayette 
of  that  fact,57 

Vergennes  regarded  this  proposed  expedition  as  de- 
void of  military  significance.  It  may  be  of  value  as  a  mili- 
tary demonstration,  he  admitted,  but  France  can  not  lend 
her  weight  to  the  annexation  of  Canada  by  the  United 


"Kingsford,  Canada,  VI,  330. 

"Washington,   Writings  (Ford  ed.),  VII,  240. 

™Ibid.,  261. 

57 Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XII,  1190-91. 


88  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [198 

States.58  He  wished  to  maintain  the  policy  toward  Can- 
ada which  he  had  outlined)  in  his  first  instructions  to 
Gerard.  He  still  preferred  that  England  should  keep  it; 
but  if  the  United  States  insisted  on  some  acquisition  he 
would  give  them  Nova  Scotia.  In  no  case  would  he  consent 
to  make  such  conquests  an  excuse  for  continuing  the  war. 
"We  think  that  peace  ought  not  to  depend  on  secondary 
matters,"  he  wrote,  "and  that  the  only  point  important  to 
the  United  States  is  the  recognition  of  their  independence. 
We  do  not  hesitate  to  stipulate  in  favor  of  Great  Britain 
for  the  preservation  of  her  actual  possessions  in  North 
America."  As  to  the  proposal  of  Miralles  that  France 
should  seize  Canada,  Vergennes  replied  decidedly  in  the 
negative.  Such  a  course,  he  argued,  would  arouse  distrust 
of  France  and  bring  about  a  rapprochement  between  Great 
Britain  and  America  which  would  make  futile  the  whole 
war.59 

Vergennes  was  not  to  show  himself  determined  against 
the  American  occupation  of  Canada.  He  knew,  however,  the 
jealousy  which  Spain  felt  toward  the  United  States,  and 
he  did  not  wish  to  take  any  stand  that  would  arouse  her 
displeasure.  In  February,  1779,  he  wrote  to  Gerard  de- 
claring that  the  question  of  Canada  could  not  be  deter- 
mined until  the  close  of  the  war;  but  in  the  meantime  he 
was  to  "urge  the  Americans  to  make  every  effort  in  their 
poAver  against  the  common  enemy.  It  does  not  matter  in 
what  point,"  he  continued,  "but  let  them  do  all  the  harm 
they  can.  If  they  succeed  in  taking  Quebec  and  Halifax, 


68"Je  ne  sais  si  les  americains  forment  seriusement  le  projet  d'attaquer 

le  Canada  mais  dans  ce  cas  je  doute  qu'ils  y  reussissent Cependant 

les  Americains  auront  raisin  de  faire  des  demonstrations  propres  a  faire 

prendre  le  change  a  la  Cour  de  Londres 1'opinion  de  1'Espagne 

est  qu'il  conviendra  de  conserva  le  Canada  et  1'acadie  a  la  grande  Bretagne. 

Mais  je  le  repete,  c'est  aux  circonstances  a  consolider  ou  a 

modifier  notre  plan  et  nos  vues."  Vergennes  to  Gerard,  November  18. 
(£.  U.,  V,  no.  7,  fol.  78.) 

"Vergennes  to  Gerard,  October  26.     (E.  U.,  V,  no.  43,  fol.  105.) 


199]  THE   FRENCH   ALLIANCE  89 

well  and  good;  and  if  this  becomes  a  condition  of  peace, 
we  can  find  other  measures  to  reassure  the  court  of 
Madrid."60 

On  the  question  of  Canada,  Washington  and  Ver- 
gennes  held  almost  identical  views.  Both  saw  the  diffi- 
culties of  allowing  France  to  get  possession  of  the  coun- 
try, and  both  saw  the  injustice  of  asking  the  French  to  aid 
in  a  conquest  for  which  they  were  to  receive  no  compensa- 
tion. Both  realized  the  power  which  the  possession  of 
Canada  would  give  to  France,  and  both  knew  that  with 
the  French  established  on  their  northern  borders  the 
United  States  would  inevitably  return  to  the  protection  of 
Great  Britain. 

Of  more  vital  importance  to  the  United  States  was  the 
question  of  the  West.  With  it,  in  the  minds  of  Spanish 
statesmen,  were  connected  the  Florid'as,  but  these  latter 
did  not  offer  so  difficult  a  problem.  The  United  State* 
had  offered  them  to  Spain  in  return  for  her  assistance,  but 
without  success.  Vergennes  had  dangled  the  possession 
of  them  before  the  hungry  eyes  of  Spanish  ministers,  but 
his  efforts  were  unavailing.  It  was  tacitly  understood, 
however,  that  Spain  might  have  them  any  time  she  was 
willing  to  go  to  war  with  Great  Britain.  The  Americans 
planned  in  the  early  part  of  1778  to  conquer  the  Florida^ 
in  the  interest  of  Spain,61  and1  there  seemed  to  be  no  differ- 
ence between  the  two  countries  regarding  their  disposition. 

The  West,  however,  was  to  prove  a  fertile  ground  for 
dispute.  Florida  Blanca  had  expressed  his  fear  and  hatred 
of  the  Americans,  and  had  given  this  as  the  reason  for  not 

«°"Nous  devons  respecter  1'opinion  de  1'Espagne,  et  elle  n'est  pas 

favorable  aux  desirs  du  Congres "  Vergennes  urged  Gerard  "vous 

borner  a  exhorter  les  Americains  a  faire  tous  les  efforts  qui  sent  en  leur 
pouvoir  pour  faire  a  1'ennemi  commun  n'emporte  dans  quel  point,  tout  le 
mal  qu'il  sera  possible.  S'ils  reussissent  a  s'emparer  de  Quebec  et  Halifax 
il  faudra  bien  de  leur  laisser,  si  la  paix  devoit  dependre  de  cette  condition : 
on  pourra  au  pis  aller  prendre  d'autres  mesures  pour  rassurer  la  cour  de 
Madrid."  Vergennes  to  Gerard,  February  19.  (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  101,  fol. 
250.) 

"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  16.     (Ibid.,  IV,  no.  23,  fol.  97.) 


$0  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [200 

joining  in  the  war  which  would  bring  them  independence. 
He  was  not  content  with  mere  inactivity.  He  felt  that  if 
Spain  was  to  maintain  her  position  in  the  New  World  she 
must  do  something  to  check  the  growing  power  of  the 
.young  nation  which  was  seeking  to  establish  itself  there. 
For  this  purpose  he  had  suggested  that  the  British  be 
guaranteed  the  possession  of  Canada.  To  this  end  lie  had 
sought  the  title  to  the  Floridas,  but  even  this  did  not  satisfy 
him.  Spain  should  control  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Mississippi  River.  This  meant  that  the  Americans  must 
l>e  barred  from  the  whole  area  of  the  West. 

On  the  question  of  the  West,  Vergennes  did'  not  at 
once  commit  himself.  He  recognized  his  obligations  to  his 
new  allies  and  was  anxious  to  get  the  assistance  of  Spain. 
He  did  not  wish  to  offend  the  United  States  by  an  apparent 
favoritism  to  Spanish  diplomacy,  and  he  wished  to  get  the 
confidence  of  Florida  Blanca.  Any  arrangement  which 
would  be  agreeable  to  the  two  powers,  he  was  willing  to 
accept. 


CHAPTER    V 

FLORIDA  BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH 

FRANCE. 

France  alone  was  unequal  to  the  struggle  with  Great 
Britain.  For  generations  the  two  powers  had  been  at  war ; 
.and  in  every  contest  the  final  victory  had  lain  with  the 
island  kingdom.  It  was  difficult  to  believe  that  now,  with 
the  puny  aid  of  a  few  revolting  provinces,  the  Bourbon 
throne  could  blot  out  the  defeats  and  humiliations  of  the 
past  and  triumph  over  its  ancient  rival.  When  Vergennes 
signed  the  treaty  that  called  into  life  a  new  nation,  the 
memory  of  1763  directed  his  mind  and  the  spirit  of  revenge 
guided  his  hand.1  His  rashness  was  self-evident.  France 
was  exhausted  by  a  century  of  misrule  at  home  and  defeat 
abroad.  Her  finances  were  in  wretched  condition.  Reform 
was  urgent.  Turgot  declared  that  peace  alone  could  work 
a  cure.2  Her  navy,  ruined  in  the  Seven  Years  War,  had 
never  recovered  its  prestige  and  could  not  hope  to  fight  the 
Britons  on  equal  terms,  and!  this  was  to  be  a  naval  war, 
a  struggle  on  many  seas. 

Alliance  with  Spain  was  the  hope  of  France.  Their 
united  fleets  might  well  match  that  of  Great  Britain,  and 
their  combined  resources  were  comparable  to  those  of  the 
enemy.  Altho  Spain  had  not  approved  the  treaty  of  alli- 
ance, Vergennes  felt  he  could  count  on  her  aid.  The 
friendship  of  the  Bourbon  powers  was  of  long  duration, 
and  sealed  by  treaties  and  family  compacts.  Together  they 
had  borne  the  humiliations  and  losses  of  many  wars,  and! 
now  Louis  asked  the  cooperation  of  his  Spanish  cousin  in 

1"I1  paroit  en  effet  que  la  providence  a  marque  cette  epoque  pour 
1'humiliation  d'une  Puissance  orgueilleuse,  in  juste,  et  avide,  qui  ne  connoit 
jamais  d'autre  Loi  que  celle  de  son  interit."  Vergennes  au  Roi,  marked 
""approve,"  Jan.  7,  1778,  (Esp.,  588,  new  22.)  Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  765. 

2Doniol,  Histoire,  I,  285. 

91 


92  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [202 

what  promised  to  be  a  Bourbon  triumph.  Spain  wished 
to  recover  her  ancient  colonies;  and  it  was  a  source  of 
great  humiliation  to  her  that  British  guns  guarded  the 
gates  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Mediterranean.  A  few 
months  before,  Florida  Blanca  had  declared  his  readiness 
for  the  struggle,  and  had  promised  to  back  France  when 
it  should  begin.3  Altho  the  tone  of  Spain's  communications 
had  since  grown  cold,  Vergennes  felt  that  there  were  suf- 
ficient reasons  to  overcome  her  hesitancy  and  push  her 
into  war. 

Spain,  however,  had  other  ends  in  view.  War  or  peace, 
each  promised  great  rewards.  War,  and  France  assured 
her  magnificent  conquests ;  peace,  and  she  might  exact  from 
Great  Britain  even  greater  concessions.  Friendship  for 
France  and  hatred  for  Great  Britain  both  urged  her  to  war. 
But  casting  aside  the  motives  of  hatred  and  friendship 
there  stood  the  solid  advantages  and  rosy  expectations 
of  peace.  In  war  Spain  was  open  to  attack  from  all  sides. 
Her  extended  colonies  were  an  easy  prey  to  the  powerful 
navy  of  England,  which  in  the  preceding  struggle  had 
made  rich  prizes  of  Havana  and  far-off  Manila.  The  loss 
of  her  colonial  possessions  was  a  fear  ever  present  to  Spain, 
and  she  was  determined  to  take  no  action  that  would  en- 
danger them.  As  Florida  Blanca  declared;  "Spain  has 
a  vast  empire  unprotected  by  sea,  which  will  be  in  great 
danger  from  British  aggression."4 

To  Spanish  statesmen  there  appeared  still  another 
danger  in  fighting  for  the  cause  of  rebellious  colonies. 
Even  recently  the  colonies  of  Spain  had  been  in  rebellion. 
Only  a  few  years  before,  Louisiana,  just  across  the  river 
from  the  Americans,  had  been  ablaze  with  revolutionary 
ideas,  and  had  broken  forth  in  open  revolt.  The  rebellion 
had  been  sternly  repressed ;  but  what  effect  would  the  suc- 
cess of  English  insurgents  have  on  the  restless  inhabitants 


•Ossun  to  Vergennes,  September  6,  1777.     (Esf>.,  587,  no.  33,  new  113.) 
*Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  January  28,  1778.   (Ibid.,  no.  9,  new  58.) 
Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  January  13.  (Ibid.,  no.  21.) 


203]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  93 

of  Spanish  America?  King  Charles,  himself,  feared  that 
recognition  of  the  new  republic  would  set  a  dangerous  ex- 
ample to  his  own  possessions.5  Still  another  question  was 
whether  the  American  states  would  be  more  peaceful 
neighbors  as  dependencies  of  the  British  Empire  or  as  an 
independent  nation.  Florida  Blanca  feared  that  if  they 
became  independent  they  would  be  animated  by  a  spirit 
of  aggression  which  would  be  dangerous  for  Spain.  Be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  Americans  there  was,  he  de- 
clared, "a  sort  of  equality  of  enmity  which  makes  it  diffi- 
cult to  prefer  either  of  them."6  If  the  colonists  should  suc- 
ceed in  their  efforts,  he  expressed  the  hope  that  they  be 
placed  in  dependence  on  the  Bourbon  crown  and'  kept  in 
a  state  of  anarchy  such  as  existed  in  Germany.7  It  was  in 
vain  that  Vergennes  pointed  out  the  danger  of  an  increase 
of  British  strength  in  the  New  World;  it  was  useless  to 
plead  that  such  was  the  constitution  of  the  new  republic 
that  it  would  more  likely  fall  a  prey  to  internal  quarrels 
than  become  a  danger  to  its  neighbors.8  Vergennes's  argu- 
ments that  there  was  a  placid  "inertia  which  is  character- 
istic of  all  constitutional  democracies"  and  which  would 
inhibit  the  spirit  of  conquest  d'id  not  convince  the  Spanish 
minister. 

When  Vergennes  found  he  could  not  convince  Florida 
Blanca  of  the  advisability  of  war,  he  changed  his  tactics 
and  began  to  try  to  push  him  by  easy  stages  into  taking 
a  hostile  attitude  towards  England.  He  offered  the  Span- 
ish minister  the  use  of  ten  vessels  to  protect  Spanish  com- 
merce, but  the  offer  was  curtly  refused.9  He  offered  to 
entrust  Gerard  with  any  mission  which  Florida  Blanca 


5Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1779.  (Esp.,  593,  no.  68,  new 
25.) 

6Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  February  2,  1778.  (Ibid.,  588,  no.  80,  new 
n.) 

7Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  20,  1778.     (Ibid.,  no.  157,  new  19.) 

8Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  3,  1778.     (Ibid.,  no.  4,  new  27.) 

°Ibid.,  588,  no.  157;  Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  II,  491. 


94  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [204 

might  wish  him  to  perform  in  the  United'  States.10  His 
efforts  seemed  to  offer  some  prospect  of  success,  when  in 
April,  1778,  after  the  Mexican  fleet  had  arrived  with  all  its 
treasure,  the  Spanish  ministry  became  belligerent  in 
speech.11  Altho  Florida  Blanca  expressed  his  defiance  of 
Great  Britain,  he  resisted  all  French  overtures.  To  Mont- 
morin's  insinuations  that  France  was  not  seeking  any  con- 
quests from  the  war,  he  replied  that  Vergennes  was  acting 
not  from  motives  of  prudence  but  of  hate.12 

The  vacillating  policy  of  Florida  Blanca  convinced 
Vergennes  that  he  must  buy  the  help  of  Spain.  He  had 
already  offered  her  Jamaica  and  the  right  of  fishing  off 
the  banks  of  Newfoundland,  and  had  suggested  that  the 
Americans  would  be  glad  to  help  conquer  the  Floridas.15 
This  offer  did  not  satisfy  Florida  Blanca.  He  no  longer 
seemed1  interested  in  these  conquests,  but  began  plotting 
for  the  recovery  of  Gibraltar,  and  placed  that  as  an  essen- 
tial condition  of  Spain's  participation  in  the  war.14 

Vergennes  was  not  yet  ready  to  concede  so  much ;  but 
he  instructed  Montmorin  to  find  what  else  might  be  a  fa- 
vorite conquest  for  Spain.15  To  this  query  Florida  Blanca 
gave  no  satisfactory  answer.  Vergennes  then  informed 
the  Spanish  minister  that  D'Estaing's  fleet  was  ready  to 
cooperate  with  the  Spanish  forces  in  an  effort  to  seize 
Jamaica,  Pensacola,  the  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
or  the  Newfoundland  fisheries.16 

In  regard  to  the  Newfoundland'  fisheries,  Florida 
Blanca  answered  curtly  that  by  the  treaty  of  1763  Spain 

loyergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  27,  1778.  (Esp.,  588,  no.  173,  new 
26.) 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  April  30,  1778.     (Ibid.,  589,  no.  50,  fol. 

I43-) 

"Doniol,  Histoire,  II,  795. 

"See  pp.  74,  89. 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  February  13,  1778.  (Esp.,  588,  no.  175, 
new  21.) 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  10,  1778.  (Ibid.,  589,  no.  13,  new 
29.) 

l*Ibid.,  588,  no.  173,  new  26. 


205]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  95 

had  renounced  her  pretentious  to  that  region ;  and  that  she 
would  not  consider  them  again.  As  to  the  Floridas,  he 
declared  that  the  United  States  had  offered  them  to  the 
Catholic  King  two  years  before.  He  cfid  not  accept  the 
offer  of  Vergennes  to  permit  Gerard  to  look  after  the  inter- 
ests of  Spain  in  America,  because,  he  declared,  Spain  had 
nothing  to  contest  with  the  United  States,  for  the  boundary 
between  the  two  countries  was  marked  by  the  Mississippi,, 
which  was  definite  enough.  In  short,  Florida  Blanca  ob- 
jected to  everything  France  had  done  and  disd'ained  every 
offer  France  could  make.17 

Vergennes  was  bitterly  disappointed  at  Spain's  inac- 
tivity, and  to  disappointment  was  added  alarm  for  fear 
that  Great  Britain  might  succeed  in  affecting  a  reconcilia- 
tion with  the  insurgents.  Reports  had!  come  to  him  that 
the  British  had  offered  the  Americans  full  possession  of 
the  Floridas  in  return  for  a  guarantee  of  their  other  prov- 
inces.18 He  foresaw  that  such  an  offer  would  be  like  "une 
pomme  de  discorde"  between  Spain  and  the  United  States. 
He  was  willing  for  the  British  to  keep  Canada,  but  he 


17"ce  ministre  me  repondit  que  1'Espagne  avoit  renounce  par  le  traite 
de  Paris  de  1/63  a  ses  pretensions  sur  Terre  neuve  qu'ainsi  il  n'y  falloit 
plus  penser.  Sa  reponse  fut  apeupres  la  meme  lorsque  je  lui  fis  part  des 
instructions  de  M.  Gerard.  II  me  dit  que  1'Esp  n'avoit  pa  rien  a  demeler 
avec  les  Americains,  sur  ceque  lui  repliquai  que  je  croijois  que  les  pos- 
sessions d'Amerique  Meridonale  pouvoient  avoir  quelques  relations  avec 
ceux  qui  etoient  les  maitres  de  I'Amerique  Septentrionale,  il  me  repondit 
que  les  limites  etoient  fixees  par  le  Mississipi  et  que  c'etoit  une  ligne  de 
frontier  assez  decidee.  Je  parlai  de  la  reocupation  de  la  Floride  qui  ne 
pouvoit  avoir  lien  qu  au  moyen  d'une  convention  prealable  avec  les  Etats- 
Unis  de  I'Amerique.  il  dit  que  cet  objet  avoit  deja  ete  offert  a  1'Espagne 
il  y  avoit  deux  ans.  En  un  mot  M.  le  parti  etoit  pris  dans  cette  premiere 
conversation  de  blamer  tout  ce  qu'avoit  fait  la  France  de  dedoigner  toutes 
les  offres  qui  pouvoient  venir  d'elle."  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  April 
10,  1778.  (Esp.,  589,  no.  15,  new  23.) 

"Frances  to  Vergennes,  April  26,  1778.  (E.  U .,  Ill,  no.  103,  foL 
224.)  Frances  was  a  secret  agent  of  Vergennes  in  Paris.  Vergennes  was- 
willing  for  the  English  to  keep  Canada,  for  this  would  forever  bind  the 
United  States  to  France. 


96  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [206 

wished  to  make  them  surrender  Halifax.19  To  avoid  the 
dangers  of  a  reconciliation,  Vergennes  once  more  urged1 
Florida  Blanca  to  accept  the  American  offer  of  the  Flor- 
idas  and  recognize  the  new  government  before  it  was  too 
late  to  reap  the  credit.20 

Florida  Blanca  declared  once  more  in  favor  of  peace. 
He  fell  there  were  too  many  difficulties  in  the  way  of  con- 
quering Gibraltar;  while  as  to  the  Floridas,  altho  he  felt 
that  Spain  ought  to  have  them  to  keep  the  English  out  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  yet  he  would  be  content  with  the  pos- 
session of  Mobile  and  Pensacola.  This  much  and  even  all 
the  coast  of  Florida,  he  argued/,  should  be  granted  his 
master  without  war.  He  was  planning  to  mediate  between 
the  combatants  and  felt  that,  if  he  gave  all  Canada  and 
perhaps  other  colonies  to  Great  Britain  that  power  would 
surely  reward  him  handsomely.21 

The  policy  of  Florida  Blanca  was  supported  by 
Charles  III,  because  that  monarch  sincerely  desired  peace. 
He  felt  also  the  danger  to  which  his  old  time  ally  was  ex- 
posing herself  in  the  war  with  the  British  Empire,  and 
strove  his  best  to  lead  her  back  to  peace.  The  efforts  of 
Spain  to  effect  a  conciliation  were  encouraged  by  the 
British  crown,  which  wished  to  keep  that  country  neutral 
as  long  as  possible;  and  it  is  by  no  means  improbable  that 
the  first  advances  for  mediation  came  at  the  suggestion 
of  the  court  of  London.22  The  French  had  no  confidence 
in  the  new  Spanish  diplomacy,  but,  in  order  to  keep  the 
good  will  of  the  court  of  Madrid,  they  felt  it  necessary  to 
encourage  the  negotiations.  Thus  with  both  belligerents 
indicating  their  willingness  for  mediation,  Florida  Blanca 
made  his  first  suggestions  for  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of 
independence  for  the  United  States  and  some  minor  con- 

19Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  May  i,  1778.    (Esp.,  589,  no.  54,  new  32.) 

20Consideration  on  the  projects  of  Spain  in  case  of  war  in  America. 
In  hand  of  Vergennes,  June  20,  1778.  (Ibid.,  589,  no.  127,  new  42.) 

21Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  June  22,  1778.  (Ibid.,  589,  no.  135,  new 
34,  fol.  335-) 

22Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  473. 


207]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  97 

cessions  for  France.23  So  certain  was  Charles  III  that 
these  conditions  would  receive  the  assent  of  Great  Britain 
that  he  asked  the  French  to  keep  their  fleet  at  home  until 
a  truce  could  be  declared  ;24  but  it  was  not  long  until  fresh 
English  aggressions  on  Spanish  commerce  convinced  King 
Charles  that  his  efforts  were  futile.25 

Vergennes  had  foreseen  the  failure  of  Spanish  media- 
tion and  was  prepared  to  make  the  most  of  it.  At  the  first 
sign  of  British  trifling,  Montmorin  came  forward'  with  a 
demand  for  action,  guaranteed  by  the  terms  of  the  Pacte 
de  Famille,  and  intimated  that  an  unfavorable  response 
would  mean  the  dissolution  of  the  alliance.26  Charles  III 
was  deeply  wounded  by  the  failure  of  his  efforts,  and  se- 
verely disappointed  at  not  receiving  the  Florid:as,  which 
he  regarded  as  his  due;  and,  while  in  this  state  of  mind, 
he  began  to  listen  favorably  to  the  pleadings  of  the  French 
ambassador.  Montmorin  felt  exultant  at  his  success  and 
wrote  Vergennes  that  if  France  would  guarantee  Gibraltar 
and  the  Floridas,  the  alliance  was  secure.27 

The  British  were  alarmed  at  the  new  drift  of  Spanish 
policy  and  at  once  revived  the  idea  of  mediation.28  This 
time  Charles  was  wary  and  insisted  that  he  would  not  again 
offer  his  good  offices  unless  the  court  of  London  formally 
requested  him  to  do  so.  This  the  British  government  agreed 
to  do,29  and  Charles  decided  to  try  again.  Montmorin  had 
previously  declared  that  the  British  were  merely  trying  to 
amuse  Spain,  and  now  he  wrote  that  they  had  succeeded. 
Vergennes,  on  his  part,  agreed'  at  once  to  the  proposition 
of  mediation;  for  he  wished  to  maintain  a  character  for 


23Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  July  I,  1778.     (Esp.,  590,  no.  2,  new  36.) 
24Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  472. 
™Ibid.,  509. 

26Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  August  7,  1778      (Esp.,  590,  no.  72,  new 
32)  ;  August  15  (ibid.,  no.  87,  new  53.) 
-''Ibid.,  no.  89,  new  49. 
28Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  August  31,  1778.     (Ibid.,  590,  no.  49,  new 

121.) 

29Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  513. 


98  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [208 

disinterestedness.30  The  French  were  soon  convinced, 
however,  that  Charles  III  decidedly  favored  their  views 
as  to  the  terms  of  settlement,  and  that  he  would  oppose 
leaving  the  British  in  possession  of  any  important  strong- 
hold near  the  American  possessions  of  the  two  crowns.31 
With  this  assurance  Vergennes  was  satisfied,  and  Spain 
entered  upon  her  office  of  mediation. 

At  the  request  of  Charles  III  Vergennes  drew  up  a 
statement  of  the  terms  which  he  would  insist  upon  as  the 
necessary  conditions  of  peace.  The  first  requirement  was 
the  recognition  of  independence  for  the  United  States, 
with  which  must  be  included  New  York,  Long  Island,  and 
Rhode  Island,  and  such  other  parts  of  the  original  colonies 
as  were  in  the  hands  of  the  British.  France  asked  no  col- 
onies in  North  America,  but  declared  her  willingness  to 
allow  Great  Britain  to  keep  Canada,  while  the  Florida* 
should  go  to  Spain.32 

All  these  suggestions  were  agreeable  to  Florida 
Blanca.  He  particularly  desired  that  the  English  should 
keep  Canada.  He  argued  that  they  were  so  enfeebled  by 
the  war  that  they  would  no  longer  be  dangerous  to  the 
two  crowns,  while  their  possession  of  that  country  would 
prove  a  constant  source  of  friction  between  them  and  the 
United  States  and  keep  the  latter  loyal  to  France  and 
Spain.33 

In  regard  to  the  new  republic,  Vergennes  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  express  himself  clearly.  "All  my  correspondence- 
for  several  months,"  he  wrote,  "has  proven  to  Florida 

80Vergennes  to  Montmorin.  (Esf>.,  590,  no.  51,  new  48.) 
81Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  September  29.  (Ibid.,  590,  no.  188,  foL 
458.)  Charles  indicated  that  he  would  approve  the  chief  French  demands  ; 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  and  the  expulsion  of  the  English 
from  Dunkirk.  Montmorin  did  not  doubt  that  Spain  would  seek  to  get 
the  British  out  of  the  way  of  their  commerce  but  he  thought  she  would 
leave  them  Canada. 

S2Vergennes  to  Mcntmorin,  October  8,  1778.     (Ibid,  591,  no.  62.) 
83Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  October  19,  1778  (ibid.,  591,  no.  33,  new 
61)  ;  October  15   (ibid.,  no.  22,  new  60). 


209]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  99 

Blanca  that  we  do  not  differ  from  him  in  principles. 
....  We  ask  only  independence  for  the  thirteen  states 
of  America,  without  including  any  of  the  English  posses- 
sions which  have  not  taken  part  in  the  rebellion.  We  do 
not  desire  that  a  new  republic  shall  arise  which  shall  be- 
come the  exclusive  mistress  of  this  immense  continent." 
Such  a  case,  he  feared,  would  make  the  new  republic  a 
hard  taskmaster  for  the  other  nations  of  the  world.  He 
agreed,  too,  that  it  was  best  to  leave  Canada  in  possession 
of  the  English  to  make  the  Americans  perceive  the  neces- 
sity of  having  "des  garants,  des  allees,  et  des  protecteurs."" 
The  Floridas,  or  at  least  West  Florida,  Vergennes  thought 
should  go  to  Spain,  as  they  were  in  no  sense  connected  with 
the  other  provinces.34 

On  this  much,  Spain  and  France  agreed;  but  here 
the  likeness  ends.  With  France,  independence  for  the- 
United  States  was  the  prime  condition  of  the  war;  with 
Spain,  an  extension  of  her  empire  was  the  chief  aim.  Ver- 
gennes regarded  the  United  States  as  a  friend  and  ally  to 


34"Nous  ne  demandons  1'independance  que  pour  les  treize  Etats  de 
1'Amerique  que  seront  unis  entre  eux,  sans  y  comprendre  aucune  des 
autres  possessions  angloises  qui  n'ont  point  participe  a  leur  insurrection. 
Nous  ne  desirons  pas  a  beaucoup  pres  que  la  nouvelle  Republique  que 
s'eleve  demeure  maitresse  exclusive  de  tout  cet  immense  continent.  Bientot 
suffisant  seule  a  ses  besoins,  les  autres  nations  seroient  dans  le  cas  de 
compter  avec  elle,  parceque  pouvant  se  passer  de  toutes,  elle  leur  feroit 

tres     certainment     une     loi     tres      dure Neamoins,      il      n'en 

est  pas  moins  intc-ressant  que  les  Anglois  demeurent  maitres  du 
Canada  et  de  la  Nouvelle  Ecosse,  ils  feront  la  jalousie  de  ce  peuple,  qui 
pourroit  bien  se  retourner  ailleurs  et  de  lui  faire  sentir  la  necessite  d'avoir 
des  garants  des  allees,  et  des  protecteurs.  Quant  au  partage  que  M.  le 
comte  de  floride  blanche  desiroit  qui  fut  fait  des  Florides  dont  1'occidentale 
devroit  revenir  a  1'Espagne,  vous  vous  rappelerez  M.  quels  ont  etc  notre 
vue  et  notre  interet,  et  que  ne  pouvoit  pas  stipuler  pour  cette  Couronne 
nous  avons  pose  dans  1'acte  separe  du  traite  d'alliance  une  preuve  d'attente 
sur  laquelle  elle  pourroit  edifier  un  jour."  Vergennes  thought  that  the 
dominant  spirit  of  the  Americans  was  that  of  trade,  and  this,  he  thought, 
would  be  less  dangerous  to  their  neighbors.  Vergennes  to  Montmorin, 
October  30,  1778.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  43,  new  67;  Circourt,  III,  310;  Doniol, 
Histoire,  III,  561.) 


100  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [210 

be  treated  generously ;  Florida  Blanca  regarded  them  as  a 
rival  and  enemy,  to  be  restricted  in  boundaries  and  subject 
to  the  restraints  of  Spanish  ambition.  He  preferred  to 
leave  the  British  in  possession  of  New  York  or  other  strong- 
holds from  which  they  might  annoy  the  American  repub- 
lic.35 

While  Vergennes  was  willing  that  Canada  should 
remain  in  British  hands  he  would  by  no  means  consent  to 
the  Spanish  demand  that  such  a  settlement  should  be  guar- 
anteed.36 He  favored  rather  the  pushing  northward  of  the 
American  boundaries.  On  the  question  of  allowing  the 
British  to  keep  some  posts  within  the  limits  of  the  thirteen 
colonies  he  took  a  decided  stand.  "We  can  not  think,"  he 
wrote,  "of  letting  any  of  the  states,  either  New  York  or 
Khode  Island,  remain  in  dependence  on  Great  Britain  with- 
out contradicting  our  first  principles ;"  and  he  firmly  main- 
tained that  if  this  was  not  agreed  to  he  would  not  make 
peace.37 

"Florida  Blanca  declared  that  the  question  of  these  posts  demanded 
much  reflection.  It  would  be  difficult,  he  reasoned,  to  get  the  Americans 
to  consent  to  such  terms  and  "il  fut  persuade  que  les  Anglois  n'en  tireroient 
jamais  aucune  utilite,  ces  places  devenant  entre  leurs  mains  a  piu  pres  ce 
que  sont  les  presides  d'Afrique  dans  celles  des  Espagnoles."  Montmorin 
to  Vergennes,  October  19,  1778.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  33,  new  61.) 

36Florida  Blanca  insisted  that  such  an  arrangement  should  be  made. 
Montmorin  objected  that  with  the  English  in  possession  of  Halifax  they 
could  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  and  threaten  the 
possessions  of  the  two  crowns.  He  also  feared  that  the  United  States 
would  not  consent  to  such  an  arrangement.  The  Spanish  minister  replied 
that  after  the  war  the  English  would  be  too  feeble  to  be  dangerous,  and 
they  would  be  still  less  so  if  they  could  arouse  between  them  and  the 
Americans  some  permanent  sources  of  division.  For  this  reason  Canada 
and  Acadia  must  be  left  to  the  British.  As  to  the  United  States,  he 
declared  they  had  need  of  peace  and  must  accept  whatever  was  given 
them.  Montmorin  declared  that  he  feared  greatly  the  prosperity  and 
progress  of  the  Americans.  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  October  19,  1778. 
(Ibid.) 

S7"I1  faudra  renoncer  a  la  paix,  monsieur,  si  les  Anglois  mettoient 
pour  condition  qu'ils  conserveroient  New-York  ou  telle  autre  place  ou 
territoire  dependant  des  treize  Provinces  unis  de  I'Amerique."  Vergennes 
to  Montmorin,  October  17,  1778  (ibid.,  591,  no.  25,  new  63;  Circourt,  III, 
307)  ;  November  2,  1778  (Esp.,  no.  68,  fol.  118). 


211]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  101 

In  spite  of  these  differences  Vergennes  did  not  cease 
his  efforts  to  involve  Spain  in  the  war.  He  ridiculed  the 
idea  that  the  United  States  would  ever  become  dangerous 
as  neighbors  of  Spain,  and  declared  that  the  Spanish  mon- 
archy had  much  more  to  fear  from  the  aggressions  of  Great 
Britain.38  His  efforts,  however,  were  unavailing,  and  he 
decided  to  guarantee  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  to  Great 
Britain  and  the  Floridas  to  Spain.39 

Other  causes  were  forcing  Spain  to  the  position 
of  France.  Great  Britain  had  treated  with  contempt  the 
offers  of  Charles  III  to  mediate,  even  after  she  had  made 
the  first  suggestion.  Florida  Blanca  was  convinced  that 
the  English  were  merely  seeking  to  gain  time,  and  that 
their  intentions  were  hostile.40  New  reports  arrived  of 
British  aggressions  in  America.  In  the  Gulf  of  Honduras 
and  the  Bay  of  Campeche,  they  were  becoming  more  inso- 
lent ;  and  they  were  suspected  of  trying  to  incite  an  upris- 
ing in  Louisiana.41  There  was  no  prospect  that  Great  Brit- 
ain would  surrender  the  Floridas,  and  the  ever-increasing 
fleets  that  hung  around  Gibraltar  was  an  added  source  of 
irritation. 

The  condition  of  France  was  becoming  desperate. 
D'Estaing  had  suffered  reverses  in  America  and  the  insur- 
gents were  driven  out  of  Rhode  Island.  The  French  treas- 
ury could  with  difficulty  stand  the  strain  and  it  was  evi- 
dent that  something  must  be  done  at  once.  Vergennes  de- 


S8"C'est  gratuitement  quon  voit  dans  ce  peuple  nouveau  une  race  de 
conquerans."  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  October  19,  1778.  (Doniol,  His- 
toire,  III,  559.) 

39Vergennes  sent  sketch  of  proposed  treaty  to  Spain,  October  17, 
1778.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  25,  new  63.) 

40"M.  de  Florideblanche  ....  pense  comme  vous  que  les  Anglois 
ne  cherchent  qu'a  gagner  du  terns  et  qu'il  faut  nous  preparer  ensemble 
a  la  guerre  pour  le  prentems  ....  II  est  sans  aucune  confiance  dans 
la  negociation  pour  la  paix  .  .  .  ."  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  November 
12,  1778.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  52;  Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  575.) 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  November  4.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  54,  new 
67.) 


102  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [212 

cided  that  he  must  accept  the  Spanish  conditions,  for  as- 
sistance was  indispensable.42 

Altho  Florida  Blanca  still  feared  war,  he  thought 
its  dangers  were  no  longer  as  great  as  were  those  of  peace. 
He  declared  his  willingness  still  to  negotiate;  but  he  said 
it  must  be  on  terms  honorable  to  the  two  crowns.43  He 
spoke  of  war  with  "la  chaleur  et  1'espece  d'enthousiasme" 
and  Montrnorin  was  convinced  that  there  would  be  no  fur- 
ther difficulty.44 

Altho  Florida  Blanca  was  expecting  war,  he  wished 
to  wring  a  few  more  concessions  from  his  ally  before  com- 
mitting himself.  Vergennes  had  consented  to  assist  the 
Spaniards  to  recover  Gibraltar,  Minorca,  Jamaica,  and 
Florida,  and  to  help  drive  the  English  from  Honduras  and 
€ainpeche,45  but  this  did  not  satisfy  the  minister  of  Charles 
III.  He  could  ask  no  more  gains  in  territory,  so  he  turned 
his  efforts  to  crippling  the  United  States.  News  had  ar- 
rived at  Madrid  in  June,  1778,  that  the  Americans  had 
captured  two  British  forts  on  the  Mississippi  and  were 
threatening  Florida.46  This  information  doubtless  in- 
creased the  cupidity  and  jealousy  of  the  Spanish  court,  for 
its  tone  became  immediately  more  hostile  to  the  Americans. 
Soon  afterwards  rumor  credited  the  Americans  with  com- 
plete success  in  Florida,47  and  Vergennes  again  urged 
Florida  Blanca  to  recognize  the  United  States  while  there 
was  yet  an  opportunity  to  reap  some  advantages.  News 


42Vergennes  to  Montrnorin,  November  2.  (Esp.,  591,  no.  68,  fol.  118.) 
43"Dans  le  courant  du  mois  prochain  nous  verron  clair  si  on  veut  nous 
amuser,  ou  si  Ton  desire  reelement  la  paix.  dans  le  second  cas,  il  faut 
faire  la  paix,  mais  honorablement  et  utilement  pour  les  deux  Couronnes." 
Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  on  interview  with  Florida  Blanca,  "ses  propres 
paroles,"  October  26,  1778.  (Ibid.,  591,  no.  52;  Circourt,  III,  309.) 

44En  un  mot,  Monsieur,  je  suis  convaincu  que  le  mois  prochain  ne  se 
passera  pas  sans  nous  ayons  commence  a  concerter  le  plan  que  nous 
•executerons  au  printems  prochain."  Esp.,  591,  no.  52. 

45 Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  December  24,  1778.     (Ibid.,  591,  no.  154.) 
48Galvez  reported  this  to  the  Spanish  court.    Montmorin  to  Vergennes, 
June  i,  1778.     (Ibid.,  589,  no.  98,  new  30.) 

47Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  July  6.    (Ibid.,  590,  no.  12,  new  45.) 


213]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE           103 

soon  arrived,  however,  that  the  Americans  were  repulsed 
and  had  retreated  to  Louisiana.  This  confirmed  the  poor 
opinion  which  the  Spaniards  held  of  the  insurgents,  but 
placed  them  also  in  a  difficult  position  with  reference  to 
the  British  court.  Galvez  refused  to  surrender  the  fugi- 
tives48 and  the  English  became  threatening.  They  built 
a  fort  at  Manchac  on  the  Mississippi,  which  not  only  pro- 
tected the  Floridas  but  threatened  New  Orleans  as  well.49 

Vergennes  pointed  out  the  danger  of  the  English  move- 
ments, but  Spain  still  held  back.  Florida  Blanca  was  now 
thoroly  alarmed,  however,  and  resolved  to  get  ready 
for  war.50  In  spite  of  his  hatred  of  the  British,  he  declared 
that  his  master  would  never  enter  into  an  alliance  with 
the  Americans,  nor  even  recognize  them,51  for  they  were 
likely  soon  to  become  an  enemy.52  Neither  English  nor 
Americans,  he  asserted,  should  come  near  Spanish  terri- 
tory, and  he  announced  his  determination  to  drive  them 
both  from  the  Mississippi  Valley.53 

Altho  Vergennes  regarded  the  Spanish  demands 
as  "gigantesque,"  he  agreed  to  all  of  them  except  the  pro- 
posal to  give  to  Spain  the  Mississippi  Valley.  He  said 
nothing  to  Florida  Blanca  of  the  West,  but  to  Gerard  he 


48Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  July  6.     (Esp.,  no.  14,  new  38.) 

4»Vergennes  wrote  of  this :  "suivant  les  renseignments  qu'on  me  donne 
il  a  le  double  objet  de  couvrir  la  Floride  Occidentale  et  de  chasser  les 
Espagnoles  de  la  droite  de  cette  riviere  en  cas  de  guerre."  July  17.  (Ibid., 
590,  no.  36,  new  47.)  Aranda  pointed  out  the  same  danger  to  his  court, 
July  20.  (Ibid.,  no.  45.) 

BOMontmorin  to  Vergennes,  November  29.    (Ibid.,  591,  no.  72,  new  67.) 

"Florida  Blanca  declared  that  Charles  III  could  never  extend  recog- 
nition to  rebels.  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  August  17,  1778.  (Ibid.,  590, 
no.  89,  new  49.) 

S2Same  to  same,  November  12.    (Ibid.,  no.  70.) 

*albid.  "M.  de  Floride-Blanche  veut  reprendre  la  Floride :  il  veut 
chasser  les  Anglois  et  les  Americains  des  deux  rives  du  Mississipi."  Same 
to  same,  November  20.  (Ibid.,  new  72;  Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  585.) 


104  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [214 

expressed  his  astonishment  at  Spanish  greediness.54  Ver- 
gennes  also  insisted  that  the  prime  object  of  the  war  should 
be  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and  to  this  the 
Court  of  Madrid  refused  to  give  its  assent.  Florida  Blanca 
argued  that  such  a  clause  in  their  agreement  was  out  of 
place  and  useless;  out  of  place  because  Spain  could  make 
her  own  arrangements  with  the  United  States,  and  useless 
because  the  independence  of  that  country  wras  the  first  and 
only  cause  of  the  war.55 

The  discussion  of  a  convention  between  the  two  coun- 
tries dragged  on  during  the  early  months  of  1779.  Florida 
Blanca,  in  rejecting  the  plan  submitted  by  Vergennes, 
promised  to  draw  up  one  himself,  but  had1  offered  excuse 
after  excuse  for  delay.  He  complained  that  the  Americans 
were  not  aggressive  enough  in  conducting  the  war.  He 
feared  that  they  would  seek  to  annex  Canada,  and  it  was 
desirable  that  this  province  should  remain  in  English 
hands.  To  all  these  objections  Vergennes  returned  the 
strongest  assurances  of  his  willingness  to  meet  the  desires 
of  Spain  and  declared  that  his  minister  to  Congress  would 
labor  to  deter  the  Americans  from  an  invasion  of  Canada 
and  would  urge  them  to  a  more  vigorous  policy  against 
Great  Britain.56  Florida  Blanca  objected  that  France  was 
less  anxious  for  the  advantages  of  Spain  than  for  the  in- 
dependence of  the  United  States.  Vergennes  had  declared 
that  this  independence  was  the  prime  object  of  the  war,  but 
in  order  to  satisfy  Spanish  pride  he  offered  to  express  the 
two  clauses  in  the  same  terms.57  Spain  still  dallied  with 

"Regarding  the  demand  of  the  United  States  for  the  right  to  navigate 
the  Mississippi  and  the  objections  of  Spain,  Vergennes  wrote :  "et  je  vous 
assure  qu'il  me  paroitroit  etonnant  qu'on  refusal  a  cette  demande."  October 
26,  1778.  (E.  U.,  V,  no.  43,  fol.  119.) 

"Vergennes  proposed  a  convention,  article  4  of  which  declared  that 
war  should  continue  until  the  independence  of  the  United  States  was 
secured.  (Esp.,  592,  no.  105.)  Florida  Blanca  complained  because  inde- 
pendence was  made  more  definite  than  the  other  objects  of  the  war.  Mont- 
morin  to  Vergennes,  February  28,  1779.  (Ibid.,  no.  140,  new  14.) 

"Vergennes  to  Florida  Blanca,  March  18,  1779.  (Ibid.,  593,  no.  33, 
fol.  81.) 

"Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  634. 


215]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE  105 

the  terms  of  the  convention  and  the  attitude  of  Vergennes 
became  daily  more  importunate.  He  wrote  letter  after  let- 
ter to  Montmorin  explaining  the  pressing  needs  of  France 
and  the  necessity  of  immediate  aid  from  Spain.58 

To  the  offer  of  Vergennes  to  express  in  the  same  terms 
the  articles  on  the  advantages  to  be  given  Spain  and  that 
on  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  Spain  interposed 
another  objection.  Florida  Blanca  insisted  that  Spain 
could  never  recognize  the  independence  of  the  American 
republic  until  England  had  done  so,  for  fear  that  such  rec- 
ognition would  set  a  bad  example  to  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America.  He  declared  he  could  go  no  farther  than  to 
give  secret  aid  to  Congress.59 

To  this  argument  Montmorin  replied  that  the  recogni- 
tion of  independence  would  not  be  so  bad  an  example  as 
the  giving  of  secret  aid.  The  maneuvres  of  Spain  aroused 
in  the  mind  of  Vergennes  the  greatest  indignation,  and  he 
wrote  bitterly  of  a  "minister  who  most  often  puts  caprice 
in  place  of  reason."  He  likewise  denounced  the  objections 
of  Spain  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  "Nothing  is  gratuitous  on  the  part  of  Spain,"  he 
wrote.  "We  know  that  she  wants  concessions  from  the 
Americans,  as  well  as  from  us."  He  did  not  oppose  this, 
but  he  regarded  it  as  absurd  that  France  should  guarantee 
possessions  to  a  nation  so  powerful  as  Spain.  He  vigor- 
ously declared  that  France  would  not  lower  her  honor  or 
dignity  by  entering  into  a  convention  nullifying  the  treaty 
of  February,  1778,  and  that  if  Spain  joined  France  she 
must  do  so  with  that  understanding.60 

Spain  had  exhausted  her  objections  to  the  alliance 
and  finally  in  April  began  to  formulate  her  demands.  Her 
first  proposition  was  that  the  two  powers  should  agree  not 
to  lay  down  arms  until  the  English  had  surrendered  Gib- 
raltar. All  other  conquests,  however,  were  to  be  subject 

58Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  634. 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1779.     (Esp.,  593,  no.  68,  new 
25,  fol.  157.) 

*°Es{>.,  593,  no.  41.    Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  672. 


106  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [216 

to  the  fortunes  of  war.  This  project  did  not  definitely  rec- 
ognize the  independence  of  the  United  States,  but  made  it 
a  subject  of  negotiation  (Art.  4).  Article  five  granted  the 
same  advantages  to  France  as  had  the  convention  previ- 
ously submitted  by  Vergennes.  It  provided  for  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  articles  of  the  peace  of  Utrecht,  restricting 
France  from  fortifying  Dunkirk  and  such  other  places  as 
she  wished  to  fortify;  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from 
Newfoundland,  the  possession  of  St.  Domingo,  and  Sene- 
gal, besides  various  commercial  advantages.  Article  seven 
proposed  for  Spain  the  recovery  of  Gibraltar,  the  posses- 
sion of  Mobile  and  the  restitution  of  Pensacola  and1  the 
coast  of  Florida  along  the  "Bahama  Canal"  so  that  no 
foreign  power  could  get  any  foothold  there,  the  expulsion 
of  the  English  from  Honduras  and  Campeche,  and  the  res- 
titution of  the  isle  of  Minorca.61 

In  the  discussion  of  this  convention  Montmorin  ex- 
pressed his  surprise  at  Spain's  demand  for  the  restitution 
of  Minorca,  for  before  this  she  had  apparently  attached 
little  importance  to  it.  Florida  Blanca  replied'  to  his  ob- 
jections that  this  acquisition  would  be  of  little  importance 
if  the  others  were  granted.  To  the  extent  of  the  coast  of 
Florida  desired  by  Spain  Montmorin  objected.  Before  this 
Florida  Blanca  had  asked  only  for  Mobile  and  Pensacola, 
T)ut  now  he  desired  all  the  shore  around  the  south  end  of 
the  peninsula  and  some  distance  up  the  east  coast.  The 
Spanish  minister,  however,  insisted  that  all  this  was  essen- 
tial to  assure  the  navigation  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.62  From 
the  negotiations  preceding  this  convention  Montmorin  de- 
cided that  it  did  not  seriously  sacrifice  the  interests  of 
France  and  accepted  Florida  Blanca's  suggestion  that 
they  sign  at  once. 


eiMontmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  30,  1779.  (Esp.,  593,  no.  68,  new 
25,  fol.  157.)  Text  of  this  convention  in  Doniol,  Transcripts,  Nou.  Acq. 
Francs.,  6488,  189;  Doniol,  Histoire,  III,  803. 

•2Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  April  13,  1779.  (Esp.,  593,  no.  112,  new 
31,  fol.  255.) 


217]         BLANCA  AND  THE  CONVENTION  WITH  FRANCE          107 

The  articles  relating  to  America  did  not  contradict 
the  previous  understanding  as  to  the  settlement  of  affairs 
in  the  New  World.  Congress  had  already  offered  Spain 
the  Floridas  and  could  not  object  to  the  article  in  the  con- 
vention regarding  them.  There  was  nothing  in  the  conven- 
tion to  imply  Spanish  control  over  the  Mississippi  river 
and  valley,  and  no  limitations  on  the  boundaries  of  the 
United  States.  The  provision  that  France  should  not  lay 
•down  arms  until  the  restitution  of  Gibraltar  was  secure^ 
has  been  most  criticized63  on  the  ground  that  it  bound  the 
United  States  to  continue  a  war  in  the  interests  of  Spain. 
The  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  France  provided 
that  neither  power  should  make  peace  until  independence 
was  secured,  and  no  treaty  was  to  be  signed  without  the 
consent  of  both  nations.  There  is  no  evidence  that  France 
ever  sought  to  use  this  clause  to  further  her  own  or  Spain's 
ambitions,  and  she  never  held  the  United  States  bound  to 
help  regain  Gibraltar.  Nor  did  the  Americans  have  the 
means  to  aid  in  such  a  project,  as  they  could  act  only  on 
the  defensive  and  with  the  expulsion  of  the  English  they 
«ould  do  nothing  more. 

France  herself  received  no  adequate  compensation  for 
the  concessions  she  made  to  secure  the  alliance  of  Spain. 
The  right  to  fortify  Dunkirk  was  no  equivalent  for  the 
guarantee  of  Gibraltar,  and  the  other  promises  that  the 
crowns  made  to  each  other  bore  almost  the  same  degree  of 
relative  importance.  Vergennes,  however,  approved  the 
signing  of  the  convention,  and  looked  eagerly  forward  to 
the  time  when  the  French  navy,  reinforced  by  that  of  Spain, 
should  sweep  the  English  from  the  seas.  Florida  Blanca 
began  hostilities  at  once,  and  commenced  with  vigor  the 
first  campaign,  which  he  believed  would  end  the  struggle. 
Across  the  Atlantic  the  new  republic  was  striving  not  only 
for  independence  from  Great  Britain,  but  was  also  labor- 
ing to  protect  its  integrity  from  the  grasping  ambition  of 
Spain. 

"Bancroft,  United  States,  V,  308;  Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution, 


CHAPTER    VI 

DEVELOPMENT   OF  A   CONGRESSIONAL   POLICY 
TOWARD  THE  WEST. 

News  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  with 
France  produced  throughout  the  United  States  a  feeling  of 
joy  and  hope.  There  were  some  who  objected  to  receiving 
aid  from  the  ancient  enemy  of  the  English  race,  but  there 
Was  almost  universal  expression  of  satisfaction.  The  inter- 
vention of  France,  however,  was  to  prove  the  source  of  a 
new  anxiety  to  patriotic  Americans.  It  meant  that  Con- 
gress must  work  out  a  policy  in  regard  to  the  disposition  of 
the  West.  What  should  be  the  western  boundaries  of  the 
new  nation?  Should  it  have  the  right  freely  to  navigate 
the  Mississippi  River?  These  questions  were  closely  con- 
nected and  presented  themselves  together.  Great  Britain 
and  Spain  as  well  as  the  United  States  had  interests  there. 
Within  Congress  there  were  hostile  factions,  each  with  a 
very  definite  view  of  the  question ;  and  upon  these  factions 
the  adroit  and  ingratiating  Gerard  played  with  varying 
success. 

Gerard  had  definite  instructions  regarding  Canada 
and  the  Floridas;  but  he  had  not  been  given  a  line  as  to 
what  attitude  France  would  take  respecting  the  ownership 
of  Eastern  Louisiana  or  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
River.  He  could  only  act  upon  his  instructions  to  look 
after  the  interests  of  Spain.  If  that  country  would  be  bene- 
fited by  the  complete  control  of  the  Mississippi  Valley, 
Gerard  might  well  argue  that  he  should  work  to  this  end. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  was  to  do  nothing  to  incur  the  ill  will 
of  Congress,  and  so  he  could  not  feel  at  liberty  freely  to 
oppose  the  designs  of  the  Americans  towards  the  West. 

Thus  Gerard  felt  compelled  to  play  a  double  game. 
When  Miralles  proposed  the  extension  of  Spanish  power 

1 08 


219]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  109 

over  the  West,  he  opposed  it  as  unreasonable,  and  declared 
that  Congress  would  never  consent  to  such  an  arrange- 
ment; but  to  his  own  court  he  suggested  that  if  Spain 
would  seize  the  course  of  the  Mississippi  below  the  mouth 
of  the  Ohio,  the  negotiations  would  be  much  simplified.1 

The  scheme  of  Miralles  was  based  on  the  idea  of  re- 
stricting the  territory  of  the  United  States  and  thus  mak- 
ing them  dependent  on  the  good  will  of  the  two  crowns. 
He  considered  the  Americans  as  dangerous  as  the  British, 
and  believed  they  would  show  their  hostility  at  the  first 
opportunity.2  Gerard  assured  his  friend  of  the  good  dispo- 
sition of  the  Americans  and  suggested  to  Congress  that,  in 
order  to  reassure  Spain,  it  should  pass  a  resolution  declar- 
ing an  enemy  of  the  Confederation  any  state  which  should 
seek  to  extend  its  borders  beyond  "certain  limits."3  Gerard 
informed  Morris,  the  secretary  of  Congress  for  foreign  af- 
fairs, that  Spain  was  afraid  of  the  great  numbers  of  Eng- 
lish who  had  established  themselves  on  the  Mississippi,  and 
also  of  the  Indians  who  had  been  driven  westward  by  the 
Americans.  They  were  a  serious  menace,  he  declared,  to 
the  Spanish  frontier,  and  a  cause  of  constant  jealousy, 
while  the  designs  of  Congress  upon  the  Floridas  had 


*£.  U.,  V,  35- 

2Miralles  proposed  to  Gerard  that  France  should  seize  Canada  and 
Spain  should  have  the  West  and  the  Floridas.  He  gave  as  his  reasons 
that  the  United  States  would  soon  become  the  enemies  of  Spain.  Gerard 
opposed  his  opinions  on  this  score,  but  declared  that  Congress  never  would 
consent  to  the  Spanish  terms.  He  pointed  out  the  American  expeditions 
to  the  West,  and  advised  Miralles  that  if  he  hoped  to  realize  his  ambitions 
he  must  not  place  the  Americans  in  a  position  to  formulate  their  demands. 
Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  20,  1778.  (Ibid.,  IV,  no.  41,  fol.  97.) 

3Gerard  stated  that  several  members  of  Congress  approved  this  sug- 
gestion and  that  one  offered  to  make  a  motion  to  that  effect.  He  expressed 
high  opinions  of  the  fairness  and  justice  of  Congress,  and  of  its  desire 
to  satisfy  Spain.  Same  to  same,  September  n.  (Ibid.,  no.  114,  fols.  311- 
3i6.) 


110  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [220 

aroused  in  the  Spanish  court  great  anxiety  and  alarm.4  He 
suggested  that  Congress  should  give  some  guarantee  to 
Spain  of  its  moderation,  and  should  formally  renounce  in 
her  favor  St.  Augustine,  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  together 
with  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

Gerard  was  gradually  led  to  this  position  by  the  ur- 
gency of  Miralles  and  the  indifference  of  Morris.  There  was 
nothing  in  the  instructions  of  Vergennes  to  warrant  such 
a  stand,  but  the  American  secretary  was  willing  to  agree 
to  the  full  demands  of  the  Spanish  court.  Morris  admitted 
that  the  anxiety  of  Spain  was  founded  on  reason  as  far  as 
some  sections  of  the  country  were  concerned,  but  asserted 
that  there  were  no  grounds  to  fear  the  Confederation  as  a 
whole.  He  confided  that  he  and  several  of  his  colleagues 
were  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  establishing  a  law  of 
concendo  imperio  which  would  prevent  any  additions  to 
the  states  already  in  the  union.  If  Spain  had  the  exclusive 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  he  argued,  the  immense 
population  which  would  form  along  that  river  and  the 
Great  Lakes  could  more  easily  be  held  in  subjection  to  the 
East.  On  the  other  hand,  if  this  population  should  hold 
control  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  he  ex- 
pressed the  belief  that  it  would  soon  dominate  both  the 
United  States  and  Spain.  As  for  the  Floridas,  Morris 
declared  that  Congress  would  cede  them  to  Spain  for  a 
money  compensation;  for  he  urged  that  there  was  also 
great  danger  of  southern  aggression.  In  Canada,  however, 
he  showed  great  interest,  and  used  every  effort  to  get 
France  to  assist  in  its  conquest.5 

4Gerard  carefully  refrained  from  admitting  any  knowledge  of  the 
wishes  of  Spain  and  claimed  to  speak  only  from  general  conditions.  He 
thought  that  Spain  had  good  reason  to  fear  the  American  spirit  of  adven- 
ture, and  pointed  out  the  dangers  to  Spain  of  the  American  western  policy. 
Gerard  to  Vergennes,  October  20.  (E.  V '.,  V.  no.  33,  fols.  68-84.) 

BGerard  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.)  Morris  urged  that  unless  the  English 
were  driven  out  of  Canada  the  French  could  never  hope  to  have  any  share 
in  the  fisheries,  and  he  offered  to  help  put  Newfoundland  into  French 
hands.  He  declared  that  with  Canada  in  British  hands  the  United  States 
must  remain  dependent  on  the  British  Empire. 


221]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  111 

Gerard  objected  to  Morris  that  there  were  many  Amer- 
icans who  insisted  upon  the  right  to  navigate  the  Missis- 
sippi, and  suggested  that  there  might  be  many  difficulties 
in  turning  it  over  to  Spain.  To  this  the  secretary  for  for- 
eign affairs  replied,  that  those  who  held  to  such  demands 
were  actuated  by  their  financial  interests,  and  that  if  the 
matter  were  presented  in  its  true  light  to  Congress  he 
could  hope  for  much.  It  is  noteworthy  that  in  all  this 
discussion  Gerard  did  not  once  suggest  that  Spain  should 
be  given  Eastern  Louisiana.  Against  the  wishes  of  the 
Spanish  court  and  without  any  support  from  the  Ameri- 
cans he  was  willing  to  leave  this  territory  to  the  new  repub- 
lic. But  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  Spain  should  have 
the  Floridas  and  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi River. 

Until  the  fall  of  1778  Vergennes  had  taken  no  position 
regarding  the  West.  He  admitted  that  he  did  not  under- 
stand the  question.  His  attitude  towards  the  United 
States  was  not  illiberal.  When  he  heard  of  the  Spanish 
claims  to  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  he 
expressed  his  surprise.  He  left  the  decision  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  France  in  this  dispute  to  Gerard,  who  should  un- 
derstand the  claims  of  both  parties.  If  it  appeared  to  the 
latter  that  Spain  could  justly  maintain  her  pretention,  he 
was  to  win  over  Congress;  but  if  it  appeared  that  the 
Americans  had  the  right  to  navigate  the  river,  he  was  to 
urge  their  claim  on  the  court  of  Madrid.6 

Vergennes  expressed  no  objections  to  the  American 
possession  of  the  West,  but  protested  against  any  project 


e"je  veux  parler  de  la  navigation  du  Mississipi ;  .  .  .  .  je  juge  par 
la  situation  des  lieux  que  les  Americains  insisteront  sur  la  liberte  de  la 
navigation  du  Mississipi  a  cause  des  etablissements  qu'ils  propose  de  former 
sur  1'Ohio,  et  je  vous  assure  qu'il  me  paroitroit  etonnant  qu'on  refusat  a 
cette  demande.  Cependant  il  peut  y  avoir  pour  la  negative  des  considera- 
tions locales  que  j'ignore  et  peuvent  meriter  quel  qu'attention  .  .  ."  Ver- 
gennes to  Gerard,  October  26.  (E.  U.,  V,  no.  43,  fol.  105 ;  Doniol,  Histoire, 
HI,  569.) 


112  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [222 

of  giving  Spain  anything  except  the  Floridas.7  When  he 
received  Gerard's  account  of  his  negotiations  with  Morris, 
he  gave  his  approval  of  the  action  of  the  French  represent- 
ative. He  believed  that  the  United  States  never  should  and 
never  would  undertake  any  conquests ,  and  he  urged 
Gerard  to  persuade  Congress  that  it  was  not  for  the  inter- 
est of  the  republic  to  extend  its  possessions.  Any  aggres- 
sion, he  declared,  would  arouse  jealousies  and  would  for- 
feit the  protection  of  the  powers,  who  alone  could  guaran- 
tee to  the  United  States  their  political  existence.8  The 
chief  end  of  the  war,  he  contended,  was  American  inde- 
pendence; and  when  that  was  attained  the  question  of 
territories  could  easily  be  decided.9 

Gerard  sought  to  carry  out  the  instructions  of  his  mas- 
ter. He  urged  Congress  to  pacific  measures  toward  Spain, 
and  begged  it  to  renounce  all  idea  of  conquest  except  such 
as  it  could  make  from  the  English,  and  to  be  content  with 
the  territory  it  already  had.10  Between  Spain  and  the 
tfnited  States  he  urged  that  there  should  be  an  estab- 
lished line  of  separation.  He  declared  that  all  Europe  was 
suspicious  of  the  new  nation,  and  urged  Congress  to  make 
clear  its  pacific  intention.  His  efforts  were  not  in  vain, 
for  several  members  of  Congress  agreed  with  him,  and 


7"Cet  agent  [Miralles]  croit  qu'il  seroit  d'une  bonne  politique  que  nous 
serassions  les  colonies  par  le  Nord  tandisque  1'Espagne  les  serreroit  par 

le  Sud.     Vous  savez  que  nous  sommes  d'une  opinion  contraire " 

(E.  U.,  V,  no.  43,  fol.  105.) 

8Vergennes  to  Gerard,  November  18.    (Ibid.,  V,  no.  78,  fol.  179.) 
""le  seul  point  qui  importe  aux  Etats-Unis  c'est  de  faire  reconnoitre 
leur  independance  par  la  Grande  Bretagne."    October  26.   (Ibid.,  no.  43, 
fol.  105.) 

10"qu'il  me  sembloit  en  general  qu'il  convenoit  qu'ils  se  hatassent  de  fixer 
d'une  maniere  positive  et  authentique  aux  yeux  de  tout  1'univers  le 
caractere  paisible  qui  doit  etre  inherent  a  une  republique  telle  que  la  leur; 
qu'en  marquent  un  desir  permanent  de  la  paix  et  une  resolution  arretee  de 
renouncer  a  toute  conquete  et  de  se  contenter  de  leur  territoire  et  des 
conquetes  qu'ils  pourroient  faire  sur  les  Anglois."  Gerard  to  Vergennes, 
December  12.  (Ibid.,  V,  no.  46,  fols.  301-316.) 


223]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  113 

some  even  declared  that  their  country  was  already  too 
large  to  be  well  governed.11 

While  the  discussion  of  the  disposition  of  the  West 
was  being  carried  on,  the  Americans  were  trying  to  make 
good  their  rights  by  force  of  arms.  Already  they  had 
established  themselves  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  while 
the  British  were  confined  to  a  few  posts  along  the  Great 
Lakes  and  some  of  the  rivers  of  the  Northwest.12  So  strong 
were  the  Americans  that  they  were  able  to  repulse  a  num- 
ber of  raids  led  by  the  British  into  this  country  and  to  bid 
defiance  to  any  attempts  to  conquer  them. 

In  the  Southwest  Galvez,  the  Spanish  governor  of 
New  Orleans,  had  been  from  the  first  a  friend  to  America 
and  an  enemy  to  Great  Britain.  He  allowed  Captain 
Willing  of  Philadelphia  to  establish  military  headquarters 
in  New  Orelans,  where  he  could  fit  out  expeditions,  recruit 
men  and  issue  seditious  proclamations  to  the  English  set- 
tlers in  Florida  and  along  the  Mississippi.  Galvez  openly 
furnished  ships  to  carry  supplies  up  the  Mississippi,  and 
aided  all  sorts  of  plans  against  the  British  in  the  West.13 
He  even  furnished  money  and  supplies  to  Willing  for  an 
-expedition  against  Mobile.14 

The  expedition  of  Major  Willing  against  the  Floridas 
attracted  much  attention.  Galvez  wrote  in  glowing  terms 
of  the  bravery  and  success  of  the  Americans.  Gerard  re- 
ported the  undertaking  less  favorably  as  led  "by  a  young 
fool,  who  in  a  commercial  expedition  has  drawn  the  Eng- 
lish from  a  great  part  of  the  Mississippi."15  In  Europe, 

11"Le  President  et  un  delegue  de  Virginie  convenrent  de  la  justesse 
•de  mes  remarques,  et  que  leur  empire  etoit  deja  trop  grande,  pour  esperer 
qu'il  put  etre  bien  gouverne."  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  December  22.  (E.  U., 
V,  no.  47,  fol.  349.)  Account  of  interview  with  a  committee  of  Congress. 

12Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution,  280. 

18For  accounts  of  the  activities  of  Galvez  see  memorials  in  Public 
Record  Office.  (C.  O.,  5,  vol.  117.)  See  also  relation  of  Pollock  to  Con- 
gress. (Papers  of  the  Continental  Congress,  no.  50,  fol.  I  et  seq.) 

14Montmorin  to  Vergennes.     (Esp.,  588,  no.  98,  new  30,  fol.  248.) 

"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  16.    (E.  U .,  IV,  no.  23,  fols.  97-102.) 


114  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [224 

also,  the  move  aroused  much  speculation.  Vergennes  was 
much  alarmed  for  fear  that  this  invasion  would  cause 
trouble  between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  The  expedi- 
tion, however,  accomplished  nothing  and  it  was  left  to 
Galvez  to  conquer  the  Floridas. 

Of  more  vital  importance  was  the  expedition  of  George 
Rogers  Clark  sent  out  in  1778,  largely  through  the  support 
of  Virginia.  He  captured  a  number  of  posts  in  the  North- 
west and  gave  the  United  States  a  real  basis  on  which  to 
maintain  their  rights  to  this  country.  Gerard  wrote  that 
the  "success  of  Colonel  Querk  in  the  country  of  the  Illinois 
presents  the  Americans  with  a  new  apas."1Q  Great  interest 
was  aroused  in  America  and  Europe  alike  by  this  attempt 
to  get  possession  of  the  West.  In  Europe  it  was  reported 
that  a  great  body  of  Americans  had  driven  the  English  out 
of  Illinois.17  The  British  still  held  Detroit  and  the  Great 
Lakes;  but  the  region  south  of  it  was  clear  and  the  best 
title  to  it  rested  with  the  United  States. 

With  the  success  of  Clark  in  the  West,  there  devel- 
oped a  new  interest  in  Congress  for  its  preservation  to  the 
republic.  At  an  interview  between  Gerard  and  a  commit- 
tee of  Congress  in  December,  1778,  the  whole  situation  was 
again  gone  over.  Gerard  declared  that  he  succeeded  in 
convincing  Jay  and  a  delegate  from  Virginia  of  the  wis- 
dom of  renouncing  all  conquests,  whereupon  the  member 
from  New  York  became  angry.18  This  was  the  beginning 


"Gerard  wrote  to  Vergennes  that  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  cared 
nothing  for  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas.  "Ces  etats,"  he  continued,, 
"aiment  mieux  diriger  1'emploi  de  leur  forces  centre  ce  qu'on  appelle 
Backountries.  Les  succes  du  Major  Querk  dans  le  Pays  des  Illinois  leur 
presentent  un  nouvel  apas.  On  croit  que  les  Anglois  sont  totalement 
chasses  des  rives  de  1'Ohio  et  du  Mississipi."  December  19,  (E.  U.,  V,. 
no.  47,  fols.  349-358.) 

11 'Arc.  Nat.  C.,  13;  Colonies,  Correspondence  General,  nos.  14-16. 

18Gerard  to  Vergennes,  December  22.  (E.  U.,  no.  47,  fol.  349.)  It  is- 
not  improbable  that  R.  H.  Lee  was  the  Virginia  member  of  this  committee,, 
for  he  held  views  at  that  time  very  similar  to  those  described  by  Gerard. 
See  his  letter  to  Patrick  Henry,  November  15,  1778.  (Letters  of  R.  H.  Leef 
I,  452.) 


225]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  115 

of  a  long  series  of  bitter  disputes  between  Gerard  and 
some  members  of  Congress  which  was  to  lead  to  the  failure 
of  all  his  schemes  regarding  the  West. 

Gerard  soon  came  to  the  realization  that  there  were 
many  influential  men  interested  in  the  Mississippi  Valley, 
and  he  saw  that  the  question  must  be  handled  carefully. 
The  western  interests,  he  wrote,  were  centered  in  three 
regions,  the  Illinois  and  two  great  projects  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Ohio,  and  all  these,  he  thought,  would  unite 
at  the  first  suggestion  of  giving  up  any  part  of  the  West.19 
Against  this  party  Gerard  held  control  of  the  committee 
of  foreign  affairs,  which  was  instructed  to  do  nothing  with- 
out his  advice.20 

The  party  opposed  to  Gerard  increased  greatly  in 
strength,  but  the  French  minister  still  thought  he  had  a 
majority  of  Congress  with  him.  The  "anti-Gallicans"  de- 
clared that  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  was  indis- 
pensable to  the  development  of  the  West,  and  maintained 
that  there  were  involved  the  interests  not  only  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  Illinois,  but  those  in  the  Southwest  as  well. 
These  people  formed  a  part  of  the  American  nation,  they 
argued,  and  must  not  be  abandoned.21  Thus  was  the  issue 
squarely  drawn.  Gerard  had  urged  Miralles  not  to  give 
the  Americans  an  opportunity  to  formulate  their  demands ; 
but  in  spite  of  his  cunning  they  had  now  declared  their 
right  to  the  whole  West.  With  this  party  the  French  min- 
ister at  once  came  into  conflict. 
\ 

19"les  proprietaires  des  Terres  des  Illinois  et  de  deux  etablissements 
immenses  projettes  et  commences  sur  1'Ohio  n'epargneroient  rien  pour  y 
susciter  des  obstacles,  et  ils  auroient  bien  des  moyens  pour  former  un 
parti  puissant."  December  22.  (E.  U.,  V,  no.  47,  fol.  349.) 

20Gerard  to  Vergennes,  January  28,  1/79.  (Ibid.,  VII,  no.  52,  fols. 
129-135.) 

21"d'autres  croyent  que  la  conservation  de  la  navigation  du  Mississipi 

est  absolument  indispensable.  Ces se  fondent  sur  les  interets 

de  la  population  qui  s'est  etablie  sur  1'Ohio  vers  la  riviere  des  illinois  dans 
le  Pays  des  Natchez  dans  la  floride  occidentale,  ils  disent  quils  ne  peuvent 
abandonner  leurs  compatriots  qui  se  sont  formes  en  corps  de  nation  et 
qui  demandent  a  etre  admis  a  la  confederation  americaine."  Gerard  to 
Vergennes,  January  28,  1770.  (Ibid.) 


116  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [226 

Gerard  had  never  before  suggested  to  the  Americans 
that  they  should  give  up  their  claims  to  the  Mississippi 
Valley.  To  Morris  he  had  talked  only  of  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi  River.  He  wished  to  look  after  the  in- 
terests of  Spain,  and  when  he  found  the  Americans  so 
yielding  he  naturally  concluded  that  they  would  surrender 
their  whole  title  to  the  West.  To  Congress  he  now  de- 
clared that  this  territory  no  more  belonged  to  the  United 
States  than  to  Spain  if  that  country  should  wish  to  con- 
quer it.  The  rightful  boundaries  of  the  United  States,  he 
argued,  were  those  they  had  possessed  as  colonies,  and  the 
proclamation  of  1763  and  the  Quebec  Act  had  forever  de- 
prived them  of  the  West.  The  pretentious  of  Congress,  he 
insisted,  were  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  alliance  with 
France,  whose  king  would  not  prolong  the  war  a  single  day 
in  order  to  maintain  them.  Such  a  course,  he  urged,  would 
also  incur  the  enmity  of  Spain,  so  that  when  the  time  for 
peace  came  they  would  find  themselves  crushed  between 
British  hatred  and  Spanish  jealousy.  The  honor  and  in- 
terests of  the  United  States,  he  added,  were  opposed  to 
conquest.  "Already  your  territory  is  unwieldy,"  he  insin- 
uated, "and  how  much  more  so  will  it  become  by  this  enor- 
mous addition  of  dominion."22 

Gerard  was  not  prepared,  however,  to  fight  for  the 
claims  of  Spain.  Altho  his  conduct  thus  far  had  re- 
ceived the  approval  of  Vergennes,  the  foreign  minister 


22"  ....  j'ai  ajoute  que  les  Etats-Unis  n'avoient  aucune  sorte  de  droit 
sur  les  possessions  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  qui  n'apartient  egalement 
au  Roi  d'Espagne,  quand  il  seroit  en  guerre  avec  1'angre.  Que 
leur  droit  se  bornoit  au  Territoire  qu'ils  possedoient  comme 
Colonies  Angloises."  He  continued  that  the  United  States  had  claimed 
to  be  thirteen  states  "et  fondee  [a  nation]  sur  les  moyens  les  plus 
legitimes,  et  que  rien  ne  seroit  plus  dangereux  pour  leur  honneur  leur 
consideration  la  Constance  de  leurs  principes  et  la  confiance  dans  leur 
bonne  foi,  qu'ils  se  sont  envisages  euxmemes  comme  une  republique 
commerqante  qui  ne  pourroit  pas  meme  conserver  une  armee  permanente ; 
qu'ils  eprouent  deja  combien  1'etendue  de  leur  territoire  rendoit  une 
administration  utile  et  active  difficile  a  etablir."  Gerard  to  Vergennes, 
January  28.  (E.  U,,  VII,  no.  52.) 


227]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  117 

had  shown  no  desire  to  support  the  extreme  demands  of 
Spain  for  possession  of  the  West.  Vergennes  had  never 
opposed  the  claims  of  the  Americans  to  this  territory, 
but  had  condemned  the  Spanish  pretensions  as  "mon- 
strous."23 He  had  expressed  his  acceptance  of  all  the 
Spanish  demands,  however,  except  their  claim  to  control 
the  Mississippi  Valley.  He  had  also  instructed  Gerard  not 
to  oppose  the  American  demands.  Under  these  circum- 
stances the  minister  to  the  United  States  could  not  go 
to  extremities,  and  began  to  conciliate.  He  urged  that  it 
would  not  be  well  to  make  of  Canada  a  fourteenth  state, 
but  suggested  that  much  might  be  expected  of  the  gener- 
osity of  the  King  of  Spain  if  he  were  conceded  Florida. 

The  propositions  of  Gerard  drew  more  closely  party 
lines  in  Congress.  His  friends  were  at  first  better  organ- 
ized and  he  felt  that  his  policy  would  triumph.  He  was 
definitely  promised  the  Floridas  for  Spain  and  thought 
he  would  soon  win  the  West.24  He  believed  that  he  had 
seized  the  critical  moment,  when  the  party  of  expansion 
was  weakest,  to  deprive  the  United  States  of  lands  which 
they  regarded  "as  the  patrimony  for  their  overflowing 
population."  He  was  sure  that  the  Americans  must  yield 
because  of  their  desire  for  peace  and  their  despair  of 
making  further  conquests.25 


23Vergennes  stood  for  the  idea  of  giving  the  Floridas  to  Spain  and 
allowing  Great  Britain  to  keep  Canada.  See  p.  08.  Altho  he  might  in- 
clude in  Canada  much  of  the  old  Northwest  still  the  implication  would 
be  that  he  conceded  the  West  to  Congress.  He  had  spoken  without  com- 
plaint of  the  American  occupation  of  the  Ohio  and  Illinois  regions,  but 
had  opposed  the  claims  of  Spain. 

2*Gerard  reported  that  he  had  good  information  that  the  committee 
of  foreign  affairs  would  cede  the  Floridas  to  Spain  if  the  Americans  con- 
quered theru  and  would  renounce  all  pretensions  that  could  give  offense 
to  that  crown.  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  January  29.  (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  533,  fol. 
136.) 

25"Peutetre  1'esperance  de  la  paix  et  le  desespoir  de  faire  aucune 
conquete  rendra  les  Americains  moins  difficiles  sur  cet  objet."  Gerard  to 
Vergennes,  February  15.  (Ibid.,  no.  89,  fols.  215-219.) 


118  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [228 

Altho  Gerard  doubtless  had  a  strong  following,  the 
anti-Gallican  party  was  rapidly  organizing.  It  not  only 
insisted  upon  possession  of  the  West  and  the  freedom  of 
the  Mississippi,  but  began  to  agitate  for  an  extension  of 
the  northern  frontier.26  They  showed  also  considerable 
hostility  to  Spain  and  Gerard  had  a  new  cause  of  worry. 
He  tried  to  get  them  to  suspend  discussion  of  the  northern 
boundary,  and  demanded  renewed  assurances  that  Spain 
should  have  the  Floridas. 

Altho  checked  for  a  time,  Gerard  did  not  give  up  his 
policy.  To  the  members  of  Congress  he  maintained  that 
the  court  of  Madrid  should  be  conciliated  and  its  friend- 
ship sought.  He  disclaimed  any  intention  to  push  the  in- 
terests of  Spain,  and  declared  that  he  sought  only  her 
alliance.  That  nation  was  content  with  her  possessions, 
he  affirmed,  but  she  might  take  a  more  friendly  attitude 
towards  the  American  cause  if  Congress  would  offer  the 
possession  of  Pensacola  and  the  exclusive  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi.  On  the  north  he  argued  that  the  British 
held  Canada  so  firmly  that  they  could  be  dislodged  only 
after  a  "most  fortunate  war."  For  this  reason  he  urged 
that  Congress  should  be  willing  to  make  peace  without 
seeking  any  additions  of  territory.  France,  he  said, 
desired  nothing  but  the  independence  of  the  United  States, 
and  asked  only  that  her  ally  should  work  to  this  end.27 

The  words  of  Gerard  produced  different  effects  on  the 
different  members  of  Congress.  Most  of  them  were  willing 
to  surrender  all  claims  to  Pensacola  but  the  proposition 
to  give  Spain  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
aroused  much  angry  discussion.  Gerard  skilfully  built 
up  his  party  once  more  to  the  acceptance  of  his  views. 
He  worked  shrewdly  on  the  jealousies  of  the  eastern  dele- 
gates to  secure  their  aid  and  even  made  an  impression  on 


I8La  difficulte  la  plus  reelle  et  la  plus  facheuse  que  les  Americains 
pourroient  clever  seroit  celle  qui  regarderoit  les  limites  de  leur  territoire 
vis-a-vis  de  1'Angre."  (E.  V.,  VII,  no.  89,  fols.  215-219.) 

"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  February  17  (ibid.,  VII,  no.  98,  fol.  233)  ; 
Pebruary  18  (ibid.,  no.  100,  fol.  244). 


229]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  119 

those  from  the  south.  Some  of  the  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina  members  admitted  their  fear  that  the  West  was 
being  rapidly  settled  by  a  lawless  class  which  would  prove 
dangerous  to  the  older  governments.  These  people  would 
become  equally  hostile  to  the  Spanish  power,  they  agreed, 
and  some  way  must  be  devised  to  restrain  them.  To  ac- 
complish this  they  were  willing  to  hand  over  to  the  court 
of  Madrid  complete  control  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Some  of  the  Gerard 
party,  however,  contended  for  a  depot  or  place  of  deposit 
at  the  mouth  of  the  river,28  altho  they  sought  first  of  all 
the  alliance  of  Spain. 

On  the  question  of  pushing  the  northern  boundary 
further  into  Canada  Gerard  took  a  decided  stand.  Wash- 
ington had  declared  the  conquest  of  Canada  imprac- 
ticable; and  the  French  minister  felt  he  could  urge  the 
same.  Accordingly  he  asked  Congress  once  more  to  re- 
nounce all  pretensions  to  this  territory.  It  has  not 
been  in  rebellion,  he  argued,  and  has  no  claim  to  help. 
This  is  not  a  war  of  conquest,  but  only  to  attain  inde- 
pendence for  the  United  States;  and  when  this  is  accom- 
plished, we  are  ready  to  make  peace.29 

Gerard  soon  felt  that  his  policy  was  again  in  the  open 
and  he  prepared  to  make  the  most  of  his  opportunities.  He 
was  sure  of  the  Floridas  and  felt  convinced  that  he  could 
get  the  control  of  the  Mississippi  for  Spain,  provided  the 
western  settlements  were  conceded  a  port  on  the  Gulf. 
Spain,  however,  was  expected  to  reward  this  concession 
with  a  large  sum  of  money.30 

The  projects  of  Gerard  furnished  the  issue  for  a  great 
battle  in  Congress.  On  one  side  were  the  New  Englanders 
who  insisted  on  the  acquisition  of  Nova  Scotia  and  the 


28Gerard  to  Vergennes.    (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  98,  f ol.  233 ;  no.  100,  fol.  244.) 

"Ibid. 

>°Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  I.  (Ibid.,  VII,  no.  123,  fol.  244.) 


120  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [230 

fisheries  necessary  for  their  prosperity  and  safety.81  On 
the  other  side  was  the  southern  and  western  party  which 
gave  preeminence  to  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  and  American  influence  in  the  West.  Gerard 
was  the  center  of  all  controversy  and  his  house  became 
the  committee  room  of  Congress.  Here  came  his  partisans 
to  discuss  the  situation  and  to  fortify  themselves  with 
arguments.  Here  came  the  opponents  of  his  policy  to 
argue  with  him  and  to  present  the  claims  of  their  country. 
Among  the  former  Gerard  lists  Gouveneur  Morris  and 
John  Jay.  His  most  determined  foes  were  the  Adams 
family  and  the  Lees.  These  two  families  had  formed 
a  sort  of  alliance  termed  the  "Junto",  and  they  were 
untiring  in  their  opposition  to  the  measures  of  France. 
Gerard  declared  that  the  purpose  of  the  opposition  was  to 
maintain  the  war  until  the  British  could  send  a  new  com- 
mission which  they  thought  would  offer  liberal  terms  of 
peace.32 

A  special  commission  of  five  appointed  by  Congress 
to  consider  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country  reported  on 
February  23.  It  urged  that  Canada  should  be  restricted 
to  the  boundaries  contended  for  by  Great  Britain  in 
the  Seven  Years  War,  which  meant  that  the  United  States 
should  control  the  Great  Lakes  on  the  north  and  extend 
westward  to  the  Mississippi.  The  southern  boundary  it 
placed  as  tAe  northern  line  of  Florida.  The  committee 
also  maintained  the  right  to  the  free  navigation  of  the 

31"Les  4  Etats  de  la  nouvelle  Angre  ont  fortement  represente  la 
necessite  de  cette  stipulation."  E.  U.,  VII,  no.  123,  fol.  244.  After 
March  I,  Gerard  could  not  count  so  strongly  on  the  help  of  a  party,  but 
he  depended  more  on  a  sort  of  personal  following  which  he  was  building 
up,  particularly  among  the  smaller  states.  Jenifer  of  Maryland  was  the 
most  important  of  these  men. 

82The  position  of  many  members  of  Congress  is  very  puzzling.  Lee 
favored  the  ideas  of  Gerard  toward  the  West  during  the  fall  of  1778  (see 
p.  119).  The  next  spring  he  led  the  opposition.  Jay  was  counted  as  a 
friend  of  the  Spanish  policy.  His  later  opinions  are  well  known.  Gerard 
declared  that  Samuel  Adams  wished  to  continue  the  war  to  save  his  im- 
portance, and  that  that  was  the  purpose  of  his  coalition  with  the  Lees. 
March  4.  (Ibid.,  VII,  no.  133,  fol.  328.) 


231]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  121 

Mississippi  and  to  the  fisheries  of  Newfoundland.  It 
recommended  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas  which  should 
be  sold  to  Spain  and  also  the  occupation  of  Nova  Scotia. 
The  discussion  of  this  report  occupied  many  days,33  and 
from  the  despatches  of  Gerard  we  get  an  idea  of  the  bitter- 
ness aroused.  The  report  of  the  committee  embodies  two 
sets  of  ideas ;  those  of  the  East  and  those  of  the  South.  The 
party  of  the  East  looked  for  an  extension  of  boundaries 
far  into  Canada,  with  the  conquest  of  Nova  Scotia  and  the 
freedom  of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries.  The  party  of  the 
South  held  to  the  possession  of  the  Mississippi  Valley 
with  the  freedom  to  navigate  that  river.  Gerard  opposed 
the  efforts  of  both.  He  conferred  with  one  of  his  friends 
in  Congress,  and  they  agreed  that  a  simple  and  fair  ar- 
rangement for  the  western  boundary  would  be  to  take  the 
line  marked  off  by  the  proclamation  of  1763.34 

The  plan  of  Gerard  received  no  serious  consideration 
from  Congress.  The  debates,  however,  covered  a  wide 
range  of  matter.  In  them  the  whole  history  of  British 
colonization  and  diplomacy  was  gone  over.  The  trend  of 
the  discussion  soon  convinced  Gerard  that  the  claim  to 
Nova  Scotia  would  be  abandoned,  but  the  question  of  the 
northwest  boundary  was  more  difficult  to  settle.  The  ad- 
vocates of  expansion  justified  the  claim  to  the  Northwest 
Territory,  not  only  on  historical  grounds  but  likewise  on 

33This  committee  represented  well  the  different  sections  of  the  coun- 
try :  it  included  S.  Adams  of  Massachusetts,  G.  Morris  of  New  York, 
Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey,  Smith  of  Virginia,  and  Burke  of  North 
Carolina.  In  its  report  it  urged  the  interests  of  every  section  and  thus 
threw  the  whole  question  into  Congress.  Journals  of  Continental  Con- 
gress (Ford  ed.),  XIII,  241-243. 

34"L'un  des  delegues  m'a  montre  le  plan  qu'il  a  redige  pour  les  [limitesl 
fixer  Quoique  cette  matiere  ne  me  soit  pas  assez  connue  dans  ses  details 
pour  fixer  mon  jugement  ce  plan  a  beaucoup  soulage  1'aprehension  ou 
j'etois  que  quelque  grand  Proprietaire  du  Sud  ne  se  chargeat  de  ce  travail. 
On  propose  de  determiner  ces  limites  en  prenant  le  Traitee  de  Paris  d'une 
main  et  1'autre  la  Proclamation  [of  1763]  cette  methode  m'a  paru 
simple  et  facile  et  je  n'ai  pu  m'empecher  d'y  applaudir."  Gerard  to  Ver- 
gennes,  March  3.  (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  67,  fol.  131.) 


122  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [232 

grounds  of  conquest  and  occupation.  They  further  con- 
tended that  the  surrender  of  this  region  would  mean  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  validity  of  the  Quebec  Act,  which 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  Revolution. 

The  debates  on  the  question  of  the  boundaries  and  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  continued  from  the  1st  of 
March  to  the  19th.  On  the  question  of  the  Mississippi 
important  interests  in  the  West  and  South  united  to  de- 
mand the  right  of  navigation.  Those  interested  in  the 
Northwest  Territory  pictured  the  great  advantages  to  the 
South  of  controlling  the  trade  of  this  region.  If  our  people 
do  not  get  this  trade,  they  argued,  the  English  will  get  it, 
and  thus  become  powerful  in  a  region  where  it  is  to  the 
interest  of  both  Spain  and  the  United  States  to  keep  them 
out.35 

So  powerful  did  the  opposition  to  giving  up  the  Mis- 
sissippi become  that  Gerard  felt  it  necessary  to  interfere. 
Through  one  of  his  partisans  he  learned  that  the  western 
party  proposed  to  treat  directly  with  the  British  crown 
for  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  Gerard  protested 
vigorously  against  this  scheme  as  vicious  and  dangerous 
in  its  purpose  and  unjust  in  its  tendencies  and  declared 
that  Congress  acted  as  if  it  wished  to  dictate  first  to  Spain, 
then  to  Great  Britain.  He  remarked  that  Spain  had  no 
contract  with  the  United  States  and  was  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  them,  and  that  the  Spanish  king  would  never  con- 
sent to  surrender  his  rights  over  the  Mississippi,  and  on 
this  question  the  king  of  France  would  probably  take  his 
part.  He  observed  that  it  seemed  strange  that  Congress 
should  think  of  treating  with  England  to  despoil  Spain 
and  that  it  appeared  that  America  would  soon  be  at  war 
with  the  Spanish  monarchy.36  This  interview  with  Gerard 
was  skillfully  used  by  his  friends,  who  believed  that  they 
had  a  majority  against  the  proposition.  They  desired, 
however,  to  win  over  the  important  state  of  Virginia.  They 


35Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  8.     (E.  U.,  no.  135,  fol.  339.) 
"Ibid. 


233]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  123 

expected  to  bring  the  question  to  a  vote  on  March  11,  but 
in  the  meantime  the  delegates  from  South  Carolina  were 
recalled  and  some  time  was  necessary  to  rebuild  their  ma- 
jority.37 The  final  vote  on  the  question  of  making  the 
right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  an  ultimatum  was  taken 
on  March  24.  Only  one  state  favored  the  motion.  Two 
were  divided  and  the  others  voted  no.38 

The  debate  on  the  boundaries  was  milder  and  there 
was  from  the  beginning  greater  unanimity  of  sentiment. 
Several  of  those  opposed  to  the  policy  of  Gerard  informed 
him  that  they  would  not  demand  conquests  beyond  what 
really  belonged  to  the  thirteen  states.39  There  was  consid- 
erable fear  that  if  Canada  were  left  to  Great  Britain  she 
would  prove  a  dangerous  neighbor.  Gerard  reassured 
them  with  the  promise  of  the  unfaltering  support  of 
France,  who  would  never  allow  them  to  sink  back  under 
the  power  of  her  rival.  He  also  suggested  that  the  whole 
quesiton  of  boundaries  be  left  until  after  the  peace  for  set- 
tlement; but  this  plan  received  no  support  at  all  in  Con- 
gress.40 The  debates  on  the  acquisition  of  Nova  Scotia 
convinced  the  New  England  delegates  that  it  would  not 
carry,  and  they  substituted  a  demand  for  the  right  of  fish- 
ing on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland,  which  was  carried  by  a 
close  vote.41 

On  March  19  Congress  decided  on  the  boundaries  it 
would  demancj.  as  an  ultimatum.  This  boundary  ran  ir- 
regularly to  the  south  end  of  Lake  Nipissing,  thence  to 
the  source  of  the  Mississippi,  down  the  middle  of  that  river 
to  the  thirty-first  parallel,  thence  along  the  northern  boun- 
dary of  Florida  to  the  Atlantic.42  This  vote  was  a  compro- 
mise. It  did  not  grant  the  demands  of  New  England  for 


37Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  10,  17/9.     (E.  U.,  no.  143,  fol.  367.) 
BSJournals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XIII,  369. 
39Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  8.     (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  135,  new  339.) 
40Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  12,  1779.    (Ibid.,  no.  144,  fol.  375.) 
41  Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XIII,  372;  Gerard  to 
Vergennes,  March  18,  1779.     (E.  U.,  VII,  no.  159,  fol.  407.) 

42Journals  of  Continental  Congress,  (Ford  ed.),  XIII,  339-341. 


124  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [234 

the  possession  of  Nova  Scotia,  but  laid  claim  to  the  whole 
region  of  the  Great  Lakes.  At  the  same  time  the  South  and 
West  received  no  promise  of  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi or  the  possession  of  the  Floridas.  In  this  contest  the 
partisans  of  Gerard  had  not  yet  showed  their  full  strength. 
They  felt  sure  of  a  majority  in  favor  of  the  French  policy, 
but  were  confronted  by  the  untiring  opposition  of  Lee. 
Such  was  the  changing  character  of  Congress  that  no  pol- 
icy could  well  be  assured;  and  the  partisans  of  Gerard 
were  waiting  until  the  time  when  they  could  carry  their 
measure  "by  such  a  majority  that  Mr.  Lee  would  find  him- 
self the  only  one  in  opposition."43 

The  vote  of  Congress  in  March  on  the  question  of  the 
boundaries  and  the  Mississippi  had  satisfied  no  one.  On 
the  question  of  the  fisheries  the  anti-Gallican  party  had 
been  active.44  New  England  was  not  content  with  the  idea 
of  having  the  English  on  its  northern  boundaries  and  re- 
newed its  proposal  to  conquer  Canada.45  Gerard  was  tire- 
less in  his  opposition  to  this  plan  and  urged  upon  Congress 
the  futility  of  continuing  the  war  for  this  purpose.46  While 
he  admitted  that  the  treaty  of  alliance  did  not  define  the 
limits  of  the  states  whose  independence  was  guaranteed, 
he  still  insisted  that  the  guarantee  could  not  be  made  to 
apply  to  territories  not  in  the  possession  of  the  United 
States.47 

By  July  Gerard  had  come  to  feel  that  his  policy  with 
regard  to  the  boundaries  was  triumphant.  He  had  built 
up  a  large  party  in  and  out  of  Congress,  but  he  had  lost 
his  influence  over  the  leading  men.  He  depended  on  men 
of  minor  caliber,  like  Jenifer  of  Maryland,  who  sided  with 
the  French  policy  and  favored  limiting  the  boundaries  of 
the  United  States  as  much  as  possible.48 


43Gerard  to  Vergennes.   (E.  U.,  VIII,  no.  to.) 

"Doniol,  Histolre,  IV,  1/5. 

45Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  14.     (E,  U.,  VIII,  no.  48,  new  83.) 

"Ibid. 

47Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  21.    (Ibid.,  no.  59,  new   88.) 

4BIbid.,  IX,  no.  17,  new    103. 


235]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  125 

On  the  12th  of  July  Gerard  held  a  conference  with 
Congress  in  committee  of  the  whole,  in  which  he  reviewed 
the  whole  history  of  French  intervention  and  declared  that 
the  world  was  convinced  that  the  war  had  no  object  of  con- 
quest but  only  to  secure  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  In  this  conference  he  urged  also  that  Congress 
should  seek  the  favor  of  Spain  by  the  offer  of  such  mod- 
erate terms  as  would  incline  His  Catholic  Majesty  to  the 
American  interests.49 

As  a  result  of  his  management  Gerard  believed  that 
he  held  the  affair  of  boundaries  well  under  control.  He 
did  not  flatter  himself  that  Congress  would  renounce  all 
its  former  pretentious,  but  he  believed  it  would  make  no 
objection  to  the  cession  of  the  Floridas  to  Spain  and  would 
tacitly  let  go  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  He  even 
expressed  his  belief  that  if  necessary  it  would  willingly 
abandon  Georgia.50 

The  partisans  of  Gerard  had  postponed  the  final  vote 
on  the  boundaries  until  a  time  when  they  could  hope  to 
carry  their  plan  by  an  overwhelming  majority.  On  July 
18  Gerard  wrote  that  the  committee  of  foreign  affairs  stood 
eight  to  four  in  favor  of  his  measure,  and  that  his  party 
worked  unceasingly  to  win  over  votes.  One  of  the  most 
active  supporters  of  this  policy  was  John  Jay,  the  presi- 
dent of  Congress.  Gerard,  who  himself  took  an  active  part 
in  the  campaign,  thought  that  it  wras  time  to  bring  the 
question  to  a  vote  and  to  pass  some  measures  favored  by 
the  opposition  in  return  for  their  support  on  the  boun- 
daries. He  felt  that  the  strength  of  the  anti-Gallicans  was 
weakened  by  the  failure  of  England  to  offer  favorable 
terms  of  peace ;  but  if  the  opposition  should  carry  the  vote 
in  Congress,  he  proposed  to  attack  its  validity  on  the 
ground  that  the  Articles  of  Confederation  provided  that 
every  state  must  ratify  a  treaty.51 


49 'Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XIV,  829-835. 
50Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  20,  1779.   (E.  U.,  IX,  no.  46,  new   109.) 
51Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  221-222. 


126  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [236 

In  the  meanwhile  the  "Junto"  opposing  the  policy  of 
Gerard  was  very  active.  Its  organization  and  workings 
are  obscure,  but  it  suddenly  attained  great  power  in  Con- 
gress. Its  strength  was  unknown  to  Gerard,  who  declared 
that  the  influence  of  Lee  in  Virginia  was  destroyed  and 
the  opposition  was  confined  to  New  England.52 

On  the  question  of  the  boundaries  and  the  treaty  with 
Spain  several  plans  were  laid  before  Congress.  Gerard 
favored  a  plan  to  outline  the  boundaries  as  vaguely  as 
possible  and  to  leave  their  final  settlement  until  after  the 
peace.  On  the  question  of  cessions  to  Spain  he  felt  there 
would  be  no  difficulty.33 

In  spite  of  his  words  of  assurance,  however,  Gerard 
feared  the  power  of  the  "Junto."  He  learned  from  his  con- 
fidants that  it  would  ask  Congress  to  demand  as  an  ulti- 
matum an  extension  of  boundaries  as  far  north  as  46°.  The 
opposition  declared  openly  that  the  justice  of  the  king 
would  never  refuse  these  conditions  so  essential  to  the 
safety  of  the  United  States.54 

Early  in  August  the  battle  in  Congress  openly  began. 
On  the  5th,  M'Kean  moved  that,  if  Great  Britain  persisted 
in  the  war,  Congress  should  seek  to  conclude  treaties  with 
both  France  and  Spain  providing  for  the  conquest  of  Can- 
ada, Nova  Scotia,  and  Bermuda.  Spain  and  France  were 
to  be  offered  for  their  aid  equal  rights  in  the  fisheries.  This 
resolution  was  made  in  the  interests  of  the  northern  states ; 
but  the  southern  delegation  secured  an  amendment  pro- 
viding for  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas  and  demanding  the 
"free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi."55 


*2Gerard  to  Vergennes.    (£.  U.,  IX,  no.  100,  new    116.) 

**Ibid.  The  actual  disposition  of  Congress,  Gerard  wrote,  is  "to  re- 
nounce the  Floridas  and  tacitly  to  give  up  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, of  which  the  two  banks  belong  to  that  crown  [Spain]  provided  they 
are  given  a  free  port  for  exporting  their  goods  and  importing  merchan- 
dise." 

"Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  222. 

"Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XIV,  924-926. 


237]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  127 

This  resolution  was  an  open  defiance  to  Gerard.  It 
repudiated  all  his  advice  and  outlined  a  new  policy  of  con- 
quest. It  is  doubtful,  however,  if  it  was  put  forth  seriously 
as  a  plan  of  action.  More  likely  it  was  intended  as  a  feeler 
to  test  the  strength  of  the  anti-Gallican  party  in  Congress. 
The  motion  was  not  voted  upon,  but  it  threw  open  for  de- 
bate the  whole  question  of  the  territories  and  of  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi.  Both  sides  understood  that  this 
was  the  last  card  of  the  game.  Gerard,  however,  felt  that 
he  would  win,  for  he  controlled  the  committee  of  foreign 
affairs,  and  through  it  transmitted  his  arguments  and 
threats  to  Congress. 

In  the  meantime  a  special  committee  had  been  ap- 
pointed to  draw  up  terms  of  peace.  It  had  done  its  work 
in  consultation  with  Gerard,  and  on  August  14  presented 
its  report.  The  terms  were  more  moderate  than  the  de- 
mands of  the  anti-Gallicans.  Florida  and  Canada  were  to 
be  given  up,  but  the  northern  boundary  was  to  extend  as 
far  as  Lake  Nipissing.56  Several  reasons  were  back  of  this 
decision.  News  had  just  reached  America  of  the  alliance 
between  France  and  Spain ;  and  it  was  seen  that  the  latter 
power  would  make  strong  demands  for  the  Floridas.57 

The  entrance  of  Spain  into  the  war  was  made  the 
occasion  for  new  propositions  of  a  treaty  of  alliance.  On 
this  question  the  extreme  anti-Gallicans  maintained  their 
fight.  On  September  9  they  introduced  a  resolution  pro- 
viding for  an  alliance  with  Spain  whereby  that  power  was 
to  assure  to  the  United  States  the  possession  of  Canada, 
Nova  Scotia,  Bermudas,  and  the  Floridas,  as  well  as  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  This  motion  provided,  how- 
ever, that  if  Spain  should  insist  upon  it,  the  United  States 
would  cede  to  her  the  Floridas  and  the  exclusive  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi  below  the  thirty-first  parallel.  The 
character  of  this  resolution  clearly  revealed  the  weakness 
of  the  extreme  position,  and  it  was  tabled  at  once  to  make 
way  for  a  more  moderate  one.  After  several  days  of  debate 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XIV,  956-967. 
87Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  205. 


128  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [238 

it  was  resolved  that  if  Spain  would  accede  to  the  treaty  of 
alliance,  Congress  would  make  no  objection  to  her  acquir- 
ing the  Floridas,  provided  that  the  "United  States  shall 
enjoy  the  free  navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi  into  and 
from  the  sea."58 

On  information  furnished  by  Gerard  that  England 
would  probably  soon  seek  peace,  Congress  resolved  to  send 
a  representative  to  Europe  who  should  be  on  the  ground 
when  the  first  advances  were  made.  There  were  two  lead- 
ing candidates  named,  Jay  and  John  Adams.  Gerard  and 
his  partisans  favored  Jay  as  being  more  moderate  in  his 
views,  while  the  anti-Gallicans  gave  their  support  to 
Adams.59  After  several  days  of  delay  the  vote  was  taken 
on  September  27  and  Adams  was  elected  minister  plenipo- 
tentiary to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Brit- 
ain.60 At  the  same  time  Jay  was  elected  minister  plenipo- 
tentiary to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Spain.  On 
the  next  day  instructions  for  Jay  were  decided  upon,  which 
in  regard  to  the  Floridas  and  the  Mississippi  were  identical 
with  those  agreed  to  on  the  9th.61  On  October  13  Wither 
spoon  moved  that  Jay  be  allowed  to  recede  from  the  claim 
of  a  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  below  the  thirty-first 
parallel,  if  such  were  necessary  in  order  to  obtain  the  alli- 
ance with  Spain,  but  this  motion  was  promptly  defeated.62 
The  instructions  to  Adams  were  the  same  as  those  agreed 
upon  on  August  14. 

The  resolutions  of  August  and  September  in  regard 
to  the  boundaries  and  the  Mississippi  mark  the  formation 
of  a  definite  policy  by  Congress.  This  policy  was  a  com- 
promise between  the  East  and  the  South,  between  the 
French  party  and  the  anti-Gallicans.  While  Gerard  was 
not  entirely  satisfied  with  the  conditions  laid  down,  he  felt 


^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.)f  XV,  1042-1046. 

"Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  209. 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XV,  1113. 

**Ibid.,  1116. 

*2Ibid.,  1168. 


239]  CONGRESSIONAL  POLICY  TOWARD  THE  WEST  129 

that  they  were  not  unfavorable  to  France.63  He  regarded 
the  appointment  of  Jay  as  a  decided  step  towards  "con- 
ciliation" with  Spain,  and  as  a  bid  for  the  friendship  of 
Charles  III. 

The  work  of  Gerard  as  minister  to  the  United  States 
was  finished.  He  had  long  been  laboring  under  a  severe 
malady  attributed  to  the  climate  of  Philadelphia  and  had 
struggled  heroically  against  disease  while  upholding  the 
interests  of  France  and  Spain.  The  Chevalier  de  la  Lu- 
zerne,  his  successor,  had  already  arrived  in  the  United 
States  and  was  in  close  touch  with  him.  Congress  regarded 
his  departure  with  regret.  In  spite  of  his  interference  in 
American  politics  he  retained  his  popularity  till  the  last. 
Congress  had  his  picture  painted  for  its  council  chamber 
and  wrote  Louis  XVI  a  flattering  letter  describing  his  loy- 
alty and  ability. 

The  mission  of  Gerard  was  unfortunate  from  the 
standpoint  of  both  his  own  country  and  the  United  States. 
To  Vergennes  he  gave  a  one-sided  picture  of  conditions  in 
the  United  States,  and  led  him  to  believe  that  the  great 
body  of  sober-minded,  intelligent  citizens  favored  restrict- 
ing the  boundaries  of  their  country,  and  that  the  opposi- 
tion was  made  up  of  a  few  narrow  and  bigoted  fanatics. 
His  meddling  in  the  politics  of  Congress  and  his  forma- 
tion of  a  faction  around  himself  led  to  serious  results.  It 
made  the  opponents  of  the  French  policy  more  determined 
and  aggressive  and  aroused,  in  the  minds  of  many,  sus- 
picion of  the  honesty  and  friendship  of  the  French  mon- 
archy. This  interference  of  Gerard  alienated  the  ablest 
men  in  Congress,  men  like  Jay  and  Morris,  who  had  hon- 
estly favored  the  policy  he  advocated.  As  a  result  of  his 
course  of  action  the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  was 
entrusted  to  his  enemies  and  thus  to  men  who  looked  with 
distruct  on  any  policy  advocated  by  Frenchmen.  John 
Adams  was  elected  minister  plenipotentiary  by  an  anti- 
French  party  and  against  the  will  of  Gerard.  Jay  had 

83Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  211. 


130  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [240 

long  been  associated  with  the  French  policy,  but  his  change 
of  heart  was  probably  known  to  his  colleagues  before  his 
election  as  minister  to  Spain.  Gerard  had  carried  out  his 
policy  without  direction  and  without  consultation  with 
the  French  foreign  office.  After  his  first  instructions, 
which  directed  him  to  look  after  the  interests  of  Spain 
and  to  restrain  Congress  from  all  attempts  at  conquest,  he 
acted  nearly  always  on  his  own  initiative.  The  result  was 
a  lack  of  harmony  between  the  representations  of  Gerard 
in  Philadelphia  and  the  promise  of  Vergennes  at  Paris. 
The  course  of  Gerard  received  the  approval  of  Vergennes 
and  considerably  modified  the  general  policy  of  the  French 
court;  and  upon  his  reports  were  based  the  instructions  to 
his  successor  Luzerne.  Thus  arose  a  serious  divergence 
between  the  views  of  Congress  and  those  of  Vergennes, 
which  was  in  turn  to  lead  to  mutual  jealousies  and  sus- 
picions; and  to  the  conduct  of  Gerard  is  due  in  a  large 
measure  the  irritation  which  later  broke  out  between  the 
French  minister  of  foreign  affairs  and  the  envoys  of  the 
United  States. 


CHAPTER    VII 

VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE. 

The  alliance  between  France  and  Spain  did  not  win 
a  friend  for  the  United  States.  While  it  added  another 
to  the  list  of  those  fighting  the  British  Empire,  it  divided 
the  councils  of  her  enemies;  for  the  ambitions  of  Spain 
were  unalterabty  opposed  to  the  interests  and  aims  of  the 
United  States.  Florida  Blanca  had  long  feared  the  growth 
of  a  powerful  rival  in  the  New  World,  and  he  had  urged 
that  Great  Britain  be  allowed  to  keep  Canada  as  a  check 
on  the  power  of  the  new  republic.  Altho  it  was  not  stipu- 
lated in  the  convention,  it  was  tacitly  understood  between 
France  and  Spain  that  no  further  effort  would  be  made 
to  conquer  the  British  possessions  north  of  the  thirteen 
states.1  Spain  had  made  exorbitant  demands  for  terri- 
tories which  the  United  States  also  claimed.  To  her  pos- 
session of  the  Floridas  there  was  no  objection;  but  her 
demand  for  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
aroused  much  opposition,  and  her  claim  to  territory  east  of 
that  river  did  not  receive  the  slightest  support  in  Congress. 

Back  of  Spain's  purpose  to  keep  the  United  States 
a  weak  and  dependent  nation  was  the  desire  to  build  up  a 
powerful  empire  around  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Cuba,  Mex- 
ica,  and  Louisiana  formed  three  quadrants  of  this  circle, 
and  the  possession  of  Eastern  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas 
would  complete  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  vast  regions 
to  the  east  of  the  Mississippi  should  become  peopled  by  a 

aFlorida  Blanca  wrote  to  Montmorin,  April  2,  1779 :  "dans  la  cas  ou 
la  paix  se  feroit  il  convient  de  ne  pas  chasser  les  Anglois  du  Canada, 
cependant  dans  le  cas  contraire  il  seroit  a  mon  avis,  necessaire  de  porter 
les  vues  des  Americains  de  ce  cote  la  ce  qui  serviroit  a  leur  donner  un 
objet  d'occupations  a  prevenir  leurs  discorde  intestines  .  .  ."  Esp.,  593, 
no.  77,  new  180.  Vergennes  wrote  to  Florida  Blanca,  March  18,  that 
while  the  Americans  were  anxious  for  Canada  he  would  seek  to  induce 
them  to  give  up  such  an  undertaking.  Ibid.,  no.  33,  new  81. 


132  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [242 

powerful  and  alien  race,  Spain  would  confront  a  new  dan- 
ger when  frontiersmen,  seeking  an  outlet  to  the  sea,  should 
come  down  and  overwhelm  her  dominions.  To  avert  this 
already  apparent  danger,  the  United  States  must  be  kept 
to  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  and  her  possessions  hemmed  in 
by  Great  Britain.  The  power  and  ambitions  of  the  British 
Empire  were  known;  but  the  formation  of  this  strange 
republic  on  the  outskirts  of  civilization  filled  the  ministers 
of  Charles  III  with  strange  and  tempestuous  terror. 

Hardly  had  the  ink  dried  on  the  signatures  of  the  con- 
vention uniting  France  and  Spain  in  the  war  when  Florida 
Blanca  proposed  fresh  restrictions  on  the  growth  of  the 
United  States.  He  suggested  that  Great  Britain  be  left 
in  possession  of  all  posts  in  America  which  she  was  able 
to  hold  at  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace. 
This  would  mean  that  New  York,  Long  Island,  the  greater 
part  of  Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island,  including  the  city 
of  Newport,  most  of  Georgia  and  a  part  of  Virginia  should 
probably  be  left  to  the  British  Empire.2 

It  is  to  Vergennes's  credit  that  he  gave  an  absolute 
refusal  to  Spain's  proposition.  He  declared  that  such  a 
course  would  make  it  appear  as  if  France  had  abandoned 
her  allies,  and  would  provoke  their  suspicion  and  enmity. 
It  would  be  an  open  violation  of  the  treaty  of  alliance, 
and  as  such  would  bring  dishonor  on  the  crown  of  France.3 
This  decided  stand  on  the  part  of  the  French  ministry  put 
an  early  end  to  the  plan  of  a  settlement  of  American  affairs 


2Florida  Blanca  argued  that  the  Americans  needed  peace  so  badly 
that  they  must  accept  any  conditions.  He  maintained  that  by  this  ar- 
rangement the  United  States  would  always  be  menaced  by  Great  Britain 
and  consequently  would  become  more  attached  to  France.  Montmorin 
to  Vergennes,  April  26,  1779.  (Esp.,  593,  no.  137,  new  320.) 

3Montmorin  pleaded  against  the  schemes  of  the  Spanish  minister 
that  France  had  engagements  with  the  Americans  which  bound  her  to 
a  different  policy.  He  declared  that  Congress  would  never  consent  to 
any  such  arrangement.  (Ibid.)  Vergennes  also  opposed  the  idea.  May, 
1779-  (Ibid.,  593,  no.  147,  new  320;  ibid.,  593,  no.  157,  new  343;  ibid., 
594,  new  192.) 


243]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  133 

on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis  and  assured  to  the  United 
States  a  geographical  unity. 

The  Floridas,  however,  were  subject  to  conquest,  and 
to  this  point  the  Spanish  arms  were  at  once  directed.  Spain 
was  anxious  to  have  the  help  of  the  United  States  in  this 
undertaking,  and  altho  she  would  give  no  recognition  to 
them,  Florida  Blanca  asked  Vergennes  to  have  them  send 
an  expedition  into  Florida  from  the  north  while  Spanish 
troops  attacked  it  from  the  Mississippi.4  Vergennes  prom- 
ised to  do  what  he  could,  and  instructed  Luzerne  to  pro- 
pose the  matter  to  Congress.5  The  mind  of  the  Spanish 
minister  however,  soon  took  another  turn;  he  gave  up  the 
idea  of  cooperation  with  the  American  troops,  and  in  June 
sent  orders  to  Galvez  to  attack  the  British  possessions  in 
America,  and  ordered  other  Spanish  governors  to  help 
him.6 

While  Spain  was  definitely  planning  the  conquest  of 
the  Floridas,  Vergennes  was  worrying  about  the  attitude 
of  Congress  on  the  question  of  boundaries.  He  could  learn 
nothing  from  Franklin,  but  he  feared  the  demands  of  the 
republic  would  be  excessive.  He  was  determined,  however, 
in  the  negotiations  for  peace,  to  insist  on  no  more  than  the 
integrity  of  the  thirteen  states.7 

The  attitude  of  Spain  was  also  a  source  of  uneasiness. 
Montmorin  had  intimated  that  negotiations  between  that 


4I1  seroit  bon  cependant  que  les  Colons  cherchassent  a  entrer  dans  la 
Floride  ou  de  notre  cote  nous  ferons  une  forte  diversion  par  le  Missis- 
sippi." Florida  Blanca  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.,  594,  no.  36,  new  80.) 

5May  and  June,  1779.  (Ibid.,  594,  no.  40,  new  263;  no.  41,  new  267.) 
To  Florida  Blanca.  (Ibid.,  594,  no.  68,  new  171 ;  no.  73,  new  180.) 

•It  appears  that  Florida  Blanca  became  suspicious  of  Congress.  He 
lost  interest  in  St.  Augustine  and  proposed  to  leave  it  to  the  Americans. 
Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  May  n.  (Ibid.,  594,  no.  40,  new  76;  ibid.,  no. 
120,  fol.  288.)  For  orders  to  other  governors  see  Don  Juan  Baptiste 
Bonet,  governor  of  San  Domingo,  to  Gonzales  de  Castegon.  (C.  O.  5,  131, 
fol.  7:  letter  book  of  intercepted  correspondence.) 

7Vergennes  to  Bretuel,  June  29.    (Esp.,  594,  no.  151,  fol.  350.) 


134  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [244 

country  and  the  United  States  must  be  bandied  carefully.8 
Vergennes  knew  that  Spain  had  no  regard  for  the  interests 
of  the  United  States,  and  from  her  projects  on  the  Missis- 
sippi he  felt  that  his  two  allies  were  in  danger  of  clashing.9 

In  spite  of  the  importunities  of  Vergennes,10  Florida 
Blanca  was  slow  to  formulate  his  demands.  He  had  re- 
alized that  he  could  not  obtain  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of 
uti  possidetix,  but  he  hoped  that  Great  Britain  could  keep 
Canada  and  East  Florida.  West  Florida  with  Pensacola 
and  Mobile  he  was  determined  to  have  for  Spain  in  order 
to  exclude  all  foreigners  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  To  this 
end  also  he  insisted  upon  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  River,  and  intimated  that  this  was  a  point  he 
would  not  yield.  All  Spanish  America,  he  maintained, 
must  be  closed  to  British  and  Americans  alike.11 

Vergennes  was  soon  relieved  of  his  anxiety  on  this 
score  by  the  report  from  America  that  Congress  would 
probably  surrender  its  claims  on  Canada  and  the  Floridas, 
as  well  as  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  River.  At 
the  same  time  he  was  informed  of  the  strong  feeling  among 
the  eastern  delegates  and  their  proposal  to  treat  directly 
with  Great  Britain  for  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
In  the  light  of  this  information  Vergennes  prepared  the 
instructions  to  Luzerne,  Gerard's  successor,  and  it  is  evi- 
dent that  he  wrote  in  a  spirit  of  hostility  to  the  United 
States.  He  believed  that  there  was  a  strong  English  party 
in  America,  and  if  such  could  exist  at  this  time  he  argued 
that  no  dependence  could  be  placed  on  the  permanent 
friendship  of  the  republic.12 

8He  asked  that  the  United  States  send  an  envoy  of  a  character  supple 
and  conciliatory;  one  with  firmness  combined  with  sweetness  and  patience. 
Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  June  3.  (Esp.,  594,  no.  85.) 

•Vergennes,  "Instructions  to  Luzerne,"  July  18.  (£.  U.,  IX,  no.  41, 
new  i.) 

10Vergennes  asked  often  for  the  views  of  Spain.  He  declared  his 
unwillingness  to  cross  her  policy  unless  it  were  absolutely  necessary. 
EsP-,  594,  no.  201. 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  July  31.     (Ibid.,  594,  no.  220,  new  491.) 

12Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  97. 


245]  VERGEXXES  AXD  THE  ALLIES  OF   FRANCE  135 

With  this  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States, 
Vergennes  opposed  their  position  on  every  point  of  dispute, 
the  western  boundaries,  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  the  Floridas.  Just  what  was  the  western  boundary 
he  did  not  attempt  to  decide;  but  he  feared  the  danger  of 
a  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  over  the 
lands  from  which  the  English  might  be  driven.  He  accord- 
ingly urged  Luzerne  to  get  Congress  to  fix  a  definite  boun- 
dary to  their  claims  on  the  West,  and  especially  did  he 
fear  the  aggressions  of  the  southern  states.13 

On  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
Vergennes  was  still  more  unfriendly  to  the  claims  of  the 
United  States.  He  had  before  this  expressed  himself  favor- 
ably to  the  American  demand ;  but  now  he  declared  that  it 
was  shown  to  his  satisfaction  that  the  Americans  had  no 
right  to  it.  Before  the  Kevolution,  he  said,  the  boundaries 
of  the  United  Provinces  in  no  place  extended  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi; and  it  was  absurd  to  claim  the  rights  of  Great 
Britain,  whose  authority  they  had  abjured.14  He  instructed 
Luzerne  to  demand  from  Congress  the  renunciation  of  all 
pretentions  to  the  right  to  navigate  the  river,  and  the  prom- 
ise to  limit  themselves  to  soliciting  the  favor  of  the  king  of 
Spain. 


13Vergennes  wrote  that  it  was  the  greatest  interest  of  Congress  to 
fix  "d'une  maniere  claire,  precise,  et  invariable  les  limites  et  les  pretentions 
des  Etats-Unis  dans  cette  partie  [the  West]  et  surtout  en  prennent  les 
precautions  les  plus  effkaces  pour  prevoir  les  empietemens  et  pour 
empecher  les  Provinces  du  Sud  de  se  laisser  aller  a  1'esprit  de  conquete." 
"Instructions  to  Luzerne,"  July  18,  1779.  (E.  U.,  IX,  no.  41,  new  I.) 

14"A  1'egard  de  la  navigation  sur  le  Mississipi,  il  est  a  peu  pres 
demontre  que  les  Americains  n'y  ont  aucun  droit  puisqu'au  moment  de 
la  revolution  les  limites  des  13  Etats-Unis  ne  s'etendoient  point  jusqu'au 
Fleuve  et  qu'il  Seroit  abuser  de  leur  part  de  reclamer  les  droits  de  1'Angre, 
c'est  a  dire  d'une  Puissance  dont  ils  ont  abjure  la  domination.  II  convient 
done  que  le  Congres  s'explique  categoriquement  sur  cette  matiere  en 
declarant  que  les  Etats-unis  ne  forment  aucune  pretention  a  la  Navigation 
du  Mississipi  et  en  se  bornant  a  solliciter  de  la  bonne  volonte  du  Roi 
•d'Espagne  les  faveurs  que  son  interet  lui  permettra  d'accorder  aux  Ameri- 
cains." Ibid. 


136  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [246 

To  the  Floridas  also  Vergennes  declared  that  the 
United  States  had  no  right.  As  a  peaceful  British  colony 
they  were  still  open  to  the  conquest  of  Spain.  They  were 
of  no  value  to  the  United  States,  whereas  Spain  had  a 
double  reason  for  their  conquest.  In  the  first  place  they 
had  formerly  been  a  part  of  the  Spanish  empire,  and  in 
the  second  they  were  essential  to  the  commercial  interests 
of  Spain  and  to  her  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.15 

Three  separate  kinds  of  considerations  dictated  these 
instructions :  dislike  of  the  anti-Gallican  party  in  Congress, 
and  a  fear  that  it  would  lead  the  country  into  a  policy 
unfavorable  to  France ;  a  desire  to  win  better  support  from 
Spain;  and  lastly  a  belief  that  many  Americans  favored 
these  terms.  Just  how  strong  each  of  these  considerations 
was  it  is  impossible  to  say.  For  the  first  and  third  he  had 
ample  reason  in  the  reports  of  Gerard;  but  he  seemed 
never  to  have  had  much  at  heart  the  ambitions  of  the  court 
of  Madrid. 

The  Spanish  government  had  given  orders  for  the  con- 
quest of  the  Floridas  and  had  authorized  Don  Juan  de 
Miralles  to  plan  in  concert  with  the  Americans  a  joint 
attack  on  these  provinces.  Before  deciding  on  any  further 
military  operations,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  wait  for 
news  from  D'Estaing,  who  had  been  instructed  to  make  a 
naval  demonstration  in  support  of  the  Spanish  attack.16 
In  spite  of  these  measures  Spain  still  showed  no  disposi- 
tion to  aid  the  cause  of  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  She  was  willing  to  grant  them  subsidies,  but  these 
were  to  be  used  only  in  an  expedition  against  the  Floridas. 
As  month  after  month  passed  with  no  news  of  the  success 
of  its  projects  the  anxiety  and  ambition  of  the  Spanish 
court  increased.  The  king  felt  that  the  conquest  of  Pen- 
sacola  was  the  object  in  America  nearest  his  heart  and 

15La  Floride  ne  rendra  les  Etats-unis  ni  plus  riches  ni  plus  puissans 
et  sa  position  geographique  n'augmentera  point  leur  surete  exterieure." 
E.  U.,  IX,  no.  41,  new  i. 

18Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  September  27,  1779.  (Esp.,  595,  no.  165, 
fol.  438.) 


247]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  137 

urged  that  every  effort  be  put  forth  to  effect  it.17  Plans 
were  hurriedly  rushed  through  to  send  reinforcements  from 
Havana  and  the  Americans  were  to  be  urged  more  vigor- 
ously to  aid  the  expedition.18  So  fearful  did  Florida  Blanca 
become  of  the  fate  of  the  Spanish  forces  that  he  finally 
entreated  France  to  send  assistance19  and  promised  that  if 
Vergennes  would  furnish  troops  and  ships  for  the  attack 
he  would  pay  all  their  expenses.20  To  this  proposal  Ver- 
gennes at  once  agreed  and  declared  that  the  French  would 
be  ready  at  any  time  with  their  contingent.21  He  thought, 
however,  that  it  would  not  be  advisable  to  speak  of  this 
project  to  the  Americans  for  fear  of  offending  them.  At 
the  end  of  December  news  came  of  the  success  of  Galvez 
on  the  Mississippi  and  his  proposed  attack  on  Mobile  and 
Pensacola;22  and  Florida  Blanca  at  once  began  to  hedge 
on  the  project  of  accepting  French  aid  in  the  conquest  of 
Florida.  He  felt  that  if  victory  could  be  assured  by  the 
efforts  of  the  Spanish  troops  alone,  it  would  be  folly  to 
pay  for  French  assistance.  To  Montmorin  he  intimated 
that  Spain  did  not  wish  to  attack  Pensacola,  and  that  she 
would  not  subsidize  the  French  troops  prepared  for  the 
expedition,23  but  suggested  that  the  united  forces  make  a 
descent  on  England. 

News  of  this  change  of  plan  aroused  much  indigna- 
tion in  the  mind  of  Vergennes,  who  declared  that  the  surest 
and  quickest  way  to  finish  the  war  was  to  push  it  in  Amer- 


17Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  November  8,   17/9.     (Esp.,  596,  no.  76, 
fol.  179.) 

16Ibid.,  596,  no.  8,  new  21 ;  ibid.,  596,  no.  95,  fol.  224. 
19Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  November  22.     (Ibid.,  596,  no.  108.) 
20Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  December  13.    (Ibid.,  596,  no.  167.) 
21Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  December  17.  (Ibid.,  596,  no.  183,  fol.  407.) 

22Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  December  13,  1779.    (Ibid.,  596,  no.  215, 
fol.  468.) 

28Florida   Blanca  to  Aranda,  January  9,   1780,  enclosed  with  Mont- 
morin's  despatches  of  same  date.     (Ibid.,  597,  no.  i,  new   22,  fol.  51.) 


138  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [248 

ica.24  He  felt  sure  that  Florida  Blanca  was  unreliable  in 
his  promises  and  would  present  all  sorts  of  excuses  for  not 
keeping  them,25  and  henceforth  there  was  little  sympathy 
manifested  between  the  two  courts,  and  the  efforts  of 
France  became  directed  almost  entirely  to  the  preservation 
of  the  independence  of  the  thirteen  states. 

At  the  beginning  of  1780,  Jay  and  Adams  arrived  in 
Europe  with  instructions  on  the  views  of  Congress  relative 
to  the  boundaries  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
Jay  had  been  friendly  to  the  plans  of  Gerard  and  was  re- 
garded very  favorably  by  that  minister,  who  believed  he 
would  consent  to  the  Spanish  pretensions,  but  Jay  had 
become  suspicious  of  French  policy  before  he  left  America 
and  he  had  imbibed  a  still  deeper  distrust  of  the  ambitions 
of  Spain.  With  him  to  think  was  to  act;  and  he  had 
thought  deeply  on  the  claims  and  pretensions  of  the  Span- 
ish monarchy  to  the  Floridas  and  the  Mississippi  Valley.28 
He  had  come,  however,  to  secure  the  alliance  of  Spain  and 
the  recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  United  States;  and  no 
sooner  did  he  land  than  he  began  preparations  to  carry 
out  his  instructions.  On  his  arrival  at  Cadiz  he  sent  his 
secretary,  William  Carmichael,  ahead  to  Madrid  to  sound 
the  Spanish  minister  on  his  intentions  towards  the  United 
States,  with  instructions  to  do  justice  to  the  interests  of 

24"Je  serois  bien  fache  que  M.  Le  C.  de  floride  blanche  renoncat  a 
son  enterprize  sur  Pensacola :  je  puis  me  tromper  mais  ie  pense  qu'en 
poussant  vigoureusement  la  guerre  en  amerique  nous  arriverons  plus 
surement  et  plus  promtement  a  la  paix  que  par  toute  autre  route."  Ver- 
gennes  to  Montmorin,  January  13,  1780.  (Esp.,  597,  no.  35,  fol.  106.) 
25Same  to  same,  January  29.  (Ibid.,  597,  no.  77,  fol.  219.) 

26Gerard  to  Vergennes,  September  9,  1778.     Jay  wrote  that  " 

both  Mr.  Gerard  and  Mr.  Miralles  ....  had  shown  me  every  mark  of 
civility  and  attention,  though  I  have  reason  to  think  both  of  them  held 
higher  opinions  of  my  docility  than  were  well  founded."  "When  Spain 
afterwards  declared  war  for  objects  that  did  not  include  ours,  and  in  a 
manner  not  very  civil  to  our  independence  I  became  convinced  that  we 
ought  not  cede  to  her  any  of  our  rights,  and  of  course  that  we  should 
retain  and  insist  upon  our  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi." 
Ibid.  Jay,  "On  Navigation  of  the  Mississippi,"  Correspondence  and  Public 
Papers,  I,  328-331. 


249]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  139 

Virginia  and  the  western  countries  near  the  Mississippi, 
and  to  represent  to  the  Spanish  court  that  it  would  be  ages 
before  these  extensive  regions  would  be  settled.  He  also 
asked  him  to  find  out  the  intention  of  Spain  in  regard  to 
the  Floridas  and  the  country  along  the  Mississippi.27  From 
these  instructions  it  is  clear  that  Jay  thoroughly  un- 
derstood the  ambitions  and  intentions  of  Spain.  His  in- 
formation had  come  to  him,  when  as  the  friend  and  com- 
rade of  Gerard  and  Miralles,  he  had  spent  long  evenings 
talking  over  an  alliance  with  Spain  and  the  concessions 
her  king  would  exact  as  the  price  of  his  help.28  He  knew 
also  that  the  conditions  he  had  to  offer  were  not  such  as 
Spain  would  wish  and  that  she  would  likely  refuse  to  ac- 
knowledge the  independence  of  the  United  States  unless 
her  terms  were  acceded  to,  but  to  her  demands  he  had  re- 
solved not  to  agree. 

Jay  did  not  know  that  Spain  was  the  dictator  in  her 
alliance  with  France,29  and  he  had  no  idea  that  Vergennes 
was  exerting  all  his  power  to  bring  about  an  understand- 
ing between  his  allies,  and  that  it  was  Spain  who  wished 
to  restrict  the  power  of  the  United  States,  and  who  was  to 
prove  herself  a  thorn  in  the  flesh  to  all  efforts  to  secure 
the  territorial  integrity  of  his  country.  Franklin  had  long 
been  silent  on  the  question  of  the  West.  Vergennes  had 
not  chosen  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  him  on  the  sub- 
ject, and  Congress  had  sent  him  no  instructions  in  regard 
to  it;  but  Franklin,  ever  awake,  had  perceived  the  drift 
of  Spanish  policy,  and  its  hostility  to  his  country;  and  he 
understood  full  well  that  there  was  no  sentiment  in  the 
Spanish  ministry  favorable  to  an  alliance  with  the  United 


27Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  I,  266-268. 
2*Ibid.,  327. 
"Ibid.,  266. 


140  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [250 

States.30  Franklin  knew  too,  that  Congress  had  at  last 
decided  on  a  policy  and  he  was  ready  to  work  loyally  with 
Jay  in  carrying  it  out.  Henceforth  the  representation  of 
the  United  States  in  Europe  was  vigorous  and  aggressive, 
while  Vergennes  was  compelled  to  play  the  role  of  peace- 
maker between  his  allies. 

Florida  Blanca  proved  to  be  more  hospitable  than  Jay 
had  hoped.  He  wrote  a  friendly  note  to  Jay,  inviting  him 
to  court,  but  at  the  same  time  informing  him  that  he  could 
not  be  received  as  the  minister  of  an  unacknowledged 
power.31  Carmichael,  in  company  with  Gerard,  was  re- 
ceived kindly  by  the  French  ambassador,  who  furnished 
him  much  information  about  the  disposition  of  the  Spanish 
king.32  He  learned  that  several  months  before  Miralles 
had  been  instructed  to  enter  into  engagements  with  Con- 
gress to  conquer  Florida,  and  he  regarded  this  as  signifi- 
cant for  the  prospects  of  a  treaty  of  alliance. 

The  politeness  of  Florida  Blanca  did  not  convince 
Jay  of  the  good  intentions  of  Spain.  He  felt  sure  that  the 
message  of  the  Spanish  minister  meant  that  independence 
would  be  acknowledged  only  if  the  United  States  acceded 
to  his  terms.  Back  of  the  Spanish  king  he  thought  he  per- 
ceived the  power  and  influence  of  France.33  Jay,  however, 
returned  a  polite  answer  to  Florida  Blanca's  note34  and 


30"But  I  own,  too,  that  my  expectations  of  great  aids  from  that 
nation  are  not  much  stronger  than  yours.  As  yet  they  know  us  too  little, 
and  are  jealous  of  us  too  much;  their  long  delay  in  entering  into  a  treaty 
with  us  ....  is  to  me  a  mark  of  their  not  being  over  fond  of  a  con- 
nection with  us."  Franklin  to  Carmichael,  January  27,  1780.  (Wharton, 
Dip.  Cor.,  Ill,  476.) 

"Florida  Blanca  to  Jay,  February  24,  1780.     (Ibid.,  Ill,  515.) 
82Carmichael  to  Jay,  February  15,  1780.     (Ibid',  III,  496-7.) 
33"There  are  many  reasons  which  induce  me  to  suspect  that  France 
is  determined  to  manage  between  us  so  as  to  make  us  debtors  to  their 
influence  and  good  correspondence  with  Spain  for  every  concession  on  her 
part,  and  to  make  Spain  hold  herself  obligated  to  their  influence  and  good 
correspondence  with  us  for  every  concession  on  our  part."    Jay  to  Con- 
gress, March  3,  1780.     (Ibid.,  Ill,  530.) 

84Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  I,  276. 


251]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  141 

the  two  soon  entered,  into  a  discussion  of  the  resources  of 
the  United  States  with  the  apparent  purpose  of  forming 
an  alliance.35  It  was  not  until  May  11  that  they  held  a 
discussion  on  the  main  points  of  difference  between  the 
two  nations.  In  this  conversation  Florida  Blanca  plainly 
intimated  that  the  great  obstacle  to  the  alliance  was  the 
claim  of  the  United  States  to  the  right  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi  River.  He  urged  also  that  they  settle  the  ques- 
tion of  the  boundaries  and  expressed  a  desire  to  obtain 
such  concessions  that  the  English  would  be  entirely  ex- 
cluded from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Jay  reminded  Florida 
Blanca  that  many  of  the  states  had  for  their  western  boun- 
dary the  Mississippi  and  were  interested  in  its  navigation ; 
but  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  they  would  be  willing  to 
adopt  any  reasonable  precaution  against  the  carrying  of 
contraband.  The  Spanish  minister  courteously  expressed 
his  desire  for  an  amicable  adjustment  and  the  interview 
closed.  Jay  reported  to  Congress  that  if  it  remained  firm 
there  would  be  little  doubt  of  the  outcome.36 

Equally  anxious  with  Jay  for  an  understanding  be- 
tween Spain  and  the  United  States  was  Vergennes ;  but  far 
better  than  Jay,  he  understood  the  aims  of  Spanish  diplo- 
macy. He  knew  its  dislike  of  the  new  republic,  and  its 
fear  that  the  example  of  a  successful  rebellion  would  have 
a  dangerous  effect  on  the  extended  colonies  of  Spanish 
America;  and  finally  he  understood  from  long  experience 
its  utter  selfishness  and  greed.37  At  the  same  time  he  felt 
that,  in  order  to  hold  Spain  to  the  war,  he  must  further  all 
her  projects  as  agreed  to  in  the  convention,  and  in  accord- 


35Florida  Blanca  wrote  to  Jay,  March  9,  desiring,  before  entering  into 
a  discussion  on  terms  of  alliance,  to  know  the  civil  and  military  condition 
of  the  United  States.  (Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  I,  277.) 
Jay  replied  in  a  lengthy  memorial  on  April  25.  (Ibid.) 

86Jay,  "Notes  on  Conference  with  Florida  Blanca  taken  immediately 
after  the  conversation."  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  Ill,  722  et  seq.) 

37Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  13,  1780.  (Esp.,  598,  no.  37,  new 
106.)  Vergennes  frequently  expressed  his  opinion  of  Spanish  policy  as 
selfish  and  unreasonable,  with  no  regard  for  the  rights  of  other  nations. 


142  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [252 

ance  with  this  policy  he  proposed  attacks  on  Florida,38 
Jamaica,  Gibraltar  and  other  English  possessions.39  In 
fact  the  French  ministry  displayed  more  zeal  and  energy 
in  these  undertakings  than  did  the  Spanish  court.  Of  all 
the  campaigns  inaugurated  by  Florida  Blanca  only  that 
of  Galvez  in  Louisiana  was  carried  out  with  vigor,  and  he 
was  unsupported  by  the  other  Spanish  governors.40  While 
Spaniards  were  congratulating  themselves  on  their  victo- 
ries on  the  Mississippi,,  their  French  allies  were  urging 
them  to  perfect  their  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  by  an 
attack  on  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  and  even  to  attempt  the 
conquest  of  Jamaica. 

In  March  Montmorin  reported  to  Vergennes  his  sus- 
picions that  Spain  had  begun  through  the  Count  of  Lisbon 
negotiations  for  peace  with  England.  These  negotiations 
were  a  source  of  much  uneasiness  to  the  French  ministry ; 
and  it  was  felt  necessary  to  take  part  in  them  so  as  to 
assure  the  principal  object  of  the  war,  the  independence  of 
the  United  States.41  Montmorin  at  once  began  representa- 
tions to  Florida  Blanca  of  the  danger  of  allowing  the 
United  States  to  return  to  the  dominion  of  England,  to 
which  the  latter  replied  that  he  would  provide  a  source  of 
constant  quarrels  and  divisions  between  the  two.42  Ver- 
gennes saw  at  once  that  if  these  negotiations  were  allowed 
to  continue  the  interests  of  the  United  States  would  be 
sacrificed  and  France  humiliated.  So  serious  was  the  situ- 
ation that  Louis  XVI  wrote  directly  to  Charles  III  urging 
that  the  two  powers  should  continue  to  act  together.43  To 
this  the  response  was  favorable  and  Charles  declared  that 
he  would  never  "compromise  either  the  dignity  of  his 
crown  or  its  sacred  engagements."44  Florida  Blanca  gave 


38Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  March  13.     (Esp.,  no.  38,  new  108.) 
39Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  13.    (Ibid.,  fol.  181.) 
40Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  13.     (Ibid.,  599,  no.  41,  new   76.) 
41Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  13.     (Ibid.,  598,  no.  42,  new  125.) 
42Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  April  14.     (Ibid.,  no.  160,  new  413.) 
"Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  551-554. 
44Ibid.,  456,  note. 


253]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  143 

some  rather  lame  excuses  for  the  presence  of  a  British 
agent  in  Spain  and  the  affair  was  allowed  to  drop. 

This  incident  convinced  Vergennes  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  give  Spain  additional  concessions  if  she  were  to 
maintain  an  interest  in  the  war.  In  order  to  allay  Span- 
ish suspicions,  he  prepared  a  memorial  on  the  benefits  of 
an  alliance  with  the  United  States  in  which  he  maintained 
that  there  was  no  danger  to  the  possessions  of  the  Spanish 
monarchy  so  long  as  the  United  States  were  dependent 
upon  the  two  crowns  for  protection  and  that  this  depend- 
ence would  exist  as  long  as  England  held  Canada  and 
Ohio.45  Thus  it  appeared  that  Vergennes  would  not  insist 
on  the  American  claims  to  the  Northwest.  Montmorin  in- 
formed him  that  the  great  obstacle  to  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain  was  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi,46  and  on  this  account  negotiations  were 
proceeding  slowly  and  likely  to  continue  to  do  so.  He 
expressed  to  Vergennes  the  belief  that  it  would  be  well 
to  inform  Spain  of  the  terms  of  alliance  between  France 
and  the  United  States,  to  which  the  latter  replied  that  the 
best  explanation  of  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries was  the  text  of  the  treaty  of  alliance.  "Independ- 
ence," he  wrote,  "is  the  first  of  all;  it  is  the  basis  of  our 
common  treaty  and  ought  to  be  for  the  negotiations  of 
peace.  The  guarantee  of  the  domains  of  the  United  States 
is  contingent,  their  extent  will  be  determined  only  by  a 
future  pacification."47  He  was  still  determined,  however, 


45Vergennes  wrote  to  Montmorin,  April  26,  1780:  "Si  les  premiers 
[the  United  States]  doivent  a  1'influence  et  a  la  protection  des  deux 
couronnes  leur  independance  et  que  les  autres  [the  British]  conservent 
ce  dont  il  nest  que  .  .  .  possible  de  les  priver  la  nouvelle  Ecosse,  le  Can- 
ada, et  L'Ohio,  dans  Cette  position  les  Americains  auront  toujours  besoin 
des  deux  couronnes  pour  contenir  et  en  imposer  a  un  voisin  qui  sans 
entreprendre  sur  leur  liberte  deverrue  constitutionelles  ne  cessera 
d'empieter  sur  leur  territorie.  (Esp.,  399,  no.  35,  new  8.) 

MIbid.,  599,  no.  51,  new  119;  ibid.,  599,  no.  60,  new  85. 

47Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  June  12,  1780.  (Ibid.,  599,  no.  44,  fol. 
282.) 


144  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [254 

to  drive  the  English  out  of  all  territory*  which  was  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  thirteen  states.48  Vergennes  himself  ap- 
peared to  be  confused  as  to  just  what  were  the  claims  and 
rights  of  the  United  States. 

In  June,  1780,  news  reached  Spain  of  the  capture  of 
Mobile  by  the  army  of  Galvez.  The  court  and  nation  gave 
way  to  the  liveliest  expressions  of  joy,49  and  the  feeling 
arose  that  the  Spanish  army  could  defeat  the  English 
without  any  foreign  assistance.  The  effect  was  disastrous 
to  the  work  of  Jay,  who  found  Florida  Blanca  henceforth 
more  arrogant  and  exacting,  and  more  unfavorable  to  the 
claims  of  Congress.50  After  his  conference  with  Florida 
Blanca  in  May,  Jay  was  unable  to  get  any  further  propo- 
sitions from  him  on  the  subject  of  a  treaty.  He  always 
avoided  any  mention  of  giving  aid  to  the  American  cause 
and  to  the  notes  of  Jay  on  the  subject  he  had  returned  no 
reply.  Bills  kept  coming  in  for  Jay  to  pay,  and  finally  in 
desperation  he  went  to  Montmorin  for  help.  The  French 
minister  promised  to  do  what  he  could;  and  early  in  Sep- 
tember Florida  Blanca  sent  his  secretary  Gardoqui  to  re- 
open negotiations  with  the  American  commissioner. 

The  conferences  with  Gardoqui  began  on  September 
3,  and  the  first  question  that  came  up  was  the  payment 
of  bills  drawn  on  Jay.  Gardoqui  remarked  that  if  the 
United  States  expected  any  help  from  Spain  they  must 
be  prepared  to  offer  some  consideration  in  return.  He 
hinted  that,  among  other  things,  the  renunciation  of  the 
right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  would  be  most  acceptable 
to  his  court.51  To  this  suggestion  Jay  replied  that  the 
Mississippi  could  not  come  in  question  as  a  consideration 
for  a  hundred  thousand  pounds.  He  declared,  furthermore, 
that  the  American  nation  regarded  this  river  as  the  natural 
outlet  to  the  vast  and  fertile  regions  of  the  West,  and  that 
without  it  the  settlers  beyond  the  Alleghanies  could  never 

48Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  (Esp.,  599,  no.  120.) 
*9Ibid.,  599,  no.  65,  66;  ibid.,  no.  194. 
60Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  I,  386. 
"Jay  to  Congress.     (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  64.) 


255]  VERGENNES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  145 

hope  to  get  their  products  to  the  sea.  To  these  arguments 
Gardoqui  observed  that  the  Americans  would  not  need 
this  navigation  during  their  generation  and  that  future 
generations  could  care  for  themselves. 

Jay  was  much  discouraged  at  the  progress  of  his  nego- 
tiations in  Spain  and  wrote  in  a  despairing  tone  to  Frank- 
lin.52 He  felt  that  little  help  could  be  expected  from  Spain, 
altho  he  was  again  convinced  of  the  friendship  of  France.53 
Franklin,  however,  was  more  optimistic  and  urged  Jay  to 
continue  his  efforts.  He  agreed  with  him,  however,  that 
the  United  States  should  never  give  up  the  right  to  the 
free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.54 

On  the  evening  of  the  23rd  Jay  was  admitted  to  a  con- 
ference with  Florida  Blanca  on  the  points  at  issue  between 
the  two  countries.  During  the  conversation  Jay  once 
more  brought  up  the  question  of  an  alliance;  but  Florida 
Blanca  replied  that  there  was  no  occasion  to  hurry,  and 
Jay  would  have  time  to  obtain  instructions  from  Congress 
on  the  articles  to  be  proposed.  He  then  brought  up  the 
question  of  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and 
its  importance  to  Spain,  which  nation,  he  declared,  would 
hold  to  her  rights.  He  observed  that  "unless  the  Spaniards 
could  exclude  all  nations  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  they 
might  as  well  admit  all,"  that  it  was  one  of  the  principal 
objects  of  the  war  and  of  greater  importance  even  than 
Gibraltar.  If  they  could  obtain  this,  he  said,  it  would  be  a 
matter  of  indifference  whether  or  not  Spain  obtained  any 


62Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  I,  395. 

8*"When  I  consider  on  the  one  hand  that  France  was  our  first,  and  is 
still  our  best  and  almost  only  friend,  that  she  became  an  ally  on  terms 
of  equality,  neither  taking  nor  attempting  to  take  ungenerous  advantage 
of  our  situation,  .  .  .  gratitude  and  generosity  forbid  me  to  solicit  a 
further  tax  on  her  generosity."  Jay  to  Congress,  September  22,  1780. 
(Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  65.) 

54"Poor  as  we  are  yet,  I  know  we  shall  be  rich.  I  would  rather  agree 
with  them  to  buy  at  a  great  price  the  whole  of  this  right  on  the  Missis- 
sippi than  sell  a  drop  of  its  waters.  A  neighbor  might  as  well  ask  me  to 
sell  my  street  door."  Franklin  to  Jay,  October  2,  1780.  (Ibid.,  IV,  75.) 


146  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [256 

other  cession.65  This  interview  convinced  Jay  that  there 
was  no  hope  of  an  immediate  treaty  with  Spain,  and  he 
turned  his  attention  to  other  matters. 

Altho  Spain  had  given  the  fullest  assurance  of  loyalty 
to  France,  she  continued  her  negotiations  with  England. 
France  was  aware  of  her  actions,  but  was  in  no  position 
to  interfere.  The  war  in  America  had  produced  no  bril- 
liant victories;  the  treasury  was  depleted j56  and  the  king, 
grown  despondent,  was  anxious  for  peace.  The  fears  of 
Louis  were  further  increased  by  the  constant  demands  of 
the  Spanish  court  for  a  general  pacification.  Vergennes 
also  was  anxious  for  peace,  but  he  had  resolved  to  obtain 
it  only  on  terms  honorable  to  his  king  and  in  accordance 
with  his  promises  to  the  United  States.57  What  disturbed 
him  most  was  the  Spanish  insistence  upon  the  uti  possidetis 
in  America,  which  would  leave  England  in  possession  of 
New  York  and  the  two  most  southern  states.58  He  urged 
Montmorin  to  sound  Florida  Blanca  again  to  see  if  he 
would  consent  to  the  recognition  of  the  United  States  with 
all  their  possessions,  for  he  held  that  this  was  the  only 
honorable  course  for  all  concerned. 

Florida  Blanca  continued  his  negotiations  with  Great 
Britain,  on  the  basis  of  the  cession  of  Gibraltar  to  Spain 
and  of  leaving  that  country  in  possession  of  all  other  terri- 
tory then  held  by  her  arms.59  This  would  have  given  Spain 

55Jay  to  Congress,  November  6.     (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  146.) 

6«Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  487. 

57 Ibid.,  488;  Vergennes  to  the  king,  September  27,  1780.  (Archives 
Nationales,  164,  no.  3.) 

58Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  September  27.    (Esp.,  601,  no.  17,  new  38.) 

B9Vergennes  wrote  to  Montmorin  that  "Either  the  outcome  of  the  war 
will  be  most  happy  for  England  or  that  power  will  suffer  great  misfor- 
tunes; in  the  first  case  Spain  will  redouble  her  efforts  to  make  peace  with 
least  disadvantage  to  herself  and  probably  with  greatest  disadvantages  to 
us ;  in  the  second  case  the  court  of  London  will  make  the  most  liberal  and 
most  appropriate  offers 'to  seduce  Spain;  she  will  show  herself  disposed 
to  cede  Gibraltar,  Pensacola,  and  Mobile,  and  perhaps  a  part  of  the  fish- 
eries of  Newfoundland,  providing  the  Americans  should  be  abandoned 
and  France  forced  to  break  her  agreement  with  them."  September  27, 
1780.  (Esp.,  601,  no.  155.) 


257]  VERGEXXES  AND  THE  ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  147 

possession  of  all  she  wished  in  Florida  and  have  left  the 
United  States  at  the  mercy  of  their  neighbors;  but  it  was 
a  policy  to  which  Vergennes  would  not  agree.  Florida 
Blanca  had  asserted  that  the  United  States  were  still  at- 
tached to  England  and  would  prove  ungrateful  allies  to 
France;60  but  his  arguments  did  not  appeal  to  the  French 
minister,  who  reasoned  that  with  England  in  possession  of 
Canada,  there  could  be  nothing  but  perpetual  hostility 
between  the  two  nations.61 

It  was  apparent  that  Spain  would  continue  her  efforts 
to  make  peace  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis,  and  the  French 
court  feared  that  it  might  have  to  accede  to  these  terms. 
In  order,  however,  to  obtain  for  the  United  States  as  much 
of  their  territory  as  possible,  Montmorin  proposed  to  trans- 
fer the  seat  of  war  to  America,  and  endeavor  to  drive  the 
British  out  of  New  York  and  their  position  in  the  south.62 
This  proposition  received  serious  consideration  from  Ver- 
gennes, who  saw  that  the  Spaniards  were  trying  to  confine 
the  United  States  to  the  interior,  and  to  leave  England  in 
possession  of  all  their  seaports,63  an  outcome  which  he 
was  resolved  to  prevent.  Spain  had  no  sympathy  for  Eng- 
land, but  she  disliked  revolting  colonies  and  she  wished  to 
make  this  rebellion  a  terrible  example  to  her  own  posses- 
sions. No  other  motive  could  have  led  her  to  demand  such 
hard  conditions  as  the  price  of  recognition  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  demand  such  conditions  against  the  wishes 
of  her  old  time  friend  and  ally,  France. 

Vergennes  was  now  firmly  convinced  that  the  only 
aim  of  Spain  was  to  get  all  she  could  out  of  the  war  even 
at  the  sacrifice  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States  and 


'°Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  November  20.     (Esp.,  115,  no.  142.) 
"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  December  8.     (Ibid.,  go,  no.  1/2.) 

•2Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  October  30,  December  20,  1780.     (Ibid., 
no.  100;  ibid.,  no.  101 ;  ibid.,  no.  219.) 

93Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  November  20.     (Ibid.,  no.  155,  fol.  385.) 


148  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [258 

the  honor  of  France.64  As  late  as  March,  1781,  Florida 
Blanca  had  shown  his  objections  to  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States.  He  suggested,  however, 
that  it  would  be  a  great  concession  if  their  independence 
could  be  assured  with  such  territory  as  they  then  held, 
while  the  British  should  be  left  in  possession  of  all  that 
was  occupied  by  their  troops.65  He  intimated  also  that 
Spain  desired  to  control  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
and  to  obtain  the  ancient  province  of  Eastern  Louisiana66 
in  addition  to  the  Floridas.  On  these  questions  Vergennes 
took  no  stand,  for  he  felt  that  they  could  be  settled  at  the 
time  of  the  peace  negotiations  between  the  two  interested 
powers.67  At  the  same  time  he  declared  that  the  United 
States  must  be  recognized  as  an  independent  nation  with 
all  the  territories  that  were  a  rightful  part  of  their  domin- 
ions. 

France  was  anxious  for  peace  and  was  ready  to  make 
many  concessions  to  obtain  it.  The  national  treasury  was 
empty  and  there  were  constant  demands  upon  it,  not  only 
to  supply  French  needs  but  also  those  of  her  allies.  The 
war  had,  on  the  whole,  been  unsuccessful,  and  reports  of 
victory  were  infrequent.  Before  seeking  peace,  however, 
Vergennes  resolved  to  make  one  more  attempt  to  drive  the 
English  entirely  out  of  the  United  States  and  thus  secure 
for  them  territorial  unity  and  a  real  independence.  If  this 
attempt  should  succeed,  France  could  then  enforce  an  hon- 
orable peace;  "if  we  fail,"  he  wrote,  "we  ought  not,  at  least, 
to  be  blamed  for  having  neglected  anything  in  our  power 

6*"Never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Spain  is  devoted  to  her  own  inter- 
ests before  all  else  and  that  she  will  subordinate  to  them  all  other  condi- 
tions of  peace,  that  she  will  interest  herself  very  little  in  the  Americans, 
whose  independence  she  would  see  with  grief."  Vergennes  to  Montmorin, 
January  22,  1781.  (Esp.,  602,  no.  47.) 

65Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  n,  1781.     (Ibid.,  no.  16,  fol.  303.) 
66Marbois  to  Montmorin,  October  17,  1780.     (Ibid.,  601,  no.  63,  fol. 

I35-) 

67Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  12,  1781  (ibid.,  602,  no.  18,  fol. 
310.)  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  12,  1781  (Ibid.,  603,  no.  25,  fol. 
57.) 


259]  VERGENNES  AND  THE   ALLIES  OF  FRANCE  149 

to  procure  it."68  The  efforts  of  the  French  forces  were  to 
be  directed  equally  in  the  interests  of  Spain  and  of  the 
United  States.  De  Grasse  was  sent  with  a  powerful  fleet 
to  America,69  and  large  sums  of  money  were  given  to 
Washington  with  which  to  equip  new  troops.70  At  the 
same  time  preparations  were  made  for  a  new  expedition 
against  Pensacola.71  Soon  after  this  Vergennes  wrote  to 
Luzerne  that  the  king  wras  in  accord  with  the  policy  of 
Congress  to  uphold  the  territorial  rights  of  the  union,  but 
warned  him  that  the  fortunes  of  war  were  such  that  some 
sacrifices  might  be  necessary  for  peace.72  The  tone  of  this 
message  displayed  a  spirit  of  fairness  and  cordiality  to- 
wards the  United  States,  in  striking  contrast  to  the  arro- 
gant demands  of  Spain. 

During  the  past  year  Spain  and  France  had  drifted 
farther  apart,  having  moved  along  different  lines  of  action. 
Spain  wished  to  abandon  the  United  States  in  return  for 
concessions  from  England;  France  insisted  that  independ- 
ence should  be  the  first  condition  of  peace  and  that  other 
advantages  should  be  sought  only  after  this  was  recog- 
nized. This  was  a  policy  France  had  consistently  main- 
tained ;  and  in  the  face  of  military  reverses  and  an  impover- 
ished treasury  and  in  opposition  to  the  entreaties  and 
threats  of  her  Spanish  ally,  she  remained  the  loyal  and 
unfaltering  friend  of  the  nation  she  had  called  into  life. 


68Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  544. 
69Esf>.,  602,  no.  137. 
70Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  587. 
7lEsj>.,  603,  no.  80. 
72E.  U.,  XVII,  no.  155,  new  19. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN. 

The  independence  of  the  United  States  was  with  Ver- 
gennes  the  prime  object  of  the  war,  and  continued  through- 
out the  first  aim  of  his  policy.  To  him  this  meant  the  in- 
dependence of  the  thirteen  states  with  all  the  territories 
belonging  to  them.  The  extent  of  their  dominions  he  did 
not  know,  and  his  idea  of  it  varied  from  time  to  time.  He 
did  not,  however,  consider  at  any  time  either  Canada  or 
the  Floridas  as  a  part  of  the  republic,  for  these  provinces 
had  never  joined  in  the  rebellion,  and  throughout  the  war 
remained  peaceful  subjects  of  Great  Britain.  If  they  still 
were  a  part  of  the  British  Empire  it  followed  naturally 
enough  that  they  were  legitimate  subjects  of  conquest  for 
any  nation  at  war  with  the  mother  country.  Canada  the 
French  minister  had  resolved  to  leave  to  the  British  crown ; 
but  Spain  looked  with  greedy  eyes  upon  the  Floridas,  and 
he  saw  no  reason  why  she  should  not  have  these  provinces. 

There  yet  remained  the  question  of  the  West;  the 
control  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  and  of  the  river  that 
bears  its  name.  Vergennes  had  been  slow  to  express  his 
opinion  on  the  subject,  for  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
merits  of  the  dispute,  and  was  compelled  to  depend  on  the 
reports  of  his  agents  and  the  representations  of  Florida 
Blanca.  From  the  former  he  learned  of  the  conflicting 
opinions  in  Congress  and  of  the  large  number  of  men  there 
who  were  willing  to  surrender  all  claims  to  the  West ;  from 
the  latter  he  heard  only  assertions  of  Spain's  right  to  this 
domain  and  demands  that  it  be  acknowledged.1 

Political  considerations  also  doubtless  influenced  Ver- 
gennes. He  was  anxious  to  hold  Spain  to  the  war  and  felt 
it  necessary  to  make  many  concessions  to  keep  her  in  good 
humor,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  identified  the  party  in 

1See  Vergennes's  instructions  to  Luzerne,  July  18,  17/9,  pp.  133,  134. 

ISO 


261]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  151 

Congress  opposed  to  Spanish  pretensions  with  the  anti- 
Gallican  party.  Under  the  influence  of  these  impressions, 
he  drew  up  instructions  for  Luzerne  in  July,  1779.  It  was 
here  that  he  first  took  a  definite  stand  on  the  great  ques- 
tions at  issue,  and  his  decision  was  against  the  United 
States.  On  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  he  upheld  the 
contentions  of  Spain  and  he  gave  no  encouragement  to  the 
hopes  of  the  Americans  to  extend  their  authority  over  the 
West.  It  is  possible  that  he  did  not  understand  the  full 
extent  of  Spanish  claims  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  but 
when  those  claims  were  defined,  France  had  already  com- 
mitted herself  to  the  Spanish  position.2 

Luzerne  arrived  in  America  at  a  time  when  Congress 
was  most  anxious  for  an  alliance  with  Spain  and  was  will- 
ing to  make  many  concessions  to  obtain  it.3  The  new  min- 
ister landed  in  Boston  and  spent  some  time  investigating 
the  attitude  of  New  England.  He  quickly  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  people  of  this  region  still  desired  the 
annexation  of  Canada  ia  order  to  control  the  fisheries,  and 
if  they  could  not  get  all  of  Canada  they  would  at  least  in- 
sist upon  Nova  Scotia.4  The  efforts  of  Gerard  to  induce 


2Vergennes's  instructions  to  Luzerne,  July  18,  1779.  In  these  instruc- 
tions Vergennes  spoke  of  the  West  in  a  very  vague  way.  At  the  most 
he  thought  of  leaving  only  the  lower  Mississippi  in  Spanish  hands,  while 
the  Northwest  was  unsettled.  Some  time  later  he  wrote  that  it  was 
hardly  possible  "de  les  [English]  privers  la  nouvelle  Ecosse,  le  Canada, 
et  L'Ohio  .  .  .  ."  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  26,  1780.  (Esp.,  599, 
no.  35,  new  8.) 

3"On  [Congress]  a  aussi  delibre  sur  le  Traite  a  proposer  a  1'Espagne; 
On  a  conclu  qu'on  lui  offriroit  la  guarantie  des  Florides  mais  on  n'est 
pas  encore  convenue  definitivement  si  on  contribueroit  a  lui  conquete." 
Gerard  to  Vergennes,  August  8,  1779.  (E.  U.,  IX,  new  83.) 

4Luzerne  wrote  that  the  conquest  of  Canada  lay  near  the  hearts  of 
the  New  Englanders  because  they  regarded  that  country  as  a  safeguard 
to  their  independence,  but  if  they  were  compelled  to  choose  between  the 
two  they  would  take  Nova  Scotia  on  account  of  the  fisheries.  September 
3,  1779.  (Ibid.,  X,  no.  4.) 


152  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [262 

this  section  of  the  country  to  give  up  all  idea  of  conquest 
had  proved  fruitless.5 

The  Floridas,  however,  did  not  offer  so  difficult  a 
problem.  Congress  had  practically  decided  on  a  policy 
by  which  they  were  to  go  to  Spain  on  condition  that  the 
right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  and  the  use  of  a  port  on 
the  Gulf  be  given  the  United  States.6  To  the  Southern 
delegates,  according  to  Gerard,  the  use  of  a  port  on  the 
Gulf  was  of  more  importance  than  the  right  to  navigate 
the  river.7  Gerard  wished  Spain  to  take  possession  of  the 
Floridas  at  once,  and  suggested  that  the  question  of  the 
ownership  of  Eastern  Louisiana  and  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  be  left  to  future  settlement.8 

Both  Spain  and  the  United  States,  however,  were  in- 
sistent upon  their  claims  to  the  Southwest.  The  points  at 
issue  were  further  complicated  by  the  conflicting  demands 
of  the  several  states.  Virginia  and  other  states  laid  claim 
to  vast  regions,  in  virtue  of  their  ancient  charters,  while 
the  landless  states  held  that  dominion  won  by  the  common 
efforts  should  be  the  property  of  all.9  These  contentions 


B"je  me  suis  vivement  recrie  Mgr.  centre  1'idee  de  conquerir  ainsi 
d'un  trait  de  plume  une  des  possessions  plus  importantes  de  1'Angre  .... 
J'ai  observai  qu'il  n'y  auroit  que  trop  de  peine  a  obtenir  1'independance 
et  la  restitution  san  equivalent  des  Territoires  conquis  par  les  armes  de 
Gde  Bretagne."  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  March  i,  1779.  (E.  U.,  VII,  no. 
67,  new  123.) 

6  See  page  128. 

7Gerard  wrote  to  Vergennes,  September  25,  that  Congress  would  offer 
Spain  the  guarantee  of  the  Floridas  up  to  the  thirty-first  degree  of  lati- 
tude and  even  promise  assistance  in  conquering  them,  on  condition  that 
Spain  would  grant  the  United  States  the  free  use  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
give  them  a  port  south  of  the  thirty-first  degree  of  latitude.  (E.  U.,  X, 
no.  37,  new  125.) 

8Gerard  to  Vergennes,  September  7.     (Ibid.,  no.  20,  new  122.) 

9"  .  .  .  il  est  bien  a  craindre  Monseigneur  que  ces  avantages  memes 
ne  soient  une  cause  de  desordes  dans  la  Republique  americain  et  que  la  iere 
conquete  de  leur  armees  reunie  ne  repande  parmi  eux  de  nouveaux  germes 
de  disunion.  Les  delegues  des  fitats  Limitrophes  pretendent  y  avoir  des 
droits  incontestables  en  virtu  de  leurs  Chartes  .  .  .  ."  Gerard  to  Ver- 
gennes, November  8,  1779.  (Ibid.,  X,  no.  9.  new  8r.) 


263]  LUZERNB  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OP  SPAIN  153 

gave  Spain  a  decided  advantage  in  the  negotiations,  an 
advantage  which  she  pressed  to  the  utmost. 

For  some  time  Miralles  had  taken  little  part  in  the 
discussions  concerning  the  West,  and,  apparently  without 
the  authority  of  his  court,  had  left  the  interests  of  his 
country  to  the  care  of  Luzerne.  When  in  November,  1779, 
Florida  Blanca  instructed  his  agent  to  seek  the  aid  of  Con- 
gress in  the  conquest  of  the  Floridas  and  the  lower  Missis- 
sippi,10 Miralles  at  once  asked  the  help  of  Gerard.  The 
forces  of  the  United  States  had  already  penetrated  the 
West,  and  it  was  plain  that  pressure  must  be  brought  to 
bear  if  Spain  were  to  make  good  her  pretentions  there.11 

Luzerne  proceeded  cautiously  in  this  work.  He  did 
not  explain  to  Congress  the  full  purport  of  Miralles's  in- 
structions, but  spoke  at  length  of  the  necessity  of  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  The  conquest 
of  the  Southwest  he  represented  as  merely  a  combined  at- 
tack upon  the  possessions  of  Great  Britain,  and  he  said 
nothing  of  the  ultimate  ownership.12 

Congress  was  perfectly  agreeable  to  the  project  of  let- 
ting Spain  have  the  Floridas,  but  it  showed  a  determina- 
tion to  maintain  American  claims  to  the  West.13  Luzerne 

10After  speaking  of  the  Floridas,  Miralles  said  to  Luzerne :  "Je  suis 
aussi  charge  d'inviter  1'honorable  Congres  a  entreprendre  la  conquete  du 
territoire  et  de  possession  occuper  par  les  Anglois  au  Nord  Est  de  la 
Louisiane  et  comme  le  Gouvernment  de  cette  province  par  ses  lumieres 
peut  contribue  infiniment  au  succes  d'une  pareille  entreprise  il  desire  de 
connoitre  le  plan  d'operation  auquel  le  Congres  s'arreter  dans  cette 
partie."  September  25,  1779.  (Papers  of  Continental  Congress,  no.  195, 
vol.  I,  fol.  21 :  Letters  of  Luzerne.) 

"Le  succes  le  plus  complet  a  accompagne  cette  entreprise  et  les 
Etats  unis  se  trouvent  aujourd'hui  tant  par  le  droit  de  conquete  que  par 
1'emigration  totale  des  habitans  possesseurs  d'une  vaste  et  fertile  contree." 
Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  November  8.  (E.  U.,  X,  no.  9,  new  81.) 

^Papers  of  Continental  Congress,  no.  95 ;  Letters  of  Luzerne,  vol.  I, 
fol.  25. 

"Congress  referred  the  matter  of  the  Floridas  to  Washington,  who 
agreed  to  approve  the  expedition  as  soon  as  the  British  were  driven  out 
of  the  Southern  states.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  December  17,  1779.  (E.  U,, 
X,  no.  118,  new  337;  Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.)» 
XV,  1331-2;  ibid.,  1387.) 


154  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION*  [264 

hesitated  to  press  the  matter  for  he  saw  many  difficulties 
in  the  way  and  did  not  dare  offend  the  United  States.  Vir- 
ginia claimed  all  the  country  westward  to  the  Mississippi 
and  was  busy  conquering  it.14  Under  these  circumstances 
Luzerne  saw  no  way  for  Spain  to  get  possession  of  this 
territory  unless  she  could  seize  it  before  the  Americans 
could  further  occupy  it.  After  some  effort,  however,  he 
got  several  members  of  Congress  to  admit  that  this  region 
was  not  a  part  of  the  thirteen  states,  and  as  such  was  open 
to  conquest  by  any  enemy  of  Great  Britain.  They  were 
careful  to  state,  however,  that  the  United  States  had  an 
equal  right  to  conquer  this  country;  and  as  Americans  al- 
ready held  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  the  success  of 
George  Rogers  Clark  seemed  assured,  this  admission 
amounted  to  little  towards  forwarding  the  plans  of  Spain.15 

14"M.  de  Miralles  auroit  desire  que  jappuyasse  ses  demandes  d'une 
maniere  plus  articulee  que  je  n'ai  pas  fait  ....  Non  obstant  ses  in- 
stances j'ai  cru  devoir  me  borner  a  des  simples  insinuations  ....  Vous 
remarquerez  cependant  que  dans  la  reponse  que  M.  le  President  me  fait 
au  nom  du  Congres  il  garde  le  Silence  Sur  la  requisition  dont  lui  a  fait 
part  M.  de  Miralles  d  S'occuper  de  la  conquete  des  parties  de  la  Louisiane 
et  dependance  dont  les  Anglois  Sont  en  possession  Sans  ajouter  pour  le 
compte  de  qui  cette  conquete  doit  etre  fait.  J'ai  lieu  de  presumer  que 
les  interets  de  quelques  fitats  et  leurs  vues  d'agrandissement  sont  cause 
de  ce  silence  autant  que  I'Ultimatum  dont  M.  Adams  est  charge.  En  effet 
la  Virginie  poursuit  ses  Enterprises  contre  les  parties  du  territoire  britan- 
nique  qui  Se  trouvent  comprises  entre  les  anciennes  limites  de  cet  Etat 
et  le  Mississipi  et  pretend  que  Sa  charter  lui  donner  des  droit  incontes- 
tables  sur  ses  territoires  D'un  autre  cote  1'incertitude  qui  a  subsiste  avant 
la  paix  de  1763  touchant  les  anciennes  limites  de  la  Louisiane,  et  les  lettres 
du  Gouverneur  de  la  havane  a  Don  Juan  paroissent  a  quelques  egards 
indiquer  que  la  Cour  de  Madrid  a  des  vues  Sur  ces  memes  territoires,  et 
qu'on  invitant  les  Etats-unis  a  enfaire  la  conquete,  elle  supose  qu'ils  les 
lui  cederont  de  la  meme  maniere  que  la  floride  orientale  1'etre,  en  cas 
qu'ils  puissant  la  conquerir."  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  December  17,  1779. 
(E.  U.,  X,  no.  18,  new  118.) 

15"  ....  il  est  vraisemblable  qu'il  ne  se  determinera  pas  aisement  a 
vendre  ou  a  ceder  ce  qu'il  aura  conquis.  Ainsi  Monsiegneur,  Si  la  Cour 
[of  Madrid]  a  reelement  des  projets  Sur  ces  territoires  et  qu'il  ayent 
1'aprobation  du  Roi,  il  seroit  convenable  que  cette  Cour  s'occupat  de  leur 
execution,  ou  du  moins  la  preparat  pas  des  insinuations  faites  au  Congres 
tandis  qu'il  en  est  encore  terns.  Un  nombre  assez  considerable  de  Delegues 


265]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  155 

With  the  bright  prospects  for  success  in  the  West, 
Congress  assumed  a  more  independent  attitude  towards 
Spain,  and  even  threatened  to  hold  no  more  communication 
with  Miralles,  unless  he  were  officially  accredited  from  his 
court.16  They  spoke  boldly  of  Clark's  conquests,  and  treated 
the  interests  and  claims  of  Spain  with  contempt,  while, 
even  France  received  less  courtesy  than  formerly. 

Canada  again  came  in  for  a  share  of  attention,  this 
time  doubtless  through  the  influence  of  the  New  England 
delegates.17  Washington  now  approved  its  conquest  but 
Luzerne  opposed  the  measure  strenuously.18  When  a  dele- 
gate asked  for  the  cooperation  of  the  French  fleet,  he  de- 
clared that  the  most  important  duty  was  to  drive  the  Brit- 
ish from  the  states  and  then  it  would  be  honorable  to  offer 
freedom  to  the  Canadians.19  In  this  project  Luzerne  could 
see  nothing  but  jealousy  of  the  North  towards  the  plans  of 
the  Southern  states,  and  he  declared  that  New  England  was 
ready  to  sacrifice  the  rights  of  her  neighbors  for  the  sake 
of  the  Canadian  fisheries.20 

The  pretensions  of  Congress  did  not  meet  the  approval 
of  Yergennes.  He  declared  that  the  guarantee  of  France 


envisagent  ces  Countrees  comme  apartenantes  reelement  a  1'Angleterre  en 
virtu  du  Traite  de  Paris  et  non  obstant  les  termes  des  differentes  chartres 
ils  sont  disposes  a  reconnoitre  le  droit  de  la  puissance  enemi  de  la  Grande 
Bretagne  qui  enfera  la  conquete.  En  attendant  un  officier  des  Troupes  de 
Virginie  comme  sous  le  nom  du  Colonel  Clark,  homme  d'un  genie  actif 
et  audacieux  fait  dans  1'Ouest  des  courses  qu'on  considera  un  jour  comme 
des  conquetes  et  Ton  m'assure  d'une  maniere  positive  que  sans  egard  aux 
Stipulations  du  Traite  du  Paris  cette  officier  s'est  avance  de  1'autre  cote 
du  Mississipi  a  une  distance  tres  considerable,  et  a  pris  possession  au  nom 
de  1'Etat  qu'il  Sut  .  .  .  ."  E.  U.,  X,  no.  18,  new  118. 


17Washington,   Writings   (Ford  ed.),  VIII,  138-141. 

18Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  December  13.    (E.  U.,  X,  no.  no,    new  317.) 

19Luzerne  to  Vergennes.    (Ibid.,  XI,  no.  33.) 

20Luzerne  wrote  to  Vergennes  in  January,  1780,  that  the  north  had 
no  disquietude  for  the  dangers  of  the  South,  but  feared  more  its  rivalry 
and  resources.  He  declared  that  it  would  without  regret  abandon  the 
southern  states  to  their  fate  if  they  thought  this  would  help  them  get 
Canada.  (Esp.,  XI,  no.  33,  new  107.) 


156  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [266 

was  for  the  independence  of  the  United  States  with  such 
possessions  as  they  held  at  the  end  of  the  war.  This  guar- 
antee, he  maintained,  did  not  in  any  sense  bind  the  guaran- 
tor to  aid  in  making  conquests  beyond  the  legal  boundaries 
of  the  original  states.21  Vergennes  had  not  changed  his 
mind  regarding  Canada,  nor  had  he  changed  his  opinion 
of  the  West  since  issuing  his  first  instructions  to  Luzerne. 
He  felt  that  those  who  insisted  upon  the  conquest  of  this 
territory  were  the  enemies  of  peace  and  were  seeking  to 
embarrass  Congress.  The  changed  attitude  of  France  was 
made  manifest  in  the  position  of  Luzerne  on  Spain's  propo- 
sition for  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis.  He 
declared  that  such  an  arrangement  was  not  unfair,  and 
urged  Congress  to  use  every  effort  to  drive  out  the  British 
before  beginning  negotiations  for  peace.22  It  is  very  im- 
probable, however,  that  he  had  any  serious  thought  of 
abandoning  to  the  English  any  part  of  the  union  as  he 
understood  it,23  and  it  is  certain  that  Vergennes  would  not 
have  consented  to  any  such  arrangement. 

The  opinions  of  Luzerne  were  duly  reported  to  Con- 
gress, where  they  became  the  signal  for  many  bitter 
speeches.  Congress  no  longer  boasted  of  the  able  men  who 
had  adorned  its  meetings  in  other  years;  but  its  members, 
altho  narrow  and  resentful,  were  determined  to  thwart 
the  purposes  of  Spain,  and  in  this  they  received  popular 


21"I1  n'en  resultera  autre  chose  sinon  que  le  roi  est  actuellement  et 
definitivement  garant  de  leur  independance  et  que  sa  garantee  pour  leurs 
possessions  et  conquetes  n'est  que  eventuelle,  c'est  a  dire  dependantes  des 
evenements  de  la  guerre  .  .  .  ."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  September  25,  17/9. 
(E.  U.,  X,  no.  2,  new  38.) 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVI,  88;  E.  U.,  XI, 
no.  36. 

28Luzerne  wrote  to  Vergennes,  June  24,  1780,  that  the  British  were 
trying  to  persuade  the  people  of  South  Carolina  that  their  fellow  states 
had  abandoned  them ;  and  he  suggested  that  the  British  were  also  trying 
to  form  a  new  colonial  empire  out  of  the  Carolinas,  Georgia,  the  Floridas 
and  the  Bahamas.  Luzerne  felt  that,  in  spite  of  its  dissensions,  Congress 
would  not  consent  to  sacrifice  any  of  the  states.  (£.  U.,  XII,  no.  118, 
new  396.) 


267]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  157 

support.24  They  declared  that  it  was  the  purpose  of  the 
Bourbon  powers  to  break  up  the  union;  and  they  started 
an  opposition  to  the  influence  of  them  both  which  did  not 
subside  during  the  war,  and  which  made  agreement  between 
the  United  States  and  Spain  impossible.  The  feeling  in 
Congress  was  intensified  by  further  attempts  of  Luzerne 
in  behalf  of  Spanish  pretentious.  Spain  had  presented  an 
"ultimatum"  to  Great  Britain,  and  in  the  discussion  of 
this  with  Congress  Luzerne  had  asked  that  body  to  explain 
itself  on  four  questions  at  issue.  These  were  the  western 
boundary  of  the  United  States;  the  navigation  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi; possession  of  the  Floridas;  the  lands  on  the  left 
or  eastern  bank  of  the  Mississippi.25-  Before  giving  Con- 
gress an  opportunity  to  answer  Luzerne  proceeded  to  state 
the  contentions  of  Spain.  He  argued,  in  her  behalf,  that 
the  boundaries  of  the  United  States  extended  no  farther 
to  the  west  than  the  headwaters  of  the  streams  flowing 
into  the  Atlantic,  and  for  this  he  cited  the  royal  proclama- 
tion of  1763.  If  this  were  true  the  United  States  would 
nowhere  border  on  the  Mississippi  and  hence  had  no  claim 
to  navigate  that  river.  This  proclamation  also  cut  off  the 
Floridas  from  the  United  States  according  to  the  Spanish 
contention.  None  of  this  territory,  Luzerne  maintained, 
was  part  of  the  original  colonies,  and  so  could  not  be  a 
part  of  the  United  States.20 

These  proposals  aroused  considerable  surprise  and 
much  indignation  among  the  members  of  Congress.  The 
delegates  argued  that  they  had  a  just  claim  to  all  the  lands 
as  far  as  the  Mississippi,  not  only  by  right  of  conquest  but 
by  the  grant  of  the  colonial  charters.  They  declared  fur- 
ther that  the  treaty  of  1763  had  assured  the  right  to 
Great  Britain  of  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
and  they  claimed  the  same  right  for  themselves.  They 

24Les  Articles  de  I'Ultimatum  ....  commencent  a  etre  connu  dans 
les  Etats  de  1'Est  et  la  fermentations  qu'ils  excitent  parmi  le  peuple  dans 
les  villes  de  Commerce  Seroit  d'un  nature  inquietude."  Luzerne  to  Ver- 
gennes,  January  16,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XI,  no.  25,  new  18.) 

26Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVI.  114.  • 

z*Ibid. 


158  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [268 

would  agree  to  restrict  the  navigation  to  merchant  vessels, 
but  they  insisted  upon  the  right  to  trade.  Nothing  was 
said  of  the  ownership  of  lands  along  the  lower  Mississippi, 
for  this  question  was  included  in  the  larger  question  of 
boundaries.  To  Spanish  control  of  the  Floridas  no  objec- 
tion was  made. 

The  discussion  of  the  Spanish  proposition  extended 
over  many  days  and  gave  rise  to  much  bitterness.  The  pos- 
session of  the  West  had  never  before  been  questioned  in 
Congress,  and  Luzerne  himself  had  not  been  aware  of 
Spain's  ambitions  until  Miralles  had  communicated  to  him 
the  instructions  which  he  had  received  the  preceding  No- 
vember. Luzerne  knew  the  hopes  of  Congress  from  the 
instructions  to  Jay;  but,  nevertheless,  he  spoke  to  several 
members  of  the  desires  of  Spain,  from  none  of  whom  he 
received  a  favorable  reply.  He  found  that  the  delegates 
from  the  Southern  and  Middle  states  were  firm  in  the 
persuasion  that  "the  lands  which  extend  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Mississippi  in  parallel  lines  from  the  equator  belong 
to  them,  either  in  virtue  of  their  charters  or  of  divers  acts 
of  possession.27  Some  of  the  Eastern  delegates  were  more 
moderate  and  recognized  that  if  the  Spanish  should  drive 
the  English  out  of  any  part  of  this  territory  it  would  be 
difficult  to  get  them  to  surrender  it,  but  this  view  was  not 
the  prevalent  one  in  Congress. 

As  the  discussion  continued,  the  indignation  of  the 
southern  members  increased  to  white  heat.  Burke  of 
North  Carolina  exclaimed,  "I  know  the  force  and  the  ex- 
tent of  our  charters  and  of  our  rights,  and  if  those  of  my 
constituents  in  the  territories  in  question  are  not  clear  and 
certain,  our  rights  on  the  Atlantic  coast  are  equally  ob- 
scure and  doubtful,  for  they  emanate  from  the  same 
source."28 

"Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  January  25.    (E.  U.,  XI,  no.  27,  new  33.) 
28"J'ai  trouve  ceux  du  Sud  et  du  Centre  dans  la  ferme  persuasion  que 
les    terres   qui    s'etendent   dequis   la   mer   atlantique   jusqu'au    Mississipi 
[belong  to  them]  soit  en  virtu  de  leurs  Chartres,  soit  en  virtu  de  divers 

actes  de  possession "     Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  February  n.     (Ibid., 

no.  30,  new  53,  fol.  190.) 


269]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  159 

The  committee  of  Congress  which  had  been  designated 
to  treat  with  Luzerne  based  the  claim  of  the  United  States 
to  the  West  on  four  acts :  the  colonial  charters,  the  treaty 
of  Paris  of  1763,  the  proclamation  of  the  king  of  England 
in  the  same  year,  and  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  alliance 
with  France.29 

The  arguments  were  long  and  tedious  and  revealed 
a  fundamental  difference  in  the  views  of  the  two  sides. 
In  regard  to  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  Luzerne  pointed  out  that 
it  had  ceded  Eastern  Louisiana  and  its  dependencies,  not 
to  the  colonies,  who  could  not  enter  into  a  treaty,  but  to 
the  king  of  England.  Before  this  time  France  had  pos- 
sessed this  territory  and  it  had  never  been  incorporated 
with  the  colonies;  now  Spain  was  merely  trying  to  recon- 
quer it  from  a  nation  with  which  she  was  at  war.  In  a 
case  of  this  kind,  he  argued,  possession  was  the  best  title 
and  Spain  held  it  in  virtue  of  her  forces  already  in  the 
country.  The  ambition  of  Great  Britain,  he  held,  had 
forced  France  and  Spain  .again  to  take  up  arms ;  and  as  a 
result  the  whole  treaty  of  Paris  was  subject  to  modifica- 
tion. 

This  argument  did  not  convince  the  committee,  which 
insisted  that  Great  Britain  had  never  acknowledged  the 
claims  of  France  to  this  country,  and  had  gone  to  war 
and  won  her  contention.  They  argued  that  the  position 
of  France  on  this  question  had  been  from  the  beginning 
a  mistaken  one  and  that  the  West  had  always  belonged  to 
the  colonies  in  virtue  of  their  charters. 

The  charters  presented  a  difficult  problem  and  one 
on  which  there  was  destined  to  be  no  agreement.  Luzerne 
declared  that  there  could  be  no  binding  force  in  such 
documents  unless  they  were  backed  by  actual  possession. 
He  remarked  that  they  had  been  carelessly  drawn,  and  in 
many  cases  contradicted  each  other  so  that  there  was  no 

.  -9E.  U.,  XI,  no.  30,  new  53,  fol.  190.  The  account  of  Luzerne  of  his 
discussions  with  this  committee  is  the  only  one  I  have  seen  and  this  states 
in  the  merest  outline  the  arguments  of  those  who  wished  to  keep  the 
West. 


160  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [270 

agreement  among  the  states  as  to  just  what  they  meant. 
With  such  a  condition  of  affairs,  he  asked  if  a  foreign 
power  could  be  expected  to  accept  them  when  they  violated 
claims  founded  upon  actual  possession. 

In  regard  to  the  proclamation  of  1763,  Luzerne  re- 
marked that  he  did  not  see  how  the  colonies  could  claim 
any  territory  which  was  not  legally  theirs  even  under  the 
English  government.  He  pointed  out  that  by  this  procla- 
mation the  royal  governors  were  forbidden  to  make  any 
grants  west  of  the  head  waters  of  the  rivers  flowing  into 
the  Atlantic. 

The  Americans  replied  that  this  provision  was  the 
source  of  many  protests  and  almost  universal  discontent 
and  was  not  accepted  by  the  colonies.  They  pointed  out 
also  the  provision  in  the  proclamation  that  the  act  should 
not  contradict  the  grants  of  the  colonial  charters.  The 
reservation,  they  declared,  was  for  the  protection  of  the 
Indians,  and  was  not  a  limitation  of  the  rights  of  the 
colonies.  Congress  would  likely  pursue  the  same  policy, 
they  asserted,  and  it  had  the  right  which  previously  be- 
longed to  the  British  government  to  buy  these  lands  to 
the  exclusion  of  any  other  power.30 

The  fourth  point  of  the  argument  of  the  committee 
that  the  treaty  of  alliance  with  France  guaranteed  to  the 
United  States  the  possession  of  the  West  was  met  by  a 
flat  denial  from  Luzerne.  In  this  he  was  acting  in  accord 
with  Vergennes's  interpretation  of  the  treaty :  that  France 
guaranteed  the  United  States  as  they  actually  were  at  that 
time  with  such  other  territory  as  they  could  conquer.31  To 
this  contention  the  Americans  made  no  objection  and  the 
matter  was  allowed  to  drop. 

These  arguments  produced  no  results  and  the  opinions 
of  each  side  remained  unchanged.  Luzerne  claimed  that 
the  United  States  had  no  right  to  these  territories,  be- 
cause they  had  never  held  possession  of  them,  and  could 

80It  is  curious  that  the  members  of  this  committee  did  not  point  out 
the  provision  of  the  proclamation  which  declared  that  the  reservation  was 
"for  the  present." 

31See  Vergennes's  instructions  to  Luzerne,  p.  151. 


271]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  161 

make  no  claim  in  virtue  of  the  sovereignty  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, a  sovereignty  which  they  had  renounced.32  Spain, 
however,  went  further,  and  demanded  that  the  states  re- 
frain from  all  settlements  or  conquests  in  the  West,  and 
leave  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley  to  her  possession.33 

The  questions  of  the  Floridas  and  the  lands  along  the 
lower  Mississippi  were  put  into  the  background  by  the 
great  contention  over  the  West,  and  even  the  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi  received  little  attention.  The  Floridas 
Congress  was  willing  to  concede  to  Spain;  and  it  could 
offer  little  objection  to  Spanish  conquests  on  the  lower 
Mississippi.  Galvez  had  already  gained  possession  of 
Natchez,  and  the  Spaniards  hoped  he  would  extend  his 
conquest  farther  to  the  north.  Luzerne  was  beginning  to 
discuss  the  purchase  of  these  territories  when  news  of  the 
victories  of  Galvez  arrived.34  Congress  realized  that  the 
United  States  could  not  drive  Spain  from  territories  which 
she  had  conquered,  and  all  claim  to  West  Florida  was 
given  up. 

Only  one  matter  connected  with  the  Floridas  aroused 
any  difference  of  opinion.  Congress  had  fixed  the  boun- 
dary of  the  Floridas  in  accordance  with  the  proclamation 
of  1763;  but  Spain  wished  to  extend  it  farther  north.  The 
question,  however,  remained  an  open  one  until  after  the 
Revolution  was  over.35 

Luzerne  himself  admitted  that  his  arguments  had  not 
produced  a  great  impression  on  Congress,  and  he  advised 

82This  whole  argument  is  reported  in  Luzerne's  letter  to  Vergennes  of 
February  u.  E.  U.,  XI,  no.  30,  new  53,  fol.  190. 

zzJournals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVI,  115. 

"Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  February  u.  (E.  U.,  XI,  no.  30,  fol.  53)  ; 
March  13  (ibid.,  no.  33,  fol.  79)  ;  March  18  (ibid.,  no.  35,  fol.  87.) 

35"La  Cour  de  Madrid  desira  peutetre  de  leur  donner  plus  d'etendiie  au 
nord  audela  du  trente  unieme  degre  de  latitude;  mais  le  Congres  est 
d'opinion  que  Sa  Mte  Cathe  trouve  d'autant  plus  d'avantage  dans  la  Fixa- 
tion presente  que  les  florides  ne  s'etendoient  du  cote  du  nord  est  sous  la 
domination  Espagnoles  que  jusqu'a  la  Riviere  St.  Jean  tandis  que  la 
proclamation  leur  assignoit  la  Riviere  St.  Marie  pour  limite  actuelle." 
Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  February  u,  1780.  (Ibid.,  XI,  no.  30,  new  53, 
fol.  190.) 


162  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [272 

that  if  Spain  wanted  the  territory  in  dispute  she  had  better 
seize  it.  Within  a  month  news  reached  Philadelphia  that 
Spain  held  all  the  lower  Mississippi  and  Miralles  had  this 
report  published  in  the  papers  with  the  intimation  that 
Spain  would  hold  it.5G  This  report  still  further  aroused 
indignation  in  America.  It  was  objected  that  the  conquest 
of  a  small  corner  of  a  vast  region  did  not  give  a  just  claim 
to  the  whole  extent  of  territory.  If  such  an  argument 
should  be  conclusive,  it  was  urged,  the  conquest  of  Clark 
had  already  given  the  United  States  title  to  the  whole 
valley.37 

There  were  also  other  sources  of  indignation.  Many 
people  held  grants  of  land  in  this  region,  and  they  com- 
plained that  they  were  being  robbed.38  This  complaint 
gave  Congress  a  new  ground  on  which  to  base  its  conten- 
tions. It  now  came  forward  with  the  claim  that  the  title 
of  the  United  States  was  good  by  right  of  conquest  and 
occupation.  This  occupation  went  back  several  years  and, 
it  was  urged,  gave  the  republic  a  priority  of  claim  over 
the  Spaniards.  Luzerene  attempted  to  evade  this  reason- 
ing by  stating  that  the  settlements  were  made  by  the  au- 
thority of  the  British  crown,  and  as  such  were  still  subject 
to  conquest.39 


36Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  March  13.    E.  V.,  XI,  no.  33,  fol.  79.) 

37"Le  Cicl  veuille  nous  preserver  .  .  .  .  de  1'idee  d'une  contestation 
avec  1'Espagne,  mais  vous  conviendrez  que  pour  avoir  conquis  un  angle 
de  terre  voisin  des  bouches  du  Mississipi  et  de  la  Riviere  Iberville  cette 
Puissance  n'est  pas  en  droit  de  dire  qu'un  Pais  de  cinq  cent  lieus  d'enten- 
dire  est  tombe  ausson  pouvoir  et  de  s'en  attribuer  la  Souveranete.  J'ai 
deja  entendu  parler  de  donner  des  renfort  au  Colonel  Clarke  pour  la 
mettre  en  etat  de  conquerir  de  son  et  vous  voiez  lesconsequences  de  ce 
sisteme."  Luzerne's  account  of  a  statement  by  Mathews,  a  delegate.  Ibid. 

38Land  had  been  granted  by  the  several  states,  and  there  were  com- 
panies organized  to  exploit  these  grants.  Ibid. 

39Luzerne  answered  that  the  American  occupation  did  not  give  any 
more  right  to  the  subjects  of  the  thirteen  states  than  it  would  have  given 
to  France,  to  Poland,  or  to  Germany,  if  after  the  Peace  of  Paris  the 
French,  the  Poles,  or  the  Germans  had  settled  in  that  part  of  ancient 
Louisiana.  Ibid. 


273]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  163 

Miralles  was  greatly  worried  by  the  tone  of  Luzerne's 
negotiations,  and  began  to  doubt  the  influence  of  his  friend. 
Luzerne  had  suggested  that  the  two  proceed  boldly  to 
force  through  the  wishes  of  Spain,  but  Miralles  would  not 
agree  to  this.  He  ridiculed  the  claims  of  Congress  but 
insisted  that  he  must  wait  for  further  instructions.  He 
finally  asked  Luzerne  to  take  no  further  part  in  the  nego- 
tiations, for  "it  would  pain  him  to  see  an  affair  of  particular 
interest  to  the  king  treated  by  another  than  himself."40 
Soon  after  this  the  Spanish  agent  died,  begging  Luzerne 
not  to  interfere  again  in  the  relations  of  his  country  with 
Congress.41 

When  the  report  of  Luzerne  on  his  conference  with 
the  members  of  Congress  reached  Yergennes,  the  latter  re- 
plied in  a  way  notable  for  its  moderation.  He  spoke  highly 
of  the  justice  of  Congress  in  leaving  the  Floridas  to  Spain 
and  ordered  Luzerne  not  to  give  any  ministerial  views  of 
the  points  in  controversy.  He  expressed  great  fear  that 
the  question  might  cause  much  trouble  between  the  two 
countries,  and  asked  Luzerne  to  be  careful  of  the  feelings 
of  both  allies  of  the  king.  Altho  he  still  felt  that  Spain 
had  a  right  to  conquer  the  territory  in  question,  he  ad- 
mitted that  the  Americans  had  some  cause  to  be  angry. 
He  hinted  that  the  question  would  likely  be  settled  by  the 
forbearance  of  Spain,  who  would,  probably  of  her  own 
free  will,  surrender  all  claim  to  the  lands  east  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  would  also  allow  the  Americans  some  right 
to  navigate  the  river.  He  felt  that  if  the  Americans  would 
only  be  easy  with  Florida  Blanca,  they  would  likely  get 
what  they  wanted.42 


*°E.  U.,  XI,  no.  33,  fol.  79- 

"Luzerne  to  Montmorin,  May  7.  (Esp.,  599,  no.  16,  new  25.)  Luzerne 
says  that  Miralles  had  explained  his  motives  to  the  court  of  Spain.  What 
these  motives  were  can  probably  be  learned  only  froir  the  Spanish 
archives. 

42"Ce  n'est  pas  a  nous  a  decider  cette  question  et  la  prudence  nous 
fait  un  devoir  d'autant  plus  stricte  de  ne  pas  articuler  d'opinion  a  cet 
egard.  Sans  etre  provoque  que  si  1'Espagne  veut  conserver  les  terreins 


164  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [274 

Luzerne  ceased  formal  negotiations  with  Congress 
early  in  1780 ;  but  he  could  not  refrain  from  private  efforts 
on  behalf  of  Spain.  He  first  approached  the  president  of 
Congress,  Samuel  Huntington  of  Connecticut,  and  his 
friends.  He  succeeded  in  arousing  their  jealousy  of  the 
West  by  calling  attention  to  the  great  immigration  which 
would  inevitably  set  in  from  the  East  to  these  fertile  val- 
leys. He  declared  that  the  possession  of  the  Mississippi 
Valley  would  never  be  a  source  of  strength  to  the  United 
States,  but  would  cause  constant  friction  with  Spain.43 
He  used  again  the  arguments  against  the  legality  of  the 
American  claims,  and  felt  that  he  had  gone  far  towards 
winning  support  for  his  favorite  project.  He  tried  next 
the  delegates  from  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Delaware.  These  states  had  little  interest  in  the  west- 
ern lands,  and  he  felt  he  could  count  on  their  support.  He 
found  them  in  a  state  of  indifference  but  unwilling  to  take 
a  decided  stand  against  the  wishes  of  the  other  states. 
Even  Virginia  showed  no  great  hostility  to  the  projects  of 
Luzerne,  for  the  County  of  Kentucky  had  just  declared  its 
independence,  and  in  this  they  thought  they  saw  the  be- 
ginning of  the  dissolution  of  the  states.44 


contestes   Elle   donnera   certainment   de   1'ombrage   aux   Americains   tan- 

disque  cette  Puissance  prendre  de  1'humeur Si  je  suis  bien  informe 

le  Ministre  espagnol  n'est  pas  tres  eloigne  d'abandonner  aux  americains 
les  rives  orientales  du  Mississipi  au  dela  des  florides  et  meme  de  leur 
accorder  une  navigation  quelqonque  sur  ce  fleuve."  Vergennes  to  Lu- 
zerne, June  3,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XII,  no.  7,  fol.  61.) 

43Luzerne  to  Montmorin,  May  12.  (Esp.,  599,  no.  49,  new  106.) 
44Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  June  n,  1780  (£.£/.,  XII,  no.  54,  new  74.) 
"Dans  mes  intretiens  avec  les  Individus  qui  les  composent  ceux  du  Xord 
se  sont  montres  asses  raisonables  et  sont  convinus  du  principe  que 
1'ancienne  Louisiane  orientale  etant  actuellement  entre  les  mains  de 
1'angleterre,  les  apartances  ayant  etc  cedees  a  la  paix  de  1763  1'Espagne 
avoit  le  droit  incontestables  d'en  faire  la  conquete.  Cette  verite  si  claire 
est  egalement  reconnue  par  le  Congres  general  et  plusiers  Membres  de 
1'Etat  du  New  York "  In  regard  to  Virginia  he  said  that  she  ap- 
peared less  attached  than  formerly  to  holding  the  West.  "Ce  changement 
est  peutetre  du  a  une  circonstance  ....  c'est  que  les  habitans  des  parties 
de  cet  Etat,  qui  sont  eloignees  du  Siege  du  Government  annonce  dans 


275]  LUZERNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OP  SPAIN  165 

Maryland  was  pronounced  by  the  French  minister  to 
be  the  best  disposed  of  all  the  states  to  the  desires  of  Spain. 
She  had  no  interest  in  the  West,  and  at  least  one  of  her 
delegates,  Jenifer,  was  intensely  jealous  of  the  power  of 
the  larger  states.  He  not  only  admitted  the  rights  of 
Spain  to  conquer  as  much  of  the  West  as  she  could,  but 
declared  that  she  had  a  perfect  right  to  conquer  any  of 
the  states  if  she  found  them  in  British  hands.45  Here  was 
a  man  who  could  perform  valuable  services  for  the  Spanish 
cause,  and  Luzerne  enlisted  him  at  once  and  through  him 
urged  his  arguments  upon  Congress. 

There  was,  however,  a  strong  opposition  to  the  schemes 
of  Luzerne.  The  old  Junto  had  broken  up,  but  the  lead 
had  been  taken  up  by  the  vehement  and  zealous  Burke  of 
North  Carolina.  The  two  had  constantly  held  opposite 
opinions  and  had  not  infrequently  clashed.  His  opposition 
was  of  a  character  to  arouse  fear  in  the  mind  of  the  French 
minister  and  his  fiery  denunciations  had  doubtless  terri- 
fied Miralles  into  silence.  Burke  denounced  the  ambitions 
of  Spain  as  overbearing  and  unjust,  as  prejudicial  to  the 
rights  of  the  states,  and  contrary  to  their  happiness  and 
tranquillity.  Luzerne  greatly  feared  that  he  would  seize 
a  favorable  opportunity  to  sweep  all  Congress  to  his  side 
and  arouse  it  to  lay  claim  to  the  Floridas  as  well  as  to  the 
West.46  Henceforth  there  were  two  well  defined  parties 


ce  moment  des  vues  d'independance  et  le  projet  de  former  un  etat  par- 
ticulier."  This  incident,  he  declares,  makes  them  fear  "1'inconvenient  des 
possessions  distantes  et  trop  etendues  et  la  danger  d'un  dismemberment 
ou  d'une  dissolution  de  1'Etat."  E.  U.,  XII,  no.  54,  new  74. 

45Le  Maryland  est  1'Etat  dont  les  sentimens  sur  cette  matiere  sont 
les  plus  raisonnables  et  les  mieux  articules  Un  delegue  de  cet  Etat,  homme 
qui  jouit  d'une  grande  influence  n'hesite  point  a  dire  que  non  seulement 
1'Espagne  peut  sans  aucune  contradiction  faire  cette  conquete  mais  que 
n'ayant  pris  aucun  engagement  avec  le  Congres  si  aujourd'hui  elle  enlevant 
aux  Anglois  1'Etat  de  la  Georgie  que  est  entre  leurs  mains."  Ibid. 

46"M.  Burke  homme  ardent  et  obstine  quoique  d'ailleurs  bon  Citoyen 
regarde  les  projets  de  1'Espagne  comme  injustes  contraires  aux  droits 
des  Treize  Etats  et  prejudiciables  a  leur  bonheurs  et  a  leur  tranquilite 


1G6  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [276 

in  Congress,  the  French  and  Spanish  party  with  Jenifer 
for  spokesman,  and  the  opposition  under  the  radical  lead- 
ership of  Burke. 

The  ability  and  enthusiasm  of  Burke  won  many  dele- 
gates who  had  previously  been  friendly  to  the  ideas  of 
Spain.  One  delegate  from  New  York  told  Luzerne  that 
he  could,  without  any  complaint  from  his  constituents, 
renounce  in  favor  of  France  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  be- 
cause they  were  not  included  in  the  charters  of  the  states; 
but  if  he  should  vote  to  surrender  Eastern  Louisiana,  he 
would  expose  himself  to  the  charge  that  he  had  sold  the 
interests  of  the  southern  and  middle  states  for  money, 
and  of  having  violated  the  sacred  laws  of  the  union  in 
sacrificing  some  states  for  the  gain  of  others.47 

Still  Luzerne  did  not  give  up  his  efforts.  He  urged 
that  the  United  States  could  never  conquer  the  western 
territories  on  account  of  the  power  of  Spain.  He  again 
besought  Congress  to  trust  to  the  generosity  of  His  Cath- 
olic Majesty ;  but  the  only  promise  he  could  gain  was  that 
nothing  should  be  done  until  Jay's  report  should  arrive. 
Luzerne  was  not  satisfied  with  this,  for  he  feared  that  the 
report  of  Jay's  mission  would  produce  more  ill  feeling,  and 
he  did  all  he  could  in  advance  to  discount  itjg  effects.  But 
while  he  was  urging  the  Americans  to  conciliation,  he  was 
trying  to  get  Spain  to  conquer  the  West.48 

In  the  midst  of  these  discussions  the  project  for  the 
conquest  of  Canada  was  revived.  This  time  there  was  a 
coalition  between  the  North  and  South,  for  New  England, 

et  si  les  relations  de  M.  Jay  donnent  lieu  au  Congres  de  faire  quelque 
alteration  a  son  ultimatum,  je  crains  toute  de  la  vehemence  de  ce 
Delegue."  E.  U.,  XII,  no.  54,  new  74. 

"Ibid. 

*8"Dans  cette  etat  des  choses  je  crois  que  la  Cour  de  Madrid  ne  peut 
mieux  faire  que  de  poursuivre  la  conquete  qu'elle  a  commencee  et  d'exercer 
sur  les  Pais  nouvelement  soumis  a  sa  Domination  tous  les  Actes  de 
souverainete  de  Jurisdiction  et  de  possession  qu'elle  jugera  les  plus  propres 
a  detruire,  dans  1'esprit  des  Americains  1'espoir  chimerique  qu'ils  ont 
conqu  de  les  conquerir  sur  1'Angleterre  ou  du  moins  de  les  acquirer  par 
le  Traite  de  paix."  Ibid. 


277]  LUZEBNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  167 

in  the  hope  of  getting  some  part  of  Canada,  was  willing 
to  support  the  southern  pretentious.  As  a  result  of  this 
combination  Luzerne  was  left  without  the  support  of  any 
section. 

The  British  aided  Luzerne  in  his  efforts  to  break  this 
coalition  between  the  two  sections.  They  slfowed  great 
harshness  towards  the  North  and  prepared  to  defend  Can- 
ada against  any  assault.49  The  southern  states  were  the 
object  of  their  concern  and  they  sought  to  win  them  over 
by  the  charge  that  their  northern  compatriots  had  deserted 
them.  It  was  their  aim  to  hold  the  three  southern  states 
even  tho  the  others  should  succeed  in  maintaining  their 
independence.  These  southern  states  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  British  army  and  it  appeared  impossible  for  Con- 
gress to  recover  them. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  their  states  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  the  southerners  kept  up  their  representation 
in  Congress;  and  many,  expelled  from  their  homes,  came 
to  Philadelphia  to  get  assistance  against  the  enemy.  Lu- 
zerne thought  this  a  favorable  moment  to  get  them  to  yield 
their  claims  in  return  for  Spanish  assistance  and  sought 
to  push  his  measures  regardless  of  the  position  of  Con- 
gress.50 He  called  first  on  Governor  Rutledge  of  South 
Carolina,  who,  he  found,  had  no  suspicion  of  the  ambitions 
of  Spain.  He  was  totally  ignorant  of  the  points  of  differ- 
ence betwen  Congress  and  the  court  of  Madrid,  but  it  had 
never  occurred  to  him  to  surrender  the  western  lands.51 
When  he  learned  that  Spain  laid  claim  to  the  east  bank 
of  the  Missisippi  and  had  already  attempted  to  possess  it, 


49Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  June  24.   (E.  U .,  XII,  no.  118,  fol.  306.) 
50Luzerne  to  Montmorin,  July  II.    (Esp.,  599,  no.  182.) 
51Rutledge  asked  Luzerne  if  Spain  did  not  want  the  Mississippi  as 
far  as  the  thirty-first  parallel,  but  spoke  with  great  confidence  of  her  good 
intentions.     He   said   that   the    Spanish   governor   at   New    Orleans    had 
replied  to  a  request  for  help  in  a  way  to  convince  the  Carolinians  of  the 
sincere  interest  which  His  Catholic  Majesty  had  in  the  preservation  of 
their  independence.    Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  August  3.     (E.  U.,  XIII,  no. 
90,  fol.  224.) 


168  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [278 

his  attitude  became  at  once  suspicious  and  even  hostile. 
He  insisted  that  the  southern  states  would  never  agree  to 
any  such  conditions;  and  that  if  Spain  attempted  to  ex- 
tend her  sovereignty  over  these  regions,  she  would  expose 
herself  to  perpetual  war.  "Congress  cannot  see  without 
jealousy,"  he  exclaimed,  "another  nation  in  possession  of 
this  territory  with  power  to  incite  the  savages  against  us 
and  to  expose  our  frontier  to  continual  invasion."  If  such 
principles  were  just,  he  argued,  Spain  would  have  a  right 
to  conquer  Canada  as  well  in  spite  of  the  danger  it  would 
bring  to  the  United  States.52 

The  discussions  between  Rutledge  and  Luzerne  fol- 
lowed the  lines  usual  in  the  debates  on  this  subject.  Lu- 
zerne made  more  emphatic  the  loss  of  population  which 
the  older  states  must  surely  suffer  if  the  West  were  incor- 
porated into  the  union.  He  declared  that  the  balance  of 
power  would  surely  shift  beyond  the  mountains  and  finally 
the  government  itself  would  be  directed  from  the  banks 
of  the  Mississippi.  Rutledge  replied  that  there  was  no 
danger,  for  the  West  should  be  formed  into  separate  states, 
entirely  independent  of  the  East  or  confederated  with  the 
older  states  on  terms  of  equality. 

The  attitude  of  Rutledge  is  typical  of  the  state  of  pub- 
lic feeling  among  patriotic  Americans.  He  did  not  realize 
that  Spain  had  any  interest  in  the  West,  nor  did  he  believe 
that  she  had  any  right  to  it.  Eastern  Louisiana  had  been 
for  many  years  recognized  as  a  part  of  the  colonial  do- 
main, and  it  seemed  incredible  that  another  power  could 
have  any  claim  to  it.  The  feeling  of  the  country  was  being 
reflected  in  Congress,  and  this  body  took  a  definite  stand 
on  the  question  of  the  West  in  its  instructions  to  Jay. 

Against  the  historic  belief  of  the  American  states  was 
opposed  the  jealousy  and  greed  of  Spain.  Greed  and  jeal- 
ousy both  were  there;  that  insatiable  greed  for  land  and 
wealth  that  had  been  the  curse  of  the  Spanish  monarchy; 
jealousy  that  feared  the  rise  of  a  new  power  which  might 

«£.  U.,  XIII,  no.  90,  fol.  224, 


279]  LUZERXE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  169 

attain  a  degree  of  prosperity  and  strength  that  would 
rival  her  own.  Jealousy  in  this  case  was  stronger  than 
greed,  but  perhaps  it  was  a  jealousy  not  unmixed  with  fear. 
Spain  had  no  need  for  the  fertile  plains  of  Eastern  Louis- 
iana, while  across  the  river  were  boundless  regions  of  her 
own  territories,  still  undeveloped  and  as  yet  hardly  touched 
by  cultivation.  The  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  was  be- 
ginning to  show  traces  of  improvement  under  the  labors 
of  the  hardy  frontiersman;  but  there  was  not  yet  enough 
to  tempt  the  cupidity  of  Spain.  It  was  jealousy  that  sought 
to  coop  the  new  republic  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the 
sea.  It  was  jealousy  that  opposed  the  independence  of  the 
United  States,  that  had  dictated  the  proposed  mediation 
by  the  terms  of  which  Great  Britain  was  to  hold  the  ports 
that  controlled  the  ingress  and  egress  from  the  country,  and 
it  was  this  same  jealousy  that  opposed  the  union  of  Canada 
to  the  young  nation.  This  passion  assumed  many  forms. 
Now  it  was  the  fear  of  the  example  of  rebellion  before  the 
Spanish  colonies ;  again  it  was  the  menace  of  a  new  power 
on  her  frontiers;  then  it  was  the  desire  to  recover  the  his- 
toric empire  of  France;  and  finally  it  was  the  pretense  of 
rendering  justice  to  the  British  crown. 

Vergennes  had  long  understood  this  feeling  of  the 
Spanish  court,53  and  it  was  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  his 
diplomacy  to  render  it  harmless.  After  the  convention  of 
1779  he  sought  to  bring  his  allies  into  a  new  triple  alliance 
against  the  power  of  the  British  Empire.  The  prime  object 
of  the  war,  as  he  often  declared,  was  to  secure  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  without  sacrificing  any  part 
of  them.  This  was  a  big  guarantee  and  Spain  insisted  upon 
and  enforced  the  principle  that  she  should  be  given  equal 


53Vergennes  repeatedly  expressed  his  lack  of  confidence  in  the  justice 
of  Spain.  In  1780  he  declared  that  the  principle  of  personal  interest 
directs  the  conduct  of  Spain  towards  the  United  States.  (Esp.,  598,  no. 
37,  new  106.)  He  declared  that  it  was  useless  to  try  to  convert  Florida 
Blanca  to  a  more  reasonable  view,  but  that  France  must  maintain  her 
position  with  firmness.  April  12,  1781.  (Ibid.,  603,  no.  25,  new  57.) 
Montmorin  also  held  this  opinion.  (Ibid.,  598,  no.  no,  new  321.) 


170  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [280 

advantages.  From  the  first  Vergennes  had  found  his  task 
a  trying  one;  and  altho  he  was  frequently  the  dupe  of 
Spain,  he  strove  faithfully  to  fulfil  his  obligation  to  both 
his  allies.  The  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was 
immensely  valuable  in  the  eyes  of  Spain  in  order  to  insure 
her  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico;  but  Vergennes  did  not 
see  how  the  right  to  navigate  this  river  could  be  of  any 
use  to  the  sparsely  populated  regions  of  the  West.  His 
wish  to  restrain  the  Americans  from  a  spirit  of  conquest  in 
the  West  can  in  no  sense  be  taken  as  a  decision  against 
the  rights  of  the  states  to  their  western  boundaries.  It 
did  not  mean  that  he  was  seeking  to  give  this  region  to 
Spain,  for  at  the  same  time  he  asked  for  his  other  ally  only 
the  province  of  West  Florida  which  was  guaranteed  to  her 
by  the  treaty  of  alliance. 

The  acts  of  Luzerne  can  not  be  taken  as  representing 
the  will  of  his  court.  Vergennes  knew  nothing  of  the  West 
and  as  a  result  he  sometimes  fell  a  victim  to  misrepresenta- 
tions. Luzerne  had  been  instructed  to  look  after  the  inter- 
ests of  Spain,  and  he  attempted  to  do  so  with  more  ardor 
than  discretion.  In  these  instructions  he  found  reference 
to  some  "lands  on  the  Mississippi  conquered  by  the  Eng- 
lish" and  directions  to  "prevent  encroachments,"54  which 
seemed  to  fit  into  the  purpose  of  Miralles  and  he  acted 
accordingly.  In  this  matter  Luzerne  plainly  exceeded  his 
instructions  which  did  not  authorize  him  to  do  anything 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  Congress;  and  Vergennes  later 


"Vergennes  wrote  that  as  there  were  some  lands  on  the  Mississippi 
conquered  by  the  English,  of  which  they  would  probably  be  dispossessed, 
their  occupation  would  likely  cause  contentions  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States.  On  this  account  he  asked  Luzerne  to  try  to  get  the  boun- 
dary fixed  in  a  "maniere  claire,  precise,  et  invariable."  Also  he  asked 
him  to  use  his  influence  with  Congress  to  get  it  to  "Empecher  les  Provinces 
du  Sud  de  se  laisser  aller  a  1'esprit  de  Conquete."  These  instructions 
clearly  refer  to  the  lands  along  the  lower  Mississippi  which  Spain  was 
preparing  to  conquer.  In  regard  to  the  whole  question  he  wrote,  "that  he 
was  ignorant  of  the  rights  of  the  states."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  July  18. 
1779-  (£.  U.,  IX,  no.  41.) 


281]  LUZEKNE  AND  THE  PRETENSIONS  OF  SPAIN  171 

instructed  him  definitely  not  to  push  the  ambitions  of 
Spain.55 

When  the  contest  over  Eastern  Louisiana  became 
acute,  Vergennes  again  refused  to  interfere  more  than  to 
advise  the  Americans  to  appeal  to  the  generosity  of  the 
king  of  Spain.  He  frankly  admitted  that  he  did  not  know 
the  merits  of  the  case  but  expressed  his  satisfaction  with 
the  liberality  of  the  Americans  in  leaving  the  Floridas  to 
Spain.56  As  a  matter  of  law  he  expressed  the  belief  that 
Spain  had  a  right  to  conquer  Eastern  Louisiana  from  the 
British ;  but  he  urged  his  minister  not  to  interfere  or  even 
to  express  an  opinion  on  the  subject.  He  realized  that  it 
was  a  delicate  question,  and  that  if  France  wished  to  keep 
the  good  will  of  both  her  allies  she  must  not  take  part  in 
their  disputes.  All  he  authorized  Luzerne  to  do  was  to  try 
to  persuade  Congress  of  the  justice  of  the  Catholic  King.57 
All  the  privately  expressed  opinions  and  public  despatches 
of  Vergennes  indicate  a  strong  interest  in  the  welfare  of 
the  American  republic.58  He  was  willing  to  reward  Spain 
for  her  services,  but  he  never  offered  her  more  of  the 

85See  p.  163.  That  the  policy  of  Miralles  was  new  to  him  and  a  com- 
plete surprise,  he  was  frank  to  confess  and  he  might  well  have  assumed 
that  his  master  was  as  ignorant  as  he  of  the  wishes  of  Spain. 

MHe  urged  that  the  Americans  could  get  more  out  of  Spain  if  they 
said  nothing  of  their  rights,  and  in  this  he  was  probably  not  mistaken. 
Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  September  25,  1779.  (E.  U.,  X,  no.  38,  fol.  126.) 

"See  p.  163,  note  42.  After  the  death  of  Miralles  left  the  care  of 
Spanish  interests  in  the  hands  of  Luzerne,  Vergennes  wrote,  ".  .  .  .  mais  le 
reserve  que  je  vous  recommende  M.  ne  doit  pas  vous  empecher  de  profiler 
des  occasions  que  Ton  fournir  pour  porter  le  Congres  a  prendre  confiance 
dans  le  Roi  Cath.  et  a  trailer  Sans  prevention  la  question  relative  aux 
terreins  situes  sur  le  Mississipi."  August  7,  1780.  {Ibid.,  XIII,  no.  8, 
fol.  101.) 

B8An  example  of  Vergennes's  care  for  the  interests  of  the  United 
States  is  shown  in  a  particular  project  to  Lafayette  in  which  he  advised 
him  of  the  course  America  should  take.  He  suggested  helping  Spain 
conquer  the  Floridas,  but  he  urged  that  the  Americans  should  drive  the 
enemy  as  far  as  possible  from  their  borders.  He  declared  that  there 
would  be  great  danger  to  the  republic  if  Great  Britain  were  left  in 
possession  of  any  part  of  America.  And  still  he  asked  nothing  for 
France.  Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  318. 


172  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [282 

American  continent  than  the  Floridas.  On  the  other  hand 
lie  always  insisted  upon  as  the  first  fruits  of  the  war,  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  in  their  fullest  extent. 
To  justify  to  Vergennes  the  American  right  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi was  to  insure  his  best  efforts  to  secure  it,  and  so 
it  was  with  other  questions.  And  this  determination  to 
secure  the  full  rights  of  his  ally  remained  his  to  the  end. 


CHAPTER    IX 

TRIUMPH  OF  THE  ANTI-GALLIC  AN  PARTY. 

The  efforts  of  Luzerne  had  left  Congress  in  a  state  of 
indecision  and  the  direction  of  further  negotiations  at 
Philadelphia  hung  upon  the  success  of  Jay.  If  Spain 
showed  a  favorable  demeanor  towards  the  new  nation,  her 
agents  could  hope  for  many  concessions;  if  she  frowned 
upon  its  ambitions,  the  work  of  bringing  about  an  agree- 
ment must  be  begun  again.  Under  these  conditions  all  fac- 
tions waited  anxiously  for  news  from  Spain.  Some  hoped 
for  a  message  recording  failure ;  but  the  more  moderate  ele- 
ment in  Congress  expected  an  account  of  mutual  conces- 
sions. Luzerne  feared  that  nothing  would  be  accomplished 
and  did  his  best  to  prepare  Congress  for  such  intelligence. 
He  knew  from  Miralles  that  the  American  demands  could 
not  be  granted,  and  he  feared  that  Spain  would  reject  all 
overtures  for  an  alliance. 

The  dispatches  of  Jay,  giving  an  account  of  his  activi- 
ties during  the  spring  of  1780,  reached  Philadelphia  in 
August1,  and  were  not  so  unfavorable  as  Luzerne  had 
feared.  The  demands  of  Florida  Blanca  for  the  exclusive 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  were  not  unexpected,  and  his 
suggestion  for  the  settlement  of  the  western  boundaries 
appeared  so  vague  that  no  one  could  understand  them,  al- 
tho  the  intention  of  Spain  did  not  go  beyond  securing 
enough  of  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Mississippi  to  control 
the  navigation.  He  had  mentioned  Cape  Antoine  and  an- 
other cape  with  the  name  blank2.  Where  Cape  Antoine 
was  no  one  knew;  and  there  were  various  opinions  as  to 
what  the  other  cape  might  be.  No  one  could  say  in  what 
direction  the  line  was  to  be  drawn,  but  Luzerne  suggested 
that  it  was  a  meridian  drawn  as  far  as  Spain  should  wish 

'Journals  of  Continental  Congress   (Hunt  ed.),  XVII,  727,  737,  749. 
2  Jay  to  Congress,  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  Ill,  724.) 

173 


174  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [284 

to  prolong  it3,  and  this  was  the  occassion  of  much  more  dis- 
cussion. If  the  line  extended  as  far  as  Lake  Michigan,  it 
was  declared  that  all  the  western  possessions  of  the  south- 
ern states  would  be  cut  off  and  their  boundaries  greatly 
reduced. 

The  prospect  of  such  an  arrangement  aroused  once 
more  the  southern  delegates.  Even  those  who  had  shown 
friendliness  to  the  plans  of  Luzerne  went  over  to  the  other 
side.  Among  these  was  Jones  of  Virginia,  who  had  pre- 
viously informed  the  French  minister  that  he  regarded  the 
ambitions  of  his  state  as  a  "cause  of  feebleness  and  ruin." 
He  now  complained  that  the  greed  of  Spain  would  deprive 
his  state  of  the  richest  part  of  her  patrimony,  and  to  that 
he  declared  he  would  never  submit.  Furthermore,  Spain 
could  never  control  this  territory,  he  asserted,  for  the  peo- 
ple who  live  there  would  never  endure  her  yoke.  Jones  de- 
clared that  Cape  Antoine  was  fifteen  leagues  above  the 
mouth  of  the  Ohio,  and  that  if  Spain  should  get  this  con- 
cession, "our  most  beautiful  territory  will  be  threatened 
with  invasion ;  we  shall  see  ourselves  despoiled  of  the  lands 
washed  by  the  Ohio  and  the  rivers  Cherokas  [Tennessee] 
and  Cumberland  which  flow  through  and  water  the  richest 
country  of  the  continent  [we  shall  see  ourselves  despoiled 
of]  the  numerous  population  who  possess  it;  and  those 


3"On  a  cherche  le  premier  cap.  Quelques  delegues  etoient  d'opinion 
qu'il  s'agessoit  de  la  pointe  la  plus  occidentale  de  PIsle  de  Cube,  et  dans  cette 
hypothese  le  Congres  a  cherche  a  donner  diverses  interpretations  a  une 
designation  aussi  obscure.  L'on  a  demande  dans  quelle  direction  la  ligne 
seroit  suree  et  lorsqu'il  a  etc  compris  quelle  devoit  former  une  medidienne, 
on  a  recherche  jusqu'a  quelle  hauteur  1'Espagne  entendoit  la  prolonger  si 
c'est  jusqu'au  lac  Moschigan.  Tous  les  Etats  du  Sud  seroient  reduits,  a 
Ton  dit  a  des  sacrifices  qu'ils  ne  feront  jamais,  et  la  Virginie,  le  plus  puis- 
sant et  le  plus  ambitieux  de  tous  perdroit  le  plus  a  cette  arrangement  aussi 
cette  opinion  a  etc  rejetee  bien  loin."  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  August  25, 
1780.  (E.  U.,  XIII,  new  150.)  According  to  Lieutenant  Ross's  map  (pub- 
lished in  London,  1772)  Cape  Antoine  was  situated  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  River,  about  fifty  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio.  I 
have  this  information  from  Professor  C.  W.  Alvord. 


285]  TRIUMPH   OF  THE   ANTI-GALLICAN   PARTY  175 

whose  labors  have  made  it  valuable,  will  be  forced  to 
abandon  it."4 

On  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
Jones  showed  himself  equally  obstinate.  His  personal  feel- 
ings, he  admitted,  favored  conceding  it  to  Spain,  but  the 
instructions  of  his  state  were  different  and  he  must  obey 
them.  This  river  and  the  St.  Lawerence  were  the  only  nat- 
ural outlets  to  the  Mississippi  Valley,  he  declared,  and  the 
people  settled  there  had  so  long  enjoyed  the  use  of  both 
that  they  would  not  consent  to  be  deprived  of  them. 

Luzerne,  however,  resolved  once  more  to  take  up  the 
cudgels  for  the  court  of  Madrid.  He  declared  that  since 
Spain  held  both  banks  of  the  river  there  was  nothing  for  the 
people  of  the  West  to  do  but  to  submit.  As  for  the  bound- 
aries, Spain  had  as  good  a  right  to  conquer  this  part  of  the 
British  Empire  as  had  the  states.  He  advised,  however, 
that  if  Congress  wanted  anything  it  had  better  throw  itself 
on  the  generosity  of  the  Spanish  King.5 

Jones  was  not  at  all  satisfied  with  the  position  of  the 
French  minister  and  sought  to  argue  against  it.  He  ob- 
served that,  if  Spain  had  a  right  to  conquer  the  western  ter- 

4After  this  plea  Jones  became  more  defiant  and  continued :  "Nous 
n'avons  pas  la  force  necessaire  pour  obliger  ces  colons  a  s'expatrier  d'une 
terre  defrichee  par  leurs  mains  et  arrosee  de  leur  sueur.  E.  U.,  XIII, 
new  150. 

B"J'ai  objecte ....  que  1'occupation  seule  ne  constituoit  pas  de  droit  que 
la  Cour  d'Espagne  mettroit,  lorsquil  lui  plairoit  un  frein  aux  excursions 
de  ces  Colons,  quelque  nombreuse  que  fut  leur  population  qu'elle  avoit 
conquis  les  forts  Anglois  sur  le  Mississippi  qu'elle  en  avoit  elle  meme 
eleve  d'autres  et  qu'elle  commanderoit  tellement  la  navigation  du  Mississip- 
pi que  tout  leurs  efforts  ne  pourroient  la  leur  faire  partager ;  Qu'il  ne  fal- 
loit  done  pas  songer  a  s'en  emparer  comme  d'un  droit  meme  a  la  demander 
comme  une  condition  necessaire  que  de  pareilles  pretentions  ne  feroient 
qu'  indisposer  la  Cour  d'  Espagne  tandis  qu'en  lui  demandant  cette  lib- 
erte  de  naviguer  comme  une  faveur  et  avec  les  restrictions  necessaires 
pour  empecher  la  contrabande  on  devoit  esperer  de  la  generosite  de  Sa 
M.  Cathe  quant  aux  limites  de  1'Ouest  qu'il  voyoit  comme  moi  que  1'Es- 
pagne  etoit  en  droit  de  s'emparer  de  tout  ce  qui  apartinoit  a  1'Angleterre 
en  virtu  du  Traite  de  Paris  que  je  ne  pouvois  dire  avec  precision  quelles 
etoient  ses  vues  actuelle  mais  que  je  pensois  qu'elles  ne  pouvoient 
s'entendu  au  dela  de  ce  que  nous  avons  posside  au  du  posseder  a  la  rive 
gauche  du  Mississipi."  Ibid. 


176  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [286 

ritories  of  the  country,  it  had  an  equal  right  to  attack  any 
place  then  in  possession  of  the  English,  such  as  Georgia, 
South  Carolina,  or  New  York. 

To  this  view  Luzerne  fully  agreed,  but  replied  that  the 
friendship  of  Spain  was  such  that  she  would  make  no  un- 
just demands.  He  returned,  however,  to  his  suggestion 
that  Spain  would  probably  want  the  east  bank  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  he  urged  that  Congress  should  grant  the  re- 
quest, relying  only  on  the  generosity  of  His  Majesty  to  do 
what  was  just  to  the  United  States. 

With  the  demands  of  Luzerne  there  came  a  division 
between  him  and  the  French  party  in  Congress,  and  there 
came  also  a  closer  drawing  of  issues.  Before  this,  Congress 
had  been  unwilling  to  refuse  the  more  extreme  demands  of 
Spain;  but  it  now  felt  independent  and  began  to  suspect 
the  intentions  of  France. 

At  this  time  Jenifer  was  absent  and  his  aid  was  sorely 
needed  by  the  French  minister.  With  the  defection  of 
Jones  there  was  no  one  on  whom  to  rely  and  he  was  com- 
pelled to  go  in  person  to  learn  the  designs  of  the  anti- 
Gallicans.  The  committee  told  him  that  the  instructions 
to  be  given  to  Jay  on  the  question  of  the  Mississippi  would 
be  such  as  Spain  would  accept ;  but  the  members  refused  to 
commit  themselves  regarding  the  boundaries.6  Luzerne 
was  not  content  and  went  to  other  members,  whom  he  found 
agreeable  enough  in  conversation,  but  who  persisted  in  op- 
posing his  plans  in  Congress.7  At  the  same  time  there  was 
apparent  a  movement  among  the  northern  members  to  sup- 
port the  pretensions  of  the  South,  and  Luzerne  conjectured 
that  they  were  planning  another  attack  on  Canada.  This 
belief  soon  become  a  certainty  and  Luzerne  learned  that 
that  country  was  to  be  sought  as  a  pledge  for  the  evacuation 
of  the  southern  states.  He  did  not  believe,  however,  that 
the  English  would  be  willing  to  make  the  exchange,  and  he 

6Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  August  25,  1780.     (E.  U.,  XIII,  no.  73,  new 
150;  Esf>.,  600,  no.  8,  new  108.) 
•'Ibid. 


287]  TRIUMPH    OF   THE   ANTI-GALLICAN    PARTY  177 

thought  they  would  attempt  to  unite  the  South  with  the 
Floridas  to  form  a  new  colony.8 

Deprived  of  any  active  assistance  from  the  Americans, 
Luzerne  enlisted  the  services  of  his  secretary  Marbois  and 
the  two  planned  to  curb  any  radical  policy  that  should  get 
free  rein  in  Congress.  The  two  found  it  difficult  to  get 
definite  information,  and  Congress  itself,  torn  by  the  fear 
of  losing  the  assistance  of  Spain  and  the  desire  to  hold 
the  Mississippi,  was  undecided  what  course  to  take.0  It 
soon  became  clear,  however,  that  this  body  would  not  yield. 
A  delegate  one  day  informed  Luzerne  that  Congress  was 
disposed  to  grant  Jay  greater  discretion  in  regard  to  the 
Mississippi  river;  but  on  further  discussion  he  revealed 
that  this  discretion  would  allow  only  a  more  systematic 
regulation  of  contraband.10 

On  the  question  of  the  disposition  of  the  western  ter- 
ritories there  were  numerous  opinions.  Many  members 
thought  the  report  of  Jay  was  so  vague  that  they  could 
take  no  action  on  it  and  wished  to  wait  for  further  ad- 
vices.11 Luzerne  regarded  this  delay  as  favorable  to  the 
Spanish  interests ;  and  he  and  his  secretary  strained  every 
nerve  to  win  over  a  majority  of  Congress.  In  these  nego- 
tiations he  labored  under  a  great  disadvantage  in  having  no 
precise  instructions  from  Spain  and  in  not  knowing  the 
exact  limit  of  her  pretensions.  Eagerly  he  searched  the  pa- 
pers of  Miralles,  left  in  the  hands  of  the  dead  Spaniard's 
secretary,  but  he  found  no  trace  of  instructions  from  Flor- 
ida Blanca.  Anxiously  he  awaited  the  arrival  of  a  new 
Spanish  agent,  who  could  furnish  definite  information.12 
The  legal  status  of  the  West  also  claimed  the  attention  of 
the  learned  Marbois.  With  members  of  Congress  he 

8£.  U.,  XIII,  no.  74,  new  152. 

*Ibid.,  XIII,  no.  80,  new  186. 

10 1  bid.,  no.  78,  new  176. 

"Luzerne  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.)  Marbois  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.,  XIV, 
no.  88,  new  14.) 

12Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  September  19,  1780.  (Ibid.,  XIII,  no.  80, 
new  186.) 


178  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [288 

went  over  the  charters  of  the  different  states,  compared 
them  and  pointed  out  that  they  were  "contradictory,  in- 
consistent and  ridiculous."  In  them  he  found  imaginary 
boundaries  and  designations  of  countries  that  never  ex- 
isted. Under  his  logic  and  ridicule  the  claim  of  imme- 
morial right  was  abandoned  and  Congress  took  its  position 
on  the  ground  of  occupation  and  possession.13 

Borne  down  by  the  arguments  of  the  Frenchman,  several 
members  of  Congress  indicated  their  willingness  to  accept 
a  compromise.  They  suggested  the  cession  to  Spain  of  the 
lands  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  right  bank  of  the  Ap- 
palachicola,  as  far  north  as  the  river  Tennessee.14  In  these 
overtures  Luzerne  had  little  faith;  for  they  were  bitterly 
attacked  by  the  southern  states,  which  raised  the  cry  that 
Spain  was  seeking  their  dismemberment,  and  many  north- 
ern delegates,  anxious  to  gain  Canada,  supported  their  con- 
tentions. One  member  brought  to  memory  an  old  resolu- 
tion that  the  thirteen  states  were  indissolubly  united,  and 
argued  from  this  that  Congress  must  maintain  the  right  of 
the  states  to  all  their  possessions  and  in  no  case  could  it 
allow  any  diminution  of  territory.15  He  demanded  that 
it  declare  in  precise  fashion  the  exact  limits  of  the  various 
states  and  draw  up  a  mutual  guarantee  to  maintain  them. 
Another  delegate,  in  his  anger,  proposed  that,  in  case  the 
Spanish  court  did  not  admit  the  American  claims,  Jay 
should  be  ordered  to  break  off  negotiations  and  quit  the 
country.  Wiser  counsels  prevailed  and  neither  of  these 
propositions  passed.  Congress  did  not  wish  to  lose  the  aid 
of  Spain  by  displeasing  her  but  it  put  faith  in  Jay's  sugges- 
tion that  if  it  remained  firm  she  would  "finally  be  content 
with  equitable  regulations.18 

13Marbois  to  Vergennes,  September  30,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XIII,  no.  85, 
new  211.) 

14Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  September  8,  1780.  (Ibid.,  XIII,  no.  78, 
new  176.) 

islbid.  Luzerne  states  that  these  were  the  motives  but  they  are  not 
given  in  any  of  the  published  journals  of  Congress. 

"Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  Ill,  no.  725. 


289]  TRIUMPH   OF  THE   ANTI-GALLICAN   PARTY  179 

The  decision  in  regard  to  new  instructions  to  Jay  hung 
fire  until  the  beginning  of  October.  Every  day  was  ex- 
pected to  bring  a  letter  giving  fuller  and  more  definite  ex- 
planation of  Spain's  proposed  boundary.  Congress  itself 
appeared  to  the  French  embassy  hopelessly  divided  on  the 
question.  Some  wished  to  follow  Jay's  advice  to  remain 
firm  ;  others  insisted  that  the  states  should  make  reasonable 
sacrifices  for  the  common  good.  So  opposed  were  the  opin- 
ions that  many  would  not  discuss  them  at  all  for  fear  of 
violent  and  bitter  debates.17 

Jay  had  asked  for  definite  instructions,  and  at  last 
Jenifer  insisted  that  they  be  given  him.  "Decency,  the  re- 
gard due  to  Spain,  and  the  interests  of  the  states,"  he  said, 
"demand  that  we  should  consider  this  affair  without  de- 
lay."18 He  then  moved  that  Jay  be  instructed  to  promise 
Spain  satisfaction  on  the  points  in  dispute,19  and  defended 
his  proposition  in  a  lengthy  speech,  describing  the  failures 
of  the  last  campaign  and  the  necessity  of  help  from  Spain  if 
independence  were  to  be  secured.20  Many  speeches  were 
made  in  answer  to  his  argument  and  the  whole  question  of 
the  boundaries  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was 
again  gone  over.  Jenifer's  opponent's  discoursed  on  the 
sacred  sanction  of  the  charters,  and  declared  the  necessity  of 
conserving  the  rights  of  the  states  if  unity  and  prosperity 
were  to  be  attained.  They  spoke  of  the  generosity  and 
fairness  of  the  king  of  France  in  contrast  to  the  ambition 
of  Spain  and  her  evident  intention  of  taking  advantage  of 
their  distresses.  One  speaker  claimed  that  "if  Spain  had 
the  right  to  make  the  conquest  of  all  that  belonged  to  the 
king  of  Great  Britain,  His  Catholic  Majesty,  by  virtue  of 
this  principle,  would  form  claims  on  Georgia  and  South 
Carolina  which  were  then  in  the  hands  of  the  British." 
Others  asserted  that  if  they  abandoned  their  fellow  citi- 

17Barbe  de  Marbois  to  Vergennes,  October  10,  1780.     (E.  U.,  XIV, 
no.  88,  new  14.) 


l°Ibid.    The  published  journals  of  Congress  do  not  give  this  motion. 
20The  whole  debate  is  described  in  Marbois  to  Vergennes.     (Ibid.) 


THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [290 

zens,  Spanish  rule  would  prove  so  oppressive  that  revolu- 
tion would  soon  break  out.  Especial  emphasis  was  also  laid 
on  the  duty  of  Congress  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  states 
that  were  then  invaded,  and  it  was  heralded  about  that  if 
the  southern  delegates  assented  to  the  cessions  demanded 
"they  would  answer  for  it  with  their  heads."21  The  argu- 
ments of  Jenifer  were  feebly  supported  by  the  other  mem- 
bers and  the  motion  was  finally  lost. 

On  October  4  Congress  unanimously22  passed  resolu- 
tions to  adhere  to  its  former  instructions  and  two  days 
later  appointed  a  committee  consisting  of  Madison,  Sulli- 
van, and  Duane  to  draft  a  letter  to  Jay.23  Of  this  com- 
mittee Marbois  judged  Madison  to  be  the  most  moderate, 
but  he  was  bound  by  instructions  and  could  not  recede  from 
the  pretensions  of  his  state.24  He  was  willing,  however,  to 
talk  over  the  question  with  the  French  envoy,  who  at- 
tempted in  every  way  to  get  him  to  tone  down  the  letter  to 
Jay.  Madison  was  conciliatory  in  his  attitude  towards 
France,  but  he  remained  firm  on  the  policy  approved  in 
Congress.25 

After  the  resolutions  of  October  4, there  aJppears  to  have 
been  only  one  advocate  of  concession  in  Congress,  Daniel  of 
St.  Thomas  Jenifer,  who  had  for  nearly  two  years  been  a 
most  earnest  supporter  of  the  Spanish  alliance  and  had 
throughout  shown  entire  willingness  to  grant  any  sacrifice 
to  obtain  it.  Before  he  had  come  to  represent  his  state  at 
Philadelphia  he  had,  as  president  of  the  senate  of  Mary- 
land, attracted  the  notice  of  Gerard  and  the  two  had  be- 
come firm  friends.26  Upon  entering  Congress  in  November, 
1778,  he  at  once  identified  himself  with  the  French  party 

21E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  88,  new  14. 

2ZJournals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVIII,  900.  Mar- 
bois says  that  Congress  passed  this  resolution  by  a  plurality  of  six  votes. 
E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  88,  fol.  14. 

23Marbois  to  Montmorin,  October  17.     (Esp.,  601,  no.  10,  new  63.) 
24Marbois  to  Vergenes,  October  21.     (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  92,  new  29.) 
To  Montmorin.  (Esp.  601,  no.  II,  new  71.) 

25Marbois  to  Montmorin,  October  17.     (Esp.,  601,  no.  10,  new  63.) 
^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.),  XII,  1141. 


291]  TRIUMPH   OF  THE   ANTI-GALLJCAN   PARTY  181 

and  soon  became  its  most  active  and  radical  member.  When 
the  designs  of  Spain  to  get  control  of  the  West  became 
noised  about  and  it  became  apparent  they  received  the  sup- 
port of  the  French  minister,  many  of  the  old  adherents  of 
Gerard,  men  like  Jay  and  Gouverneur  Morris,  determined 
upon  an  independent  course.  Not  so  with  Jenifer.  He  be- 
came an  ardent  enthusiast  for  any  concession  that  would 
help  to  gain  Spanish  assistance  or  would  please  the  king  of 
France.  His  views  do  not  appear  to  have  been  regarded 
as  unpatriotic  by  his  constituents  at  home  or  his  colleagues 
in  Congress.  He  became  the  center  of  opposition  to  the 
combination  of  Samuel  Adams  and  the  Lees  to  push  New 
England  interests  in  Canada  and  Virginian  ambitions  in 
the  Mississippi  valley.  He  was  the  first  representative  of 
the  small  states  party  and  drew  to  his  side  all  factions 
jealous  of  the  dominance  of  the  "Junto." 

Maryland  had  no  interest  in  a  colonial  policy  and 
dreaded  the  dominance  of  her  southern  neighbor.  The  nav- 
igation of  the  Mississippi  and  the  control  of  its  valley 
meant  no  increase  in  her  resources  but  only  an  added  ex- 
pense to  conquer  them.  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  New 
York,  and  New  Jersey  were  likewise  circumscribed  in  their 
limits  and  never  displayed  much  enthusiasm  for  acquisi- 
tions to  the  territory  of  their  sister  states.  At  the  behest 
of  Gerard,  Jenifer  had  led  the  fight  against  the  demands  of 
Congress  for  the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  as  ex- 
pressed in  Jay's  first  instructions.  In  the  winter  of  1779-80 
when  Luzerne  and  Miralles  were  urging  acquiescence  in 
Spain's  pretentious  to  the  ownership  of  Eastern  Louisiana, 
Jenifer  had  been  their  spokesman  and  had  continued  the 
advocate  of  Spain  during  the  second  struggle  over  the 
policy  of  Congress  towards  the  West. 

Not  at  all  daunted  by  his  defeat  in  the  resolutions  of 
October  4,  Jenifer  planned  with  Marbois27  to  renew  the 
fight  when  the  committee  should  report  its  draft  of  the  let- 
ter to  Jay.28  They  sought  to  influence  the  members  of  Con- 

27Luzerne  had  left  Philadelphia  on  his  vacation. 

"Marbois  to  Vergennes,  October  10.     (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  88,  new  14.) 


182  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [292 

gress  both  by  private  conferences  and  by  arguments  de- 
livered before  the  whole  assembly.  They  were  still  handi- 
capped, however,  by  their  inability  to  speak  authoritatively 
on  the  position  of  Spain.  The  secretary  of  Miralles  had 
been  left  as  charg6  d'affaires  in  Philadelphia  and  he  had 
only  a  vague  notion  of  the  desires  of  his  court.20  He  was 
frightened,  however,  at  the  stand  of  Congress  and  begged 
Marbois  to  exert  his  influence  in  behalf  of  more  moderate 
measures.  With  different  members  of  Congress  different 
arguments  were  employed.  To  the  more  radical  there  was 
pointed  out  the  need  of  an  alliance  with  Spain  and  the  dan- 
ger of  displeasing  her  if  the  claims  of  Congress  were  based 
on  pretensions  of  right.  To  them  it  was  urged  that  the 
United  States  should  throw  themselves  on  the  magnanimity 
and  generosity  of  the  Catholic  king.30  To  those  who  were 
very  friendly  to  the  French  king  and  yet  suspicious  of 
Spanish  ambitions,'  Marbois  urged  concession  because  it 
would  please  His  Majesty,  and  this  argument  he  thought, 
had  a  powerful  effect.  Throughout  the  whole  war  there 
were  frequent  expressions  of  gratitude  for  French  aid  ;  and 
on  these  the  French  representatives,  tho  often  disappointed, 
depended  for  substantial  acts  of  gratitude.  In  this  case 
however,  Marbois  received  more  than  ordinary  encourage- 
ment and  felt  confident  of  success.  Samuel  Huntington 
himself,  the  president  of  Congress  and  a  New  Englander, 
expressed  alarm  at  the  prospect  of  incurring  the  enmity  of 
Spain  and  promised  to  urge  moderation  in  the  new  instruc- 
tions to  Jay.31 

At  the  solicitation  of  Marbois  and  with  his  help  Jenifer 
undertook  to  prepare  a  memoir  which  should  set  forth  the 
pretensions  of  Spain  in  the  most  favorable  light  and  answer 
all  the  arguments  of  the  opposition.32  The  result  of  his  la- 
bors is  the  clearest  and  most  convincing  exposition  of 

29Marbois  to  Vergennes,  October  17,  1780.     (£.  (/.,  XIV,  no.  91,  new 
23.)    Marbois  to  Montmorin,  October  17,  1780.    (Esp.,  601  no.  10,  new  63.) 


S1lbid. 
"Ibid. 


293]  TRIUMPH    OF  THE  ANTI-GALLICAN   PARTY  183 

Spain's  position  that  appeared  during  the  revolution.33  He 
goes  over  all  the  old  questions  of  the  validity  of  the  char- 
ters, the  treaty  of  1763,  the  necessity  of  a  well-defined 
frontier,  such  as  the  Mississippi,  and  all  the  legal  and  diplo- 
matic questions  involved.  In  this  document  the  Maryland 
delegate  argued  that  those  interested  in  the  question  ought 
to  have  no  voice  in  the  decision ;  but  no  state  would  consent 
to  remain  defenseless  while  its  claims  were  set  aside.  The 
most  powerful  point  of  his  argument,  however,  was  for  con- 
cessions to  win  the  alliance  of  Spain.34 

His  legal  analysis,  keen  tho  it  was,  could  have  little 
effect  on  a  body  of  revolutionists  who  held  it  their  duty  to 
obey  the  wishes  of  their  constituents.  Alliance  with  Spain, 
however,  had  become  a  vital  question.  Gates  had  been  igno- 
miniously  defeated  in  South  Carolina33  and  the  interior  of 
the  whole  region  as  well  as  the  cities  along  the  coast  were 
in  the  possession  of  the  British.36  The  patriot  party  in  the 
South  was  broken  up  and  such  of  its  leaders  as  were  alive 
and  free  had  fled  to  the  north.  It  was  the  time  of  greatest 
discouragement  for  the  American  cause.  The  American 
army  was  unpaid  and  unprovided  for  and  the  French  king 
had  refused  to  grant  another  subsidy  or  to  send  more  troops 
and  the  French  navy  had  for  a  long  time  rendered  no  serv- 
ice.37 In  the  midst  of  this  general  distress,  news  of  Ar- 
nold's treason  added  to  the  all-pervading  spirit  of  gloom.38 

It  was  a  fitting  time  to  urge  any  concession  to  secure 
the  help  of  Spain,  and  Jenifer  made  the  most  of  his  oppor- 
tunity. In  contrast  to  the  reverses  of  the  Continental 
army,  Spanish  troops  were  victorious  on  the  Mississipi; 
and  it  was  believed  they  would  soon  overrun  the  whole  ter- 

88The  title  of  this  memoir  was  "Observations  on  the  points  contested 
in  the  present  negotiations  between  Spain  and  the  United  States."  Copies 
were  enclosed  to  Vergennes  and  Montmorin  with  the  dispatches  of 
October  17. 

3*£.  13.,  XIV,  no.  91,  new  25. 

3S"  Observations"  etc.  with  dispatch  of  October  17,  (Ibid.) 

30Ibid.  Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution,  301. 

37Marbois  to  Vergennes.     (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  91,  new  23.) 

38 Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution,  306. 


184  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [294 

ritory  in  dispute.  Why  not  then,  he  argued,  make  a  virtue 
of  necessity  and  in  return  for  the  Spanish  alliance  grant 
that  which  we  can  never  hope  to  conquer?30  With  the  help 
of  Spain  he  held  that  success  was  assured;  without  it  fail- 
ure was  inevitable.  Under  the  existing  conditions  he  be- 
lieved that  the  war  carried  on  by  Spain  was  more  harmful 
than  helpful  to  the  American  cause,  for  Spanish  demands 
were  a  drain  on  the  resources  provided  for  by  France.  With 
the  Spanish  troops  to  attack  from  the  south  and  the  Ameri- 
cans from  the  north,  he  argued  the  British  would  be  be- 
tween two  fires  and  would  soon  be  driven  out  of  the  coun- 
try.40 

How  are  we  to  secure  this  needed  assistance?  he  asked. 
There  was  only  one  way  possible:  to  grant  the  Catholic 
King  Eastern  Louisiana  and  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi.  In  this  opinion  he  was  backed  up  by  the  pow- 
erful influence  of  the  French  embassy  and  he  felt  that  Con- 
gress must  agree  to  make  the  concession.41 

The  opposition  to  surrendering  American  interests  in 
the  West,  strangely  enough,  was  led  by  New  England, 
while  the  southern  states  were  rather  inclined  to  give  up 
their  claims.  The  eastern  delegates  argued  that  since  Jay 
was  on  the  ground  his  opinion  should  be  followed  and  they 
were  for  remaining  firm.  Marbois,  however,  thought  there 
were  other  reasons  for  their  stand.  The  eastern  states  had 
never  been  amenable  to  French  influence  and  had  been  the 
hot-bed  of  the  anti-Gallican  party.  Their  attitude  had  often 
before  been  attributed  to  hostility  to  the  French  alliance, 
and  Marbois  thought  that  this  hostility  was  more  bitter  in 
its  opposition  to  Spain.  In  these  states  the  British  power 
was  considered  broken  and  he  believed  that  their  leaders 
wished  to  continue  the  war  in  order  to  conquer  Canada  and 
Nova  Scotia.42  Still  another  reason,  he  suggested,  might  be 

89Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution,  306. 

""Observations"  etc.,  with  dispatch  of  October  17.     (£.  U.,  XIV,  no. 
91,  new  26.) 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 


295]  TRIUMPH   OF  THE  ANTI-GALLICAN   PARTY  185 

that  they  feared,  if  the  ultimatum  on  the  western  bound- 
aries was  set  aside,  the  southern  states  would  desert  them 
on  the  issue  of  the  northern  limits. 

The  attitude  of  the  middle  states  was  more  moderate. 
New  York  held  strongly  for  the  former  instructions  on  the 
western  boundary  but  was  willing  to  surrender  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi.  Marbois  believed  that  she  hoped,  if 
the  right  to  use  this  river  were  prohibited,  her  citizens 
could  then  control  the  western  trade  by  the  way  of  the 
Lakes  and  the  Hudson.  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Dela- 
ware, and  Maryland  appeared  for  the  most  part  indifferent 
to  the  West  and  strongly  anxious  for  the  favor  of  the  King 
of  France  and  the  alliance  with  Spain.  Marbois  thought 
that  when  the  question  came  up  for  final  decision  they 
would  all  vote  in  favor  of  his  projects.43  Virginia,  led  by 
Madison,  was  inflexibly  opposed  to  any  concession.  The 
delegates  from  the  three  southern  states  expressed  to  Mar- 
bois their  opinion  that  Spain  should  be  conciliated,  but  de- 
clared they  must  not  vote  to  make  any  sacrifices  of  the 
rights  of  their  states.44 

On  October  17  the  committee  submitted  its  draft  of  a 
letter  to  Jay  explaining  the  "reasons  and  principles"  on 
which  the  resolutions  of  the  4th  were  founded.45  This  letter 
was  prepared  by  Madison46  and  is  in  his  handwriting.47  It 
presents  a  masterly  defense  of  the  principles  agreed  upon 
two  weeks  before  and  answers  in  detail  the  memoir  of  Jen- 
ifer with  a  breadth  of  view  never  attained  by  the  mem- 
ber from  Maryland.  It  states  simply  and  concisely  the  po- 
sition of  Congress,  and  then  passes  to  a  discussion  of  the 

4SE.  U.,  XIV,  no.  91,  new  26. 

"Ibid. 

48 Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVIII,  935. 

46"Mr.  Madison,  charged  by  his  colleagues  to  show  in  memoir  the 
state  of  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  posses- 
sion of  the  lands  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  that  river,  has  communicated 
to  me  this  writing  .  .  .  .  "  Marbois  to  Vergennes,  October  21,  1780. 
(E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  92,  new  29)  ;  to  Montmorin  (Esp.,  601,  no.  n,  new 

70. 

"Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVIII,  947- 


186  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [296 

questions  involved.  In  his  contention  for  the  Mississippi 
as  the  western  boundary  Madison  ignores  the  obsolete  de- 
limitations of  the  charters  and  bases  his  arguments  on  the 
cession  by  the  treaty  of  1763.  "It  is  sufficient  that  by  the 
definition  of  the  treaty  of  Paris,  of  1763,  article  seventh,  all 
the  territory  now  claimed  by  the  United  States  was  express- 
ly and  irrevocally  ceded  to  the  king  of  Great  Britain, 
and  that  the  United  States  are,  in  consequence  of  the  revo- 
lution in  their  government,  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  that 
cession."48  The  sovereignty  of  this  territory,  he  contended, 
was  vested  in  the  king  of  Great  Britain  by  virtue  of  his  po- 
sition as  king  of  the  people  of  America.  Consequently, 
when  this  sovereignty  over  the  thirteen  states  was  over- 
thrown, it  returned  to  the  people.  "From  these  princi- 
ples," he  asserted,  "it  results  that  all  the  territory  lying 
within  the  limits  of  the  states,  as  fixed  by  the  sovereign 
himself,  was  held  by  him,  for  their  particular  benefits,  and 
must  equally  with  his  other  rights,  and  claims  in  quality 
of  their  sovereign,  be  considered  as  having  devolved  on 
them,  in  consequence  of  their  resumption  of  the  sovereignty 
to  themselves."  In  answer  to  the  Spanish  claim  of  right  of 
conquest,  Madison  replied  that  these  conquests  did  not  ex- 
tend farther  north  than  Fort  Natchez,  while  the  remain- 
der of  the  territory  had  been  conquered  and  was  held 
by  American  arms.  He  furthermore  insisted  that  the 
United  States,  as  an  idependent  nation,  could  not  permit 
another  power  to  conquer  territory  contained  within  its 
limits.49  He  defended  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
to  this  territory  on  the  grounds  of  a  national  boundary 
and  its  settlement  by  American  citizens.  The  right  to  navi- 
gate the  Mississippi  river  Madison  based  on  arguments 
the  same  as  those  advanced  for  the  possession  of  the  west- 
ern territories,  and  the  right  of  passage  through  the  Span- 
ish possessions  he  supported  by  appeal  to  the  law  of  na- 
tions.50 The  document  as  a  whole  shows  much  learning  and 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XVIII,  936. 
™Ibid.,  XVIII,  938. 
*°Ibid.,  945. 


297]  TRIUMPH    OF  THE   ANTI-GALLICAN   PARTY  187 

a  thoro  understanding  of  the  principles  of  international 
law.  It  is  clear  in  exposition  and  expresses  the  most  subtle 
ideas  in  a  simple  and  concise  manner.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
that  Marbois  considered  the  pretensions  of  the  United  States 
as  set  forth  in  this  document  as  too  ambitious,51  the  letter 
was  accepted  by  Congress,  with  the  belief  that  it  would 
convince  Spain  of  the  justice  of  the  American  position.52 
According  to  Marbois,  however,  Jay  was  left  much  dis- 
cretion as  to  insistence  on  the  resolutions  of  Congress.  He 
was  not  to  present  them  as  an  ultimatum,  and  was  author- 
ized to  retract  as  circumstances  and  prudence  suggested. 

Altho  the  French  representatives  did  not  approve  the 
stand  of  Congress,  they  recognized  a  spirit  of  moderation 
that  promised  a  reasonable  settlement.  Marbois  wrote  that, 
if  Spain  acceded  to  the  conditions  laid  down  by  Congress,, 
her  action  would  cause  general  satisfaction  in  America.  He 
was  not,  however,  sanguine  of  such  a  concession,  and  sought 
to  prepare  Congress  for  harder  terms.  He  was  handicapped 
in  his  efforts  by  ignorance  of  the  full  extent  of  Florida 
Blanca's  demands33  and  felt  constrained  to  inform  Con- 
gress of  his  lack  of  definite  knowledge. 

The  decision  of  Congress  in  these  instructions  to  Jay 
marks  the  end  of  the  personal  diplomacy  of  the  French  min- 
isters. Upon  the  gratitude  of  Congress  and  personal  coun- 
sel to  individual  members  of  Congress  Gerard  and  Luzerne 
had  built  up  a  powerful  machine  in  thex  interests  of  the 
Spanish  ambition.  One  by  one  the  members  of  this  organ- 
ization had  fallen  away,  and  after  the  debate  of  October 
several  months  elapse  before  Jenifer's  name  appears  in  the 

"Marbois  to  Vergennes,  October  21.     (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  92,  new  29.) 
52"The  president  of  Congress  has  said  that  he  believes  an  impartial 
power  will  find  the  new  instructions  satisfactory  for  the  court  of  Madrid." 
Ibid. 

63He  believed,  however,  that  Spain  "had  demanded  of  Congress  at 
this  moment  that  part  of  Louisiana  which  in  the  atlas  of  Damible  is 
comprised  between  the  Mississippi  on  the  west,  the  Floridas  on  the  south, 
the  river  Athbamnus  or  Appalachicola  on  the  east,  and  a  line  drawn  from 
the  sources  of  these  rivers  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  in  the  Mississippi." 
Ibid. 


188  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [298 

votes  of  Congress.54  With  his  departure  the  last  partisan 
of  the  old  French  party  disappears  and  the  diplomacy  at 
Philadelphia  begins  to  assume  the  character  of  interna- 
tional relations. 

This  effort  of  Luzerne  and  Marbois  also  marks  their 
last  attempt  at  active  intervention  in  behalf  of  Spain.  Gar- 
doqui,  the  successor  of  Miralles,  had  arrived  and  he  neither 
gave  information  to  the  French  representatives  nor  sought 
their  confidence.  Henceforth  there  is  no  intimation  that 
French  and  Spaniard  are  hand  and  glove  and  Gardoqui  is 
left  free  to  pursue  his  aims.  Another  reason  for  this  with- 
drawal from  the  Spanish  affairs  may  be  found  in  the  in- 
structions of  Vergennes.  He  had  previously  declared  his 
ignorance  of  American  rights  in  the  West  and  his  fears  of 
incurring  the  distrust  of  the  United  States;53  and  in  conse- 
quence, he  now  directed  his  representative  to  cease  inter- 
fering and  to  urge  nothing  against  the  will  of  Congress. 

Thus  by  the  close  of  1780  the  United  States  had  re- 
ceived recognition  in  spirit  as  previously  in  fact  and  was  no 
longer  a  mere  protege"  of  the  French  monarchy.  It  was  ac- 
knowledged that  Congress  could  judge  of  its  own  rights  and 
interests  and  was  not  to  be  dominated  by  notions  of  senti- 
ment. Spain  must  seek  her  ends  through  the  channels  of 
ordinary  diplomacy  and  the  United  States  were  henceforth 
permitted  to  work  out  their  own  destiny. 


64He  is  not  recorded  as  voting  until  April,  1781. 
05See  above,  p.  170,  note  54. 


CHAPTER     X 

THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAK 

Congress  proceeded  to  the  exercise  of  its  ne\v  found 
freedom  with  moderation.  Marbois  had  expressed  the  be- 
lief that  the  shifting  membership  of  this  body  would  sooner 
or  later  cause  a  change  in  its  policy;1  and  within  a  few 
months  this  opinion  was  apparently  justified.  In  October 
Congress  had  unanimously  agreed  to  resolutions  demand- 
ing widely  extended  boundaries,  but  these  resolutions  did 
not  express  the  ideas  of  all  the  members,  and  many  of 
them  assured  Marbois  that  they  would  be  satisfied  with 
narrower  limits,  but  that  it  was  necessary  to  present  a 
united  front. 

There  were  many  considerations,  however,  that 
pointed  to  the  necessity  of  concession.  Cornwallis  now 
held  Georgia  and  South  Carolina  and  had  advanced  north- 
ward far  enough  to  proclaim  North  Carolina  a  conquered 
province;2  and  it  appeared  that  without  more  effective 
aid  these  three  states  would  be  lost  to  the  union.  In  the 
north  Washington  was  inactive,  and  no  additional  help 
was  then  expected  from  the  French.  Still  another  danger 
menaced  the  republic;  the  danger  that  Spain  would  make 
a  separate  peace  with  Great  Britain;  and  early  in  1781 
came  a  letter  from  Jay  which  aroused  still  greater  doubts 
as  to  Spanish  designs.  Jay  had  learned  of  Spain's  neg(> 
tiations  with  a  British  agent,  and  of  her  disavowal  of  any 
purpose  to  treat  independently;3  but  the  agent  still  re- 
mained. "If  they  have  rejected  all  overtures  of  Britain, 

iMarbois  to    Vergennes,  October    i,    1780.      (E.   U.,  XIV,  no.  92, 
new  29.) 

2Van  Tyne,  American  Revolution,  324, 
3See  p.  143. 

189 


190  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [300 

why  is  Mr.  Cumberland  still  here,"  asked  Jay;4  and  his 
suspicions  found  an  immediate  echo  in  Congress. 

The  Americans  had  abandoned  their  claim  to  any  ter- 
ritory by  charter  right,  and  now  realized  that  their  pre- 
tensions, in  order  to  be  effective,  must  be  maintained  on 
other  grounds.  They  understood  at  last  that  when  they 
came  to  treat  for  peace  the  enemy  would  surrender  terri- 
tory in  their  possession  only  for  adequate  compensation. 
This  truth  had  been  urged  by  Vergennes;  and  he  had  in- 
sisted that  the  first  aim  should  be  to  expel  the  enemy  from 
their  borders,3  but  nothing  had  been  accomplished.  Now 
with  the  British  in  possession  of  the  southern  states  and 
the  Spaniards  active  along  the  Mississippi,  Congress  re- 
solved to  retrieve  itself  and  proposed  two  plans  of  action : 
an  effective  military  campaign,  and  renewed  efforts  to 
obtain  help  from  the  Court  of  Madrid.  Washington  was 
entrusted  with  the  military  plans  and  prepared  for  en- 
ergetic measures.  Once  more  he  turned  his  eyes  towards 
Canada  and  succeeded  in  convincing  the  reluctant  Lu- 
zerne  of  the  advisability  of  its  conquest.0  Luzerne  ad- 
mitted the  desire  of  his  court  to  free  the  French  in  Can- 
ada as  it  had  freed  the  Anglo-Saxon  colonies,  and  declared 
its  eagerness  to  attempt  any  measures  for  the  humiliation 
of  Britain ;  he  also  wrote  to  Vergennes  that  he  thought  the 
invasion  would  be  "practical  and  of  great  utility."7  Ver- 
gennes lent  a  favorable  ear  but  urged  that  the  British 
should  first  be  expelled  from  the  United  States.  After  this 
should  be  accomplished,  he  declared  his  willingness  to 

*November  6,  1780.  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  148.)  Cumberland  was 
the  name  of  the  British  agent. 

5See  p.  191,  note  9. 

6Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  November  3,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  49, 
new  213.) 

TAu  defaut  du  Siege  de  New  York,  qui  paroit  devoir  etre  au  dessus  de 
nos  moyens  au  moins  pour  la  plus  grande  partie  de  la  Campagne,  une  ex- 
pedition contre  le  Canada  Sera  la  plus  agreable  aux  Etats  de  la  nouvelle 
Angleterre,  et  je  crois  qu'elle  est  a  la  fois  practicable  et  d'une  utilite  in- 
finee."  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  April  29,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  62, 
new  137.) 


301]  THE  CLOSE  OP  THE  WAR  191 

support  the  expedition,  for  he  regarded  it  as  necessary 
for  Halifax  and  Penobscot  at  least  to  belong  "either  to 
us  or  to  the  Americans."8  The  project  was  continually 
discussed  in  Congress9  but  military  events  forbade  its  un- 
dertaking. The  advance  of  Cornwallis  to  the  north  threat- 
ened the  central  states,  and  thus  ended  the  last  attempt 
against  Canada. 

In  the  Mississippi  Valley,  American  power  was  equally 
precarious,  altho  in  the  regions  of  Kentucky  and  Ten- 
nessee settlers  from  the  states  had  occupied  the  land  and 
it  seemed  that  possession  there  was  secure.  The  expedi- 
tion of  Clark  had  given  the  Americans  a  claim  to  a  large 
part  of  the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio;  but  the  British 
still  held  posts  on  the  Lake  Shore,  such  as  Niagara,  De- 
troit, and  Mackinac,  and  these  commanded  an  extensive 
region.  Washington  felt  that  it  was  essential  to  reduce 
these  posts,  but  he  did  not  have  the  necessary  military 
strength  to  do  so  alone,  and  suggested  that  Virginia  should 
furnish  additional  aid.10 

The  Spaniards  in  this  region  had  aroused  the  fears 
of  the  Americans.  Their  designs  on  Eastern  Louisiana 
were  well  known,  and  their  expeditions  along  the  Mis- 


8Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  October  22,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  32.) 
9This  measure  was  chiefly  fostered  by  the  New  England  delegates 
who  insisted  that  their  states  would  never  be  secure  as  long  as  Great  Brit- 
ain held  Canada.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  April  29.  (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  62,  fol 
137.)  "Le  penchant  des  delegations  du  Nord  pour  une  expedition  centre  le 
Canada  se  manifeste  de  plus  en  plus  et  M  Samuel  Adams  qui  vient  de 
partir  pour  1'Etat  de  Massachussett  est  toujours  plein  de  cette  idee.  Les 
Delegues  du  Sud  qui  sentent  combien  il  importe  de  ne  donner  lieu  a  au- 

cune  division  en  Congres  sur  la  matiere  importante ont  cru  devoir 

se  montrer  faciles  sur  les  pretentions  de  leurs  Colleagues  ....  mais  ils 
ont  memes  tems  annonce  qu'ils  s'opposeroient  de  tout  leur  pouvoir  a  toute 
operation  centre  Quebec  ou  les  autres  parties  Septentrionales  du  Canada 

aussi  longtems  qu'une  parti  des  Treize  Etats  seroit  invadie "  May  12, 

1781.     (Ibid.,  no.  75,  new  139.) 

"Washington  to  Jefferson,  December  28,  1780.    (Writings  (Ford  ed.), 
IX,  81.) 


192  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [302 

sissippi  were  of  an  alarming  character.11  Galvez  had  early 
captured  the  British  posts  on  the  lower  Mississippi  without 
protest;  but  when  in  1781  the  Spanish  commander  at  St. 
Louis  sent  an  expedition  across  the  Illinois  country  which 
captured  St.  Joseph,  there  was  a  cry  of  alarm  among  pa- 
triotic Americans.12  It  is  probable  that  Spain  did  not 
have  any  designs  on  the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio,  but 
her  intrigues  to  obtain  that  south  of  this  river  convinced 
many  that  she  was  trying  to  get  possesion  of  the  whole 
Mississippi  valley. 

In  harmony  with  Washington's  ideas,  and  possibly 
at  his  suggestion,  two  expeditions  were  planned  against 
the  Northwest.  One  was  to  be  composed  of  French  "hab- 
itants" along  the  Mississippi,  under  the  leadership  of  La 
Balme;  the  other  was  to  be  made  up  of  troops  from  Vir- 
gina  and  Kentucky  commanded  by  Colonel  Clark.13  La 

11Geo.  Rogers  Clark  wrote  to  John  Todd  in  March,  1780:  "I  am  not 
clear  but  that  the  Spaniards  would  fondly  suffer  their  settlements  in 
the  Illinois  to  fall  with  ours  for  the  sake  of  having  the  opportunity  of 
retaking  both."  (John  Todd  Papers:  Chicago  Historical  Society  Collec- 
tions, IV,  326.) 

"See  E.  G.  Mason,  "March  of  the  Spaniards  across  Illinois."  (Maga- 
zine of  American  History,  XV,  457.)  This  account  merely  reflects  the 
contemporary  American  fears  without  any  real  knowledge  of  facts.  Frank- 
lin was  very  much  alarmed  at  the  Spanish  project,  fearing  it  was  an  at- 
tempt to  restrict  the  republic  to  the  Appalachian  mountains.  (Franklin 
to  Livingston,  April  12,  1782.  Writings,  Smyth  ed.,  VIII,  425.)  Jay 
wrote  to  Congress  on  March  12,  that  the  Madrid  Gazette  after  describ- 
ing the  expedition  speaks  of  its  importance  as  preventing  the  English 
from  attacking  St.  Louis  and  compelling  the  Indians  to  remain  neutral  in 
the  war.  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.  V,  364.)  Luzerne  did  not  know  what  motive 
the  Spaniards  had  in  undertaking  this  conquest.  He  described  it  as  of 
little  use  and  very  hard  to  defend.  He  describes  fully  the  alarm  felt 
among  the  Americans.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  August  9,  1782.  (E.  U., 
XXII,  no.  8,  new  24.) 

13La  Balme  was  a  French  cavalry  officer  who  was  one  of  the  many 
sent  over  by  Deane  in  the  winter  of  1776-7.  Deane  to  Congress,  October  17, 
1776.  (Sparks,  Dip.  Cor.,  I,  42.)  He  was  granted  a  passport  by  Vergennes 
and  took  the  quality  of  a  merchant.  Lenoir  to  Vergennes,  January  28,  1779. 
(E.  U.,  II,  no.  32,  new  54.)  In  granting  the  passport  Vergennes  wrote: 
"Le  gouvernment  ne  pouvant  avouer  leur  que  veulent  aller  tenter  fortune 
dans  cette  partie  de  1'Amerique  ne  peut  absolument  donner  un  titre  qui  con- 


303]  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  193 

Balme  was  the  first  to  start.  He  aroused  the  French 
settlers  at  Kaskaskia,  and  with  a  small  force  started  to- 
wards Detroit.14  Before  they  could  reach  their  destination 

stiterois  quil  a  connoissance  de  leur  projet.  Vergennes  to  Lenoir,  Jan- 
uary 29,  1777.  (E.  U.,  II,  no.  33,  new  55.)  In  May  Congress  conferred 
upon  La  Balme  the  title  of  Lieutenant  colonel  of  horse  (Journals  of 
Continental  Congress,  (Ford  ed.)  VII,  385)  and  in  July  he  was  made  in- 
spector general.  (Ibid.,  539.)  In  October  he  resigned  (ibid.,  IX,  797), 
and  spent  several  months  in  trying  to  get  his  pay  adjusted.  Just  how 
La  Balme  got  back  into  the  American  service  is  not  clear,  for  in  February 
1778,  the  committee  on  foreign  applications  informed  him  that  it  would 
have  no  further  use  for  his  services.  (Ibid.,  X,  157.)  We  next  find  men- 
tion of  him  in  the  West  "provided  with  a  commission  of  inspector  gen- 
eral of  all  the  cavalry  in  America  and  with  a  letter  of  recommendation 
dated  June  25,  1780,  addressed  to  the  suppliants  by  Mr.  Fowler  who  was 
formerly  our  commandant . . . ."  Petition  to  governor  of  Virginia  by  inhab- 
itants of  Kaskaskia,  May  4,  1781.  (Kaskaskia  Records,  237.)  His  activities 
here  aroused  suspicions  among  the  Americans  that  he  was  in  the  employ 
of  France  (ibid,  169),  but  he  began  his  work  at  Kaskaskia.  There  he 
found  the  Kaskaskians  full  of  hatred  towards  the  "Virginians,"  who,  they 
claimed,  had  despoiled  and  were  oppressing  them.  La  Balme  skilfully 
appealed  to  their  patriotism  as  Frenchmen,  and  promised  them  redress  from 
Congress.  (Ibid.,  181.)  He  sympathized  with  them,  but  since  they  were 
subjects  of  the  United  States  he  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  make  a  formal 
request  in  their  behalf  and  contented  himself  with  speaking  privately  to 
various  members  of  Congress.  La  Balme  raised  a  force  of  Frenchmen 
which  started  against  the  fort  at  Detroit  but  was  ambushed  and  slain.  Lu- 
zerne  to  Vergennes,  May  12,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  75,  new  139.)  La 
Balme's  expedition  was  of  no  importance  in  itself;  it  derives  an  interest 
from  the  fact  that  there  was  then  and  has  been  since  some  suspicion  that 
he  was  acting  to  further  some  ambitious  plans  of  France.  (Turner,  in 
American  Historical  Review,  X,  235.)  There  seems  to  be  no  evidence  for 
this  assumption,  and  there  is  much  to  urge  against  it.  In  the  French  ar- 
chives there  is  no  mention  of  La  Balme  except  the  perfunctory  one  of 
granting  him  passports.  Luzerne  apparently  did  not  know  him,  for  he 
spoke  of  him  in  a  disinterested  sort  of  way  and  did  not  even  make  mention 
of  his  death.  Most  important  of  all  is  the  fact  that  Vergennes  did  not 
have  any  designs  on  the  Mississippi  Valley. 

14"Une  colonie  de  Francois  etablie  sur  les  bords  du  Mississippi  dans  le 
Pays  des  Illinois  au  poste  des  Kaskaskias  a  cru  recemment  pouvoir  tenter 
une  enterprise  centre  les  Fort  du  detroit  et  sous  la  conduite  de  M  La 
Balme :  Us  ont  remonte  L'oubache  et  se  sont  empares  du  poste  des  Mi- 
amis."  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  May  12,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  75,  new  139.) 


194  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [304 

they  were  ambushed  and  La  Balme  and  most  of  his  little 
band  were  slain. 

Clark  was  instructed  to  collect  a  force  at  Fort  Pitt  and 
to  make  ready  for  an  attack  on  Detroit.  He  was  then  to 
march  east  and  capture  Niagara  and  after  that  to  join  with 
other  forces  in  an  effort  to  capture  Quebec.15  He  was  slow 
in  raising  his  troops,  however,  and  before  he  could  start 
events  were  hurrying  the  war  to  a  close  and  the  expedition 
never  set  out. 

Luzerne  heartily  approved  of  the  attempt  of  Congress 
to  get  possession  of  the  Northwest.  He  called  the  measure 
a  piece  of  "sound  politics"  for  "if  it  succeeds,"  he  wrote, 
"it  will  assure  the  frontiers  of  the  thirteen  states  to  the 
north."  He  recognized  that  the  possession  of  the  Great 
Lakes  would  place  the  Americans  in  a  much  better  position 
to  negotiate  with  great  Britain.16  The  failure  to  conquer 
these  posts  resulted  as  Luzerne  had  foreseen ;  and  with  the 
British  in  possession  of  them  they  long  remained  a  fruitful 
cause  of  trouble. 

The  desperate  condition  of  American  affairs  in  the 
last  months  of  the  war  inclined  Congress  once  more  to  seek 
Spanish  aid,  and  some  of  the  southern  delegates  confided 
to  Luzerne  their  intention  to  reopen  negotiations  regard- 
ing the  West,17  They  had  decided  to  offer  Spain  in  return 
for  her  help  "one  hundred  miles  of  land  on  the  left  bank  of 

15Plan  for  an  attack  on  Quebec.  (Papers  of  the  Continental  Con- 
gress, 25,  I,  fol.  37-) 

18 une  expedition  centre  les  Forts  de  Niagara  et  du  detroit  a  etc 

secretement  resolue.  Elle  doit  etre  enterprise  par  le  Colonel  Clarke  avec 
quelques  forces  quil  tierara  de  la  Virginie  et  avec  les  milices  du  district 
de  Kentucke.  Si  elle  reussit  elle  assurera  la  frontiere  des  Treize  Etats  au 
Nord  Elles  les  rendra  maitres  de  deux  postes  importantes  et  des  lacs  mich- 
igan,  Huron,  Erie  et  Ontario  qui  sont  dans  1'etendiie  des  limites  quils  se  sont 
Fixes  et  cette  possession  leur  donnera  les  moiens  de  Negocier  sur  un  pied 
beaucoup  plus  avantageux  avec  la  grande  Bretagne."  Luzerne  then  de- 
scribes the  difficulties  in  the  way  which  were  great  enough  to  make  him 
doubt  of  the  success  of  the  expedition.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  May  12, 
1781.  (E.  U.,  XVI,  no.  75,  new  139.) 

1TLuzerne  to  Vergennes,  November  26,  1780.  (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  89, 
fol.  337.) 


305]  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  195 

the  river"  [Mississippi].18  On  this  question  there  was  the 
same  old  alignment  of  parties;  the  New  England  states 
and  Virginia  opposing  any  concession,  while  a  majority 
of  the  other  delegates  favored  it.  After  much  discussion 
a  compromise  resolution  was  passed,  which  authorized  Jay 
to  give  up  the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi  below  the  thirty-first  parallel,  provided  that 
the  right  of  navigation  above  this  line  was  recognized.19 
No  concession  of  territory  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  was 
made,  and  it  was  apparent  that  Virginia  and  New  England 
would  concede  no  more.20  Congress  felt  that  these  terms 
were  most  liberal  and  did  not  doubt  that  Spain  would 
accept  them.21  Luzerne  himself  believed  that  now  Spain 
would  accede  to  the  treaty  of  alliance,  if  she  were  given 
control  of  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  and  he  ceased 
urging  concessions  upon  Congress.22 

The  resolutions  of  Congress  agreeing  to  relinquish 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  gave  new  life  to  the  nego- 
tiations at  Madrid.  In  January  Florida  Blanca  had  de- 
manded this  as  the  sine  qua  non  of  forming  an  alliance 
with  the  United  States;  but  Jay  had  not  felt  at  liberty  to 
grant  it  and  Franklin  had  approved  his  stand.23  In  all 
his  efforts  Jay  had  been  counseled  by  Montmorin,  and 
after  the  ultimatum  of  Florida  Blanca  both  agreed  that 

18Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  December  15.   (E.  U.,  XIV,  no.  108,  new  120.) 

19Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  257;  Journals  of  Continental  Congress 
(Hunt  ed.),  XIX,  153. 

20Luzerne  thought  there  was  a  deal  by  which  the  northern  states  were 
to  support  Virginia's  pretentions  to  the  West  in  return  for  that  state's 
support  of  the  New  England  claim  to  an  extended  northern  boundary. 
(Esp.,  601,  no.  191.) 

"Congress  to  Jay,  May  28,  1781.  Journals  of  Continental  Congress, 
XX,  555.  A  resolution  to  allow  greater  concessions  was  unanimously 
defeated  on  August  10.  Secret  Journals,  II,  468. 

22Luzerne  to  Montmorin,  May  i,  1781.     (Esp.,  603,  no.  61.) 

23Franklin  to  Jay,  January  27,  1781.  (Writings  (Smyth  ed.),  VIII, 
202.) 


196  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [30$ 

nothing  more  could  be  done  before  the  general  settlement 
of  peace.24 

When  Jay  received  instructions  allowing  him  to  relin- 
quish the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  below  the  thirty- 
first  parallel,  he  attempted  to  reopen  the  negotiations  with 
the  Spanish  minister.  He  did  not  reveal  his  instructions 
at  once,  altho  he  strongly  suspected  that  the  Spanish  min- 
ister knew  all  about  them.  He  was  still  opposed  to  the 
cession  of  the  right  of  navigation  and  resolved  to  make  one 
more  effort  to  conserve  it.  After  all,  he  reasoned,  Spain 
will  fight  as  well  in  our  cause  without  a  treaty  as  with  one 
To  Florida  Blanca  he  declared  that  "Congress  views  the 
speedy  accomplishment  of  this  union  as  very  important  to 
the  common  cause;  and  therefore,  if  Spain  would  consent 
forthwith  to  come  into  it,  in  that  case  they  would  gratify 
His  Majesty  by  ceding  to  him  the  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi below  their  territories  on  reasonable  terms."  Florida 
Blanca  showed  no  inclination  to  agree  to  these  conditions, 
and  argued  that  the  whole  question  could  better  be  ad- 
justed in  a  general  peace.25 

Jay  then  went  to  Montmorin,  who  advised  him  to  con- 
tinue his  efforts,  and  declared  that  the  exclusive  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi  ought  to  satisfy  Spain.26  Jay  acted  on 
the  suggestion,  but  to  all  his  communications  Florida 
Blanca  returned  no  answer.  He  excused  himself  on  the 
plea  of  illness  and  finally  asked  Jay  to  submit  in  definite 
terms  the  demands  of  Congress  in  regard  to  the  Mississippi 
and  the  boundaries.  Jay  then  sent  a  project  of  a  treaty 
of  alliance  which  followed  exactly  the  conditions  laid  down 
by  Congress  in  regard  to  both  questions.  He  dwelt  at 
length  on  the  sacrifices  which  the  loss  of  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  would  entail  on  the  inhabitants  of  the  West, 
and  begged  that  the  generosity  of  the  king  would  give  them 

24Jay  to  Congress,  October  3,  1781.  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  739.) 
Luzerne  wrote  to  Vergennes  that  Jay  counted  little  on  the  success  of  his 
attempts  to  treat  with  Spain  before  the  peace.  July  6.  (Esp.,  604,  no.  21, 
new  44.) 

25Jay  to  Congress.    Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  738-747- 
28Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  July  6.     (Esp.,  604,  no.  21.) 


•307]  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  197 

some  relief.27  This  was  practically  the  end  of  the  negotia- 
tion with  Spain  on  the  question  of  an  alliance  and  the  dis- 
putes over  the  Mississippi,  for  the  Spanish  minister  never 
could  find  time  to  discuss  the  question  until  after  Jay  had 
departed  from  Spain. 

To  Montmorin  Florida  Blanca  expressed  the  most  hos- 
tile views  towards  the  United  States.  He  dwelt  much  on 
the  perfidy  of  the  Americans  who,  he  declared,  were  still 
devoted  to  Great  Britain.  He  reiterated  his  fears  of  aggres- 
sion by  the  new  nation,  and  gave  this  as  the  principal  rea- 
•son  why  he  would  not  enter  the  alliance.  He  acknowledged 
that  independence  was  assured,  but  hoped  that  the  Ameri- 
•can  republic  would  always  remain  feeble.  He  attempted 
to  revive  the  old  scheme  of  uti  possidetis  and  planned  to 
leave  Great  Britain  in  possession  of  New  York,  Charleston, 
-and  Chesapeake  Bay.  This  he  felt  would  keep  the  states 
in  dependence  on  their  allies.28 

Montmorin  opposed  this  view  decidedly  and  firmly. 
He  ridiculed  the  idea  that  a  people  who  had  fought  as  sav- 
agely as  the  Americans  could  bear  any  love  for  their  old 
foe;  and  he  declared  that  the  policy  of  Spain  would  make 
them  dependencies  of  the  common  foe  and  thus  render 
fruitless  the  whole  war.  If  Great  Britain  should  keep 
these  important  posts,  he  argued,  American  independence 
will  not  be  absolute,  and  American  commerce  will  be  a  prey 
to  the  caprice  of  England.  He  pointed  out  that,  if  Spain 
wished  the  new  nation  to  be  weak,  her  wish  was  assured 
by  the  very  constitution  of  the  confederacy.29  These  argu- 
ments had  no  effect  upon  Florida  Blanca  and  he  remained 
obstinately  set  against  the  recognition  of  American  inde- 
pendence. 

27Jay  to  Congress,  October  3,  1781.  (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  IV,  766  et 
seq.)  A  copy  of  this  projected  treaty  is  in  the  French  foreign  office.  (Esp., 
^4,  no.  187.)  Through  some  error  Van  Tyne  asserts  that  "Jay  never 
revealed  these  instructions."  (American  Revolution,  312.)  Both  Jay  and 
Montmorin  assert  the  contrary. 

28Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  12,  1781.  (Esp.,  602,  no.  18,  new 
.310.) 


198  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [308 

The  failure  of  Jay's  negotiations  widened  the  breach 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain.  Spain  had  never 
desired  an  alliance  and  hated  the  Americans  as  rebels. 
She  had  aided  them  only  out  of  hostility  to  Great  Britain, 
but  at  the  same  time  had  tried  to  cripple  them  as  a  nation. 
Her  offers  of  assistance  had  been  only  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  some  of  her  own  immediate  ends,  and  had  never 
looked  towards  independence.  She  assisted  in  the  conquest 
of  the  Floridas,  when  they  were  to  be  for  her  own  posses- 
sion; but  she  insisted  that  they  must  include  the  whole 
Mississippi  Valley.  When  Congress  refused  this  exorbitant 
demand,  Spain  decided  to  seek  the  realization  of  her  ambi- 
tion in  other  ways,  and  henceforth  treated  the  pretentious 
of  the  new  republic  with  scornful  indifference. 

In  Congress  the  failure  of  Jay's  negotiations  increased 
the  feeling  of  hostility  and  distrust  towards  Spain.  The 
measure  surrendering  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  had 
been  forced  through  with  difficulty,  and  when  Spain  hesi- 
tated to  accept  the  terms  offered,  the  opposition  increased.30 
When  news  reached  Philadelphia  of  Jay's  complete  failure, 
many  members  of  Congress  demanded  that  all  negotiations 
be  broken  off.  They  felt  that  they  had  conceded  too  much 
under  the  strain  of  adversity ;  and  now  that  Yorktown  had 
gone  into  history,  they  wished  to  take  back  this  concession. 
Many  schemes  were  suggested.  One  member  advanced  the 
idea  of  offering  Russia  an  establishment  in  Eastern  Louis- 
iana as  a  check  to  Spanish  aggression  and  a  guarantee  of 
peace  in  the  West.31  Congress  contented  itself,  however,, 
with  a  resolution  introduced  by  Madison  that  "the  limita- 
tion affixed  by  him  [Jay]  to  the  proposed  surrender  of  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  in  particular  corresponds 

80Luzerne  to  Montmorin,  September  i.  (Esf>.,  605,  no.  119.) 
31"Ce  Ministre  [Livingston]  est  porte  a  croire  aussi  que  le  Congres 
que  cette  puissance  voit  avec  inquietude  1'elevation  d'une  Republique  dont 
elle  craint  que  le  voisinage  ne  lui  devienne  dangereux  .  .  .  Parmi  les  idees 
deraisonnables  que  ces  conjunctures  ont  fait  ....  II  n'en  est  point  de 
plus  bizarre  que  celle  d'offrir  a  la  Russie  un  etablissment  dans  la  Louis- 
iane  orientale  pour  la  rendre  favorable  aux  Etats-Unis  ....  "Luzerne  to 
Vergennes,  May  10,  1782.  (E.  U.,  XXI,  236,  new  48.) 


309]  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  199 

with  the  views  of  Congress;  that  they  observe  not  without 
surprise  and  concern,  that  a  proposition,  so  liberal  in  itself, 
and  which  removed  the  only  avowed  obstacle  to  a  connec- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  his  catholick  majesty, 
should  not  have  produced  greater  effect  on  the  councils  of 
the  latter."32  Congress  further  resolved  that  the  conces- 
sion was  offered  for  the  immediate  aid  of  Spain  and  that 
every  delay  detracted  from  the  reason  for  the  sacrifice.  It 
declared  that  no  more  liberal  terms  would  be  offered  and 
with  this  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
passed  out  of  the  Revolution. 

The  jealousy  and  ill  will  of  the  Spanish  court  did  not 
escape  the  knowledge  of  the  watchful  Vergennes.  He  had 
been  irritated  at  its  refusal  to  recognize  the  United  States, 
and  its  grasping  ambition  had  angered  him.  He  had  hoped 
for  a  more  liberal  policy  but  he  was  at  last  convinced  of 
Spain's  hostility  to  his  American  allies.33  He  believed  that 
Florida  Blanca  would  never  accede  to  the  alliance,  and 
that  the  whole  question  would  have  to  be  threshed  out  at 
the  time  of  the  settlement  of  peace.  By  his  advice  all 
efforts  to  induce  Spain  to  sign  the  treaty  of  alliance  were 
discontinued ;  and  for  the  remainder  of  the  war  Vergennes 
sought  to  obtain  such  harmony  of  action  as  the  conditions 
would  permit. 

Vergennes  realized  that  the  difference  between  the  two 
countries  was  fundamental  and  might  lead  to  serious  con- 
sequences. He  had  never  brought  up  the  question  of  the 
West  in  his  communications  with  the  Spanish  court,  but 
he  knew  from  the  reports  of  Luzerne  the  extent  of  its 
claims,  and  shrewdly  surmised  that  these  conflicting  pre- 
tentions  kept  Florida  Blanca  from  treating  with  Congress. 

*2Secret  Journals,  III,  gg;  Charles  Thompson  to  Montmorin,  May  24, 
1782.  (Esp.,  607,  no.  99.) 

33"I1  y  a  longtems,  Monsieur,  que  je  suis  convaincu  que  M  le  comte 
de  Florida  Blanche  a  des  principes  errones  a  1'egard  de  TAmerique  qu'il 
est  secretement  contraire  a  1'independance  les  Etats-unis  et  qu'il 
nous  causera  autant  qu'il  sera  en  son  pouvoir  des  embarras  lorsqu'il  sera 
question  de  traiter  cette  matiere  vis-a-vis  de  la  Grande  Bretagne."  Ver- 
gennes to  Montmorin,  April  12,  1781.  (Esp.,  606,  no.  159;  Circourt,  IIIr 


200  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION*  [310 

His  best  hope  of  a  successful  issue  was  to  keep  all  disputes 
under  cover  until  the  war  was  finished ;  and  so  he  refused 
to  commit  himself  on  the  question  and  enjoined  his  subor- 
dinates to  do  the  same.34 

The  closing  years  of  the  war  pressed  no  less  heavily 
upon  France  than  upon  the  United  States.  The  French 
government  had  unflinchingly  borne  the  expenses  of  many 
campaigns,  but  the  strain  was  beginning  to  tell.  Vergennes 
was  not  the  first  to  complain.  There  were  others  at  the 
court  who  felt  that  France  had  already  gone  beyond  her 
strength.  In  September,  1780,  Maurepas  informed  the  king 
that  the  finances  were  in  such  a  state  that  peace  was  im- 
perative. Vergennes  even  then  did  not  withdraw  from  his 
position  but  forced  his  leading  opponents  out  of  office.  This 
did  not  relieve  the  finances,  however,  and  Vergennes  him- 
self was  compelled  to  take  measures  looking  towards  peace. 

Vergennes  found  his  chief  difficulty  in  satisfying  the 
demands  of  Spain.  He  had  promised  her  Minorca,  Ja- 
maica, and  Gibraltar ;  but  only  the  first  had  fallen  and  the 
others  seemed  impregnable.*5  i  It  appeared  likely  that 
Spain  could  not  get  the  territories  she  wanted,  and  now 
she  was  clamoring  for  indemnity  in  other  regions.  Florida 
Blanca  felt  that  his  country  could  get  more  by  a  settlement 
on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis,™  which  would  give  her  Mi- 
norca and  the  Floridas  with  some  minor  concessions,  and 
which  would  leave  New  York  and  the  three  southern  states 
in  the  hands  of  the  British.  Under  these  terms  also  Spain 
might  have  claimed  Eastern  Louisiana,  for  she  maintained 
that  it  had  been  conquered  by  Galvez ;  and  the  Northwest 
would  have  remained  in  British  hands. 

Military  reverses,  financial  difficulties,  and  the  de- 
mands of  Spain  were  all  sources  of  anxiety  to  the  French 
minister.  He  knew  that  France  could  not  much  longer 
continue  the  strua^le,  but  he  felt  that  the  royal  honor  de- 
manded independence  for  all  the  states.  He  refused  to  dis- 

34Vergennes  thus  instructed  Luzerne,  August  12,  1781   (E.  U.,  XXII, 
no.  17,  new  38)  ;  to  Montmorin  (Esp.,  603,  no.  25). 

35Lecky,  American  Revolution  (Woodburn  ed.),  428. 
88Doniol,  Histoire,  IV,  498. 


311]  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  201 

cuss  the  proposition  of  uti  possidetis,  and  insisted  that 
France  would  stand  by  her  alliance  with  the  Americans.37 
At  the  same  time  he  realized  that  unless  the  allied  forces 
should  achieve  a  striking  success  it  would  be  impossible 
to  force  the  British  to  surrender  their  recent  conquests; 
and  so  he  instructed  Luzerne  to  "familiarize"  Congress 
with  the  idea  that  some  sacrifice  might  be  necessary.  Ver- 
gennes,  however,  was  resolved  to  maintain  the  principles 
of  his  alliance  with  the  United  States  above  all  other  con- 
ditions.38 

In  order  to  maintain  the  principles  of  the  alliance, 
Vergennes  resolved  on  aggressive  military  action,  and 
urged  Spain  to  attack  East  Florida  and  Jamaica.  The 
Florida  campaign  he  planned  as  a  help  to  the  Americans.39 
He  strengthened  the  forces  around  Gibraltar  and  projected 
another  invasion  of  Canada.  He  sent  De  Grasse  back  to 
American  waters  and  prepared  for  a  strong  campaign. 
This,  he  felt,  must  be  his  last  effort;  and,  if  he  failed,  he 
must  yield  to  British  terms;  but,  if  he  triumphed,  the  alli- 
ance would  be  maintained  in  all  its  provisions.  The  attack 
on  Jamaica  was  not  made;  Gibraltar  did  not  fall;  but 
Yorktown  solved  the  problem,  and  Vergennes  declared  that 
the  independence  of  the  whole  of  the  United  States  was 
assured.40 

The  question  of  the  boundaries  presented  to  Vergennes 
a  most  serious  dilemma.  On  the  north  there  was  little 
difficulty.  He  did  not  feel  that  the  Americans  could  claim 
all  Canada  but  he  was  anxious  for  them  to  have  Halifax41 

"Vergennes  declared  that  the  propositions  of  Spain  would  be  advan- 
tageous to  France  on  account  of  the  conquests  she  had  made,  but  he  main- 
tained that  it  did  not  enter  into  his  plan  of  settling  the  future  of  America. 
To  Luzerne,  September  7,  1781.  (£.  U.,  XVIII,  no.  69.) 

38"Le  Roi  tient  a  Ses  obligations  par  principe  comme  par  sentiment,  et 
que  son  propre  interet  leur  est  garant  de  la  fidelite  avec  la  quelle  il  est 
resolu  de  les  remplir,  mais  vous  aurez  soin  en  meme  terns  de  les  famil- 
iariser  insensiblement  avec  les  hypotesis  qui  en  se  realizant  rendroient 
un  Sacrifice  quelconque  indispensable.  ..."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  June 
30,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVII,  no.  19,  new  55.) 

89 Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  September  6,  1781.    (Esp.,  605,  no.  129.) 
40Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  July  27,  1781.    (£.  U.,  XVII,  no.  142.) 
41  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  October  22,  1780.     (Ibid.,  XIV,  no.  32.) 


202  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [312 

to  avoid  the  danger  of  British  aggression.  The  boundaries 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Spanish  possessions 
were  the  source  of  greatest  difficulty,  and,  as  to  the  justice 
of  the  case,  Vergennes  professed  himself  totally  ignorant.42 
The  only  indications  that  he  gave  of  his  sympathies  are  his 
bitter  protests  against  Spanish  cupidity,  and  his  praise  of 
the  moderation  of  Congress.43 

Thus  it  was  that  the  opposing  claims  of  Congress  and 
the  Spanish  court  entangled  Vergennes  into  a  policy  that 
appeared  weak  and  vacillating,  and  has  led  to  the  charge 
of  insincerity.  Yet  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  made  a 
promise  he  did  not  try  his  best  to  keep,  or  that  he  gave 
countenance  to  measures  he  was  unwilling  to  support ;  and 
throughout  he  showed  a  willingness,  unusual  in  statesmen 
of  any  time,  to  sacrifice  French  claims  to  the  cupidity  of  his 
allies.  In  no  sense  was  he  responsible  for  the  breach  be- 
tween  Spain  and  the  United  States.  While  he  made  many 
concessions  to  the  court  of  Charles  III,  he  promised  noth- 
ing that  interfered  with  any  claim  which  Congress  had  set 
up.  He  guaranteed  to  the  United  States  independence 
and  such  conquests  as  they  might  make  and  this  guarantee 
he  faithfully  maintained.  The  question  of  the  West  and 
the  Mississippi  did  not  come  within  his  purview  until 
forced  upon  him  by  outside  events,  and  he  did  not  profess 
to  know  on  which  side  justice  lay.  He  tried  to  reconcile 
contending  views  and  to  harmonize  differences  until  the 
close- of  the  war  when  the  question  could  be  settled  on  its 
merits;  and  it  was  in  this  spirit  that  Vergennes  entered 
upon  the  negotiations  for  peace. 

42"  ....  nous  pouvons  juger  ....  que  selon  toutes  aparances  les 
deux  parties  auront  bien  peine  a  s'accorder  sur  le  partage  des  territoires  qui 
sont  a  1'Est  du  Mississipi  et  du  1'Ohio.  Nous  garderons  le  silence  le  plus 
absolue  jusqu'  a  ce  que  nous  soyons  invites  a  prendre  connoissance  de  la 
discussion  et  a  en  dire  notre  sentiment ;  vous  voudrez  bien  ....  a  en 
faire  autant  de  votre  cote."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  August  12,  1762.  (£.  [/., 
XXII,  no.  38,  new  55.)  He  had  previously  refused  to  discuss  the  subject 
because  it  was  not  "sufficiently  clear."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  September 
7,  1781.  (Ibid.,  XVIII,  no.  60.) 

43 Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  April  12,  1781.  (Esf>.,  603,  no.  25.)  To 
Luzerne,  September  17,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVIII,  no.  69.) 


CHAPTER   XI 

VERGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR 
PEACE 

The  close  of  the  war  did  not  bring  any  compromise 
between  the  claims  of  Spain  and  those  of  the  United  States, 
nor  did  it  enlighten  Vergennes  on  the  rights  of  either  coun- 
try. He  had  succeeded  in  postponing  the  question  until 
all  were  ready  to  treat  for  peace,  but  with  the  assurance 
of  pacification  the  rancor  and  obstinacy  of  the  opposing 
forces  became  more  insistent.  Congress,  united  by  the  land 
cessions  of  the  larger  states  into  a  common  interest,1  and 
relieved  of  the  dangers  and  anxieties  of  invasion,  at  once 
returned  to  its  former  pretensions.  Spain,  foiled  in  her  as- 
saults on  Gibraltar,  and  maddened  by  her  misfortunes  in 
the  West  Indies,  clamored  for  compensation  on  the  Missis- 
sippi. 

Congress  was  the  first  to  act.    During  the  preceding 

•  years  its  pretensions  had  varied  with  its  membership  from 

a  claim  to  all  British  America  down  to  a  proposal  to  accept 

merely  the  Atlantic  seaboard.    When  it  appeared  that  the 

war  would  soon  be  over,  Congress  adopted  the  suggestion 

aThe  struggle  between  the  landless  states  and  the  landed  ones  had 
been  bitter.  Virginia  had  claimed  not  only  Kentucky  but  the  country  north 
of  the  Ohio,  and  the  small  states  which  had  no  hopes  of  conquest  com- 
plained bitterly  against  carrying  on  a  war  for  her  aggrandizement.  This 
had  been  the  stay  of  the  French  party  in  Congress.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes, 
January  4,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XV,  no.  8,  new  112.)  Tom  Paine  wrote  a 
pamphlet  in  his  most  caustic  style  assailing  the  pretentions  of  the  large 
states  and  especially  those  of  Virginia.  (Copy  with  above  despatch.)  As 
a  result  of  the  opposition  of  the  smaller  states,  some  of  the  states  claim- 
ing lands  in  the  West  agreed  to  abandon  their  claims  and  allow  the  lands 
to  be  sold  for  the  benefit  of  the  soldiers.  These  cessions  gave  a  new 
strength  to  the  confederacy  by  stopping  petty  jealousies  and  hatreds,  and 
by  giving  a  common  interest  in  this  vast  domain.  It  probably  had  much 
to  do  with  the  collapse  of  the  French  party. 

203 


204  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [314 

of  Luzerne  and  began  to  formulate  once  more  its  claims  for 
the  consideration  of  the  negotiators.2  Vergennes  was  insist- 
ent that  the  views  of  Congress  be  drawn  clearly  and  pre- 
cisely; and  to  accomplish  this  a  committee  was  appointed 
to  draw  up  instructions  for  the  American  envoys.3  It  was 
agreed  without  difficulty  that  the  treaty  of  alliance  with 
France  should  be  the  basis  of  the  demands  of  Congress; 
but  in  addition  it  was  necessary  to  determine  the  boun- 
daries.4 

On  June  6  the  committee  presented  its  report  and  the 
debates  on  the  boundaries  to  be  claimed  by  Congress  were 
renewed  and  continued  for  more  than  a  week.  On  the  15th 
it  was  agreed  to  instruct  the  envoys  that  "As  to  the  dis- 
puted boundaries  .  .  .  we  refer  you  to  the  instructions 
formerly  given  Mr.  Adams,  dated  14th  August,  1779."  This 
was  to  serve  only  to  explain  the  views  and  hopes  of  Con- 
gress ;  but  as  the  instructions  declared,  "we  think  it  unsafe 
to  tie  you  by  absolute  and  peremptory  instructions."  The 
envoys  were  to  "make  the  most  candid  and  confidential 
communications  upon  all  subjects  to  the  ministers  of  our 
generous  ally,  the  king  of  France ;  to  undertake  nothing  in 
the  negotiations  for  peace  .  .  .  without  their  knowledge 
and  concurrence,  and  ultimately  to  govern  yourselves  by 
their  advice  and  opinion  .  .  ."5 

The  provisions  regarding  the  boundaries  were  not 
agreed  to  without  much  debate  and  discussion;  but  there 
seems  to  have  been  no  opposition  to  the  clause  requiring 
the  commissioners  to  act  only  with  the  knowledge  and  con- 
currence of  the  king.  Throughout  the  war  Congress  had 
explained  all  its  intentions  to  the  French  minister.  Altho 

2Luzerne  to  Congress,  May  26,  1781.  (Journals  of  Continental  Con- 
gress, Hunt  ed.,  XX,  561.) 

3"Vous  voudrez  bien  en  attendant  presser  cette  assemblee  d'adresser 
a  Sou  plenipre  des  instructions  claires  et  precisses,  afin  que  les  matieres 
puissant  etre  prepares  d'avantage  avec  luy  et  que  lorsque  les  negociateurs 
seront  entamees  serieusement."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  July  27,  1781. 
<£.  U.,  XVII,  no.  20,  new  142.) 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XX,  616. 

8/&td.,  606,  617. 


315]        VERGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE       205 

he  had  often  frankly  opposed  them,  he  had  never  betrayed 
the  confidence  reposed  in  him.  There  was  no  reason  to 
think  that  France  was  unfriendly  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States,  and  no  reason  why  this  confidence  should 
not  continue.  Luzerne  had  definitely  stated  that  the  king 
would  insist  upon  independence  for  all  the  United  States, 
and  would  not  treat  on  the  basis  of  uti  possidetis®  France 
had  also  advanced  large  sums  of  money  and  had  given 
promise  of  further  aid. 

On  the  question  of  the  boundaries,  however,  there  was 
a  wide  diversity  of  opinion.  Some  wished  to  demand  widely 
extended  frontiers  with  permission  to  the  negotiators  to 
yield  as  it  became  necessary,  or  to  leave  the  settlement  of 
the  question  until  after  the  peace.7  Luzerne  opposed  any 
extreme  demands  and  reminded  Congress  how  absurd  it 
was  to  insist  upon  conquests  with  the  enemy  in  possession 
of  much  of  their  own  territory.  The  old  arguments  were 
gone  over  without  result,8  and  finally  Luzerne  suggested  to 
the  committee  that  "some  discretion  be  left  the  envoys." 
Another  suggestion  was  a  line  of  demarkation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  British  possessions,  and  this  Luzerne 
approved,  but  the  committee  refused  to  present  it  to  Con- 
gress.9 This  discussion  brought  out  the  ideas  which  Lu- 
zerne held  regarding  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States. 
Vergennes  had  expressed  the  wish  that  Congress  should  not 
set  up  "indefensible  pretensions,"  but  he  had  declared  that 
he  would  not  dictate.10  Luzerne  interpreted  this  to  mean 

^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XX,  677. 

''Ibid.,  608-609.     Luzerne  to  Vergennes.     (E.  U.,  XVII,  no.  17,  new 

145.) 

8See  p.  175  et  seq.  The  question  of  the  charters  and  the  proclamation 
was  again  gone  over.  See  Luzerne  to  Vergennes.  (Ibid.) 

9"Un  delegue  me  dit  qu'il  croyait  que  Si  Ton  prenoit  pour  ligne  de 
demarckation  celle  que  la  france  vouloit  tracer  avant  la  guerre  de  1756  on 
ne  pourroit  donner  une  plus  grande  marque  de  moderation  puisque  ce 
Seroit  abandonner  a  1'Angleterre  d'immenses  territoires  qu'Elle  reclamoit 
au  droit  de  Ses  Colonies."  This  suggestion  received  the  approval  of 
Luzerne.  (Ibid.) 

10Quant  au  reglement  des  limites  de  quelques  Etats  nous  ne  nous 
melerons  point  mais  nous  desirons  que  les  Americains  n'entravint  pas  les 
negociations  par  des  pretentions  ensoutenables,  leurs  continents  n'est  pas 
trop  vaste  pour  leur  population,  et  ils  seront  longtems  sans  avoir  besoin 


206  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [316 

that  his  master  favored  a  restricted  boundary,  when  the 
sense  of  his  instructions  pointed  only  to  the  necessity  of 
peace.  Accordingly  he  spoke  favorably  of  the  plan  to  re- 
strict the  United  States  to  the  boundaries  which  France 
had  demanded  before  1756. 

The  reports  of  Luzerne  reveal  three  interests  opposed 
to  his  policy :  those  of  the  large  states  like  "Virginia  and 
Massachusetts"  which  had  western  claims  that  they  were 
anxious  to  maintain;  those  who  feared  to  have  the  British 
too  near  their  frontiers ;  and  those  who  desired  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war  for  profit.  Those  who  out  of  hatred  for 
Great  Britain  desired  to  keep  her  as  far  as  possible  from 
the  American  frontiers  were  mostly  small  state  men,  and 
to  these  Luzerne  devoted  his  greatest  efforts.  They  believed 
that  the  vast  regions  of  the  West  would  soon  fill  up,  and 
they  felt  it  to  be  to  the  interests  of  their  country  to  keep 
the  new  states  in  the  Confederacy.  To  them  Luzerne  urged 
that  no  matter  how  extended  their  boundaries,  they  must 
still  have  neighbors.11  He  felt  that  if  lie  could  win  over 
this  class,  the  party  of  moderation  would  triumph. 

There  were  so  many  contrary  ideas  in  Congress  that 
an  agreement  on  definite  instructions  was  next  to  impos- 
sible. The  ideas  of  Luzerne  were  discussed  but  were  bit- 
terly opposed  by  Virginia,  Connecticut,  and  Massachusetts, 
with  New  York  not  voting.  Nothing  was  hoped  from  this 
latter  state  for  its  delegates  were  "even  less  tractable  than 
the  Virginians  on  the  extent  of  the  boundaries  which  they 

de  S'etendu  pourquoi  done  preferoient-ils  a  la  paix  future  [un] contingent 
qui  ne  fera  ni  leur  bonheur  ni  celui  de  leurs  arrieres  neveux?  Vergennes 
to  Luzerne,  June  28,  1782.  (E.  U.,  XXI,  no.  103,  new  35.) 

n".  .  .  le  parti  que  je  me  suis  le  plus  attache  a  persuader  est  celui 
des  gens  Sages  et  moderes,  mais  que  par  haine  pour  1'Angleterre  et  par 
crainte  de  son  ancienne  influence  vouloient  la  tenir  a  une  grande  distance 
des  Etats-unis."  Among  these  was  the  president  of  Congress.  Luzerne 
to  Vergennes,  June  8,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVII,  no.  145,  foL  17.)  Luzerne 
spoke  of  the  rapid  settlements  of  Illinois  and  Kentucky  and  the  danger 
this  would  be  to  the  older  states  whose  inhabitants  they  would  entice 
away  by  the  promise  of  cheap  lands.  Ibid. 


317]        VERGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOE  PEACE       207 

wish  to  fix  for  Canada  in  the  West."12  The  large  state  party 
was  insistent  upon  the  pretentious  ultimatum  of  1779  ;  but 
most  of  the  delegates  were  willing  to  accept  the  Ohio  River, 
while  a  few  more  were  inclined  to  take  the  watershed  sepa- 
rating the  East  from  the  West.13  Virginia  was  most  aggres- 
sive and  demanded  first  the  line  running  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Miami  to  the  headwaters  of  the  Illinois,  thence  down 
that  river  to  the  Mississippi.  When  she  found  no  support 
for  this,  she  framed  as  her  ultimatum  that  her  northern 
boundary  should  be  the  Ohio,  while  the  territory  beyond 
must  remain  neutral.14  Many  delegates  supported  this 
proposition,  but  Luzerne  declared  himself  against  precise 
instructions  and  the  motion  failed.  Yorktown  was  not  yet 
taken,  and  so  great  was  the  discouragement  in  Congress 
that  Luzerne  believed  that  it  would  make  almost  any  sacri- 
fice for  peace,  even  to  accepting  the  Alleghanies  as  the  west- 
ern boundary.  He  recognized,  however,  that  such  an  ar- 
rangement would  cause  universal  complaint  and  arouse  in- 
tense hostility  to  France.15 

12Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  June  n,  1781.     (E.  U.,  XVII,  no.  27,  new 
I47-) 


^Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.)f  XX,  612,  613. 

15Le  trosieme  article  laisse  aux  Plenipotentaires  la  plus  grande  lati- 
tude sur  tous  les  autres  points.  Le  premiere  qui  se  presente  est  de  deter- 
miner se  qui  constitue  le  Territoire  des  treize  Etats.  II  y  a  eu  trois 
opinions  differentes  sur  ce  sujet  dans  le  Congres.  Quelques  Delegues 
vouloient  qu'on  ne  se  departit  point  des  limites  fixees  en  1779  et  qu'on 
n'innovat  rien  a  cet  egard  leur  opinion  n'a  point  prevalu.  D'autres  de- 
manderent  qu'on  designat  L'Ohio  dans  rultimatum.  Us  observoient  que 
c'etoit  la  limite  la  plus  naturalle  la  plus  sure,  la  moins  Sujette  a  varier 
et  il  y  avoit  tant  d'opinions  en  faveur  de  cette  motive  qu'il  auroit  dependu 
de  moi  de  la  faire  passer  mais  j'ai  trouve  des  inconvenient  a  engager  le 
Congres  a  rien  determiner  sur  cette  matiere  ----  J'ai  pense  qu'il  valoit 
mieux  ne  rien  fixer  avec  precision  .....  Je  me  suis  contente  de  m'assurer 
si  1'Ohio  forme  cette  limite  les  treize  Etats  ne  se  plaindront  point  qu'ils 
se  croiront  meme  obliges  au  Roi.  ...  si  les  circonstances  necessitent  de 
plus  grandes  concessions  que  cette  paix  sera  moins  agreeable  .  .  .  Je  crois 
....  que  si  les  circonstances  forcoient  a  adopter  pour  limites  les  mon- 
tagnes  qui  separant  les  Rivieres  qui  se  jettant  dans  1'atlantique  de  celles 
qui  content  a  1'Ouest  la  paix  seroit  encore  accepte  et  ratifee  mais  qu'elle 


208  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [318 

Altbo  the  resolutions  of  Congress  were  agreeable  to 
Luzerne  they  did  not  meet  the  points  at  issue  and  they 
were  not  in  harmony  with  the  desires  of  Vergennes,  who 
had  asked  for  definite  instructions.  The  northwest  boun- 
dary was  vaguely  outlined,  while  the  possession  of  the 
Southwest,  which  was  complacently  assumed  by  Congress 
and  tacitly  agreed  to  by  Luzerne,  became  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  the  negotiations  the  great  point  at  issue.  Vergennes 
had  refused  to  interfere  in  the  dispute  and  had  even  pro- 
fessed ignorance  of  the  merits  of  the  question  and  the 
silence  of  Luzerne  is  no  less  striking. 

Altho  there  was  much  dissatisfaction  with  the  instruc- 
tions agreed  to  by  Congress,  the  efforts  to  change  them  met 
with  no  success.16  Livingston,  however,  explained  fully  to 
the  peace  commissioners  the  ambitions  of  the  states  and 
urged  them  to  endeavor  in  every  way  to  extend  the  western 
boundary  to  the  Mississippi.17  He  felt  strongly  the  danger 
of  being  surrounded  by  Great  Britain,  and  it  was  in  accord 
with  his  advice  that  the  commissioners  began  their  negotia- 
tions. It  is  remarkable  that  in  all  these  discussions  noth- 
ing was  said  of  the  pretensions  of  Spain,  either  by  Luzerne 
or  by  the  Americans. 

In  spite  of  the  forgetfulness  of  Congress  and  the 
French  minister,  Spain  had  not  given  up  her  pretensions 
and  her  greed  for  territory  was  no  less  devouring  than  be- 
fore. Eastern  Louisiana  was  still  an  object  of  great  inter- 
est, for  she  still  was  anxious  to  control  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
without  any  one  to  dispute  her  claim,  and  to  do  this  she 
must  control  the  mighty  Mississippi.  Spain  could  then 
"make  the  law"  for  the  settlers  in  the  upper  Mississippi 

occasioneroit  des  plaintes  generates  qu'elle  refroidirot  nos  partisans  et  qu'il 
seroit  difficile  a  persuader  aux  Americains  que  leurs  interets  n'ont  pas 
etc  sacrifics."  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  June  13,  1781.  (E.  U.,  XVII,  no. 
148,  new  33.) 

a'The  opposition  proposed  to  reopen  the  whole  question  on  the  return 
of  the  New  York  delegates.  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  July  14.  (E.  U.,  XVII, 
no.  106,  new  158.)  Virginia  revived  her  claims  by  a  resolution  of  June 
29.  Journals  of  Continental  Congress  (Hunt  ed.),  XX,  713. 

"Livingston  to  Franklin.     (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  V.) 


319]        VERGENNES  AND  THE   NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE       200 

Valley  by  the  control  of  their  commerce,  or  could  force 
immigration  into  her  own  territories  by  the  grant  of  special 
privileges.18 

At  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations  Spain  did  not 
make  any  claim  to  the  possession  of  Eastern  Louisiana, 
but  asked  merely  for  the  conquests  promised  her  by  the 
convention  of  1779,  with  special  emphasis  on  the  guarantee 
of  Gibraltar.19  In  addition  to  this  she  presented  a  demand 
for  the  Bahama  Islands ;  but  this  was  peremptorily  refused 
by  Vergennes,  who  declared  he  could  sustain  no  claim  be- 
yond what  he  had  agreed  to  by  his  convention  with  the 
court  at  Madrid.  Spain  did  not  insist  upon  this  condition 
but  maintained  her  claim  to  the  "conservation  of  her  con- 
quests around  the  Gulf  of  Mexico."20  Rodney's  victory 
in  the  West  Indies  made  impossible  the  conquest  of  Ja- 
maica, which  had  been  promised  her;  but  in  spite  of  the 
destruction  of  the  fleets  besieging  Gibraltar,  she  still  in- 
sisted upon  its  restitution. 

To  Spain  as  to  the  United  States,  Vergennes  had  al- 
ways sought  to  keep  his  promises;  and,  tho  realizing  the 
weakness  of  his  position,  he  set  loyally  to  work  to  obtain 
the  cession  of  Gibraltar  to  his  ally.  The  failure  of  the  siege 
of  this  stronghold  made  necessary  the  offer  of  some  com- 
pensation. The  negotiations  on  this  point  were  long  and 
tedious  and  nothing  came  of  them. 

In  his  desire  to  recover  Gibraltar,  Vergennes  had  sent 
his  secretary  Rayneval  to  London  to  interview  Shelburne, 
who  had  recently  come  to  power.  Rayneval  did  not  accom- 
plish his  purpose,  but  lie  opened  up  a  series  of  discussions 
with  Shelburne  on  the  terms  of  peace.21  Little  was  said 
regarding  the  boundaries  in  America,  altho  Shelburne  im- 

18See  a  "note  on  the  new  advantages  which  favor  the  commerce  of 
Louisiana."  Anonymous.  (Transcript,  Margry  Collections,  Documents 
inedits  sous  Louisiane,  Nou.  Acq.  franc.,  9309.) 

19Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  August  25,  1782.  (Esp.,  668,  no.  166.) 
Montmorin  summed  up  the  claims  of  Spain  as  that  which  was  stipulated 
in  the  convention.  (Ibid.,  no.  15,  new  31.) 

20Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  September  20.     (.Esp.,  608,  no.  244.) 

21Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  104. 


210  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [320 

plied  that  the  West  was  not  included  within  the  bounds  of 
the  original  colonies.  Rayneval,  however,  refused  to  com- 
mit himself.  Shelburne  then  let  it  be  known  that  "the 
Floridas  with  a  district  up  to  the  neighborhood  of  New 
Orleans,  joined  to  the  east  territories  which  lie  between 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Lakes,  and  the  western  frontiers 
of  America,  might  form  a  proper  equivalent  for  Gibral- 
tar."22 This  idea  did  not  please  Vergennes,  who  feared 
the  rivalry  of  Spaniards  and  British  on  the  Mississippi, 
and  it  is  doubtful  if  Shelburne  meant  it  seriously, 

Altho  the  mission  of  Rayneval  was  unsuccessful,  Ver- 
gennes did  not  cease  his  efforts  to  keep  his  pledge  to  Spain, 
and  offered  to  compensate  Great  Britain  out  of  the  pos- 
sessions of  France.23  News  of  the  signature  of  the  prelim- 
inary articles  of  peace  between  the  British  and  American 
negotiators,  however,  made  Shelburne's  demands  so  high 
that  France  determined  to  renew  the  war  to  keep  her  honor 
with  Spain,  and  was  preparing  for  another  struggle  when 
the  British  ministry  and  the  Spanish  court  unexpectedly 
came  to  terms. 

Vergennes  was  equally  determined  to  keep  faith  with 
the  United  States,  and  in  spite  of  a  strong  dislike  for 
Adams,  his  friendship  for  the  new  nation  was  earnest  and 
sincere.  In  every  way  he  had  pressed  American  interests 
at  Madrid  and  had  always  urged  Congress  to  vigorous  ac- 
tion.24 He  had  guaranteed  independence  to  the  United 
States  and  had  maintained  the  war  at  great  hardship  in 
order  to  save  the  honor  of  France.  As  he  refused  to  sup- 
port Spanish  claims  to  the  Bahamas,  so  he  declared  also 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  October  6,  1782.  (Esp.,  609,  no.  22,  new 
81.)  Montmorin  urged  the  proposition  upon  Florida  Blanca  as  a  barrier 
to  the  Americans;  but  the  Spanish  minister  refused  to  consent  to  give 
the  British  a  port  [Pensacola]  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  also  refused 
to  cede  any  territory  around  the  city  of  New  Orleans.  Montmorin  to 
Vergennes,  November  23.  (Ibid.,  no.  129,  new  94.) 

28Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  230. 

24His  statement  to  Montmorin  that  "the  future  of  America  is  of  equal 
interest  to  Spain  and  to  us"  sums  up  his  efforts  to  secure  recognition  for 
his  ally.  (Esp.,  606,  no.  159,  new  n.) 


321]       VERGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE       211 

that  he  would  not  support  any  extravagant  pretensions  on 
the  part  of  Congress.25 

On  the  question  of  the  western  boundaries  France  was 
at  last  compelled  to  declare  herself  through  the  insistence 
of  Jay.  He  had  been  called  to  Paris  by  Franklin,  and  ar- 
rived there  under  the  impression  that  he  was  to  continue 
the  negotiations  in  which  he  had  not  succeeded  at  Madrid.26 
He  at  once  began  a  discussion  with  Aranda  relative  to  the 
disposition  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  but  the  difference 
between  them  soon  became  apparent.  Vergennes  did  not 
presume  to  interfere,  altho  Rayneval  expressed  surprise  at 
the  extent  of  Jay's  demands,27  and  submitted  a  memorial 
explaining  the  principles  on  which  the  two  countries  ought 
to  act.28  To  the  territory  south  of  the  Ohio,  Rayneval  as- 
serted, neither  nation  had  any  title  except  that  of  conquest ; 
for  before  the  treaty  of  1763,  he  argued,  it  was  owned  by 
France,  and  after  its  cession  to  Great  Britain,  it  was  never 
incorporated  with  the  colonies.  Neither  country,  he  urged, 
had  conquered  it,  and  so,  by  way  of  settling  the  dispute, 
he  suggested  a  division  by  which  the  land  south  of  the  Ten- 
nessee should  be  under  the  suzerainty  of  Spain,  and  that 
to  the  north  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  As 
to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  Rayneval  expressed 
the  hope  that  some  arrangement  could  be  made  by  which 

25"le  roi  ne  sera  pas  moins  exacte  a  les  tenir  de  son  cote  .  .  .  il  n'en 
existe  aucune  dans  nos  traites  qui  1'oblige  a  prolonger  La  Guerre  pour 
soutenir  les  pretentions  ambitieuses  que  les  Etats  unis  peuvent  former 
soit  par  raport  ...  a  1'Etendue  des  Limites."  He  goes  on  to  say  that 
"je  serai  toujours  a  terns  de  venir  a  leur  Secours  car  je  prevois  qu'ils 
auront  plus  d'une  difficulte  a  vaincre  et  meme  tres  grandes  s'ils  persistent 
dans  leurs  premieres  pretentions."  This  does  not  show  a  spirit  of  hos- 
tility. Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  November  23.  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  43,  fol. 
138.)  Before  this  Vergennes  had  written  Montmorin  that  if  the  Ameri- 
cans would  unite  more  thoroly  they  would  be  able  to  drive  the  British 
from  the  continent.  (Esp.,  606,  no.  159,  new  n.) 

28Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  108;  Jay,  Life  of  Jay,  I,  137. 

"Vergennes  declared  that  he  would  keep  silence  the  most  absolute 
until  he  was  asked  to  express  his  opinion.  See  p.  200. 

2iRayneval  said  he  was  acting  at  Jay's  request,  and  submitted  this 
memorial  as  his  personal  ideas.  Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  159. 


212  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [322 

the  Americans  could  be  given  the  right,  subject  to  proper 
regulation.  As  to  territory  north  of  the  Ohio,  he  held  by 
the  same  reasoning  that  it  was  a  part  of  Canada,  and  as 
such  a  fit  object  of  negotiation  between  the  Americans 
and  British.20 

This  memorial  was  submitted  merely  as  an  opinion 
on  the  merits  of  the  question.  It  wras  fortified  by  histori- 
cal and  legal  allusions,  against  which  the  Americans  could 
urge  only  their  charter  rights.  It  asserted  that  both 
Americans  and  Spaniards  must  base  their  claims  on  the 
right  of  conquest.  It  attempted  to  apportion  to  each 
power  the  territory  which  each  held  or  had  conquered,  and 
tried  to  divide  the  unoccupied  lands  as  equally  as  pos- 
sible.30 

Altho  Vergennes  still  held  to  his  determination  not 
to  interfere  in  the  dispute  between  his  allies,31  he  held  to 
the  belief  that  the  domains  west  of  the  mountains  were 
legally  the  property  of  Great  Britain,  subject  only  to  the 
fortunes  of  war.  He  did  not  think  that  the  charters  were 
of  any  force,  and  maintained  that  whatever  the  Americans 
got  out  of  the  contest  must  be  gained  by  war  or  diplomacy. 
He  was  willing  to  make  good  his  guarantee  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  with  all  their  possessions, 
but  he  would  not  continue  a  war  to  make  additional  con- 
quests. To  neither  Spain  nor  the  United  States  would  he 


29Rayneval  entitled  this  memorial  an  "Idea  on  the  manner  of  deter- 
mining and  fixing  the  boundaries  between  Spain  and  the  United  States 
on  one  side  of  the  Ohio  and  towards  the  Mississippi."  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no. 
57,  new  200.) 

80Spain  held  Fort  Natchez  and  all  posts  on  the  west  banks  of  the 
river,  from  which  she  could  make  incursions  into  the  disputed  territories, 
and  on  this  Rayneval  based  her  claims  to  both  banks  of  the  river.  As 
Fort  Natchez  was  the  only  post  to  the  Southwest,  it  was  argued  that  the 
possession  of  it  gave  her  claim  to  the  whole  of  the  territory.  Doniol, 
Histoire,  V,  159. 

81"Au  reste  M.  ces  notions  sont  pour  vous  seul."  Vergennes  to  Lu- 
zerne,  October  14,  1782.  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  40,  new  115.) 


323]       VEEGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE       213 

concede  anything  more  than  he  had  already  promised,  for 
he  felt  that  peace  was  essential.32 

The  stand  of  Vergennes  was  due  not  to  unfriendliness 
to  the  United  States  but  to  the  desire  for  peace.  He  re- 
alized the  importance  of  the  West  to  the  American  nation, 
and  wished  it  to  take  measures  to  extend  its  rights  there.33 
In  no  way  did  he  interfere  with  the  negotiations  between 
Aranda  and  Jay ;  nor  did  he  attempt  to  control  the  Ameri- 
can envoys  in  their  efforts  to  get  all  they  could.  He  re- 
pressed both  Spain  and  the  United  States  because  his  coun- 
try needed  peace;  and  when,  without  consulting  him,  the 
American  envoys  won  more  than  he  thought  possible,  he 
still  applauded  their  ability.34  Altho  his  willingness 
to  aid  the  Americans  received  no  returns,  he  showed  noth- 
ing more  than  a  momentary  anger. 

Vergennes  was  not  alone  in  regarding  the  American 
claims  to  the  West  as  without  support.  Shelburne  had 
ridiculed  the  pretensions  of  Congress,  and  had  declared 
that  the  Mississippi  Valley  had  never  been  a  part  of  the 

32".  ...  a  present  dans  la  discussion  Subsistante  entre  M.  de  Cte 
d'Aranda  et  M.  Jay  que  les  deux  parties  reclament  des  countries  sur  les 
quelles  aucune  d'Elles  n'a  de  droit  acquis  et  qu'il  sera  a  peu  pres  impossible 
de  les  accorder."  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  40,  new  115.) 

33"il  a  etc  remis  a  M.  Jay  une  notte  confidentielle  par  la  quelle  il  est 
a  peu  pres  demontre  que  les  limites  des  Etats-unis  au  Sud  de  1'Ohio  se 
bornent  aux  montagnes  en  suivant  le  versant  des  eaux  et  que  ce  qui  est 
•au  Nord  de  cette  riviere  nommement  les  lacs  a  autrefois  fait  parti  du 
Canada."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne.  (Ibid.)  Vergennes  had  gained  this 
idea  doubtless  from  the  memorial  of  Rayneval,  and  this  is  the  first  time 
he  expressed  it.  In  spite  of  this  purely  legal  view  of  the  question  Ver- 
gennes wrote,  "Nous  pensons  comme  les  Americains,  M.  sur  1'importance 
de  1'etablissement  des  anglois  a  Oswego,  cette  station  en  meme  tems 
qu'elle  en  impose  aux  Sauvages  met  les  Anglois  en  mesure  de  troubler 
les  derrieres  de  la  province  de  Newyork."  Ibid. 

34"Si  les  Commissioners  americains  sont  exacts  dans  les  comptes  qu'ils 
rendent  a  leurs  Commitans  ils  ne  Se  plaindront  pas  que  nous  cherchons  a 
influenc  et  a  les  gener  dans  leur  negociations."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne, 
November  23.  (E.  U.,  no.  43.)  After  the  peace  he  wrote :  "Vous  aplaud- 
irez  surement  M.  aussique  moi  aux  avantages  tres  Etendus  que  nos  allies 
les  americains  doivent  recuiller  par  la  paix."  December  19.  (Ibid.,  no. 
45.) 


214  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [324 

colonies.35  Virginia,  the  most  aggressive  of  all  the  states, 
had  insisted  upon  nothing  more  than  the  Ohio  as  the  boun- 
dary; but  Congress  did  not  have  courage  enough  to  insist 
upon  even  this  much.36  Even  after  Yorktown  some  of  the 
most  aggressive  Americans  offered  to  leave  all  the  disputed 
territory  in  the  West  to  the  Indians  under  the  joint  pro- 
tection of  Spain,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United 
States,37  and  several  states  agreed  to  accept  the  mountains 
as  the  western  boundary.38 

Military  conditions  also  seemed  to  forbid  the  preten- 
sions of  Congress  to  extensive  territories.  The  British  still 
held  the  posts  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  continued  to  do  so 
for  many  years.  Parts  of  the  South  as  well  as  the  city  of 
New  York  and  other  important  posts  were  still  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  Under  these  conditions  it  seemed  that  Ver- 
gennes  was  right  in  his  declaration  that  Congress  had  no. 
claim  whatever  to  the  wide  regions  of  the  West. 

In  spite  of  all  these  discouragements  Vergennes  stood 
ever  ready  to  help  the  ambitions  of  his  American  allies. 
Altho  he  condemned  the  extravagance  of  the  American 
claims,  he  never  tried  to  get  his  allies  to  demand  less,  but 
offered  rather  to  assist  them  to  the  best  of  his  ability.39  In 
spite  of  the  unconcealed  dislike  of  Jay  and  Adams,  and 
his  own  dislike  of  them,  Vergennes  showed  himself  through- 
out a  loyal  friend  to  the  United  States.  Even  when  he 
found  his  counsels  disregarded  and  the  pledges  made  to 
him  badly  broken,  he  showed  no  trace  of  jealousy  or  mean- 
ness. For  the  ability  of  the  American  diplomats  he  showed 

85Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  133. 

88See  page  207,  note  14. 

37They  told  Luzerne  that  "si  Ton  assuroit  aux  Sauvages  la  possession- 
des  Pays  contestes  sous  la  garantie  de  la  France,  de  1'Esp  de  1'Angleterre 
et  des  Etats-unis  ce  parti  accomodiroit  peutetre  tout  le  monde."  Luzerne- 
to  Vergennes,  September  12,  1782.  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  271,  new  68.) 

88Luzerne  mentions  Maryland  as  willing  to  accept  this.  (Ibid.,  no.. 
89,  new  275.) 

S9Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  November  23,  1782.  (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  160,. 
new  43.)  See  also  p.  211,  note  25. 


325]        VERGENNES  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  PEACE       215 

the  greatest  respect,  and  their  success  not  only  surprised 
him  but  aroused  in  him  the  liveliest  admiration.40 

To  Vergennes  America  owes  a  great  debt  of  gratitude 
for  the  preservation  of  its  independence.  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  he  entered  the  war  for  a  selfish  purpose,  from 
which  he  never  entirely  escaped,  the  years  of  common  trials 
and  efforts,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  French  people,  and  the 
personality  of  Franklin,  infused  his  cold  heart  with  some- 
thing like  enthusiasm  for  the  nation  he  had  called  into 
existence,  and  for  whose  protection  he  devoted  the  best 
efforts  of  many  years.  We  may  give  great  praise  to  the 
foreign  heroes  who  fought  and  died  in  defense  of  American 
liberties,  but  among  all  the  friends  of  the  new  republic,  no 
one  can  show  a  higher  title  to  loyalty,  not  even  the  lovable 
and  chivalrous  Lafayette,  than  the  care-worn  and  thought- 
ful statesman,  Vergennes. 

*°Vergennes  wrote  of  the  American  envoys  that  they  were  "no  less 
practised  than  the  English  in  the  art  of  drawing  indefinite  lines  and  of 
making  them  a  title  and  a  right."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  November  23. 
(E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  160.)  He  further  declared  that  the  English  bought 
peace  rather  than  made  it.  McLaughlin,  Confederation  and  Constitution 
30.  In  order  to  show  his  good  will  he  made  the  Americans  a  new  grant 
of  six  million  livres  immediately  after  the  articles  were  signed.  Doniol, 
Histoire,  V.  269. 


CHAPTER    XII 

PEACE 

Peace,  the  goal  towards  which  Vergennes  had  so  pa- 
tiently toiled,  came  at  last;  but  it  came  through  negotia- 
tions unknown  to  him,  and  by  a  diplomacy  which  over- 
reached his  own.  During  the  early  years  of  the  war  Ver- 
gennes had  often  expressed  astonishment  at  British  stupid- 
ity in  alienating  the  colonies,1  and  he  felt  that  he  was  scor- 
ing a  triumph  in  winning  them  to  France.  With  the  over- 
throw of  the  North  ministry,  however,  the  accession  to 
power  of  Shelburne,  first,  as  secretary  of  state  for  the  col- 
onies, then  as  prime  minister,  all  this  was  changed.  Shel- 
burne at  once  inaugurated  a  new  policy,  a  policy  of  con- 
ciliation towards  an  independent  republic,  and,  instead  of 
humiliating  America,  he  bid  high  for  her  friendship,  and 
carried  off  the  prize  for  which  Vergennes  had  already  paid 
so  dearly. 

With  this  plan  in  mind  Shelburne  had,  early  in  the 
spring  of  1782,  sent  Richard  Oswald,  a  Scotch  merchant, 
to  Paris  to  sound  Franklin  on  the  conditions  which  the 
Americans  would  ask  for  peace,  and  to  suggest  a  treaty 
separate  from  the  one  with  France.  To  this  idea  of  a  sepa- 
rate treaty  Franklin  at  once  objected;  but  he  was  ready 
enough  to  suggest  the  terms  of  peace  which  he  regarded 
as  suitable.2  Oswald  talked  much  of  conciliation  and,  with 
this  idea  in  mind,  Franklin  declared  that  in  order  to  con- 
ciliate, Great  Britain  should  cede  Canada  to  the  United 
States,  as  an  evidence  of  her  good  will.3  This  suggestion 
did  not  meet  any  objection  from  the  British  agent,  who 
asked  permission  to  submit  it  to  his  government,  and  the 

aSee  page  14. 

2Franklin's  Journal,  Writings  (Smyth  ed.),  VIII,  463. 

*Ibid.,  472. 

216 


327]  PEACE  217 

American  envoy  consented.  A  few  days  later  Oswald  in- 
formed Franklin  that  he  thought  the  "affairs  of  Canada 
would  be  settled  to  [your]  satisfaction,"  but  he  asked  that 
it  be  not  pressed  until  near  the  end  of  the  negotiations.4 

The  negotiations  dragged  slowly  on  until  midsummer, 
when  Franklin  became  more  active;  and,  on  July  10,  he 
outlined  to  Oswald  a  definite  plan  of  a  treaty,  which  made 
as  a  necessary  article  "a  confinement  of  the  boundaries  of 
Canada  to  what  they  were  before  the  last  act  of  Parlia- 
ment, I  think  in  1774,  if  not  to  a  still  more  contracted  state 
on  an  ancient  footing,"  and  which  declared  that  the  cession 
of  all  Canada  was  advisable.5  Oswald  submitted  these 
conditions  to  Shelburne,  who  in  the  meantime  had  become 
prime  minister,  and  had  left  Townshend  to  direct  negotia- 
tions with  the  Americans.  Townshend  followed  Shelburne's 
liberal  policy  and  agreed  to  the  withdrawal  of  British 
forces  from  the  states,  and  promised  also  a  part  of  the 
"ungranted  lands  to  be  annexed  to  each  province  in  return 
for  the  restoration  of  the  loyalists."6 

In  the  meantime  negotiations  were  going  on  rapidly 
in  Paris,  and  early  in  August  Franklin  and  Vergennes 
united  in  demanding  a  "treaty  that  no  one  would  break."7 
Shortly  after  this  Franklin  plead  with  Oswald  to  grant 
the  Americans  a  permanent  peace  on  such  conditions  as 
not  "to  force  them  into  the  hands  of  other  people,"  and  he 
explained  that  in  order  to  ensure  such  a  peace  the  United 
States  must  have  Canada.8  From  the  drift  of  the  negotia- 
tions and  the  avowals  of  Oswald  the  experienced  American 
saw  the  British  ministry  was  willing  to  sacrifice  much  for 
peace,  and  still  more  to  win  the  friendship  of  the  United 
States.  Oswald  complained  that  the  French  proposals 
were  exorbitant  and  appealed  to  Franklin  to  check  them  ;9 

4Franklin,  Writings  (Smyth  ed.),  VIII,  486. 

5Oswald  to  Shelburne,  July  10,  1782.    (F.  O.,  France,  2a,  fols.  42-44.) 

•Dated  July  25,  1782.     (Ibid.,  2a,  fols.  87-92.) 

7Oswald  to  Townshend,  August  7,  1782.     (Ibid.,  141.) 

8Oswald  to  Townshend,  August  13,  1782.     (Ibid.,  152-161.) 

^Oswald  to  Townshend,  August  15,  1782.     (Ibid.,  2a,  173.) 


218  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [328 

but  that  wily  statesman  pressed  his  advantage  so  strongly 
that  the  British  agent  was  compelled  to  advise  the  accept- 
ance of  his  demands.10 

The  British  government  acted  before  receiving  Os- 
wald's communication,  and  on  September  1  acceded  to  the 
full  extent  of  Franklin's  ultimatum  of  July  10.  By  this 
it  agreed  to  recognize,  first  of  all,  independence.  The  third 
article  provided  for  the  restriction  of  the  boundaries  of 
Canada  to  what  they  were  before  1774 ;  the  fourth  granted 
the  freedom  of  fishing  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland ;  and 
another  clause  added  that:  "His  Majesty  will  also  waive 
collection  of  debts  before  1775  and  also  claims  of  refugees 
for  losses."11 

Here  was  granted  all  that  the  Americans  could  hope 
to  obtain  and  more  than  was  to  be  ultimately  conceded 
them.  It  had  been  the  aim  of  the  Shelburne  ministry  to 
detach  the  United  States  from  France  and  these  conditions 
were  well  calculated  to  effect  it.  The  genius  of  the  mighty 
Franklin  had  triumphed. 

On  September  5,  Oswald  wrote  Franklin  that  he  had 
received  definite  information  as  to  the  views  of  the  British 
ministry  in  regard  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  and  was  then 
ready  to  begin  formal  negotiations.12  Franklin  replied 
three  days  later,  asking  for  a  copy  of  Oswald's  instruc- 
tions,13 and  it  appeared  that  the  terms  would  soon  be  satis- 
factorily settled. 

These  instructions,  however,  were  never  submitted  to 
Franklin.  Jay  had  arrived  at  Paris  some  time  before  and 

10Oswald  strongly  urged  the  cession  of  that  part  of  Canada  added  by 
the  act  of  1774.  "If  not  granted,"  he  wrote,  "this  will  cause  much  diffi- 
culty, especially  on  the  western  frontier,  and  a  refusal  would  occasion  a 
particular  grudge  as  a  deprivation  of  an  extent  of  valuable  territory,  the 
several  provinces  have  always  counted  upon  as  their  own."  He  advised 
also  that  a  right  to  the  fisheries  be  granted  to  avoid  quarrels  with  New 
England.  Oswald  to  Townshend,  August  29,  1782.  (F.  O.,  France,  2a, 
fol.  234.) 

"Townshend  to  Oswald,  September  i,  1782.     (Ibid.,  2a,  101.) 
12Oswald  to  Franklin,  September  5.     (Wharton   Dip.  Cor.,  V,  699.) 
"Franklin  to  Oswald,  September  8.    (Ibid.,  V,  712.) 


329]  PEACE  219 

begun  an  aimless  negotiation  with  Aranda  which  led  to 
nothing,  because  the  two  could  not  agree  on  the  exchange 
of  their  commissions.14  Franklin  had  been  sick  since  June 
and  was  willing  to  entrust  the  burden  of  affairs  to  his 
young  associate,  who  was  only  too  glad  to  undertake  the 
more  congenial  task.  Jay  was  a  far  different  man  from 
Franklin.  He  was  young  and  comparatively  inexperienced 
in  the  management  of  men,  and  he  possessed  neither  the 
reputation  nor  the  personality  that  gave  such  weight  to  the 
words  of  his  aged  compatriot.  Jay  had  come  to  Paris  dis- 
gusted with  the  Spaniards,  but  he  soon  came  to  dislike  the 
French  more,  and  he  hated  the  British  as  a  patriotic  Ameri- 
can should. 

The  attitude  of  Jay  at  once  made  it  impossible  to  con- 
tinue the  negotiations;  for,  on  reading  the  commission  of 
Oswald,  he  found  that  it  did  not  recognize  the  independ- 
ence of  the  United  States  and  refused  to  treat  until  a  new 
commission  was  framed  with  form  more  to  his  liking. 
Franklin  protested,  but  in  vain.  Oswald  was  compelled  to 
write  for  a  new  commission  and  the  negotiations  were  held 
up  for  several  weeks;  it  was  not  until  September  28  that 
the  two  were  ready  to  renew  the  discussion  of  terms  of 
peace.15 

In  the  meantime  Jay  had  found  fresh  causes  of  suspi- 
cion against  the  French  court.  Vergennes  had  advised  him 
to  continue  the  negotiations  and  to  allow  Oswald  to  act 
under  his  old  commission,  and  this  had  convinced  him  that 
"this  court  chooses  to  postpone  an  acknowledgement  of 
our  independence  by  Britain,  to  the  conclusion  of  a  general 
peace  in  order  to  keep  us  under  their  direction."  The  Brit- 
ish had  transmitted  to  him  a  copy  of  an  intercepted  letter 
from  Marbois  which  opposed  American  claims  on  the  fish- 
eries,16 and  the  memorial  of  Rayneval  on  the  terms  of  set- 

14Jay  to  Livingston,  September  18.     (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  V,  740.) 

15 Jay  to  Adams,  September  28.     (Ibid.,  778.) 

"Jay  to  Livingston,  September  18,  1782.  (Wharton,  Dip,  Cor.,  V, 
740.)  It  is  doubtful  if  this  letter  of  Marbois'  is  authentic,  as  the  French 
envoy  always  wrote  in  cipher. 


220  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [330 

tleinent  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  had  angered 
him.  With  these  feelings  he  was  sure  to  be  alarmed  at  any 
unforeseen  move  on  the  part  of  the  French  court.  Jay  at 
once  became  suspicious  of  Rayneval's  mission  to  London, 
and  decided  to  despatch  an  agent  to  Shelburne  to  counter- 
act any  intrigues  of  the  French  secretary.  Benjamin 
Vaughn,  a  friend  of  America,  was  selected  for  this  purpose, 
and  he  was  instructed  to  show  the  ministry  that  it  was 
"the  obvious  interest  of  Britain,  immediately  to  cut  the 
cords  which  tied  us  to  France,"  and  to  propose  a  settlement 
with  Great  Britain  with  this  undertaking  as  a  basis.17 
Vaughn  proceeded  to  London,  had  several  interviews  with 
Shelburne  and  convinced  him  that  the  United  States  were 
willing  to  break  away  from  France. 

Oswald's  new  commission  arrived  on  the  27th  and  he 
and  Jay  at  once  drew  up  a  proposed  treaty  on  the  basis  of 
the  instructions  of  September  I.18  The  first  article  pro- 
vided for  the  boundaries  asked  by  Congress  in  1778,  and 
included,  besides  what  was  later  assigned  the  United 
States,  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  territory  south  of  Lake 
Mpissing.19  In  this  treaty,  as  in  all  subsequent  projects, 
there  was  a  provision  for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi. 

Altho  Townshend  had  authorized  these  terms,  he  dis- 
avowed the  treaty.  The  reason  is  obvious.  He  had  offered 
these  concessions  in  order  to  separate  the  United  States 

17Jay  to  Livingston.    (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  VI,  29.) 
18Jay  to  Livingston.     (Ibid.,  47.) 

19"The  said  states  are  bounded  north  by  a  line  drawn  from  the 
north-west  angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  along  the  highlands  which  divide  those 
rivers  which  empty  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  from  those  which  fall 
into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  to  the  northermost  head  of  the  Connecticut  river, 
thence  down  along  the  middle  of  that  river  to  the  45th  degree  of  north 
latitude  ....  thence  due  west  to  the  northernmost  side  of  the  river  St. 
Lawrence  ....  thence  straight  to  the  south  end  of  Lake  Nepissing,  and 
thence  straight  to  the  source  of  the  Mississippi."  On  the  west  the  United 
States  were  to  be  bounded  by  the  Mississippi  and  on  the  south  by  the 
Floridas.  (Ibid.,  V,  806;  F.  O.,  France,  29,  305.) 


331]  PEACE  221 

from  French  influence,20  but  the  mission  of  Vaughn  showed 
him  that  this  end  was  already  accomplished.  Before  this 
time  the  British  put  forth,  as  the  chief  aim  of  their  policy, 
conciliation;  and  it  was  with  this  understanding  that 
Franklin  and  Oswald  had  carried  on  their  negotiations, 
and  upon  it  Franklin  had  based  his  demands.  To  Great 
Britain,  however,  conciliation  did  not  mean  so  much  friend- 
ship to  her  as  enmity  to  France;  and  when  the  Shelburne 
ministry  perceived  that  the  councils  of  their  enemies  were 
divided  they  withdrew  their  bids  for  friendship. 

Jay  was  deeply  disappointed  at  the  failure  of  his 
efforts.  He  felt  that  he  must  strive  against  all  Europe  and 
even  against  his  fellow  negotiator.  "I  think  we  have  no 
rational  dependence  except  on  God  and  ourselves,"  he 
wrote,  "nor  can  I  yet  be  persuaded  that  Great  Britain  has 
either  wisdom,  virtue  or  magnanimity  enough  to  adopt  a 
perfect  and  liberal  system  of  conciliation."21  His  disap- 
pointment was  the  keener  for  the  assurances  of  Oswald 
had  convinced  him  that  there  would  be  no  objection  to  the 
treaty  as  drawn  up.  He  now  showed  the  greatest  indigna- 
tion towards  Oswald  and  even  resorted  to  threats  of  break- 
ing off  the  negotiations.22 

However  much  Jay  felt  anger  at  the  duplicity  of  Brit- 
ain, he  gained  no  love  for  France.23  His  suspicion  and 
distrust  of  her  policy  increased  and  soon  after  the  arrival 
of  Adams  in  October,  the  two  resolved  to  keep  secret  from 
her  all  knowledge  of  their  negotiations  and  forced  the  aged 
and  enfeebled  Franklin  to  agree. 

20Shelburne  wrote  to  Carleton  and  Digby,  June  3,  that  independence 
was  offered  "with  the  view  of  showing  America  that  farther  war  was  only 
in  the  interest  of  France  and  Spain,  and  to  detach  her  from  France." 
(C.  O.  5,  Vol.  178,  fol.  439.) 

21Jay  to  Livingston,  November  17.     (Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  VI,  49.) 

22Jay  replied  that  in  the  case  of  the  refugees  nothing  could  be  done; 
and  that  if  Great  Britain  broke  off  negotiations  on  that  account,  the 
United  States  would  present  claims  against  her  for  unnecessary  destruc- 
tion in  war."  Oswald  to  Townshend,  November  6.  (F.  O.,  France,  29, 
fol.  340.) 

23Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  VI,  47. 


222  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [332 

From  this  time  on,  however,  the  British  conducted 
their  negotiations  in  a  different  spirit.  Hitherto  they  had 
talked  of  conciliation,  and  even  of  federal  union ;  but  now 
they  began  to  push  more  vigorously  their  material  advant- 
ages. Oswald  had  served  well  enough  when  conciliation 
was  the  end,  and  he  still  remained  at  Paris,  where  his 
frankness  and  sincerity  were  a  valuable  asset.  To  push 
the  claims  of  the  empire,  however,  a  different  man  was 
necessary;  and  the  shrewd  and  determined  Strachey  was 
sent  to  look  after  the  boundary  question  and  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  loyalists.24 

Strachey  began  his  efforts  with  vigor.  No  longer  were 
there  projects  of  ceding  Canada,  but  in  place  of  this  there 
was  a  demand  that  the  country  north  of  the  Ohio  be  used 
to  found  a  colony  of  loyalists.25  Nothing  had  been  said  of 
this  in  the  previous  negotiations,  but  now  Strachey  added 
a  restriction  of  the  right  to  fish  on  the  banks  of  the  New- 
foundland. Of  the  arguments  used  to  beat  down  the  new 
demands  of  Britain  we  know  little;  but  Adams  and  Jay 
were  determined  men  and  resolved  to  surrender  nothing. 

On  the  north  the  Americans  offered  the  choice  of  two 
lines.  The  first  provided  a  boundary  running  from  the  in- 
tersection of  the  forty-fifth  parallel  with  the  Connecticut 
river  due  west  to  the  Mississippi.  The  second  ran  west  on 
the  same  parallel  to  the  St.  Lawrence,  thence  through  the 
middle  of  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  sources  of  the  Missis- 
sippi.26 Both  provided  that  in  case  Great  Britain  should 
keep  Florida  the  southern  boundary  should  run  through 
the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  due  west  to  the  Applachicola,  and 
both  provided  also  for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi. Strachey  had  been  borne  down  by  the  superior  skill 
and  determination  of  his  adversaries,  but  he  refused  to  do 

24Townshend  to  Oswald,  October  23,  1782.  (F.  O.,  France,  2a,  328.) 
Of  Strachey  Adams  wrote,  "He  is  artful  and  insinuating.  He  pushes  and 
presses  every  point  as  far  as  it  could  possibly  go;  he  is  the  most  eager, 
earnest,  pointed  spirit" 

"Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  VI,  113. 

26/&tU,  V.  856.  Strachey  to  Townshend,  November  8,  1/82.  (F.  O., 
France,  2a,  363;  C.  O.  5,  8.) 


333]  PEACE  223 

more  than  transmit  the  proposed  treaties  to  Townshend  for 
his  consideration.  Neither  of  them  was  in  accord  with  the 
instructions  sent  out  by  the  British  ministry,  but  the 
Americans  had  pronounced  this  their  ultimatum.27 

The  provisions  regarding  the  Floridas  were  the  result 
of  Jay's  efforts  and  grew  out  of  his  dislike  for  Spain  and 
perhaps  also  of  a  desire  to  embarrass  Vergennes.  Jay  had 
formerly  been  very  hostile  to  Great  Britain;  but  this  had 
changed  under  the  genial  frankness  of  Oswald  and  through 
the  suspicious  attitude  of  his  allies  into  a  feeling  of  friend- 
ship.28 During  the  early  days  of  September,  while  Oswald 
was  waiting  for  his  new  commission,  Jay  often  talked  in- 
formally with  him  of  the  Floridas,  and  in  these  conversa- 
tions, the  British  envoy  often  expressed  the  desire  that  if 
Great  Britain  should  keep  them  their  boundary  might  be 
pushed  still  further  to  the  north.  Jay  met  the  suggestion 
kindly  and  declared  that  since  the  proclamation  of  1763 
the  boundary  had  been  moved  northward  by  another  proc- 
lamation.29 

With  this  the  matter  was  allowed  to  drop,  but  Jay 
brought  it  forward  again  when  he  took  up  the  negotiations 
with  Oswald,  and  suggested  that  the  British  forces  in 
New  York  be  sent  on  an  expedition  to  seize  these  prov- 
inces.30 He  declared  that  he  did  not  want  to  leave  in  the 
hands  of  the  Spaniards  authority  over  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
and  with  it  control  of  the  western  trade;  and  he  main- 
tained that  any  agreement  regarding  this  region  would  not 
be  a  violation  of  the  alliance  with  France.31  Jay  argued 

27Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  V,  856;  F.  O.,  France,  2a,  363;  C.  O.  5,  8. 

28Until  the  middle  of  August  Oswald  believed  that  nothing  could  be 
expected  of  Jay.  Oswald  to  Townshend,  August  7.  (F.  O.,  France,  2a, 
125.)  Later  he  wrote,  "Jay  is  more  friendly."  (Ibid.,  162.) 

"Oswald  to  Townshend,  September  n.  (F.  O.,  France,  23,  332.)  This 
was  the  proclamation  of  1767. 

"October  2.     (Ibid.,  271.) 

31"The  employment  of  these  troops  [in  America]  against  Spain  would 
not  infringe  on  the  treaty  with  France,  Jay  says,  for  the  states  are  not 
bound  to  Spain."  (Ibid.)  "Jay  again  insists  that  for  the  common  good 
Florida  shall  not  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards."  (Ibid.,  280.) 


224  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [334 

that  the  province  was  rich  in  itself  and  would  be  of  addi- 
tional advantage  to  the  British  in  giving  them  control  of 
both  outlets  to  the  Mississippi  Valley;  the  Gulf  and  the 
St.  Lawrence,  by  which  they  could  hold  all  the  trade  they 
had  ever  possessed.  As  a  final  argument  he  urged  that  the 
retention  of  the  Floridas  would  go  far  to  win  the  friend- 
ship of  the  Americans.  He  became  every  day  more  earnest 
and  finally  offered  to  write  General  Washington  asking 
him  to  permit  the  peaceable  evacuation  of  New  York  and 
Charleston  by  the  British  troops.32  Oswald  was  convinced, 
from  Jay's  earnestness,  that  he  could  carry  the  boundary 
of  West  Florida  far  to  the  northward.33 

Townshend  did  not  take  kindly,  however,  to  the  efforts 
of  Jay.  He  was  suspicious  of  the  whole  transaction,  but 
he  believed  that  capital  might  be  made  of  it  if  France 
should  learn  the  details.34  Oswald  was  anxious  for  the 
arrangement,  and  urged  that  if  it  had  no  other  merit  it 
would  at  least  please  the  Americans.35  Jay  was  afraid 
of  the  effect  of  his  suggestions,  and  when  the  provision  re- 
garding the  Florida  boundary  was  inserted  he  "scored  it 
out"  but  "admitted  it  in  addition  at  the  bottom  as  a  sepa- 
rate article."36  Jay  himself  was  not  proud  of  his  tactics, 
and  altho  he  dwelt  with  pride  on  the  early  negotiations 
with  Oswald  with  which  he  had  nothing  to  do,  he  never 
found  occasion  to  discuss  the  part  he  took  in  the  Florida 
boundary  arrangement.37 

In  the  later  negotiations  Franklin  took  little  part  and 
their  success  may  be  attributed  to  the  vigor  and  determina- 
tion of  Jay  and  Adams.  The  man,  who  had  won  for  the 
United  States  the  aid  of  France  and  who  had  overreached 
the  diplomacy  of  Britain,  was  now  worn  with  disease,  and 
was  pushed  out  by  his  younger  associates.  He  found  his 

32Oswald  to  Townshend,  October  7.    (F.  O.,  France,  2&,  302.) 
"October  8.     (Ibid,,  310.) 

"Townshend  to  Oswald,  October  26.    (Ibid.,  330.) 
35Oswald  to  Townshend,  December  4.    (Ibid.,  489.) 
36Oswald  to  Strachey,  November  8.     (Ibid.,  388.) 
"Compare  letters  of  Adams  to  Livingston  on  this  question.     (Whar- 
ton,  Dip.  Cor.,  V,  856.) 


335]  PEACE  225 

advice  overborne  in  their  councils,  and  his  suggestions 
disregarded ;  but  to  preserve  harmony  he  still  signed  their 
despatches  and  forebore  any  opposition.  Altho  his  shrewd 
mind  must  have  seen  clearly  the  contempt  with  which 
Adams  and  Jay  regarded  him,38  he  bore  the  humiliation 
patiently,  and  at  last  with  hearty  goodwill  made  their 
peace  with  the  irritated  Vergennes.39 

The  firmness  of  Jay  and  Adams  was  not  due  to  any 
knowledge  of  the  negotiations  of  their  allies  but  to  their 
own  personal  convictions.  At  that  time,  however,  Florida 
Blanca  and  Shelburne  were  deadlocked  over  the  question 
of  Gibraltar;  and  unless  terms  were  speedily  arranged 
with  the  Americans,  the  allied  powers  might  renew  the 
war.40  Under  the  circumstances  Shelburne  chose  to  give 
the  United  States  favorable  terms  and  detach  them  from 
the  Bourbon  alliance  and  then  refuse  the  demands  of 
Spain. 

The  work  of  Jay  and  Adams  made  it  impossible  for 
the  Spanish  court  to  realize  its  hopes.  The  Bourbons  had 
offered  Guadaloupe  and  San  Domingo  for  Gibraltar  and 
expected  to  settle  on  these  terms.  When  Shelburne  heard 
of  the  agreement  with  the  Americans,  however,  he  raised 
his  price  so  high  that  it  could  not  be  accepted  and,  even 
after  the  preliminaries  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  were  signed,  France  threatened  to  renew 
the  war.41 

Shelburne  was  anxious  for  peace  and  made  a  last  ef- 
fort for  conciliation.  He  offered  to  cede  Spain  the  Flor- 
idas  and  Minorca  provided  she  would  surrender  her  pre- 
tensions to  Gibraltar;  and  Spain  seeing  the  helplessness 
of  her  position  accepted  these  terms. 

There  remained  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi.  The  British  had  conceded  it  to  the  Ameri- 

38See  Adams's  Journal  for  his  opinion  of  Franklin. 
39Wharton,  Dip.  Cor.,  V,  857. 

^"Correspondence  of  Fitzherbert,"  who  was  negotiating  with  France 
and  Spain.     (F.  O.,  France,  7,  797,  et  seq.) 
41Doniol,  Histoire,  V,  228-231. 


226  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [336 

cans  but  their  concessions  were  valueless.  In  the  final 
negotiations  Vergennes  was  to  show  again  his  friendship 
for  the  United  States.  If  Great  Britain  had  surrendered 
the  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi  to  Spain  the  Ameri- 
cans would  have  had  no  recourse.  If  she  had  fixed  the 
boundaries  of  the  Floridas  in  her  treaty  with  Spain, 
American  claims  would  have  been  weakened.  Spain  was 
anxious  to  obtain  these  advantages;  Great  Britain  had  no 
interest  in  refusing  them;  and  to  Vergennes  alone  must 
be  given  the  thanks  for  thwarting  Spanish  ambition.42 

The  preliminaries  of  peace  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  were  agreed  upon  on  November  20,  1782 ; 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  Bourbon  powers  on  Janu- 
ary 20;  and  the  question  of  the  West  passes  out  of  the 
American  ^Revolution. 

The  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  boundaries 
of  the  Floridas  were  still  fruitful  causes  of  dispute.  Flor- 
ida Blanca  accepted  the  western  boundary  as  agreed  upon 
by  the  British  and  American  negotiators,  and  began  at 
once  negotiations  concerning  the  Mississippi.43  Montmorin 
and  Aranda  recommended  that  New  Orleans  be  made  a 
free  port;  but  this  advice  was  too  liberal  for  the  Spanish 
minister.44  Vergennes  expressed  similar  views,45  altho  he 

42"Je  suis  informe  d'une  maniere  assez  possitive  que  ce  dernier  [J. 
Adams]  a  mande  en  amerique  que  nous  avions  cherche  a  les  centre  carrer 
en  angre  relative  aux  limites  et  .  .  .  Des  imputations  de  cette  nature  sont 
si  absurdes  qu'elles  se  detruisent  parelles-memes  cependant  comme  j'ai 
lieu  a  croire  qu'elles  ont  quelques  adherents  en  amerique  et  comme  M. 
Adams  doit  y  retourner  incessament,  je  pense  se  devoir  a  tout  evenement 
vous  metter  en  etat  de  les  refuter."  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  September  7, 
1783.  (E.  U.,  XXV,  no.  52,  new  144.) 

"Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  February  18,  1783.  (Esp.,  610,  no.  67.) 
Vergennes  wrote  that  the  great  trouble  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  was  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  (Ibid.,  no.  80.) 

44Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  March  i,  1783.     (Ibid.,  no.  up.) 

"Vergennes  declared  that  Spain  would  not  adopt  his  sentiments  on 
account  of  contraband.  (Ibid.,  no.  149.)  ...  la  conduite  de  1'Espagne  a 
1'egard  des  Etats-unis  etablit  une  sisteme  d'eloignement  entre  les  deux 
nations.  Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  December  20,  1782,  (Ibid.,  XXII,  no.  46, 
new  188.) 


337]  PEACE  227 

realized  that  they  were  futile.  At  the  same  time  he  urged 
moderation  upon  the  Americans  in  their  dealings  with 
Spain,46  and  preserved  to  the  last  his  r61e  of  harmonizer. 

In  America  news  of  the  peace  was  received  with  joy, 
altho  there  were  many  who  complained  that  the  boundaries 
of  the  country  were  too  much  restricted.47  Spain  raised 
no  complaint,  and  Vergennes  was  happy  that,  in  keeping 
the  faith  as  an  honest  man,  he  had  at  last  wrought  the 
humiliation  of  England  and  glorified  the  prestige  of  his 
beloved  France. 

"Vergennes  to  Luzerne,  December  20,  1782.     (E.  U.,  XXII,  no.  118.) 
47.  .  .  .  au  milieu  de  cette  agitation  un  petit  nombre  de  delegues  se 
(  )   montrent  deja  inquiets  a  1'egard  des  limites  .  .  ."     Luzerne  to 

Vergennes,  February  8,  1783.    (E.  U.,  XXIII,  no.  51,  new  154.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

GUIDES  AND  BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Andrews,  Charles  McLean.  Guide  to  the  Manuscript  Materials  for  th* 
History  of  the  United  States  to  1783,  in  the  Public  Record  Office,  London. 
Carnegie  Institution,  Washington,  1912. — This  work  is  thoro  and 
systematic  and  is  indispensable  to  all  who  have  occasion  to  work  in  the 
Public  Record  Office. 

and  Davenport,  Frances  G.  Guide  to  the  Manuscript  Materials 

for  the  History  of  the  United  States  to  1783,  in  the  British  Museum,  in 
Minor  London  Archives,  and  in  the  Libraries  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge. 
Carnegie  Institution,  Washington,  1908. — As  carefully  prepared  as  the 
Guide  to  the  Public  Record  Office.  It  does  not,  however,  have  as  much. 
to  do  with  material  valuable  for  this  study  as  does  the  former. 

Canada.  Report  on  the  Canadian  Archives.  26  vols.  in  23.  Ottawa, 
1882-1905. — Contains  much  material  of  interest  regarding  British  policy 
and  American  conditions. 

Catalogue  des  livres,  recueils,  cartes,  etc.,  relatifs  a  la  guerre  de 
I'independance  de  I'Amerique  et  a  I'etablissement  de  la  republigue  des  £tats- 
Unis  de  I'Amerique  du  Nord.  Amsterdam,  1888. — Of  little  value. 

Perez,  L.  M.     Guide  to  the  Materials  for  American  History  in  Cuban 
Archives.    Carnegie  Institution,  Washington,  1907. 

Shepherd,  William  H.  Guide  to  the  Materials  for  the  History  of  the 
United  States  in  Spanish  Archives  (Simancas,  the  Archivo  Nacional,  and 
Seville).  Carnegie  Institution,  Washington,  1907. 

United  States.  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library,  Bulletin,  No.  i.  Wash- 
ington, 1893. — This  gives  a  good  summary  of  the  documents  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

Van  Tyne,  Claude  Halstead,  and  Leland,  Waldo  Gifford.  Guide  to  the 
Archives  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  IVashington.  Car- 
negie Institution,  Washington,  1904. — This  is  a  very  useful  manual 
and  covers  completely  the  archival  material  in  Washington. 

MANUSCRIPT  SOURCES 
FRANCE. 

A.  Archives  Nationales.  Paris. — The  materials  found  in  the 
French  National  Archives  fall  into  four  groups :  Archives  des  Colonies,. 
Canada;  Archives  des  Colonies,  Louisiane,  44,  division  2;  Archives  de  la 
Marine,  B.  4,  cartons  125-402 ;  Correspondance  de  Vergennes,  series  K,  164.. 

228 


339]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  229 

(This  classification  was  taken  from  Doniol,  and,  altho  the  present  arrange- 
ment is  somewhat  different,  a  request  calling  for  the  old  numbers  brought 
the  works  desired.) 

Archives  des  Colonies,  Canada,  contain  little  material  of  the  period 
of  the  Revolution,  and  most  of  the  earlier  material  which  I  saw  related 
mostly  to  questions  of  administration. 

Archives  des  Colonies,  Louisiane.  These  are  largely  of  the  same 
character  as  the  former  but  they  contain  a  few  documents  of  a  political 
character  and  some  of  first-rate  importance. 

fitat  Sommaire  des  Archives  de  la  Marine  Anterieures  a  la  Revolution, 
B  4,  cartons  125-402. — These  contain  plans  of  naval  and  military  operations 
from  1774  to  1783,  many  of  them  of  such  a  character  as  to  reveal  the  trend 
of  French  diplomacy,  and  also  many  documents  of  great  political  import- 
ance. This  division  is  worthy  of  careful  and  exhaustive  study. 

Correspondance  de  Vergennes,  series  K,  164 — I  found  little  of  im- 
portance in  this. 

B.  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  Division  des  Manuscrits.  Paris. — The 
Division  of  Manuscripts  in  the  National  Library  is  much  better  conducted 
than  the  National  Archives ;  it  is  comparatively  easy  to  learn  what  it 
contains  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  gain  access  to  any  desired  documents. 
Only  the  Doniol  Transcripts  and  the  Margry  Collection  were  used. 

1.  Doniol,  Henri.    Histoire  de  la  participation  de  la  France  a  1'etab- 
lissement  des  fitats-Unis  d'Amerique.     Copies  et  epreuves  de  I'imprime. 
Paris.     Impri.     Nationale,  5  t.  in  4°,  1888-1892.     Don  de  1'auteur,  H.  M. 
Doniol,  directeur  de  1'Imprimerie  nationale.     34  vols.  in  mss.  and  proofs. 
Nouvelles  Acquisitions  franchises,  6464-6497.    The  volumes  of  these  tran- 
scripts are  classified  as  follows : 

I-VI.    Affaires  Etrangeres,  Angleterre,  1774-1783. 
VII.    Biblioteques  et  Archives  anglaises,  1775-1782. 
VIII-XVII.    Affaires  Etrangeres,  fitats-Unis,  1775-1782. 
XVIII.    Affaires  Etrangeres,  fitats-Unis,  Supple,  1765-1789. 
XIX-XXIX.    Affaires  Etrangeres,  Espagne,  1774-1782. 

XXX.  Affaires    Etrangeres,    Prusse,    Vienne,    Russie,    Hollande,    et 
Suede,  1776-1782. 

XXXI.  Archives  et  Biblioteques  nationales,  documents  divers,  1774- 

1795- 

XXXII.  Archives  de  la  Marine,  1776-1782. 

XXXIII-XXXIV.  Archives  dr.  la  Guerre,  Correspondance  de  Roch- 
ambeau,  1799-1781. 

These  documents  were,  for  the  most  part,  well  copied,  and  they  were 
very  useful  when  the  original  was  illegible.  They  were  also  useful  as  a 
guide  to  the  documents  in  the  National  Archives,  the  Foreign  Office  and 
in  other  places. 

2.  Margry,  P.  Documents  inedits  sous  la  Louisiane,  etudes  sous  le 
titre  d'histoire  des  cessions  de  la  Louisiane.    Nouvelles  Acquisitions  fran- 


230  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [340 

c.aises,  9309  et  seq. — Has  a   great  number  of   transcripts  of   documents 
collected  from  many  sources ;  many  of  these  are  very  interesting. 
C.    Ministere,  Archives  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.    Paris. 

1.  Angleterre.    Vols.  500  et  seq. — The  documents  in  this  series  do  not 
reveal  much  of  French  policy,  as  Vergennes  did  not  take  the  ambassa- 
dors to  England  fully  into  his  confidence.    The  series  has  nothing  regard- 
ing the  West. 

2.  Espagne.       Vols.      570-610      (1774-1783). — This     contains     the 
sources   for  all   the   diplomatic  negotiations  between   France   and   Spain 
during  the  Revolution,  the  correspondence  between  Vergennes  and  the 
French  ambassadors  to  Spain,  between  these  ambassadors  and  the  Spanish 
court,  and  minutes  of  cabinet  meetings,  the  decision  of  which  might  involve 
Spain,  copies  of  many  Spanish  documents  relating  to  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, and  other  documents  of  importance.    On  account  of  the  close  rela- 
tions of  the  two  countries  we  find  here  the  fullest  account  of  Spanish 
and  French  policy  regarding  the  territories  at  stake  in  the  Revolution. 

3.  France.     Vols.   410   et   seq.      (1774-1783). — These   volumes    con- 
tain some  documents  of  great  importance,  but  comparatively  few  by  men 
who  were  directing  affairs. 

4.  £tats-Unis.     Vols.    1-25     (1778-1784). — These     volumes     contain 
the    diplomatic    communications    between    Vergennes    and    the    French 
agents  in  America.    With  the  series  Espagne  they  give  the  whole  policy 
of  France  toward  the  American  Revolution.    They  also  give  much  infor- 
mation concerning  the  resources  of  the  country,  the  internal  conditions 
in  the  United  States,  and  politics  both  within  and  without  Congress.    The 
accounts  of  Gerard  and  Luzerne,  of  Washington,  Gouverneur  Morris,  Jay, 
Madison,  John  and  Samuel  Adams,  and  the  Lees,  represent  them  in  quite 
a  different  light  from  that  commonly  accepted,  and  give  new  information 
on  the  lapses  of  some  of  them. 

The  Archives  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  have  a  double  system  of  number- 
ing the  documents  contained  therein.  They  were  first  numbered  consecu- 
tively as  they  were  filed,  and  Doniol  referred  to  these  numbers  alone. 
Since  then  the  documents  have  been  in  part  renumbered  according  to  an- 
other system;  in  the  text  references  are  made  to  both  systems,  the  old 
and  the  new. 

GREAT  BRITAIN. 

A.  British  Museum.    London.    Auckland  Papers,  34415-34419. 

B.  Public  Record  Office.    London. 

I.  Colonial  Office  Papers  5,  Nos.  7-264.  Letters  of  the  secretaries  of 
state,  orders  in  council,  minutes  of  council  meetings,  abstracts  of  letters, 
Indian  affairs,  petitions,  military  dispatches,  war  office  papers,  commissions 
to  colonies,  peace  commissions,  Pelham  correspondence,  and  a  great  quan- 
tity of  miscellaneous  matter. The  Colonial  Office  is  rich  in  materials 

concerning  the  activities  of  the  British  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  their  plans 


341]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  231 

and  their  methods  of  carrying  them  out,  and  it  also  contains  personal 
papers  that  shed  light  on  the  subject. 
2.    Foreign  Office. 

a.  America  and  West  Indies,  Vol.  290.     Letters  on  Spanish  support 
to  the  rebels  on  the  Mississippi  (1776-1778). 

b.  France,  Nos.  2-10.     Advices  and  intelligences,  correspondence  of 
Thomas  Walpole,  Richard  Oswald,  Alleyne  Fitzherbert,  Thomas  Grenville, 
Duke  of  Manchester,  William  Strachey,  Thomas  Townshend,  and  the  Earl 
of  Shelburne   (1782-1783). — This  series  describes  all  the  negotiations  be- 
tween England  and  the  allies  from  the  British  viewpoint,  and  reveals  quite 
fully  the  plans  and  purposes  of  the  British  ministers. 

c.  Miscellaneous. 

No.  8.    American  duplicates,  1782-1783. 

No.  468.    Foreign  minister's  letter  book,  1782-1783. 

No.  535.  American  negotiations  in  Paris,  1782-1783.  This  is  a  collection 
of  transcripts  of  the  most  important  papers  describing  the  negotiations  at 
Paris.  I  had  no  opportunity  to  see  this  number  as  it  was,  at  the  time  when 
I  was  in  London,  withdrawn  from  the  use  of  the  public. 

d.  Spain.    No.  85.    Miscellaneous  dispatches  of  small  importance  for 
this  subject.     All  the  documents   described  above  in  the   Public  Record 
Office,  except  that  otherwise  noted,  were  used  in  the  preparation  of  this 
study.     Many  more  were  consulted,  but,  as  they  proved  of  no  value  for 
my  purpose,  they  are  not  described.    No  attempt  is  made,  however,  to  give 
a  full  description  of  these  documents,  for  they  are  fully  and  carefullv- 
described  in  Andrews'  Guide  to  the  Public  Record  Office. 

UNITED  STATES. 

A.    Department  of  State.    Washington. 

i.     Papers  of  the  Continental  Congress. 

No.  5.  Secret  Journals  of  Foreign  Affairs,  November  29,  17/S-Sep- 
tember  16,  1778.  3  vols.  folio. — These  have  been  published  in  the 
Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress. 

No.  18.     Foreign  letters  of  R.  L.  Livingston. 

No.  79.  Letters  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  R.  L. 
Livingston,  secretary  for  foreign  affairs.  3  vols.  and  appendix.  Vol  I, 
letter  book  of  the  committee  of  foreign  affairs  and  of  R.  L.  Livingston, 
1776-1782.  Vols.  II  and  III,  letters  of  R.  L.  Livingston.  Appendix,  letter 
book  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  1776-1781. — Many  of  these 
have  been  published  in  Wharton. 

No.  82.  Letters  of  Franklin  to  the  President  of  Congress  and  to  R.  L. 
Livingston,  secretary  for  foreign  affairs.  3  vols.  folio. — Many  or 
perhaps  all  of  these  are  published  in  Smyth's  edition  of  Franklin's  Works. 

No.  85.  Letters  of  the  Joint  Commissioners  for  the  negotiations  of 
peace,  i  vol.  folio. — Published  in  Wharton. 

No.  95.    Letters  of   de   la   Luzerne.    2  vols.    folio. — These   are   im- 


232  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [342 

portant  in  showing  the  methods  by  which  the  French  attempted  to  influ- 
ence Congress. 

No.  101.    Transcripts  of  letters  of  Franklin  and  Adams,  1781-1783. 

No.  105.  Transcripts  of  letters  of  joint  commissioners  of  the  United 
States,  I777-I779. 

No.  106.  Transcripts  of  letters  of  joint  commissioners  for  the  nego- 
tiations of  peace. 

No.  no.  Letters  of  Jay,  1779-1784. — Published  in  Correspondence  and 
Public  Papers  of  John  Jay. 

No.  in.  Communications  made  by  Monjr  Gerard,  Minister  Plenipo- 
tentiary of  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  to  the  United  States  of  America. 
Letter  book.  « 

No.  114.    Record  of  Correspondence  with  Foreign  Ministers,  1778-1779 

2.    Franklin  Papers. 

No.  i.    Records  of  the  United  States'  legation  at  Paris,  1777-1780. 

No.  2.    The  same,  1779. 

No.  3.    The  same,  1779-80. 

Nos.  8  and  8a.  The  same  and  records  of  the  Peace  Commission, 
1780-1783. 

No.  12.    Oswald's  Journal  (transcripts),  1782. 

No.  13.    Franklin's  Journal,  1782. 

These  papers  furnish  abundant  information  regarding  the  part  Frank 
lin  had  in  American  diplomacy. 

B.    Library  of  Congress,  Division  of  Manuscripts.    Washington. 

i.     Papers  of  the  Continental  Congress. 

No.  4.  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  Foreign  and  Domestic,  from 
October  18,  1780,  to  March  29,  1881,  folio. 

No.  7.  Journal  of  Congress  called  the  "more  secret  journal,"  June  6. 
I78i-August  8,  1782.  Pamphlet,  original  and  letter  book. 

Nos.  4  and  7  have  been  published  in  the  Journals  of  the  Continental 
Congress. 

No.  13.  Letter  books  of  the  Presidents  of  Congress  (Henry  Laurens) 
containing  official  letters  from  November  i,  1777,  to  December  8,  1778.  3 
vols.,  folio  and  index. 

No.  14.  Letters  of  the  Presidents  of  Congress  (John  Jay  and  Samuel 
Huntington),  December  n,  1778-May  19,  1780. 

No.  18.  Letter  books  (A  and  B)  of  Charles  Thomson,  secretary  of 
Congress,  containing  the  record  of  official  letters  from  November  20, 
1779,  to  May  i,  1789.  2  vols.  folio. 

No.  25.  Reports  of  committees  relating  to  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs  from  1776  to  1788.  2  vols.  folio.  Each  volume  has  two  parts. 

These  four  numbers  show  the  efforts  of  Congress  to  work  out  a  policy 
towards  the  West.  With  these  and  the  letters  of  Gerard  and  Luzerne 
we  have  a  full  account  of  this  policy. 

No.  41.  Memorials  addressed  to  Congress  from  1775  to  1778.  15  vols. 
folio  and  index. 


343]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  233 

No.  48.  Memorials  of  the  inhabitants  of  Illinois,  Kaskaskia,  and 
Kentucky,  1780-1785.  I  vol.  folio. 

No.  50.  Letters  and  papers  of  Oliver  Pollock  from  1772  to  1782.  2 
vols.  folio.  With  them  is  a  bundle  of  letters  relating  mostly  to  the  pur- 
chase of  slaves. 

These  three  numbers  give  important  information  in  regard  to  the 
state  of  public  feeling  in  the  West,  and  from  the  letters  of  Pollock  much 
information  can  be  gathered  regarding  Spanish  aid  to  the  Americans. 

No.  166.  Letters  and  papers  relating  to  Canadian  affairs,  to  General 
Sullivan's  expedition  in  1779,  and  to  the  northern  Indians.  It  also  gives 
an  account  of  Lafayette's  proposed  expedition  of  1778.  Folio. 

2.  Stevens,  Benjamin  Franklin  (compiler).  Catalogue  Index  of 
manuscripts  in  the  archives  of  England,  France,  Holland,  and  Spain,  re- 
lating to  America,  1763-1783.  50  vols.  Chronological  index  to  same.  100 
vols.  Alphabetical  index  to  same.  30  vols.  (London,  1870-1902). — The 
180  volumes  are  in  manuscript  in  the  Library  of  Congress.  The  work 
is  still  very  useful,  but  since  its  preparation  the  documents  in  the  Public 
Record  Office  in  London  and  in  the  Foreign  Office  in  Paris  have  been  re- 
numbered so  that  the  references  in  Stevens's  work  are  now  incorrect.  To 
one  who  wishes  to  know  what  is  contained  in  the  archives  of  Europe 
relating  to  America,  Stevens  is  useful. 

3. Transcripts  of  documents  in  European  archives  relating  to 

America,  1763-1783.  About  200  cartons. — Not  complete  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  West. 

4. Transcripts   of  documents   relating  to  the  French  alliance, 

1778-1784.  19  boxes. — Documents  transcribed  from  the  French  For- 
eign Office,  principally  correspondence  of  Vergennes  with  the  French 
ministers  in  America,  office  minutes,  taken  mostly  from  the  Archives  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  fitats-Unis,  III-XXVII. 

5. Peace  transcripts,  1782-1783.  18  vols. These  are  tran- 
scripts from  foreign  archives  relating  to  the  treaty  of  peace. 

6.  British  transcripts.  Transcripts  from  the  British  Museum,  Bodle- 
ian, Cotton,  Egerton,  Hargrave,  Harleian,  King's  Hyde,  Lansdowne,  and 

Sloane   libraries,   and    from   the    Public   Record    Office.      248   boxes. 

This  collection  has,  as  yet,  added  very  little  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
Revolutionary  period. 

PRINTED  SOURCES 

Adams,  John.  Works,  edited  by  Charles  Francis  Adams.  10  vols. 
Boston,  1850-1856. 

Alvord,  Clarence  Walworth.  Cahokia  Records,  1778-1790:  "Collections 
of  the  Illinois  State  Historical  Society,"  Vol.  II :  Virginia  Series,  Vol.  I 
Springfield,  1907. 

.  Kaskaskia  Records,  1778-1790:  Collections  of  the  Illinois 

State  Historical  Society,  Vol.  V :  Virginia  Series,  Vol.  II.  Springfield.  1909. 


234  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [344 

Chicago  Historical  Society.  Collections,  Vol.  IV.  Contains  Rocheblave 
Papers  and  John  Todd  Papers,  edited  by  E.  G.  Mason.  Chicago,  1890. 

Force,  Peter.  American  Archives  in  Six-  Series.  Series  one,  two.  and 
three  were  never  published.  Series  four  and  five  were  published  under 
authority  of  an  act  of  Congress.  Washington,  1837-1853. — Of  considerable 
value,  but  now  largely  superseded. 

Franklin,  Benjamin.  Writings,  edited  by  Albert  Henry  Smyth.  10 
vols.  New  York,  1905-1907. — Franklin  understood  diplomacy  better 
than  any  other  American  of  his  time,  and  he  fully  appreciated  the  im- 
portance of  the  West.  As  a  result,  his  works  possess  great  value  for  a 
study  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Revolution.  Smyth's  edition  is  good  but 
there  are  additional  documents  in  the  Papers  of  the  Continental  Congress 
and  some  letters  of  considerable  value  in  the  French  foreign  office. 

Hay,  H.  Miner.  Calendar  of  the  Papers  of  Benjamin  Franklin  in  the 
Library  of  the  American  Philosophical  Society.  5  vols.  Philadelphia,  1908. 

Jay,  John.  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  edited  by  Henry  P. 
Johnston.  4  vols.  New  York,  1891. — The  selections  are  good,  and 
the  work  as  a  whole  well  edited.  There  are  no  papers,  however,  that  show 
Jay's  early  attitude  on  the  question  of  the  West,  or  of  American  relations 
with  France  and  Spain. 

Lafayette,  General.  Memoires  et  correspondance  du  General  Lafay- 
ette. 6  vols  in  8.  Paris.  1838. — Valuable  for  Lafayette's  point  of 
view,  but  they  reveal  nothing  of  French  diplomacy  or  the  plans  of  the 
French  court. 

Lee  Richard  Henry.  Letters,  edited  by  James  Curtis  Ballagh.  New 
York,  1911. — Of  use  in  tracing  the  politics  of  Congress. 

Madison,  James.  The  Papers  of  James  Madison,  Purchased  by  Order 
of  Congress,  Being  His  Correspondence  and  Reports  of  Debates  during 
the  Congress  of  the  Confederation,  and  His  Reports  of  Debates  in  the 
Federal  Convention.  Published  under  the  superintendency  of  Henry  D. 
Gilpin.  3  vols.  Washington,  1840. 

Malloy,  William  M.  (Editor).  Treatises,  Conventions,  Interna- 
tional Acts,  and  Protocols  betiueen  the  United  States  and  Other  Pozi'ers, 
1776-1909.  2  vols.  Washington,  1910. 

Mlem-oire  lustortque  et  politique  sur  la  Lou-isiane  par  Vcrgcnney), 
Paris,  1802. — A  forgery;  see  above  pp.  31-32. 

New  York.  Documents  Relating  to  the  Colonial  History  of  the  State 
of  New  York,  Procured  by  J.  R.  Brodhead.  Vols.  I-XI  edited  by  E.  B. 
O'Callaghan;  vols  XII-XV  edited  by  B.  Fernow.  15  vols.  Albany, 
1853-1883. 

Sparks,  Jared.  The  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American 
Revolution.  6  vols.  Washington,  1857. — Now  superseded  by  Whar- 
ton's  work. 

Stevens,  Benjamin  Franklin.  Facsimiles  of  Manuscripts  in  European 
Archives  Relating  to  America.  1773-1783.  London,  1889-1898. — The  only 


345]  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

publication  that  contains  a  fairly  complete  set  of  documents  on  the  Euro- 
pean side  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution. 

Thomson,  Charles.  The  Thomson  Papers,  1765-1816:  New  York 
Historical  Society  Collections,  1878.  4  vols.  New  York,  1879. 

United  States.  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  Vols.  I-XV 
edited  by  Worthington  Chauncey  Ford,  vols.  XVI-XXI  edited  by  Gaillard 
Hunt,  from  the  original  records  in  the  papers  of  the  Continental  Congress. 
21  vols.  now  published.  Washington,  1904. — The  journals  are  here  excel- 
lently edited  and  the  foot-notes  are  valuable  for  their  explanations  of  the 
policy  of  Congress. 

.  Secret  Journals  of  the  Acts  and  Proceedings  of  Congress 

from  the  first  meeting  thereof  to  the  dissolution  of  the  Confederation  by 
the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  4  vols.  Boston, 
1820. — Vols.  II  and  III  relate  to  foreign  affairs.  This  work  has  been 
superseded  in  part  by  the  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress  (Ford  ed.). 

.  Treaties  and  Conventions  concluded  betiueen  the  United 

States  of  America  and  other  powers  since  July  4,  1776,  edited  by  the 
Department  of  State,  Hamilton  Fish,  secretary.  Washington,  1871. 

Walpole,  Horace.  Journals  of  the  Reign  of  King  George  the  Third 
from  the  Year  1771  to  1783,  edited  by  Dr.  Doran.  2  vols.  London,  1859. 

,  Last  Journals  of  Horace  Walpole  during  the  Reign  of 

King  George  the  Third  from  1771  to  1783,  edited  by  Dr.  Doran.  2  vols. 
London  and  New  York,  1910. 

.  Letters  of  Horace  Walpole,  Fourth  Earl  of  Orford,  edited 

by  Mrs.  Paget  Toynbee.  16  vols.  Oxford,  1903-1905. 

Washington,  George.  Writings,  edited  by  Worthington  Chauncy 
Ford.  14  vols.  New  York,  1889-1893. 

Wharton,  Francis.  The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of 
the  United  States,  Washington,  1889. — A  useful  collection  of  the  most  im- 
portant documents  found  in  the  archives  at  Washington. 

HISTORIES,  BIOGRAPHIES,  AND  SPECIAL  TREATISES 

Alden,  George  Henry.  New  Governments  West  of  the  Alleghanies 
before  1780.  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,  Economics,  Polit- 
ical Science,  and  History'  Series,  II,  No.  I.  Madison,  1897. 

Alvord,  Clarence  Walworth.  "The  British  Ministry  and  the  Treaty 
of  Fort  Stanwix :"  Proceedings  of  Wisconsin  Historical  Society.  Madison, 
1908. 

,  "Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763:"  Michigan  Historical 

Collections,  XXXVI.  Lansing,  1908. 

These  two  studies  by  Professor  Alvord  contain  many  interesting 
suggestions  regarding  British  policy  toward  the  West  in  the  years  pre- 
ceding the  outbreak  of  the  American  Revolution. 

,  and  Bidgood,  Lee.  The  Explorations  of  the  Trans-Alle- 

ghany  Region  by  the  Virginians.  1650-1674.  Cleveland,  1912. 


236  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [346 

Bancroft,  George.  History  of  the  United  States  of  America  from  the 
Discovery  of  the  Continent.  6  vols.  New  York,  1882.  Altho  this  work 
has  many  errors  of  detail,  it  shows  a  breadth  of  view  and  an  appreciation 
of  actual  conditions  that  make  it  one  of  the  most  valuable  accounts  of 
the  diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution.  Bancroft  knew  better  than 
most  American  historians  the  characters  and  aims  of  the  men  of  this 
period,  and  he  was  able  to  express  his  knowledge  in  clear  and  vigorous 
language.  He  undoubtedly  knew  much  of  the  French  sources,  and 
writes  with  apparently  first  hand  knowledge.  Altho  the  French  archives 
were  not  open  to  his  inspection,  in  some  way,  possibly  through  his 
acquaintance  with  French  diplomats,  he  gained  a  wide  knowledge  of 
their  contents.  He  wrote  with  honesty  and  great  ability,  but  often  he 
expressed  his  ideas  with  too  much  patriotic  fervor. 

Beer,  George  Louis.  British  Colonial  Policy,  1754-1765.  New  York, 
1907. — This  is  a  valuable  survey  of  British  colonial  policy  during  the 
period  treated,  but  it  has  little  regarding  the  West 

Channing,  Edward.  A  History  of  the  United  States.  3  vols.  New 
York,  1905-1912. — Vol.  Ill  gives  one  of  the  best  surveys  of  the  period 
from  1763  to  1789  that  has  yet  been  written.  Channing's  account  cf  the 
diplomacy  is  fair  minded  and  carefully  written.  His  account  of  the  aims 
of  French  diplomacy,  however,  does  not  bear  evidence  of  careful  research, 
and  he  is  too  much  biased  by  the  views  of  early  American  statesmen. 

Circourt,  Adolphe  Marie  Pierre,  Comte  de.  Histoire  de  I'action 
commune  de  la  France  et  de  I'Amerique  four  I'independance  par  George 
Bancroft  ....  traduit  et  annote  ....  accompagne  de  documents  inedits. 
3  vols.  Paris,  1876. — Vols.  I  and  II  are  a  rather  free  translation  of  a  part 
of  Bancroft's  history.  Vol.  Ill,  Documents  originaux  inedits  is  made  up 
of  documents  relating  to  the  diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution  gath- 
ered from  the  archives  of  France,  Spain,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and 
other  countries.  These  documents  are  freely  translated  into  modern 
French  and  are  poorly  edited. 

Coffin,  Victor.  The  Province  of  Quebec  and  the  Early  American 
Revolution:  Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin.  Madison,  1896. — 
Valuable  for  its  presentation  of  certain  phases  of  British  policy  toward 
the  West  during  the  years  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution. 

Doniol,  Henri.  Histoire  de  la  participation  de  la  France  a  Fetablisse- 
ment  des  £tats-Unis  d'Amervque.  5  vols.  Paris,  1885-1892. — This  work 
has  a  store  of  valuable  documents  not  otherwise  easily  accessible.  The 
narrative  is  too  controversial  in  character  to  be  particularly  useful,  and 
the  account  of  American  conditions  is  especially  one-sided.  Altho  Doniol 
drew  extensively  from  the  French  archives,  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
American  or  English  sources.  In  his  completed  work  Doniol  gave  little 
attention  to  the  West,  altho  his  notes,  known  as  the  "Doniol  Transcripts" 
and  now  preserved  in  the  National  Library  at  Paris,  contain  much  of  the 
material  used  in  this  study. 


347]  BIBLIOGRAPHY  23T 

Everett,  Edward.  Review  of  Sparks'  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of 
the  American  Revolution:  North  American  Review,  XXXIII. 

Fitzmaurice,  Lord  Edmond.  Life  of  William,  Earl  of  Shelburne, 
with  Extracts  from  His  Papers  and  Correspondence.  3  vols.  London, 
1875-1876. — This  is  an  admirable  work.  The  narrative  is  clear  and  to 
the  point,  and  the  documents  are  well  selected.  The  whole  work  is 
scholarly  and  is  written  with  a  fairness  unusual  in  works  of  this  character. 
The  new  edition  appeared  after  this  study  was  completed. 

Fortier,  Alcee.  A  History  of  Louisiana.  4  vols.  New  York,  1904. — 
A  good  narrative  account  containing  many  details  of  curious  interest. 

Gayarre,  Charles.    History  of  Louisiana.    4  vols.    New  Orleans,  1903. 

Hale,  Edward  Everett,  and  Hale,  Edward  Everett,  Jr.  Franklin  in 
France.  From  Original  Documents  Most  of  Which  Are  now  Published 
for  the  First  Time.  2  vols.  Boston,  1887-1888. — This  biography  is  very 
friendly  to  Franklin,  but  the  biographers  depended  upon  the  accounts  of 
Adams  and  Jay  for  their  knowledge  of  Franklin's  activities  and  thus 
fail  to  do  justice  to  the  greatness  of  the  man  whose  work  they  attempt 
to  portray. 

Hamilton,  Peter  Joseph.  Colonial  Mobile.  Boston  and  New  York, 
1897. — Interesting  but  of  little  value  for  this  study. 

Howard,  George  Elliott.  Preliminaries  of  the  Revolution.  (American 
Nation  Series,  VIII.)  New  York,  1905. 

Jay,  William.  Life  of  John  Jay,  with  Selections  from  His  Corre- 
spondence and  Miscellaneous  Papers.  2  vols.  New  York,  1883. — Inter- 
esting from  its  point  of  view,  but  one-sided.  As  a  source  it  has  been 
superseded  by  Johnston's  edition. 

Kapp,  Friedrich.  Leben  des  amerikanischen  Generals  Johann  Kalb. 
Stuttgart,  1862.  Translated  into  English  as  the  Life  of  John  Kalb,  Major 
General  in  the  Revolutionary  Army.  New  York,  1884. — This  is  a  work 
of  great  value,  little  known  but  reliable  and  scholarly  in  every  respect. 
In  it  are  copies  of  many  documents  not  elsewhere  known  but  those 
which  I  have  been  able  to  compare  with  the  original  are  accurately  copied. 

Kingsford,  William.  History  of  Canada.  10  vols.  London,  1887- 
1898. — A  dry  and  commonplace  style  is  the  worst  fault  of  this  work.  It 
is  a  mine  of  information  and  its  attitude  is  fair  toward  all  parties. 

Lecky,  William  Edward  Hartpole.  History  of  England  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century.  8  vols.  London,  1883-1890. 

McLaughlin,  Andrew  Cunningham.  The  Confederation  and  the  Con- 
stitution. 1783-1789.  (American  Nation  Series  X.)  New  York,  1905. — 
Written  in  a  spirit  of  fairness.  The  first  chapter  on  the  negotiations 
for  peace  is  the  only  one  bearing  on  this  study.  It  attempts  to  reconcile 
the  conventional  American  view  with  Doniol,  but  the  result  is  not  a  just 
view.  Bancroft's  treatment  of  the  subject  is  more  accurate. 

Mason,  E.  G.  "March  of  the  Spaniards  across  Illinois" :  Magazine 
of  American  History,  XV,  457. — The  conclusions  of  this  account  are  mere 
surmises  without  any  foundation  of  fact. 


238  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [348 

Ogg,  Frederic  Austin.  Opening  of  the  Mississippi.  New  York,  1904. — 
Of  little  value  for  this  study. 

Parton,  James.  Life  and  Times  of  Benjamin  Franklin.  2  vols.  Bos- 
ton, 1867. 

Perkins,  James  Breck.  France  in  the  American  Revolution.  Boston 
and  New  York,  1911. — A  semi-popular  account  based  largely  on  Doniol. 

Raynal,  Abbe.  The  Revolution  in  America.  Philadelphia,  1782. — Of 
little  value. 

Rives,  William  Cahill.  History  of  the  Life  and  Times  of  James 
Madison.  3  vols.  Boston,  1859-1868. — One  sided;  gives  little  information 
on  the  politics  of  Congress. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore.  Winning  of  the  West.  4  vols.  New  York, 
1894-1896. — Gives  no  information  on  the  subject  of  this  study. 

Tower,  Charlemagne.  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  in  the  American 
Revolution.  2  vols.  Philadelphia,  1901. — An  interesting  story  but  one- 
sided. Taken  largely  from  Doniol. 

Turner,  Frederick  Jackson.  "Policy  of  France  toward  the  Mississippi 
Valley  during  the  Administration  of  Washington  and  Adams:"  in  Ameri- 
can Historical  Review,  X,  255  et  seq. — See  above  pp.  31-32. 

Van  Tyne,  Claude  Halstead.  The  American  Revolution.  (American 
Nation  Series,  IX.)  New  York,  1905. — An  excellent  general  account. 
The  work  is  fair  in  spirit,  but  its  account  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Revolu- 
tion is  not  based  upon  extensive  research  outside  the  archives  at  Wash- 
ington. It  attempts  to  maintain  a  balance  by  combining  the  accounts 
of  Doniol  with  those  of  American  writers ;  but  this  method  does  not 
always  lead  to  the  exact  truth. 

Winsor,  Justin.  The  Westward  Movement.  Boston,  1897. —  Accepts 
as  true  all  the  suspicions  which  American  statesmen  felt  toward  France; 
of  no  value  for  the  diplomatic  phases  of  the  westward  movement. 


INDEX 

Acadia,  81. 

Adams,  John,  in  Congress,  120;  minister  for  negotiations  of  peace,  128; 
attitude  towards  France,  129,  138;  arrives  in  Europe,  138;  arrives  at 
Paris,  221 ;  American  commissioner  for  negotiations  for  peace,  221, 
223,  225. 

Adams,  Samuel,  attitude  toward  France,  181. 

Africa,  40. 

Albany  Convention,  62. 

Alleghanies,  7,  n,  49,  169. 

Alliance  between  France  and  Spain,  127.     See  also  France,  Spain. 

Alliance  between  France  and  United  States,  78,  108,  159,  160.  See  also 
France,  United  States. 

America,  center  of  world  diplomacy,  20.    See  also  United  States,  Congress. 

American  commissioners  for  negotiation  of  peace,  appointment  of,  128; 
resolve  to  keep  secret  their  negotiations  with  Great  Britain,  221 ;  ulti- 
matum of,  223;  position  of,  225.  See  also  Adams,  Franklin,  Jay. 

American  commissioners  to  France,  62 ;  ask  treaty  with  France,  64 ;  wil- 
ling to  surrender  the  Floridas,  65 ;  make  treaty  of  alliance,  78.  See 
also  Alliance  between  France  and  United  States. 

American  Revolution,   18. 

Anti-Gallican  party,  115,  118,  124,  125,  127,  151,  184.  See  also  Junto, 
Parties  in  Congress,  Congress. 

Aranda,  Comte  de,  supports  French  policy,  40;  character  and  influence  of, 
46,  47;  negotiations  with  Jay,  211. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  failure  of  expedition  to  Canada,  24;  treason  of,  183. 

Bahama  Canal,  in  convention  between  France  and  Spain,  106. 

Bahama  Islands,  demanded  by  Spain,  209. 

Beaumarchais,  44. 

Bonvouloir,  sent  to  U.  S.,  29;  mission  of,  58. 

Boundaries  of  U.  S.,  question  of,  61,  138,  196,  201,  204;  discussed  by  Jay 
and  Florida  Blanca,  141;  opinions  concerning,  118,  120,  123-126,  133, 
174,  179,  185,  204,  205,  211,  212.  See  also  United  States,  West,  Canada. 

Bourbons,  14,  39,  43,  69,  93. 

British,  18,  19;  trade  of  Mississippi,  19;  attitude  of  concerning  West,  10,  25; 
disaffection  of  in  Canada,  22;  power  of  in  Northwest,  24;  see  import- 
ance of  West,  25 ;  distrust  by  France,  35 ;  suspects  Spain,  42 ;  right  to 
Mississippi,  60;  aroused  over  territories,  74;  offer  concessions  to  the 
Americans,  76;  suggest  Spanish  mediation,  97;  policy  of,  167;  hold 
Northwest  posts,  214.  See  also  Great  Britain. 

British  Empire,  62.    See  also  Great  Britain. 

British  ministry,  policy  of,  10. 

British  politics,  character  of,  10. 

239 


240  THE  WEST  IX  THE  REVOLUTION  [350 

British  traders,  13. 

Burgoyne,  Gen.,  surrender  of,  59,  73,  74. 

Burke,  Thomas,  of  North  Carolina,  attitude  of,  165,  166. 

Cahokia,  18. 

Campeche,  Bay  of,  101,  106,   107. 

Canada,  9,  12,  15,  17,  61,  76,  83,  87,  88,  95,  96,  98,  100,  no,  117,  120,  121,  124, 
126,  127,  131,  134,  143,  150,  155,  167,  168;  importance  of,  21;  American 
attack  upon,  24;  plans  to  conquer,  67,  86,  166,  184,  190;  proposed  attack 
upon  abandoned,  86;  in  negotiations  for  peace,  217. 

Canadians,  French,  satisfied  with  British  rule,  15,  21 ;  D'Estaing's  procla- 
mation to,  86;  uneasiness  among,  87. 

Cape  Antoine,  173. 

Caribbean  Sea,  39. 

Carleton,  Sir  Guy,  alarmed  at  American  designs  on  Canada,  23. 

Carmichael,  William,  secretary  to  Jay,  138,  140. 

Carolinas,  claims  of  in  West,  13. 

Charles  III,  king  of  Spain,  97,  98,  101,  142;  desires  to  maintain  peace, 
37,  38,  55,  96;  opposes  recognition  of  U.  S.,  53;  fears  Great  Britain, 
81 ;  fears  United  States,  93. 

Choiseul,  Etienne-Frangois,  Due  de,  interest  in  America,  8,  14,  15,  17; 
loses  interest,  18. 

Clark,  George  Rogers,  expedition  of,  114,  154,  191-194;  conquests  of,  155. 

Colonial  charters,  force  of,  157,  159,  168,  183;  character  of,  1/8;  ignored  by 
Madison,  186;  views  of  Rayneval  as  to,  211. 

Congress,  112,  139;  desires  Canada,  22;  and  question  of  boundaries,  61, 
81,  173;  elects  commissioners  to  France,  62;  proposes  treaty  with 
France,  62;  seeks  alliance  with  Spain,  62,  194;  position  on  Floridas,  67, 
T53;  territorial  policy  of,  67;  demands  right  of  navigation  of  Mis- 
sissippi, 67;  instructions  of,  78;  policy  of,  84,  128,  145,  156,  157,  189. 
190,  198,  199;  plans  invasion  of  Canada,  86,  87,  176;  policy  towards 
West,  108,  178,  187;  fear  of  West,  119;  factions  in,  108,  115,  117-124, 
126,  165,  166,  176,  178,  179,  180,  195,  206;  character  of,  124;  committees 
of,  121 ;  attitude  of,  133,  134,  155,  157;  position  of,  177,  187;  instruc- 
tions to  Jay,  179,  180,  195;  opposes  policy  of  France,  187;  indepen- 
dence of,  188;  anger  of  at  Spain,  198;  sounded  by  Luzerne,  201;  de- 
mands of,  203 ;  instructions  of  for  negotiation  of  peace,  204,  208 ; 
views  of,  214.  See  also  United  States. 

Considerations,  31. 

Convention  between  France  and  Spain,  104,  106,  107 ;  character  of,  107. 

Cornwallis,  Charles,  191,  in   South,  189. 

Cumberland,  British  agent  in  Spain,  190. 

Deane,  Silas,  elected  American  commissioner  to  France,  62;  asks  treaty 
with  France,  64;  proposes  terms  of  alliance.  65.  See  also  American 
commissioners. 

Declaration  of  Independence,  61 ;  and  question  of  boundaries,  67. 


351]  INDEX  241 

D'Estaing,  Charles,  Comte;  memorial  of,  16;  arrives  in  America,  84; 
plans  of,  85,  86;  proclamation  of  to  Canadians,  86;  to  act  with  Spanish 
fleet,  94;  reverses  of,  101 ;  supports  Spanish  attack,  136. 

Detroit,  26,  85,  114,  191. 

Dunkirk,  provision  regarding  in  convention  between  France  and  Spain, 
106;  importance  of  this  provision,  107. 

Dunmore,  Lord,  in  Virginia,  25. 

East,  20,  25. 

East,  party  of,  121. 

Eastern  Louisiana,  desired  by  Spain,  9,  13,  60,  108,  116,  168-169,  184,  208, 
209;  demanded  by  Spain,  148. 

Family  compacts,  8,  46. 

Finances  of  France,  101,  200. 

Fisheries  (Newfoundland),  74,  79,  85,  94,  121,  123,  124;  question  of,  218; 
demands  of  Great  Britain  respecting,  222. 

Florida  Blanca,  prime  minister  of  Spain,  succeeds  Grimaldi,  46;  changes 
policy  of  Spain,  47;  character  of,  48;  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  49,  70, 
75,  79',  policy  of,  49,  72,  80,  92,  94,  133,  134;  seeks  to  recover  former 
colonies  of  Spain,  50,  75,  79;  prepares  for  war,  51;  attitude  towards 
"United  States,  52,  93,  104,  144,  148,  197;  wishes  Revolution  to  con- 
tinue, 52;  justifies  Spanish  armaments,  54;  desires  concessions  from 
Great  Britain,  55 ;  distrusts  France,  55 ;  fears  Great  Britain,  79 ; 
blames  France  for  war,  74;  fears  United  States,  93,  103;  dislike  of 
for  United  States,  93;  diplomacy  of,  102;  demands  of,  102,  103,  147, 
195;  and  French  aid,  137;  distrusted  by  Vergennes,  138;  negotiations 
with  Jay,  140,  141 ;  sends  Gardoqui  to  treat  with  Jay,  142 ;  negotia- 
tions with  England,  146;  propositions  for  peace,  147;  ends  negotia- 
tions with  Jay,  196;  mentioned,  69,  70,  96,  98,  142,  150. 

Floridas,  The,  9,  n,  13,  61,  65,  66,  67,  74,  76,  81-83,  96-98,  101,  102,  106, 
no,  112,  113,  117-121,  124-128,  131,  134,  138-140,  150,  160,  170,  200; 
claimed  by  Spain,  26,  61,  80,  106,  148;  offered  to  Spain,  65,  94, 
95;  attacked,  133,  136;  importance  of,  152;  boundaries  of,  161 ;  desired 
by  Great  Britain,  210;  in  treaty  of  peace,  223,  224. 

Fort  de  Chartres,  13. 

Fort  Stanwix,  treaty  of,  n. 

France,  expulsion  of  from  New  World,  9;  weakness  of,  7,  28,  91,  148,  200; 
desires  to  humiliate  England,  30;  policy  of,  43,  99,  100,  149,  150; 
plans  to  aid  Americans,  43 ;  cooperates  with  Spain,  91 ;  alliance  with 
Spain,  107 ;  alliance  with  United  States,  78,  108 ;  urges  attack  upon 
Floridas,  142;  desires  peace,  146,  200;  withdraws  support  from  Ameri- 
cans, 183;  attitude  of  towards  United  States,  205;  on  boundaries,  211; 
mentioned,  9,  15,  30,  32,  33,  44,  47,  58,  59,  61,  73,  75,  ?8-88,  91,  99,  101, 
106-108,  116,  136-139,  149,  181. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  views  regarding  West,  10,  25,  62,  139;  arrives  at  Paris, 
46;  influence  at  French  court,  46;  seeks  alliance  with  Spain,  55;  char- 
acter, 62 ;  demands  right  to  navigate  Mississippi,  66,  145 ;  his  interview 
with  Hutton,  76;  insists  upon  independence,  76;  asks  indemnification, 


242  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [352 

76;  insists  upon  immediate  treaty  with  France,  78;  refuses  to  reveal 
his  plans,  133;  supports  Jay,  140;  summons  Jay  to  Paris,  211;  begins 
negotiations  with  Oswald,  210;  proposes  settlement  of  boundaries, 
217;  negotiations  with  Oswald,  217-219;  illness  of,  219;  part  in  later 
negotiations,  224;  conciliates  Vergennes,  225. 

Frederick  the  Great,  7. 

French  agents  in  America,  15,  16. 

French  diplomacy,  9. 

French  habitants,  in  Illinois,  12. 

French,  in  West,  13. 

French  interest  in  America,  14,  18,  52. 

French  party  in  Cpngress,  187,  188. 

Gage,  Gen.  Thomas,  plan  to  arouse  West  and  to  cut  rebellion  in  two,  25. 

Galvez,  minister  for  the  Indies,  48;  character  of,  49;  friendship  for 
America,  49. 

Galvez,  Bernardo  de,  governor  of  Louisiana,  53 ;  seizes  British  vessels  in- 
Mississippi,  54,  60;  aids  Americans,  68,  103,  113;  attacks  the  Floridas, 
133;  success  on  Mississippi,  137;  campaign,  142;  captures  Mobile,  144; 
conquests  of,  161 ;  policy  of,  192. 

Gardoqui,  secretary  of  Florida  Blanca,  negotiations  with  Jay,  144,  145 ;. 
position  of,  188. 

Gates,  Gen.  Horatio,  defeated  in  the  South,  183. 

George  III,  14. 

Georgia,  13,  132,  176,  200;  held  by  Cornwallis,  189. 

Gerard  de  Rayneval,  Conrad,  referred  to  in  text  as  Gerard,  minister  to- 
United  States,  82;  instructions  of,  82;  promises  of,  84;  attitude  on 
invasion  of  Canada,  85;  diplomacy  of,  118;  opposes  Congress,  124; 
relations  with  Congress,  125;  ends  mission  to  United  States,  129; 
character  of  his  work,  129;  mentioned,  86,  108,  109,  in,  112,  114-116,. 
121-123,  127,  130,  138-140,  152. 

Gerard  de  Rayneval,  M.     See  Rayneval. 

Gibraltar,  British  defense  of,  38,  40;  desired  by  Spain,  75,  79,  104;  diffi- 
culties of  conquering,  96;  France  agrees  to  help  conquer,  102,  106; 
demanded  by  Spain,  209;  question  of,  225;  mentioned,  97,  101,  107. 

Grantham,  British  ambassador  to  Spain,  41,  42,  54. 

Grasse,  Comte  de,  sent  to  America,  149,  201. 

Great  Britain,  influence  of  in  America,  21,  colonial  empire  of,  7,  30; 
hostility  of  France  to,  32,  33,  35,  41 ;  and  Portugal,  36 ;  and  Spain,  38, 
42.  96,  98,  146;  increases  her  armaments,  38;  suspects  Spanish  policy, 
41,  52,  54;  and  Spanish  aid  to  Americans,  68;  distrusted  by  Florida 
Blanca,  49;  and  France,  54,  71,  210;  declares  war  against  France,  79; 
and  Vergennes,  88,  95;  rejects  Spain's  offer  of  mediation,  101 ;  and  the 
West,  108,  214;  attitude  of  Spain  towards,  132,  147,  148,  157,  197; 
rights  of  discussed,  143,  159,  186,  211;  policy  of,  167,  221,  222;  and 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  226. 

Great  Lakes,  26. 


353]  INDEX 

Grenada,  70. 

Grimaldi,  Marquis  de,  friendship  of  for  France,  36,  37;  and  Great  Britain, 
38,  42;  character  of,  40;  prepares  for  war,  41;  and  France,  41,  45; 
desires  peace,  43;  succeeded  by  Florida  Blanca,  46;  mentioned,  71. 

Halifax,  86,  88,  96. 

Havana,  Spain  despatches  troops  to,  51. 

Henry,  Patrick,  governor  of  Virginia,  67. 

Holker,  M.,  agent  of  Vergennes  in  U.  S.,  39. 

Honduras,  Gulf  of,  101,  102,  .106,   107. 

Hutton,  chief  of  Moravians,  interview  with  Franklin,  76. 

Huntington,  Samuel,  president  of  Congress,  164;  urges  moderation,  182. 

Illinois,  mentioned  by  D'Estaing,  16;  loss  of  population,  18;  trade  of,  19; 
Clark  in,  114;  American  interest  in,  15;  Spaniards  in,  192. 

Independence  of  U.  S.  recognized  by  France,  77;  Oswald's  instruc- 
tions, 219. 

Indians,  and  the  West,  II,  12,  109. 

Ireland,  70. 

Jamaica,  desired  by  Spain,  40,  plans  to  conquer,  70,  81,  102. 

Jay,  John,  attitude  of  regarding  West,  25,  114;  and  French  interests,  120, 
125;  elected  to  negotiate  treaty  with  Spain,  128;  alienated  from 
French,  129,  181 ;  arrives  in  Europe,  138;  negotiations  with  Spain, 
138,  140,  141,  144,  145,  195,  196;  dispatches  of,  173,  189; -instructions 
to,  176,  179,  181,  185,  186,  195;  failure  of  his  mission,  198;  arrival  of 
at  Paris,  211 ;  negotiations  of  with  Aranda,  211 ;  and  Oswald,  218,  219, 
223,  224;  character  of,  219;  and  Europe,  219;  distrusts  French  designs, 
219-221 ;  and  Rayneval's  mission,  220;  and  the  Floridas,  223,  224. 

Jenifer,  Daniel  of  St.  Thomas,  and  French  policy,  124;  attitude  of,  165, 
166,  176,  180,  181 ;  on  instructions  to  Jay,  179;  memorial  of,  182,  183. 

Jesuits,  driven  from  Spain,  46. 

Jones,  Joseph,  of  Virginia,  opposes  claims  of  Spain,  174,  175. 

Junto,  in  Congress,  found,  120;  opposes  Gerard,  126;  broken  up,  165. 

Kalb,  Baron  de,  mission  to  America,  15,  18;  reports  of,  29. 

Kaskaskia,  18,  193. 

Kentucky,  County  of,  25;  Americans  in,  113;  declares  independence,  164; 
mentioned,  154. 

La  Balme,  192,  193,  194. 

Labrador,  61. 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  plan  of  for  invasion  of  Canada,  85,  87. 

Lake  Nipissing,  boundary  of  Quebec,  n. 

Lee,  Arthur,  seeks  aid  of  Spain,  52,  53 ;  mentioned,  74. 

Lee,  R.  H.,  opposition  of  to  French  plans,  122,  126. 

Lees,  family  of,  120,  181. 

Lexington,  report  of  battle  of,  30. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  views  on  boundaries,  208. 

Louis  XV,  14,  18. 


244  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [354 

Louis  XVI,  importance  of  accession  to  the  throne,  27;  writes  to  Charles 
III,  142. 

Louisiana,  13-15,  17,  18,  20;  preparations  to  defend,  51;  threatened  with 
attack,  53 ;  rebellion  in,  92 ;  British  in,  101 ;  Americans  retreat  into, 
103;  importance  of  to  Spain,  131;  Galvez  governor  of,  142. 

Loyalists,  British,  51. 

Luzerne,  Chevalier  de  la,  minister  to  U.  S.,  129,  151 ;  negotiations 
of,  regarding  West,  153,  154,  157,  164,  166;  opposes  conquest  of  Can- 
ada, 155;  friendship  of  for  Spain,  157,  167,  168,  170,  172,  175,  176; 
opposes  claims  of  U.  S.,  159,  168,  173;  attacks  anti-Gallicans  in  Con- 
gress, 177;  mentioned,  130,  133,  149,  187,  190,  195;  approves  conquest 
of  Northwest,  194;  promises  of,  205;  views  on  boundaries  of  U.  S., 
205-207. 

Madison,  James,  writes  instructions  to  Jay,  180,  185-187;  views  of  on 
West,  180,  185,  186. 

Manchac,  103. 

Marbois,  M.,  opposes  radicals  in  Congress,  177,  184;  attitude  of  on  West, 
178,  185,  187;  on  opinions  of  Madison,  180;  relations  with  Congress, 
182,  189;  letter  of,  219. 

Marie  Antoinette,  and  Vergennes,  28. 

Maryland,  position  of  on  the  West,  165,  181. 

Maurepas,  Comte  de,  prime  minister,  27;  asks  for  peace,  200. 

"Memoire  Historique  et  Politique  sur  la  Louisiane,"  30. 

Mexican  fleet,  arrives  in  Spain,  94. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  39,  68,  80,  96,  106. 

Michigan,  Lake,  174. 

Minorca,  desired  by  Spain,  40,  106. 

Miralles,  Don  Juan  de,  negotiations  with  Congress,  67;  seeks  exclusive 
navigation  of  Mississippi  for  Spain,  67 ;  relations  with  Gerard,  83,  88 ; 
opposes  American  policy,  108-111;  Spanish  instructions  to,  140;  nego- 
tiations of  regarding  West,  153;  alarmed  at  policy  of  U.  S.,  163; 
mentioned,  115,  136,  139,  162,  170,  177,  181. 

Mississippi  River,  navigation  of,  60,  61,  66-68,  77,  84,  108-111,  113,  115,  116, 
118-128,  131,  134,  135,  137-139,  141,  143-145,  148,  150-152,  157-161,  163,  170, 
173,  175,  176,  181,  184-186,  100,  191,  195,  196,  199,  220,  225,  226;  plans 
to  fortify,  44;  views  of  Rayneval,  211 ;  boundary  of  U.  S.,  95;  British 
on,  102;  Spain  desires,  103;  American  interest  in,  115;  control  of, 
208,  209;  mentioned,  7,  121,  202,  210. 

Mississippi  Valley,  desired  by  Spain,  80;  question  of,  213;  mentioned, 
16,  19,  45,  121,  192,  195,  198. 

Mobile,  18,  51,  66,  96,  137. 

Montgomery,  Gen.,  failure  in  Canada,  24. 

Montmorin,  Comte  de,  French  ambassador  to  Spain,  74,  94,  97,  105,  106, 
133,  146,  226;  asks  alliance  of  Spain,  74;  explains  French  policy,  81 ; 
and  Spanish  negotiations  with  Great  Britain,  142 ;  and  U.  S.,  147 ; 
advises  Jay,  195 ;  and  Florida  Blanca,  197. 


355]  INDEX  245 

Montreal,  22;  fall  of,  24. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  and  Gerard,   109,   no,   112,   116;  attitude  regarding- 

West,  no;  a  partisan  of  France,  120;  alienation  of  from  France,  181. 
Natchez,  18. 

New  England,  and  the  West,  184. 
New  Englanders,  22,  62,  106. 
Newfoundland,  62,  106.     See  Fisheries.  t 

New  France,  14,  33. 

New  Orleans,  13,  17,  18,  87,  210;  a  depot  for  American  supplies,  68. 
New  York,  98,  100;  and  West,  185. 
North  America,  60. 
North  Carolina,  24. 
North  ministry,  downfall  of,  216. 
Northwest,  and  the  colonial  charters,  12;   British  traders  in,  19;  troops 

withdrawn  from,  20;   British  control  of,  24,  25;  Americans  in,  113; 

boundary,  121 ;  British  in,  191 ;  importance  of,  194. 
Nova  Scotia,  61,  62,  76,  83,  88,  121,  123-127. 
Ohio  County,  settlement  of,  n,  115. 
O'Reilly,  Spanish  governor  of  Louisiana,  15. 
Ossun,  Marquis  de,  French  ambassador  to  Spain,  urges  Spain  to  prepare 

for  war,  40;  and  Florida  Blanca,  54;  to  Vergennes,  61. 
Oswald,    Richard,    negotiations    with    Franklin,    216;    position    regarding 

Canada,  217;  instructions  of,  218;  writes  for  new  commission,  219; 

agrees  to  treaty  with  U.  S.,  220. 
Pacte  de  Famille,  the,  36,  97. 
Paris,  treaty  of,  9,  14. 

Peace,  negotiations  for,  216,  217  et  seq. ;  treaty  of,  226. 
Pennsylvania,  25. 
Pensacola,  51,  66,  96,  137. 
Pollock,  Oliver,  at  New  Orleans,  68. 
Pontleroy,  French  agent  in  U.  S.,  15. 
Porto  Rico,  39,  51. 

Portugal,  Spain  desires  to  conquer,  43. 
Proclamation  of  1763,  n,  157,  159,  160. 
Quebec,  government  of,  n;  conquest  of,  86,  88. 
Quebec  Act,  n,  60,  116,  122;  influence  of  in  French  opinion,  60. 
Rayneval,  M.   Gerard  de,  Reflexions  of,   31 ;   desires  to  recover  French 

colonies,    33;    treats   with   American    commissioners,    77;    mission    to 

London,  209,  210;  his  views  on  boundaries  of  U.  S.,  21 1,  212. 
Rhode  Island,  98,  100. 

Rodney,  Admiral,  victory  of  in  West  Indies,  209. 
Roman  Catholic  religion,  in  Quebec,  21. 
Russia,  and  territorial  expansion  in  America,  198. 
St.  Augustine,  85. 
St.  Domingo,  39,  41,  106. 


246  THE  WEST  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  [356 

St.  Lawrence  River,  II,  84,  no. 

St.  Louis,  13,  1 8. 

Senegal,   106. 

Seven  Years  War,  /,  9,  12,  13,  91. 

Shelburne,  Earl  of,  president  of  board  of  trade,  10;  fears  Americans,  75; 
interview  of  with  Rayneval,  209,  210;  demands  of  for  peace,  210; 
policy  of,  216,  218;  sends  Oswald  to  Paris,  216;  concedes  terms  of 
U.  S.,  225;  offers  terms  to  Spain,  225. 

South,  party  of  the,  121 ;  attitude  of  the,  167;  disasters  in  the,  183;  British 
successes  in,  190. 

South  Carolina,  123 ;  Rutledge  governor  of,  167-168. 

Southwest,  contentions  over,  152. 

Spain,  15;  claims  the  Floridas,  21,  26,  66;  her  policy  of  peace,  20,  82; 
dispute  with  Portugal,  36;  fears  Great  Britain,  37;  unprepared  for  war, 
39J  opposes  French  plans,  40;  fears  U.  S.,  40,  44,  169;  diplomacy  of, 
43,  167,  168;  refuses  to  treat  with  Lee,  53;  willing  to  aid  Americans 
secretly,  53,  67 ;  claims  Mississippi  Valley,  57 ;  claims  exclusive  navi- 
gation of  Mississippi  River,  61,  167,  226;  ambitions  of,  65;  position  on 
boundaries  of  U.  S.,  66;  interests  in  Gulf  of  Mexico,  66;  hatred  of 
for  Great  Britain,  80;  and  West,  90,  116,  150,  186,  191,  192;  wishes  to 
recover  colonies,  92;  policy  of,  09-101,  105-107,  117,  131,  132,  141,  149, 
174,  179,  180,  198,  200,  203,  208,  209;  opposes  independence  of  U.  S., 
105,  130;  declares  war  against  Great  Britain,  107;  contention  cf  with 
France;  107;  alliance  of  sought  by  U.  S.,  119;  and  U.  S.,  128;  nego- 
tiations of  with  Great  Britain,  142,  146;  victories  of  on  Mississippi, 
183,  190;  expedition  across  Illinois,  192;  failure  of  her  plans,  225; 
accepts  terms  of  peace,  225;  demands  Bahama  Islands,  209;  mentioned, 
15,  108,  112,  114,  122;  see  Mississippi,  Floridas,  Florida  B'lanca. 

Spanish,  18,  19;  mediation  of,  96-98. 

Stormount,  Lord,  British  ambassador  to  France,  suspects  Vergennes  of 
aiding  Americans,  71 ;  expects  war,  73. 

Strachey,  British  minister  for  negotiations  of  peace,  character  of,  222. 

Tennessee,  n,  12,  113,  154. 

Territories,  an  issue  in  the  Revolution,  26. 

Townshend,  Thomas,  policy  of,  217;  disavows  treaty  with  U.  S.,  220; 
opposes  American  position  on  the  Floridas,  224. 

Treaty  of  1763,  7. 

United  States,  desires  West,  9;  claims  the  Mississippi,  57;  treaty  of  alli- 
ance with  France,  79,  108 ;  opinions  concerning,  82,  83 ;  boundaries  of, 
83,  loo,  109,  116-127,  132,  133,  135,  139,  143,  150,  157,  178,  186,  208, 
210,  217-220;  and  Vergennes,  88;  independence  of,  96,  98,  99,  142, 
150,  202;  policy  of  regarding  the  West,  108,  112,  117,  157,  158;  claims 
to  West,  113,  152,  154,  159,  190,  203;  and  Spain,  114,  162;  and  the 
Floridas,  157;  and  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  157;  and  the  several 
states,  181 ;  disasters  of,  183;  parties  in,  206;  and  treaty  of  peace,  210; 
position  of,  214;  boundaries  of  proposed  by  Strachey,  222;  views  on 
peace,  227. 


-357]  INDEX  247 

Uti  possidetis,  132-134,  156,  196,  200,  205;  urged  by  Spain,  146,  opposed 
by  France,  147. 

Utrecht,  treaty  of,  106,  107. 

Vaughan,  Benjamin,  sent  to  London  by  Jay,  220. 

Vera  Cruz,  51. 

Vergennes,  Charles  Granier,  Comte  de,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  8, 
27;  character  of,  27;  policy  towards  Great  Britain,  28;  favors  rebellion 
in  America,  28,  33;  sends  Bonvouloir  to  America,  29;  opposed  to  co- 
lonial expansion  of  France,  29,  33,  50,  74;  policy  towards  America, 
32,  58,  65,  81,  148,  169,  1/2;  program  of,  33-36;  suspects  Great  Britain,  33, 
38,  39,  44,  55,  60,  96;  declines  use  of  New  Orleans,  45;  defends 
French  armaments,  54;  suggests  conquests  for  Spain,  56;  and  British 
colonies,  56,  74;  urges  Spain  to  form  alliance  with  U.  S.,  57, 140, 141, 143 ; 
his  knowledge  of  America,  58;  opinions  of  on  West,  60,  65,  90,  104, 
in,  139,  151,  163,  170,  185;  and  navigation  of  Mississippi,  60,  226; 
and  U.  S.,  65,  134,  136,  144;  desires  war,  69,  70,  72;  decides  on  war, 
73,  urges  war,  75;  aids  Americans,  72;  seeks  cooperation  of  Spain, 
73,  74,  82,  91-93;  fears  reconciliation  of  British  and  Americans,  77; 
and  Canada,  87,  88;  policy  of,  97-99,  105,  116,  117,  129,  130,  139,  140, 
150,  170-172,  190,  199,  201,  202;  and  Spanish  demands,  103,  104,  170-172; 
offers  treaty  to  Spain,  104;  and  Spain,  105,  132,  137,  169,  209;  and 
convention  with  Spain,  107;  alarmed  at  American  conquests,  114; 
instructions  of  to  Luzerne,  135,  136,  157;  distrusts  Spain,  137,  138; 
and  independence  of  U.  S.,  143,  146;  on  terms  of  peace,  147,  213;  and 
policy  of  U.  S.,  155,  156,  188;  difficulties  of,  200,  204;  and  boundaries, 
201,  202,  205,  210,  212,  213;  friendship  of  for  U.  S.,  210,  214,  215;  and 
treaty  of  peace,  216,  217;  advice  of,  219. 

Versailles,  Court  of,  16,  36,  52. 

Virginia,  13,  24,  120,  122,  191;  tobacco  of,  59;  interest  of  in  West,  139,  164; 
claims  West,  152,  154;  demands  of,  207,  214. 

Washington,  George,  attitude  towards  West,  24,  25 ;  plans  to  attack  Can- 
ada, 23,  84-86;  and  attack  on  Canada,  87,  89,  153;  receives  money  from 
France,  149;  plans  of,  189,  190,  192. 

Watauga  Association,  25. 

West,  The,  British  policy  towards,  10;  claims  of  different  nations  to,  24, 
26 ;  in.  early  Revolution,  25 ;  opinions  regarding,  25,  60,  63,  65 ;  Frank- 
lin's opinion  of,  25,  63,  84,  177 ;  Vergennes's  opinion  of,  60,  65 ; 
Miralles's  opinion  of,  84;  Gerard's  opinion  of,  84;  disputes  over,  89; 
claims  regarding,  163,  168;  position  of,  184;  question  of,  199,  202,  210; 
mentioned,  66-68,  108-111,  113-117,  120-124,  131,  139,  150,  153,  154, 
157-159,  164-168,  173,  174,  178,  196,  226.  See  United  States,  Spain, 
Mississippi. 

West  Indies,  47,  51,  69,  70. 

'Willing,  Capt,  at  New  Orleans,  113. 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

THE  STATE  UNIVERSITY 

Urbana 
EDMUND  J.  JAMES,  Ph.D.,  LL.D.,  PRESIDENT 


THE  UNIVERSITY  INCLUDES  THE  FOLLOWING  DEPARTMENTS: 

The  Graduate  School 

The  College  of  Liberal  Arts  and  Sciences  (Ancient  and  Modern 
Languages  and  Literatures ;  History,  Economics  and  Account- 
ancy, Political  Science,  Sociology;  Philosophy,  Psychology, 
Education;  Mathematics;  Astronomy;  Geology;  Physics; 
Chemistry;  Botany;  Zoology;  Entomology;  Physiology;  Art 
and  Design;  Ceramics) 

The  College  of  Engineering  (Architecture;  Architectural,  Civil, 
Electrical,  Mechanical,  Mining,  Municipal  and  Sanitary,  and 
Railway  Engineering) 

The  College  of  Agriculture  (Agronomy;  Animal  Husbandry;  Dairy 
Husbandry;  Horticulture  and  Landscape  Gardening;  Veteri- 
nary Science;  Agricultural  Extension;  Teachers'  Course; 
Household  Science) 

The  College  of  Law  (Three  years'  course) 
The  School  of  Education 

The  Courses  in  Business  (General  Business;  Banking;  Account- 
ancy; Railway  Administration;  Insurance) 
The  Course  in  Journalism 

The  Courses  in  Chemistry  and  Chemical  Engineering 
The  Courses  in  Ceramics  and  Ceramic  Engineering 
The  School  of  Railway  Engineering  and  Administration 
The  School  of  Music  (Voice,  Piano,  Violin ;  four  years'  course) 
The  School  of  Library  Science   (two  years'  course) 
The  College  of  Medicine  (in  Chicago) 
The  College  of  Dentistry  (in  Chicago) 

The  School  of  Pharmacy  (in  Chicago;  Ph.G.  and  Ph.C  courses) 
The  Summer  Session  (eight  weeks) 

Experiment  Stations :  U.  S.  Agricultural  Experiment  Station ;  En- 
gineering Experiment  Station;  State  Laboratory  of  Natural 
History;  State  Entomologist's  Office;  Biological  Experiment 
Station  on  Illinois  River;  State  Water  Survey;  State  Geolog- 
ical Survey;  Mine  Rescue  Station 

The  library  collections  contain  (December  I,  1913)  286,000  volumes, 
including  the  library  of  the  State  Laboratory,  of  Natural  His- 
tory, the  Quine  Medical  Library,  and  the  library  of  the  School 
of  Pharmacy. 
For  catalogs  and  information  address 

THE  REGISTRAR 

Urbana,  Illinois 


PUBLICATIONS 

OF    THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

Following  is  a  partial  list  of  the  publications  issued  at  the  Univer 
I.     The  University  Studies.    A  series  of  monographs  on  miscellaneous 
subjects  issued  five  or  six  times  a  year.     Volume  I  contains  ten  numbers, 

'.mie  II,  5  volume  III,  624  pages. 

;ty  of  Illinois  Studies  in  the  Social  Sciences  is  a  special  group 
of  studies   in   this   general    series.     A   series   of   monographs   in    Ir 
econ.  -sued  quarterly.    Th: 

per  year. 

1  he  Jou  it/lish  am  v  Philology,  published  quar- 

terly. Three  dollars  per  year. 

3.     The  Bulletin  .•  Experir  .-port 

of  th  rk  in  the  Engineering  Experiment  Sta- 

he  bulletin,  of  the  Agricultural  Experiment  Si,: 

5.  The  Bulletin  .Moratory   of   \utnral   i 

6.  The  Bulletin  of  the  State  Geol(>: 

/  the  Sti:- 
8.     Report  of  Entomologist. 

-y,    including    the    I  .log,    and    the 

circulars  of  the  undergraduat'  the  Graduate  School,  the  Colleges 

of  Law  a;  :ne,  the   Schools  of   Dentistry,   Pharmacy,   Education, 

the  C<  \dministr  '  and  the  Sum- 

ion. 

10.  The  Bulletin  of  the  Illinois  Association  of  Teachers  of  E;; 

11.  The  Bulletin  of  the  School  of  Edm\: 


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